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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores French feminist philosopher and psychoanalyst Luce Irigaray's 
articulation of the divine as a means of the reinscription of female bodies in "western" culture. 
According to Irigaray, the physical excess constituted by female bodies in the patriarchal 
"west" is denied specific expression through the symbolic function of the Christian God as 
man's transcendent, disembodied representative. And yet Irigaray's work implies that the 
"excess" of both female bodiliness and the cultural construction of the divine is ultimately 
uncontainable and open to symbolic transformation and political use. 
In this study I read Irigaray as a visionary theorist and supplement consideration of her own 
reworking of the concept of God in the ~'west" with a reading of The Book of Margery Kempe, 
a fifteenth-century mystical text by an English woman. In Kempe's Book the mystic's body, 
understood by her culture as dangerously excessive, is the primary agent of her representation 
of God, whereas Irigaray rereads the divine as the means of rearticulating female bodiliness. 
The Introduction connects Irigaray's writings .with the discourse of late medieval female 
mysticism and the psychoanalytic category of hysteria, in terms of the destabilising 
representations of female bodiliness present in all three discourses. Chapter One pursues this 
connection in more depth, while Chapter Two focuses on The Book of Margery Kempe and 
considers the presentation of the female body in Kempe's text. In Chapter Three I read 
Kempe and Irigaray together as "hysterical" writers in terms of the interaction of female body 
and written text which is highlighted in their work. Chapter Four explores in more depth the 
ethical dimension of the Irigarayan reworking of the divine as an agent of symbolic exchange 
between sexually specific subjects, and Chapter Five (re )approaches this topic from the angle 
of women's experience of mothering and "madness" in patriarchal culture, returning to the 
conjunction of the divine, mysticism and hysteria set out in the beginning. 
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INTRODUCTION 
But there isJsimply no way I can give you an account of "speaking (as) woman"; it 
is spoken, but not in meta-language (Irigaray 1985a, 144). 
In answer to a question from a philosophy seminar regarding the specific practices involved 
in "speaking as a woman," Luce Irigaray produces a statement that attests to the paradoxical 
nature of female speech. According to her view of the linguistic order of "western" society! 
as a thoroughly masculinised system, Irigaray posits "speaking as a woman" - as a specifically 
female subject of language - as an excessive or transgressive act. "It is spoken, but not in 
meta-language." By its nature female speech exceeds the symbolic system ordered by 
masculine parameters (meta-language), since that system orders itself as such at the expense 
of "the feminine." Hence, female speech is that which appears in the interstices of masculine 
language, because no dualistic, dominating system can wholly repress or do without its 
"other." 
These passing moments in which female speech occurs are the focus of much of Irigaray's 
philosophical and psychoanalytic investigations. She appears to be interested primarily in 
suggestively elaborating the terms on which she believes "speaking as a woman" might 
become more than a transgressive act; might, in fact, transform the system in which masculine 
representation relies upon the appropriation of the female. No trifling agenda, this. lrigaray 
is renowned for the sheer philosophical scope of her work, for the hyperbolic terms of her 
intentions. For myself, a fascination with her work which led to the radical transformation of 
my initial thesis topic, is centred around her idiosyncratic conception of the divine. Interested 
originally in pursuing a study of late medieval female mysticism via The Book of Margery 
Kempe, an English text, I was struck by the ways in which the physical excesses depicted and 
celebrated within this type of discourse, alqng with the centrality of religion, were echoed in 
lrigaray's writings. 
In both the discourses of late medieval, female mysticism and Irigaray's poststructuralist 
feminism, understandings of female bodiliness are destabilised in the interests of a future 
transformation. For the mystic the alteration is a spiritual one, which is nonetheless inscribed 
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upon her body, and her body's ultimate transformation will occur in the afterlife when she 
is united with her divine lover, Christ. For Irigaray, the transformation is more difficult to 
define because it is oriented towards a future in which women can become active subjects in 
bodies understood as specifically female. And in her analysis, the means of this transformation 
have yet to be brought into existence and so must be imagined, like the mystic's rapturous 
visions, so that political change can occur. 
For lrigaray as for the mystics, a particular understanding of "the divine" or God is the means 
of the bodily transformations which, in her view, will enable women to signify as active 
rather than as male-defined, passive subjects. Thus Irigaray herself acts as a visionary whose 
focus is 'the future metamorphosis of the cultural meanings of female bodies. "And the works 
of medieval women mystics, whose distinctively physical engagements with the sufferings of 
Christ she sees as having empowered them (Irigaray 1985b, 191-202; 1993a, 63), shed light 
on Irigaray's own contentions and visionary pronouncements about the divine. 
This project, subtitled "Female Bodily Transformations and the Divine," attempts to chart 
some specific ways in which both the notion of God (or the divine) and the cultural 
representation or morphology of female bodies" are put into process through their interaction 
in certain mystical/philosophical/psychoanalytic texts. Principally this involves a reading of 
lrigaray as the producer of a particular kind of "visionary feminism" centred on the (female) 
body. In addition, one complete chapter and several chapter sections are devoted to The Book 
of Margery Kempe, a visionary text in another historical sense, read in the light of and 
sometimes against Ir~garay's feminist concems.2 While I also examine, more briefly, other 
texts in relation to Irigaray's work, the choice of texts for study has been governed mainly 
by the desire to explore Irigaray's interest in "bodies and God" (Stockton 1992) in relation 
to her visionary feminist stance. 
My reading of Kempe's fifteenth-century visionary text, in particular, alongside Irigamy, is 
intended both as a contextualisation of and counterweight to the feminist philosopher's work. 
I read Kempe so as to contextualise Irigaray in the sense that a text like Kempe's shows us 
a time when the representation of "God'! and "the female body" were explicitly and implicitly 
linked together, in ways which I will elaborate, and this "slice of history" regarding the 
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Christian tradition's attitude to female physicality may help make sense of Irigaray' s interests, 
five centuries later, when "God" is a mystifying term to so many. To read Kempe with 
Irigaray is also to counter Irigaray's ideas with the historical record of a woman from the 
middle ages who claimed privileged access to the divine. As I hope to show, reading texts 
from the present and the past together, with a feminist agenda, can help to broaden that 
agenda by highlighting aspects of its construction that might otherwise normalise themselves. 
I also make use of the work of Julia Kristeva in this study to illuminate both Kempe's text 
and Irigaray's writings, and consider Kristeva's essay "Stabat Mater" in more depth in the 
final ch~pter. Like Irigaray, Kristeva has demonstrated a continued concern with questions of 
religion, particularly Christianity, in relation to (female) subjectivity and language. She has 
described this interest as "a never abandoned effort to take transcendence seriously and to 
track down its premise into the most hidden recesses of language." She claims that her 
"prejudice is that of believing that God is analysable. Infinitely" (Kristeva 1983, 46-7, qtd. 
in Rose 1991a, 32). To my mind this claim echoes Irigaray's view that rethinking "God" is 
not only a possibility but a necessity and that the divine, if rethought, can serve as an 
"infinite" resource for feminist theorising. While Kristeva abjures the title "feminist" and her 
concerns are different from Irigaray's, her writings on religion have been useful in helping 
me forge connections between the texts which make up this study. 
The following pages represent, then, in their focus on future change, also a type of visionary 
endeavour. They form a point of alignment with Irigaray's thought, although not always an 
untroubled one. As a result, this project itself may seem idiosyncratic in its scope and specific 
choice of texts. However, Irigaray is a thinker whose intellectual and philosophical range, as 
well as her interlocutive tone (which seems to demand or require a personal response 
(Whitford 1986, 6; 1991a, 5)) can lead to a wide variety of feminist readings. I hope that the 
chapters to follow will justify my choice of texts to read in relation to Irigaray on "female 
bodily transformations and the divine." 
Elizabeth Castelli notes that, recently, "the body's emergence as a central cipher for cultural 
studies" 'has meant that it has "come to be seen as a map of social meanings, a terrain upon 
which battles of interpretation are waged or within which contradictions are mediated ... [ as] 
4 
a physical fact but also a producer of signification and a transformer of political and 
philosophical givens" (Castelli 1991, 134). My own study has this notion of the (female) body 
as a volatile site of the encoding and transforming of cultural meanings firmly in focus 
throughout. Castelli further notes that developments regarding the issue of the body in the 
study of religion in recent years means that lithe question of the body (in all of its varieties) 
in religion may now be posed non-theologically, or [at leastJ. .. non-doctrinally" (Castelli 1991, 
135). It is certainly my intention to avoid, as far as possible, focusing on questions of doctrine 
and theology as such in relation to the Christian religion. I see my project as distinct from the 
work of feminist theologians such as Rosemary Radford Ruether and feminist historians of 
religion such as Elisabeth SchUssler Fiorenza insofar as these writers situate their work within 
a field framed by Christian doctrine (Ruether 1983; 1984; Fiorenza 1983; 1984), however 
much they question its premises. I am primarily interested in the role of religion as a form 
of cultural symbolisation, specifically in relation to understandings of female embodiment, 
which I see as a somewhat broader focus than that of work originating in the fields of 
feminist theology and religious studies.3 I would describe my work as situated within the 
domain of feminist cultural studies. 
But to return to my subject of study: not only does Irigaray image female bodiliness and 
sexuality as excessive to a masculinist symbolic system, but one of her principal strategies for 
change in this area involves rearticulating the female by means of what might be called, with 
qualifications, a divine "third term." This "third term" mediates between the masculine (the 
current model for selfuood) and the feminine (its appropriated other); however, it is 
fundamentally opposed to the notion of the patriarchal Christian God. Irigaray is apparently 
as interested in calling this symbolic figure into question as she is in transforming the cultural 
relations between feminine and masculine. In fact it appears that for her the two projects are 
inseparable.4 
Irigaray argues that the construction of "God" in the Christian tradition is still operative in the 
late twentieth century in the "west" because it endorses and is bound up with the patriarchal 
cultural system which has produced the idea (Irigaray 1993b, 88). Thus in her view, "God is 
being used by men to oppress women and ... therefore, God must be questioned and not simply 
neutered in the current pseudoliberal way. Religion as a social phenomenon cannot be 
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ignored ... " (Irigaray 1993d, v. See also 1986a, 6; 1989a, 70). Because Irigaray considers the 
concept of the Christian God to have an integral impact on social relations (or the lack of 
them) between women and men in "western," capitalist culture, she aims to rethink God as 
a means of rethinking "manll and tlwoman" in feminist terms. 
Currently, in her view, the Christian God functions as a symbolic category which 
simultaneously (re)confirms "man" as a transcendental subject and confines 11 woman 11 to a 
position of immanence, to use Simone de Beauvoir's terminology (de Beauvoir 1976, xxxiii, 
cited in Keller 1986, 14). The God of Christianity validates a model of selfhood involving 
separation, dominance, and a negative relation to the body and its functions which is culturally 
understood as masculine. As Catherine Keller puts it, "in our culture the Divine Outsider who 
is supposed to rescue us is an infinite inflation of the male ego itself' (Keller 1986, 220). The 
patriarchal Christian God functions as the ultimate, transcendental signifier which enables 
"man" to become the symbolically recognisable sign for the genre "human" (Irigaray 1986a, 
11; Whitford 1991a, 141-2), and women are disempowered by the setting up of a God who 
functions as "both the source and justification of Western knowledges," in Elizabeth Grosz's 
words (Gross 1986, 12). 
Irigaray effectively argues that this mediating role performed by God for man can (and must) 
be refigured as a means of symbolic interaction between individual female subjects as well 
as between female and male (Irigaray 1986a, 9, 11; 1993a; 1993b, 68-9, 140). Otherwise, she 
claims, women will continue to remain without symbolic power in the world, such is the 
entrenched nature of masculine transcendence (which makes "womanlt its repressed and 
disempowered other) that is aided by the concept of a singular, patriarchal God (Irigaray 
1991b, 64-5). She states: 
Divinity is what we [women] need to become free, autonomous, sovereign. No 
human subjectivity, no human society has ever been established without the help of 
the divine.... If she is to become woman, if she is to accomplish her female 
SUbjectivity, woman needs a god who is a figure for the perfection of her 
subjectivity (Irigaray 1993a, 62). 
In Irigaray, then, "the divine ll refers to the idea of God/gods as a symbolic mediating function, 
whether in the traditional sense - for men - or in the more utopian sense of her feminist 
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project.S Because I want to suggest in this study that both categories - the Christian God and 
lrigaray's idiosyncratic reworking - are in fact productively unstable, I will use the term 
"divine" to refer at times to both, and clarify which sense is intended by context. 
Irigaray's project appears to consist, primarily to date, of articulating the symbolic conditions 
under which women might achieve cultural status as specific subjects, no longer merely the 
others of men.6 Her refigured version of the divine is intrinsically related to this aim. The 
divine, which Irigaray also refers to as the "sensible transcendental,,7 (1991c, 112; 1993b, 32, 
115, 129) and sometimes as IIgod," "gods," or "the angel" (Irigaray 1991a, 173-4), can only 
be described as a "third term" operating between masculine and feminine in the sense that it 
exceeds' both sides of this binary as they currently operate in the "westerri" philosophical 
system. It exceeds both terms because it is intimately bound up with the materiality of both. 8 
Thus for Irigaray the divine (the term will henceforth connote the sensible transcendental 
along with its other, related meanings already discussed) is the means of (re)articulating the 
process by which, in her view, masculine and feminine are bound up together in 
representation. She contends that the feminine is hidden yet indispensable in the symbolic 
system oflanguage and culture operative in the capitalist "west" Hence, the feminine can only 
"speak" subversively in the gaps of masculine meta-Ianguage.9 
Irigaray's insistent and unusual focus on God and religion, combined with the centrality of 
the representation of the body (female and male) in her work, suggests some provocative 
affinities with the texts of medieval female mystics. I have said that Irigaray can be read as 
a visionary thinker, an idea suggested by Margaret Whitford's description of her work as 
'positively "utopian" in stance (Whitford 1991 a, 9-25).10 Whitford claims that "Irigaray 
suggests that we need to distinguish between [feminist] struggle on the one hand, and the 
long-term vision on the other" (Whitford 1991a, 12), and cites Marcelle Marini's view that 
for Irigaray '''the value of a utopia is not to programme the future but to help to change the 
present'" (Marini 1978, 621, qtd. in Whitford 1991 a, 20). Irigaray's "visionary feminism," 
then, despite its forward-looking tone and occasional apocalyptic imagery, is fundamentally 
concerned with the present, with articulating the terms on which women's bodies - the 
inescapable site of the experience of "femaleness" - might achieve speciflc representation. In 
"The Culture of Difference" Irigaray includes in a list of necessary steps toward the re-
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presentation of femalebodiliness in "western" culture the following injunction: "Don't be 
confined to the description, reproduction and repetition of that which exists, but know how 
to invent or imagine that which hasn't as yet taken place!! (Irigaray 1990, 51). 
The texts of European female mystics of the late middle ages also contain a similar tension 
in relation to the body, and they reflect the potentially destabilising tendencies of the late 
medieval notion of imitatio Christi. Lay, that is, non-clerical believers were encouraged to 
model their lives on Christ's in a range of very specific and concrete ways; for instance one 
highly popular early fifteenth-century devotional work directed its readerslhearers to envisage 
and act out their participation in scenes from Christ's life, a suggestion that Margery Kempe 
takes up (Love 1992; Atkinson 1983, 155).11 The kind of mystical behaviour in which 
continental lay women mystics engaged and helped to popularise tended to take these 
devotional prescriptions to extremes. Their mysticism privileged the female body, the 
emotions and the senses, and frequently transformed the body into a site of strange miracles 
or other excessive acts of piety, as well as the place of an erotic encounter with Christ (Petroff 
1986, 14; Ash 1990, 85-91). Anna Antonopoulos, for instance, describes the case of Catherine 
of Genoa, whose death by an apparently supernatural fire constituted her ultimate experience 
of mystical union with the divine (Antonopoulos 1991, 186). Margery Kempe was endorsed 
in her piety by her dramatic and violent gift of tears, which involved bodily convulsions in 
imitation of Christ's Passion, and she also had visions of taking Christ into her bed (Kempe 
1988, 126-7).12 This kind of mysticism was an extension of the increased focus on human 
physicality - and on God's physical representative in the person of Christ - which prevailed 
in Europe in the late middle ages (Bynum 1989, 162; Gibson 1989, 5-8; Lochrie 1991a, 3). 
I describe this trend in greater depth in Chapter Two. 
Since these behaviours were the result of female mystics' imitation of Christ, which was 
endorsed generally by the Church, such "excesses" were seen as a legitimate participation in 
Christ's suffering (Petroff 1986, 12-14). Medieval theology and Church teaching are riddled 
with condemnations of female sexuality and accounts of the dangers of the female body. But 
female mystics, in their physical engagement with Christ, were involved in a process that 
necessarily transformed the orthodox, patriarchal understanding of their physical being as a 
site of danger into a view of the female body as a site of potential holiness. Elizabeth Petroff 
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connects this transformative process with the increase in social activity shown by visionary 
women such as Margery Kempe, indicating that it was a source of social as well as personal 
empowerment for them: 
The process of visions taught women not to sacrifice their desire but to transform 
it, to strengthen it by purifying it, so that finally all their most conscious desire 
might be directed toward union with the divine.... These visions of the loving 
encounter with the divine often are accompanied by a burst of activity in the outside 
world, for it is at this time that visionaries may leave their enclosures to do works 
of mercy, provide spiritual counselling, administer charitable foundations, and begin 
to write down their experiences. All these activities required determination, 
assertiveness, and inspiration in the face of ambivalence and hostility toward women 
(Petroff 1986, 18). 
lrigaray's use of the divine as a means of destabilising and refiguring conventional sexed 
identity has political implications for contemporary women which echo the trend towards 
involvement in public life in medieval women's mystical practice. Irigaray, after all, claims 
that the Christian religion informs the workings of "western" culture in the late twentieth 
century as much as it ever did; only now, as she says, its social function is simply accorded 
less attention (Irigaray 1989a, 70; 1993d, v). Her divine is envisaged ultimately as a means 
of altering cultural representation so that women will be able to speak and act specifically as 
women in the public sphere and so playa greater role in the development of society. The 
divine is intended to empower women politically, as medieval lay women mystics were also 
empowered to active involvement in the world through their relationship with Christ. 
A further similarity between Irigaray and the mystics arises from the fact that, in the late 
middle ages, the Christ whom female visionaries imitated was himself a "feminised" figure. 
Jennifer Ash notes that, amidst the increased devotion to Christ's bodiliness which occurred 
in the late medieval period, this body was simultaneously constructed as maternal and 
therefore "feminine" as well as male (i.e., representative of "humanity"), so that "two separate 
systems of metaphoricity confiate, two distinct discourses merge in Christ's dying body" (Ash 
1990, 89; Petroff 1986, 18-19).13 Female mystics engaged with both "feminine" and 
"masculine" aspects of the figure of Christ in their physical responses to his suffering (Bynum 
1989). Hence, the already shifting nature of the representation of Christ at this time (Beckwith 
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1993, 5) was further destabilised through his representation in the mystical behaviours and 
written texts of visionary women. Irigaray's portrayal of the divine in her work as a symbolic 
category which she sees as being profoundly embodied also plays on the destabilisation of 
conventional sex/gender categories. Irigaray's divine, like the Christ of mystical women, 
partakes of characteristics of female and male as they are conventionally understood, but in 
order to produce interactive change in the cultural representation of sexed bodies. As in the 
works of the mystics, the divine in Irigaray also indicates a strong focus on the future; it may 
be seen as one of her most visionary notions since it is figured as a means of prospective 
social changes of a wide-ranging type. 
The visionary qualities of Irigaray's work on the divine are, however, strategically focused 
on the female body, whereas in the works of medieval women mystics the female body is the 
site of heavenly visions perceived as valuable ends in themselves. Indeed I think it can be 
argued, as Kathryn Bond Stockton has done, that Irigaray deliberately "mystifies" "the female 
body" in her work as a strategy for suggesting both its place in excess of a masculinist 
symbolic system and the possibility of its attaining alternative, more empowering meanings 
(Stockton 1992, 123-5, 135-49; Gallop 1988,98). This move is impelled by Irigaray's overtly 
political concerns: to challenge a cultural system in which, according to her analysis, women 
are invisible on a symbolic level and in which their capacity to enact social change is 
therefore severely limited, and to produce the symbolic means by which women might accede 
to specific cultural representation. 
Late medieval lay mysticism - that is, mysticism practised by those not confined to convents 
or anchorholds - as a movement composed largely of women, was also not without political 
ramifications, although obviously these were not calculated in contemporary feminist terms. 
Medieval clerics were swift to turn a watchful eye on popular, uncloistered and unofficial 
women's groups such as the Beguines of Belgium and the Humiliati of Lombardy. These 
groups consisted of women pursuing an apostolic lifestyle who participated together in 
spiritual devotions and manual labour. They were condemned in 1312 by the Council of 
Viennes, and medieval commentators tended to focus on their divergence from already 
established categories for female spiritual and social activity (Neel 1989, 324).14 
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Margery Kempe is an obvious example of a female visionary negotiating the perils and trials 
(the latter sometimes literally) of a public spiritual life in the fifteenth century. As I attempt 
to show in the second chapter, Kempe's female physicality is always at issue when she is 
challenged by male authorities for allegedly usurping authority in the masculine social sphere. 
By outlining these suggestive parallels between mystical and feminist discourses I do not 
intend to conflate the two but in the chapters which follow to use each of them to investigate 
the other. I will say more about this process of mutual reflection in the first chapter. 
To return to the destabilising nature of both medieval female lay mysticism and Irigaray's 
work on the divine. Writers on both female mysticism and Irigaray have described the 
attention to physical excess in both kinds of work as "hystericalu (on the mystics see Ash 
1990, 92; Bynum 1991, 186; Johnson 1992, 192-3; on Irigaray, see Grosz 1989, 137-8; Elliot 
1991,147-89).15 These uses of the term are clearly figurative and suggest the kind of unusual 
physical behaviour displayed by Freud's first female patients, who were known as hysterics 
(the term is generally used to describe the inexplicable female physical afflictions encountered 
by psychoanalysts in the nineteenth century; it is no longer a generally current term in 
psychoanalytic practice) (Rose 1991 b, 96-7; Evans 1991). A number of contemporary feminist 
thinkers, including Irigaray, have claimed hysteria as a symptom of female rebellion (Grosz 
1989, 134-6; Evans 1991, 200-22). In this view, the female hysteric represents an excess of 
female desire which, for lack of a legitimate symbolic outlet, manifests itself disturbingly 
upon her body. Irigaray conflates the figures of the female mystic and hysteric in a central 
section of her most famous work, Speculum o/the Other Woman (Irigaray 1985b, 191-202), 
producing a celebratory and utopian reading of what she names the "mysterical" body-speech 
of both. 
While mystics and hysterics may both be read as physically excessive, Irigaray can be seen 
to play the parts of both figures in her writings. Her "mystical" or visionary qualities I have 
already described. Elizabeth Grosz has figured Irigaray as both a visionary and a self-
conscious "hysteric" "insofar as she wants to make woman's body speak, be representable, 
articulate itself' (Grosz 1989, 136): 
Like the hysteric, [Irigaray] is unable simply to accept her predesignated role as 
passive, marginalised support system for the One Subject who counts - the male 
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(husband-knower). She refuses the position of "philosopher's wife" insofar as this 
silences woman and precludes her from knowledge except through him, for it covers 
her with his projections, needs and fantasies .... Irigaray shares the hysteric's 
excessive mimicry, the conversion of her passivity into activity by taking on, in the 
most extreme forms, what is expected, but to such an extreme degree that the end 
result is the opposite of compliance: it unsettles the system by throwing back to it 
what it cannot accept about its own operations (Grosz 1989, 137-8). 
Throwing back to the patriarchal system "what it cannot accept about its own operations," 
Irigaray engages the Christian God, the Virgin Mary, the female mystic, and bodies both 
female and male in her excessive texts of philosophical mimicry. She focuses on the "excessll 
that is differently constituted by God and the female body in "western" patriarchal culture (the 
former serves as an anchor for the male as transcendental subject, the latter as its outlawed 
materiality), and refigures both together as a means of challenging the masculinist basis of 
"western" society. 
In this sense I see Irigaray as echoing the work of female mystics who, centuries earlier, were 
also able to cull a kind of symbolic power from the instability written into cultural 
representations of the divine. The chapter which follows initiates in more depth the particular 
feminist critique of Christianity which this project as a whole undertakes. It outlines some 
problems that women customarily experience in relation to their bodies as they become 
speaking subjects, and considers the "essentially" visionary nature of feminist theories of 
embodiment. It posits mystical discourse, because of its privileged relation to the divine, as 
a site of potential experimentation with modes of speaking, inhabiting and representing the 
female body. The chapter also suggestively aligns female mystical discourse with the 
hysterical discourse which is central to the origins of psychoanalytic theory. In both systems 
women predominate as speaking subjects, women who privilege the body in unusual ways as 
a means of communication. I argue that their attempts at speaking through the body can be 
seen to advance a rearticulation of femininity which is experienced as a challenge to 
masculinist representations of women. 
The second chapter C'Speaking the Body") introduces Margery Kempe and aims to situate her 
socia-historically in terms of ideas about female physicality and speech which permeated her 
culture and with which she was forced to negotiate in order to gain an authorial speaking 
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VOlce. I investigate the workings of this process as reflected in her Book by considering 
Kempe in relation to four specific discourses of the late middle ages which focus on "the 
feminine," and represent the female or feminised male (Christic) body as a site of 
transgression and mutation. 
Chapter Three (,IFlesh Made Word") is concerned both with the privileging of the language 
of the body in Kempe's Book and the centrality of the female body in Irigaray's deliberately 
"hysterical" writings. The strange bodily behaviour which often constitutes Kempe's imitation 
of Christ is fore grounded in her text as the means by which she proves her holiness and 
thereby gains the support of a scribe to take down her revelations. Her relationship with her 
amanuensis, necessary to ensure her Book's orthodoxy and circulation, places her in a position 
similar to the hysteric, whose bodily speech is represented textually (in book form) by her 
analyst, but which remains the essential basis and unsettling focus of literary production. In 
this chapter I consider the interconnection between body and written text in both writers in 
order to suggest ways in which cultural understandings of bodies and written texts (and the 
different intentions of the two writers) may radically reinscribe each other. 
I introduce more fully the concept of Irigaray' s divine in this chapter through my discussion 
of mystic as hysteric (the figures Irigaray conjoins in the "Mysterique" section of Speculum) 
and from this point onward the Irigarayan divine assumes more importance. My thesis aims 
both to enact a critique of Christian discourse (the main concern of the first half of the study) 
through a feminist cultural analysis and to chart the potential ofIrigaray's divine for effecting 
change in the symbolic order in the present and the future (the major focus of the second 
half). Thus I begin to highlight Irigaray's "feminised," contemporary concept of divinity near 
the midpoint of my study. In a sense, then, the thesis effects its own "crossing back through 
the mirror" by which, as Irigaray claims, patriarchy endorses itself in the form of a masculine 
God (Irigaray 1985a, 77). According to· Irigaray, since God mirrors male subjects to 
themselves as transcendent while appropriating the bodies of women, who form the material 
ground of "Godl"s reflective function, her refigured divine aims to reconstitute both the 
substance of the female body and the traditional function of IIGod" as agent of transcendence 
for the subject together, so that the divine might become a useful symbolic category for 
women. This process involves challenging the reflective function of God which underwrites 
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masculinist discourse in the "west." It involves a "crossing back through the mirror" (Irigaray 
1985a, 77) of divinely-enabled, masculine transcendence that is at the heart of that discourse, 
a concept in Irigaray which I will elaborate in the first chapter. 
Following this idea, I use The Book of Margery Kempe in the thesis as the starting point for 
an analysis of historical connections between "God" and female bodiliness which leads onto 
a contemporary, philosophical exploration of the use of a refigured divine for the embodying 
of sexually specific female selves. Hence, the Irigarayan divine comes into its own at the 
metaphorical surface point o'f the mirror which Kempe in her Book claims to be (3. 2, "A 
mirror among men"), a discussion of which is at the centre of my thesis. The following 
chapters attempt to look beyond the mirror to express new, more empowering readings of 
women and divinity, without losing sight of what is on the other, commonly reflected side, 
the Christian legacy which is Kempe's means of empowerment and the history that informs 
"our" own lives. 
The fourth chapter ("Divine Imaginings") continues to explore the potential of Kempe's 
"hysterical" imitatio to express an otherwise unsymbolisable feminine desire. Through an 
analysis of aspects of the critical reception of Kempe's Book I produce a deconstruction of 
the discourses of "positive" (physically-focused) and "negative" (anti-body) mysticism from 
a feminist perspective which is then extended, in the chapter's second half, into an elaboration 
of Irigaray's work as that of a "positive" mystic, who privileges the (female) body. Most of 
the earlier critics of Kempe's Book reveal a' bias towards the assumptions of negative 
mysticism while Kempe's mysticism is, I argue, more accurately situated in the affective, or 
"positive" tradition which privileges the physical in its approach to the divine. I contend that 
the latter tradition of mystical practice, as depicted in Kempe's Book, provides a model for 
an active embodiment of divinity through which, in Irigarayan terms, a feminine specificity 
might be expressed. 
The second part of the chapter is an attempt to move beyond the duality of negative versus 
positive mysticism and its limiting construction of the female body in mystical discourse, by 
pursuing Irigaray's interest in mysticism and the divine in relation to female bodies. Seduction 
is a theme as is "carnal exchange," because Irigaray's conception of divinity in relation to 
14 
women is an attempt to articulate exchanges between (sexually) specific selves, or selves and 
others who are selves in their own right (e.g., women and men). These exchanges are also 
necessarily for her the means of re-presentation of the female body, which lacks representation 
in its own right as yet, hence the need for symbolic exchange with the divine mediating 
between the female and the male. Overall, I align Kempe and lrigaray on the basis of their 
use of the liminal space inhabited by the divine in "western" metaphysics and mystical 
discourse. Both women effectively use this space as a moveable "horizon" by which to project 
and envision transfigurations of bodily experience. 
Chapter Five ("MysterialHysteria") returns to the mysticism and hysteria alignment proposed 
from the first and brings together "mysterical" activity with some \vTitten representations of 
the experiences of "madness" and motherhood as they are prescribed in "western" patriarchal 
culture. I suggest that both experiences contain the potential to disrupt phallocentric systems 
of representation, a potential which is actualised when they are imaged by women in 
conjunction with the divine. On these occasions mothering and madness can become sites of 
female bodily and subjective transformation. 
I produce this argument through a reading of the hysterical "labourings" in imitation of Christ 
which Margery Kempe describes herself performing in her Book; the representation of the 
phantom pregnancy of Freud's hysterical patient "Dora" in Freud's "Fragment of an Analysis 
of a Case of Hysteria"; and Julia Kristeva's "Stabat Mater," an essay on the role of the Virgin 
Mary in "western" culture, which she intertextua:lises with an autobiographical account of her 
own mothering experience. I read the three texts progressively in order to try and ascertain 
whether they present a continuum of female empowerment, and examine how the bodily 
speech which the three women present disrupts the meta-text which frames each one's 
self-representation. I investigate to what extent this eruption of somatic speech enacts a 
subversive reproduction or "rebirthing" of patriarchal prescriptions of mothering and female 
madness. 
The brief conclusion returns to the themes of the Introduction and recapitulates lrigaray's 
arguments concerning the (im)possibility of specifically female speech. It reflects on the thesis 
as an exploration of the conjunction of female bodily excess in patriarchal culture with the 
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bodily excess that is contained in the representation of the Christian God. It acts as an 
open-ended conclusion or horizon such as Irigaray recommends; that is, as a statement which 
places the thesis as a whole in a feminist context as passionate endeavour .in which claims to 
truth are always provisional and open to constructive rereadings. 
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1. This phrase is problematical, of course, not only because it is falsely tot ali sing but 
because the vantage point which defines "west" in opposition to "east" and thereby 
"others" the latter is normally masked by its use. I'm predominantly using it to refer 
to parts of the world long influenced by Christianity in the context of this project, 
but as "Christian culture" produces even more difficulties I have decided to stay with 
"western." However I use quotation marks with the word throughout the text as a 
means of preventing its naturalisation therein. A further note on terminology: The 
word "feminine" is used somewhat interchangeably with "female" in order to 
underline what I see as the artificiality of the traditional distinction made, in English, 
between the two words; i.e., "female" is often used to signify a state more "natural" 
or intrinsic to being-a-woman than "feminine." My point is that both terms, the so-
called "social" and the so-called "biological," are equally culturally constructed. 
Similarly, I present the word "woman" in quotation marks where it refers to women 
as a group, in order to highlight the artificiality of such a universalist conception. 
However, I generally use "man" without quotation marks since my point in this 
study is that while it is possible for men to take up a universalist, singular subject 
position (however falsifying this "neutral" position is), the same is not possible for 
women, and it is women's exile from the domain of subjectivity that I wish to focus 
on here. The quotation marks with the word "woman" are a strategy to point up the 
difficulties inherent in "speaking as a woman," difficulties which do not apply to 
"speaking as a man." 
2. I read The Book of j\;fargery Kempe in this study as a "mystical" text as well as a 
devotional one, insofar as it claims to present experience which is different from that 
of most fifteenth-century believers; for example, Kempe's "mystical marriage" to the 
Godhead in Rome (Kempe 1988, 122-4). I am aware that a number of earlier 
scholars have questioned the Book's "mystical" status; however, in Chapter Four 
specifically I critique traditional interpretations of mysticism in relation to the Book, 
and also describe the effects of Christian discourse which claims to be spiritually or 
mystically privileged, using the work of Michel de Certeau and Karma Lochrie in 
order to formulate working definitions. 
Because this is a Women's Studies thesis, all quotations from the Book are from the 
modem translation by B. A. Windeatt. I have also translated quotations from Middle 
English texts since I am assuming that the bulk of my readership will not be 
medieval specialists. 
3. One possible exception to this definition in my view is Catherine Keller's book 
From a Broken Web (1986), which is undoubtedly a work of feminist theology but 
is impressive in its scope and the incisiveness of its feminist cultural critique, taking 
in psychoanalysis, philosophy, myth and poetry as they relate to the construction of 
a feminist understanding of self-other relations. 
4. Irigaray refers to a "third term" as that which enables the human subject to signify; 
as a mediating element in the passage to subjectivity (Idgaray 1991 a, 170-1); and 
as that which is present but generally disavowed in the masculinist cultural economy 
in relation to women (Irigaray 1993b, 20-1). For example, in the discourse of 
traditional psychoanalysis, the "third term" is that which intervenes between mother 
17 
and child, and which "supposedly avoids the fusion that would lead into the chaos 
of psychosis, and is said to guarantee order" (Heliime Rouch, interviewed in lrigaray 
1993c, 42). However, in an interview published in Je, tu, nous in which lrigaray 
questions Helene Rouch, a biology teacher, about the relationship between mother 
and child in utero, Rouch claims that the "differentiation" performed by the third 
term as "father, law, Name of the Fatherll and so on, is already present in the 
maternal situation. She states that: !tIt seems to me that the differentiation between 
the mother's self and the other of the child, and vice versa, is in place well before 
it's given meaning in and by language, and the forms it takes don't necessarily 
accord with those our cultural imaginary relays: loss of paradise, traumatizing 
expulsion or exclusion, etc" (Irigaray 1993c, 42). lrigaray agrees with this view, 
arguing that mother/child relations before childbirth, while represented by !tthe 
patriarchal imagination (for example, in psychoanalysis) as in a state of fusion, are 
in fact strangely organized and respectful of the life of both" (Irigaray 1993c, 38). 
Irigaray describes as "divinefl the means of representing forms of mediation which 
in the case of mother and child privilege and articulate rather -than annul the 
female/maternal. In f'The Culture of Difference ll she writes: liThe female body 
tolerates the other's growth within itself without incurring either the illness or the 
death of the living organisms. Unfortunately, culture has almost inverted the 
meaning of this economy of respect for the other. Blindly, it has venerated the 
mother-son relationship to the level of religious fetishism, but it has not interpreted 
the model of tolerance of the other within and with a self which this relationship 
manifests" (Irigaray 1990, 45). 
5. Irigaray's concept of a "divine for women lf is related to her view of IIwesternll 
culture as a society bent on self-destruction and the annihilation of nature (Irigaray 
1993b, 107). As a consequence she is given to referring positively to matriarchal, 
pre-Christian goddesses and cultures on occasion, although she does state, in relation 
to at least one of these references, that in her view "there is no question of us simply 
returning to the earth goddesses, even if that were possible" (Irigaray 1986a, 11). I 
have not taken up this aspect ofIrigaray's thought in my study since to address her 
alignment of matriarchal goddesses with the notion of flnature" would require 
exploring the complexities of the idea of "the natural" in her oeuvre, and I do not 
have space to address the topic in the context of this project. On the subject of 
matriarchal goddesses in Irigaray's work see lrigaray (1986a, 10-11; 1989a, 61; 
1993e, 129; 1993f, 189-91; 1993g; 1993h; 1993i, 110-11; 1993j, 90). 
6. Margaret Whitford points out that "the divine" in Irigaray is used in a variety of 
different ways, however it may be seen as "a condensed way of referring to all the 
conditions of women's collective access to subjectivity .... [and] as the symbolic order 
in its possibilities of and for transformation, in other words, language as a field of 
enunciation, process, response, and becoming" in which both female and male might 
speak as legitimate subjects of language (Whitford 1991a, 47. Emphasis added). 
7. This term is introduced in lrigaray's work in L 'Ethique de fa difference sexuelle 
(1984), translated as An Ethics of Sexual Difference (1993b) and is an important 
theme of the essays in that volume. Whitford argues that the sensible transcendental 
can be used to Itlink together the different parts of Irigaray's work - the imaginary 
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and the symbolic, language, the body, ethics and so on" (Whitford 1991a, 144), a 
statement which I endorse through my reading of Irigaray in this study. 
8. For example in an essay on Descartes in An Ethics of Sexual Difference, Irigaray 
represents "wonder" in terms of the sensible transcendental. She describes wonder 
as "a birth into transcendence, that of the other, still in the world of the senses 
(' sensible'), still physical and carnal, and already spiritual." Wonder is depicted as 
"the passion of the encounter between the most material and the most metaphysical, 
of their possible conception and fecundation one by the other. A third dimension. An 
intermediary. Neither the one nor the other. Which is not to say neutral or neuter. 
The forgotten ground of our condition between mortal and immortal, men and gods, 
creatures arid creators. In us and among us" (Irigaray 1993b, 82). 
9. Elizabeth Grosz writes in relation to Irigaray that "to speak as woman means to undo 
the r~ign of the 'proper' - the proper name, property, self-proximity. It means to. 
evoke rather than designate, to overflow and exceed all boundaries and oppositions. 
It involves speaking from a position in the middle of the binaries (the so-called 
position of the 'excluded middle'), affirming both poles while undoing their 
polarisation" (Grosz 1989, 132). And Catherine Porter glosses the phrase "speaking 
(as) woman (parler-femme)" in a note to her translation of This Sex Which Is Not 
One in the following way: "Not so much a definitive method as an experimental 
process or a discovery of the possible connections between female sexuality and 
writing, 'speaking (as) woman' would try to disrupt or alter the syntax of discursive 
logic, based on the requirements of univocity and masculine sameness, in order to 
express the plurality and mutuality of feminine difference and mime the relations of 
'self-affection'" (Irigaray 1985a, 222n). 
10. Whitford also claims that Irigaray's work has "a visionary aspect" in that "past, 
present and future are interwoven" in her texts (Whitford 1991 b, 13). 
11. The work in question is the Meditationes Vitae Christi, Nicholas Love's English 
translation of which (The Mirror of the Blessed Life of Jesus Christ) is one of 
several and is described by Margaret Deanesley as "probably more popular than any 
other single book in the fifteenth century" (Deanesley 1920, 353, qtd. in Nolan 1984, 
84). It is a condensed version of the Franciscan original and displays a greater 
emphasis on the humanity than on the divinity of Christ (Hughes 1988, 231, 287). 
Barry Windeatt observes some clear parallels between the }.,firror (Meditationes) and 
The Book of Margery Kempe (Kempe 1988, 326-7n), as does Gail McMurray Gibson 
(Gibson 1989, 49-60). 
12. Bynum claims of the "especially somatic" quality of female spirituality from 1200 
to 1500, that "the emergence of certain bizarre miracles characteristic of women may 
actually mark a turning point in the history of the body in the West" (Bynum 1989, 
162). Further examples of such miracles are virgins inexplicably lactating and curing 
followers with their breast milk (Bynum 1987, 122-3, 126, 211, 273-5), "trances, 
levitations, catatonic seizures or other forms of bodily rigidity, miraculous elongation 
or enlargement of parts of the body, swellings of sweet mucus in the throat 
(sometimes known as 'globus hystericus') ... ecstatic nosebleeds," physical survival on 
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only the eucharistic Host, tlmystical pregnancytl or bodily swelling, and so on 
(Bynum 1989, 165). See also Dickman (1984, 152); Lagorio (1984, 172~3); Petroff 
(1986, 3~59). 
13. See also the prior work of McLaughlin (1975); Bynum (1982; 1989; 1991); Lagorio 
(1985). Julian of Norwich (c.1342-after 1413) is the medieval proponent of a 
theology of Christ's "motherhood,'1 which Bynum and others have discussed. See 
Julian of Norwich (1978); Jones (1984); Lichtmann (1990); Bynum (1991,96-7). 
14. For more information on the Beguines, see McDonnell (1969); Bolton (1973); 
Devlin (1984); Petroff (1986, 171-5); Nee! (1989). On the Humiliati, see Bolton 
(1972); Petroff (1986, 231). 
15. Karma Lochrie also implies as much in her book on Kempe without using the term 
hysteria. In a chapter entitled tlEmbodying the Text: Boisterous Tears and Privileged 
Readingsl1 (Lochrie 1991a, 167-202), she describes the excessive bodily 
performances of the female mourners surrounding the Cross in medieval depictions 
of Christ's Passion. She reads Kempe's own physically intense imitation of Christ 
and his Mother, portrayed in the Book, in the light of these aids to devotion, and 
argues that Kempe's body performs Christ's suffering as a spectacle that demands 
a response from her readers. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
CROSSING BACK THROUGH THE MIRROR: WOMEN AND DIVINITY 
If we needed fire to remind us 
that all true images 
were scooped out of the mud 
where our bodies curse and flounder 
then perhaps that fire is coming 
to sponge away the scribes and time-servers 
and much that you would have loved will be lost as well 
before you could handle it and know it 
just as we almost miss each other 
in th~ ill cloud of mistrust, who might have touched 
hands quickly, shared food or given blood 
for each other. I am thinking how we can use what we have 
to invent what \ve need (Rich 1969, 56). 
1. 1 "Inventing what we need": Luce Irigaray's Visionary Feminism 
The gender of God, the guardian of every subject and discourse, IS always". 
masculine in the west (Irigaray 1991a, 166). 
The concluding lines from Adrienne Rich's poem "Leaflets" which form the epigraph to this 
chapter reflect a number of themes that are addressed by the work of Irigaray. The extract 
uses Christian imagery, apocalyptic imagery in fact, to suggest the centrality of the body in 
acts of interpersonal communication. Rich reminds us, firstly, that "all true images" are body-
based, and yet, in the imagery of Christian tradition, women's bodies "curse and flounder," 
they are negatively portrayed. Rich does, however, finish her poem on a note of hope, 
mimicking the teleological cast of Christian myth, but in relation to a specific female purpose. 
The inescapable imagery of Christian rite - "we .. ./who might have touchedlhands quickly, 
shared food or given blood/for each other" - leads on to a statement which, in the context of 
Rich's work, concerns the possibility of a future for women: "I am thinking how we can use 
what we have/to invent what we need." 
The final lines of "Leaflets" also remind me of Irigaray in their lyricism, bound up as it is 
with a sense of prophecy and the need to articulate something (trust?) through the language 
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of the body. Although Rich's politics are different from Irigaray's in certain obvious ways, 
the two writers' fundamental concerns are not so dissimilar. Irigaray places great store on 
poetic language; she uses it as a means of subverting the linearity of conventional grammar, 
which in her view is the result of a pervasive process of cultural masculinisation (Irigaray 
1985b, 78-80; 1989b; Duchen 1986, 89). Also, lrigaray is fundamentally concerned with the 
representation of "the female body," and, by extension, with the inescapability of the body for 
male subjects as well. It is her view that women and men must find alternative ways of being 
in their bodies than those that currently exist. lrigaray articulates this concern through a 
persistent focus on what she calls "sexual difference tl : the need for women's bodies to accede 
to a spe~ific cultural symbolisation instead of functioning as the passive, material flipside of 
the male sexual subject. Her interest in the divine is primarily a means to this end. Thus 
Irigaray can be seen to be engaged in the visionary process that Rich represents in the fmal 
lines of her poem. Irigaray is concerned with how women's bodies currently signify in the 
masculinist symbolic system of "western" culture, and how they might be differently signified 
and more empoweringly experienced by individual women. 
Irigaray's thinking on the divine is, then, impelled by her conviction of the need for sexual 
difference - the different and productive positioning of the two sexes we habitually recognise 
- to be articulated in all forms of social, philosophical and political life. Her philosophy of 
a feminine divine, sometimes called a "sensible transcendental I! (Irigaray 1991c, 112; 1993b, 
32, 115, 129), is envisaged as a means of producing such revolutionary social change. The 
articulation of a sensible transcendental requires that the model of self as same, unified, 
consistently self-sufficient and present to itself - in fact, the phallic morphology which 
underlies classical "western" philosophy and culture - be recognised and reconnected with its 
own disavowed materiality, a materiality that, in Irigaray's analysis, is displaced onto women. 
Women may then escape the domain of sheer bodiliness and imagine a divine to represent 
their own symbolic possibilities. l 
In Irigaray's view, the structures and symbols of the Christian religion enable the stabilising 
of a form of society that privileges men. However the concept of "Qodl! contains the 
materiality of the repressions enacted in order for this process to take place. That is, according 
to Irigaray (following Derrida), binaries such as female/male (passive and active human 
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subjects) are never fixed but always unstable and prone to shift. Hence Irigaray focuses on 
sites of "excess" where such destabilisation might be seen to occur. She locates her version 
of the "divine" in these places and so it serves on one level as a means of symbolising 
moments of productive displacement in what appears to be a fixed cultural system. As Judith 
Butler puts it: 
When Irigaray sets out to reread the history of philosophy, she asks how its borders 
are secured: what must be excluded from the domain of philosophy for philosophy 
itself to proceed, and how is it that the excluded comes to constitute negatively a 
philosophical enterprise that takes itself to be self-grounding and self-constituting? 
Irigaray then isolates the feminine as precisely this constitutive exclusion, whereupon 
she is compelled to find a way of reading a philosophical text for what it refuses to 
include. This is no easy matter. For how can one read a text for what does not 
appear within its own terms, but which nevertheless constitutes the illegible 
conditions of its own legibility? Indeed, how can one read a text for the movement 
of that disappearing by which the textual "inside" and "outside" are constituted? 
(Butler 1993, 37). 
One way in which Irigaray proceeds to analyse the "movement of [the] disappearing" of the 
feminine in masculinist metaphysics is by investigating how "woman" and" God" serve similar 
functions for man. That is, "woman". traditionally bears the burden of materiality that is 
disavowed by the male proto-subject: "man's self-affect depends on the woman who has given 
him being and birth" (Irigaray 1993b, 60). In place of recognition of his female "other," man 
posits a male God as his other, thus: "the (female) other who is sought and cherished may be 
assimilated to the unique God. The (female) other is mingled or confused with God or the 
gods" (Irigaray 1993b, 61). Both God and "woman" occupy the site of excess that enables the 
masculine subject to signify (Irigaray 1993b, 145). In the foreword to Elemental Passions 
Irigaray writes that: 
man is divided between two transcendencies: his mother's and his God's - whatever 
kind of God that may be. These two transcendencies are doubtless not unrelated but 
this is something which he has forgotten. His mother is transcendent to him because 
she is of a different genre and she gives him birth. He is born of an other who is 
always Other-inappropriable. For centuries, at least in the so-called Western 
tradition, that transcendency has seldom been recognised as such. The mother is seen 
as the earth substance which must be cultivated and inseminated so that it may bear 
fruit. The father is the one who gives form to the child, who uses earth to create 
him. The father is in the image of God the creator (Irigaray 1992a, 1). 
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And in the essay entitled "Sexual Difference" she claims that: "[man] is ultimately the slave 
of a God on whom he bestows the qualities of an absolute master. He is secretly a slave to 
the power of the mother woman, which he subdues or destroys" (Irigaray 1991 a, 169. See also 
1985b, 161-2).2 Irigaray also makes this point in "The Female Gender," where she asks 
whether it is the case that: 
the first mover and the first matter cannot touch, according to one conception of 
spirit formed by the race of men? 
But the man-god, like the language of the male gender, is born of woman, of an 
immaculate matter that has been celebrated as such, even when it is clothed in 
, various disguises. Between the two stands man (Irigaray 1993k, 114). 
This masking of the female principle with the masculine divine has paradoxical results. While 
Christianity denies the sexuality and bodiliness of women and mothers in its orthodox, 
institutional structures, this materiality can be seen to survive or return, I would argue, in 
popular devotional movements such as that surrounding the feminised Christ in late medieval 
European affective piety (Bynum 1989; Ash 1990, 95-6), or the extreme emotionalism and 
bodily convulsions oflate twentieth-century pentecostalism, for instance (Lawless 1988, 108-
11; Abell 1982, both cited in Armstrong 1992). That it is women who play by far the largest 
part in such movements should then come as no surprise. Women's involvements in 
movements of popular religion make clear that there is a sense in which the symbolic excess 
that God and "woman" each represent in "western" culture can and do meet, and in this 
meeting they alter, affect and inform each other, with sometimes surprising results. Examples 
of such excessive transformations are the bodily miracles associated with female mystics 
mentioned in the Introduction. 
The role of religious symbolising in endorsin.g the patriarchal system of "western" culture can 
be seen in the mirroring which occurs between the myth of the birth of Christ and the account 
of the birth of the human (male-model) subject produced by psychoanalytic theory. Elizabeth 
Grosz shows how the traditional psychoanalytic account echoes the cultural institution of 
Christianity: 
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The social order.... covers over the debt culture owes to maternity but cannot 
accept. ... A whole history of philosophy seems intent on rationalizing this debt away 
by providing men with a series of images of self-creation culminating in the idea of 
God as the paternal "mother," creator of the universe in place of women/mothers. 
Man's self-reflecting Other, God, functions to obliterate the positive fecundity and 
creativity of women. Born of woman, man devises religion, theory and culture as an 
attempt to disavow this foundational, unspeakable debt (Grosz 1990a, 181). 
Kristeva also describes this pattern as endemic to the structures of monotheistic societies when 
she asserts, with regard to ancient Judaic culture in About Chinese Women, that the radical 
separation of the symbolic roles of the two sexes upholds the social order in relation to the 
masculine God. This means that "woman" is excluded from "the law of the" community" and 
"its political and religious unity." However, it is "woman" "who knows the conditions, the 
material conditions so to speak - those of the body, of sex, of procreation - which permit the 
existence of the community, its permanence, and, therefore man's dialogue with his God" 
(Kristeva 1977a, 17). Kristeva further claims that "without this localization of the 
polymorphic, orgasmic body, laughing and desiring, in the other [female] sex, it would have 
been impossible, in the symbolic sphere, to isolate the principle of One Law - One, Purifying, 
Transcendent, Guarantor of the ideal interest ofthe community" (Kristeva 1977a, 19). lrigaray 
also argues that the God of Christianity excludes women as desiring beings from the sphere 
of the divine by appropriating female sexuality through the figure of the Virgin Mary (Irigaray 
1991b, 64-5; 1991d, 166-7), an idea which I will take up specifically in later chapters. 
In Irigaray's view the figure of the sacrificed or unsymbolised maternal body functions, then, 
as the fertile common ground which enables religious mythology in the "west" to endorse a 
form of society in which men rule as "creators" of culture while women's creativity and 
fertility is taken for granted. The symbolically unacknowledged contribution of women within 
this patriarchal society can be seen, following Irigaray, to form the material ground of the 
"blank slate" upon which Christianity's dreams of another (or an after-) life are sketched. That 
is, the exclusion of women from active subject positions - women's functioning only as the 
passive "maternal-feminine" horne for men in the symbolic - ensures the perpetuation of 
human community, as Kristeva makes clear above, yet without public recognition of this fact. 
This human community is the condition and source of "man's dialogue with his God" and the 
25 
trappings of Christianity: Old Testament "Law" and its New Testament revision. "Woman" 
stands for the continuation of human life of which God becomes the transcendental principle 
and the Christian religion becomes a kind of organising socio-cultural metaphor; the symbolic 
basis of the organisation of "western" patriarchal society. The absence of symbolic 
representations of women's bodies - as distinct from a deficient version of men's bodies -
functions as a lacuna in this patriarchal system of cultural representation Cwoman"'s place 
being taken by God (Irigaray 1993b, 60-1)) that serves as a utopian space in which male-
model subjects fantasise about the regenerative powers of Christian religion. 
Accordipg to lrigaray, such a fantasy will never be truly regenerative because it negates the 
possibility of equal symbolic representation between the two sexes and thus the conditions for 
legitimately productive cultural exchange. In her analysis the fertile "promised landH of Judeo-
Christian mythology is an expression of desire for originative space: the social order's 
covering over of "the debt culture owes to maternity l1 (Grosz 1989, 81; Irigaray 1993b, 61). 
Christian myths both mark and mask the desire for the body of the mother which persists 
precisely because the figure of the mother does not currently accede to representation in her 
bodiliness in "western" culture: 
F or centuries the One has remained entrusted to God, even though this longing for 
the unique is a specifically male nostalgia, derived from man's desire for the lost 
womb. With God the Father substituting for the return to and into the mother which 
can never take place (Irigaray 1993b, 68-9). 
In Irigaray's view religion and social relations are bound up together, then, in the patriarchal 
"west." This culture has its roots in Christian rituals that have traditionally been in the hands 
of men (Irigaray 1986a, 8; 1991 b, 191). Irigaray argues that Christian rite, which ostensibly 
celebrates God's sacrifice of his son, is in fact based on the prior sacrifice of Christ's mother 
Mary (Irigaray 1986a, 8-9; 1991d, 166-7; Whitford 1991a, 145), who represents the symbolic 
status of all women in the "western" tradition. Women have been excluded from active 
celebration of rituals which would however be meaningless without female contribution 
(Irigaray 1991e, 45-6). But their exclusion is no accident, since Christian myth provides a 
narrative according to which "western" patriarchal culture can image itself as defined and 
birthed by one sex, the male. 
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The rites of Christianity symbolise a sacrifice whichlrigaray, following Rene Girard, claims 
"brings the social space into being" (Irigaray 1986a, 6), and serves to mediate conflict in the 
social domain (Whitford 1991a, 145). But the Christian God mediates conflict according to 
a model which benefits men and excludes women from active participation. Irigaray sees the 
sensible transcendental - the divine - as performing the essential task of cultural mediation, 
but in ways which both require and represent the active involvement of women as well as 
men. 
The sensible transcendental requires the deconstruction and reworking of the traditional binary 
represented by the concepts "sensible" and "transcendental," that is, women as passive 
materiality and men as transcendent, active subjects. The sensible transcendental is mobile, 
active, and seems to be primarily intended as a means of intersubjective exchange (Irigaray 
1993b, 82, 128-9, 140, 149-50). It represents female and male subjects as they are currently 
understood yet enables them to communicate as separate selves without "othering" each other 
(Gross 1986; 1989, 159-60, 180-1; Whitford 1991a, 140-7). Irigaray's reconsideration of 
"God," then, is based on a return to the body, especially the female body, in order that it may 
be alternatively symbolised. The sensible transcendental is a means of revalourising the 
"sensible" and giving it a means of transcendence in the sense of representation, so that 
women no longer represent dumb flesh (immanence) in the metaphysical scheme of things. 
Transcendence is already valourised in "western" patriarchal culture but at the expense of the 
sensible; therefore, the two need to dialogue together as equals. 
This mediating function of the divine is central to Irigaray's project, but its importance for 
feminism is that it will allow female sexuality and female bodies, in her view, to signify 
specifically in the symbolic. She states that: "Women, traditionally mothers of god, lack their 
own God (or gods) with which, individually or as a community, to attain a specificity of their 
own" (Irigaray 1987, cited in Irigaray 1986a, 11). Irigaray argues that, while female sexuality 
has no symbolic representation or mediation such as that which she envisages in the form of 
the divine, it cannot be reimagined. Because of her belief that, in the late twentieth-century 
"western" world, "the exclusion or suppression of the religious dimension seems to be 
impossible," she asserts that women need urgently "to rethink the religious question, 
particularly its scope, categories and its utopias, all of which have been male for centuries and 
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remain so" (Irigaray 1986a, 6). 
This last phrase seems to me to express the extent of Irigaray' s interest in religion as a means 
of simultaneous oppression and enablement. While the scope of the Christian religion's effects 
in upholding dominant patterns of social relations remains unchallenged, the specific 
categories (notably those of women and men) instituted and hierarchised in "western" 
patriarchy will not be significantly altered, and, most importantly in Irigaray's terms, 
imaginative possibilities for alternative patterns of social relations, which transform the 
hierarchies we presently live among, will be foreclosed. That is, in her view, unless we can 
rethink tp.e divine in and for the revolutionary struggles of our own times, the utopias we are 
enabled to imagine will continue to be male. 
1. 2 "Using what we have": Feminist theories of embodiment 
The deployment of Irigaray' s divine as a means for women to become autonomous symbolic 
selves, as I have said, necessarily involves new ways of imagining and experiencing female 
bodies. Irigaray describes the way in which women become subjects who are in fact non-
subjects or passive subjects (passive bodies) of culture and language in psychoanalytic terms. 
As a practising psychoanalyst with ardent feminist political interests, Irigaray is deeply critical 
of traditional psychoanalytic theory. All of her wTitings can be read in a psychoanalytic light, 
or, as Whitford puts it, "as a sort of 'psychoanalysis' of Western culture and metaphysics, 
seeking what underpins its fragile rationality, looking for the repressed or 'unconscious' of 
culture" (Whitford 1986, 6). From Irigaray's feminist revisionist perspective on 
psychoanalysis, the non-symbolisation of female bodiliness is vvTitten into the drama of 
achieving subjectivity which traditional psychoanalytic theory describes. Thus, in her view, 
traditional psychoanalytic theory according to Freud and as revised by Jacques Lacan, 
unconsciously constructs and depends upon female embodiment and sexuality as passive in 
relation to male sexuality. 
In Speculum Irigaray takes Freud and Lacan to task for their phallocentrism; for the ways in 
which their discourse constitutes "woman" as the invisible prop or mirror for male-model 
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subjectivity. In her interrogation of conventional psychoanalytic precepts, Irigaray insists on 
the sexual specificity of the (male) subject on whom the theory is based. While Irigaray shares 
Lacan's view that the body is an imaginary or morphological construct, the product of the 
intersection of psychical and social processes which causes subjects to experience their bodies 
in specific ways, she questions his version of how this process occurs for women and men in 
"western" patriarchal culture. 
Lacan has famously described as the "mirror stage" (the equivalent of primary narcissism in 
Freud) the process by which the ego is formed and the child's (prior) "libidinal impulses" are 
re-channelled into its own body (Lacan 1977a; Grosz 1992, 36). In Lacan's account the 
formation of the ego is marked by the child's (mis)recognition of its reflected body image, 
the image which it perceives as congruent with itself yet split off from its own perception. 
The body-image, or Gestalt, serves as the symbol for the subject's insertion into the social 
order, the way in which the subject will henceforth realise its perceptions as mediated by 
others. The body, as the site of the assumption of the split self or alienated ego (symbolised 
by the subject's misrecognition of itself in the mirror) is thus mediated by the subject's social 
experience from the moment the ego is formed. The Gestalt "symbolizes the mental 
permanence of the 1, at the same time as it prefigures its alienating destination ll (Lacan 1977a, 
2). The body, then, according to Lacan, is a formation of fantasy and desire, an image which 
is internalised at the point where the subject is inserted into the symbolic domain: 
The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency 
to anticipation - and which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of 
spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented 
body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call orthopaedic - and, lastly, to the 
assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid 
structure the subject's entire mental development.. .. This moment in which the 
mirror-stage comes to an end inaugurates, by the identification with the imago of the 
counterpart and the drama of primordial jealousy ( ... ), the dialectic that will 
henceforth link the 1 to socially elaborated situations (Lacan 1977a, 4-6). 
In his 1958 paper on "The Meaning of the Phallus," Lacan described the phallus as the 
"privileged signifier" which orders the workings of desire in the symbolic and the relations 
between the sexes (Lacan 1987a, 82). Where Irigaray parts company from Lacan is in his 
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view of how the child must proceed in the taking up of a subject position according to a 
phallic third term and the "bodily identity" it assumes as a result. In Lacan, the phallus 
represents the moment of division of the mother-child dyad at which the child recognises that 
it is not its mother's sole object of interest. At this point the child realises separation from its 
mother and enters the domain of language, the symbolic order governed by the Law of the 
Father (Lacan 1987a, 83). The phallus marks the non-satisfaction of desire (symbolic 
castration or thl.' subject's "lack-in-being" (Rose 1987, 40», which is the emergent subject's 
lot in the symbl)lic. Thus "the phallus forbids the child the satisfaction of his or her own 
desire, which b the desire to be the exclusive desire of the mother" (Lac an 1957-8, 14, qtd. 
in Rose ,t987, 38; Lacan 1977b, 198; 1987a, 83). 
While Lacan and followers of Lacan have persistently claimed that the phallus bears no 
relation - ana{~'mical1y or in terms of the morphological imaginary - to the penis, Irigaray, 
along with l'){h\.." feminists, rejects this claim. Since the phallus is that which orders social and 
sexual relatilln~ 111 the symbolic with reference to the fundamental notions of desire and lack, 
and the child tY~omes a subject with reference to the phallus when it recognises separation 
from its I1l1."1 tt",-,:: . the phallic function and the position of the mother are significantly 
connected, in h'r view (Idgaray 1991f, 52), in ways that are not made explicit in Lacan. 
To return h., L'l.,-.;:m's account of the mirror stage, which he takes as the schema for the ego's 
misrecogni::i,·", ::l11ction, the mother is the one who aids the child in its act of misrecognition, 
which mon:e:::, ~lS Jacqueline Rose explains, "only has meaning in relation to the presence and 
look of the r:-:.,,' who guarantees its reality for the child" (Rose 1987, 30). However in 
Lacan's de~'::::;'.:ion of the mirror stage the figure of the mother is depicted as "support" for 
the child 1977 a, 1) in a drama in which the child is precipitated towards the 
recognition ;,\;1ternal intervention. The child's first "other" is its mother, yet the formation 
of the chi!'::'.$ with reference to the mother is cast in phallic terms which effectively 
obliterate ;'~'::ysical presence. As Judith Butler points out: 
::-::..;'::!ernal body prior to the formation of the subject is always and only known 
by ..:;;. ~~ect who by definition postdates that hypothetical scene. Lacan's effort to 
.. ::::-: account of the genesis of bodily boundaries in "The Mirror Stage" (1949) 
narcissistic relation as primary, and so displaces the maternal body as a site 
_ ,~lry identification. This happens within the essay itself when the infant is 
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understood to overcome with jUbilation the obstruction of the support which 
presumably holds the infant in place before the mirror. The reification of maternal 
dependency as a "support" and an "obstruction" signified primarily as that which, in 
the overcoming, occasions jubilation, suggests that there is a discourse on 
differentiation from the maternal in the mirror stage. The maternal is, as it were, 
already put under erasure by the theoretical language which reifies her function and 
enacts the very overcoming that it seeks to document (Butler 1993, 71. See also 
Gallop 1985, 78-84). 
As a result, the part played by the mother in the child's passage to subjectivity remains 
unsymbolised; thus, Irigaray posits a matricide at the origins of psychoanalytic theory and the . 
social processes it purports to describe (Irigaray 1991e). In Irigaray's view, this "sacrifice" of 
the mother has negative effects for female subjects who have no means of symbolising the 
transition from dependence on their mothers to becoming "subjects" of language \vith 
reference to the phallus (Irigaray 1991f, 52; Grosz 1990a, 71-2). 
What does it mean for women that they become subjects in reference to the phallus and 
through rejecting the bodies of their mothers? How does the phallus organise "the female 
subject'''s perception of her body? Butler points out that in "The Meaning of the Phallus" 
Lacan "refuses the question" raised by the earlier "The Mirror Stage" about how the imaginary 
body is incorporated by the ego and is experienced as a totality (Butler 1993, 79): 
If the phallus is the privileged signifier of the symbolic, the delimiting and ordering 
principle of what can be signified, then this signifier gains its privilege through 
becoming an imaginary effect that pervasively denies its own status as both 
imaginary and an effect. If this is true of the signifier that delimits the domain of the 
signifiable within the symbolic, then it is true of all that is signified as the symbolic. 
In other words, what operates under the sign of the symbolic may be nothing other 
than precisely that set of imaginary effects which have become naturalized and 
reified as the law of signification (Butler 1993, 79). 
In this way the symbolic order, governed by the phallus, masks the maternal function which 
is nonetheless the site of the subject's first orientation as it enters that order. The symbolic 
order, where meaning circulates endlessly, is called by Lacan the domain of the Other to 
which the subject addresses its unsatisfiable desire (Lacan 1987a, 83). But this Other is the 
mother first, and in fact, all women participate as Other in the symbolic insofar as they must 
perform the function of "being" the phallus for men (Lacan 1987a, 84; Butler 1990, 44). In 
this sense women's functioning as the confirmation of the phallus is bound up with their 
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symbolising the lost jouissance of the pleasures of the maternal body for male subjects. This 
is a key theme in Irigaray, particularly as regards the current impossibility of women attaining 
a symbolic home for themselves while they must represent - in phallic terms - the loss of the 
maternal container ("a sense of place," "a kind of envelope" (Irigaray 1991a, 169» for men 
(Irigaray 1985b; 1991a, 169-70; 1993b, 60-71, 97-115). 
Irigaray asks how women might signify their own maternal loss and, by extension, their 
relations with others in the symbolic. She claims that women in fact have no symbolic means 
of mediating their relation to their mothers, since the phallic term which governs language 
masks the maternal. As a result women are "lost" in the symbolic, in a state of "dereliction" 
(Irigaray 1993b, 126).3 Thus Irigaray sees several problems confronting women: the lack of 
symbolic mediation between mother and daughter; the fact that women become subjects of 
language by representing the phallus (i.e, the lost maternal body) for male subjects; and the 
fact that women cannot become specific, individuated female subjects of the symbolic and 
therefore cannot differentiate themselves from other women. For Irigaray, these difficulties 
relate to the impossibility of representing specifically female bodies in a social order which 
recuperates the maternal into the governance of phallic law. As we have seen, women's bodies 
can only appear as simultaneous lack and excess in the phallocentric symbolic system. ~at 
is needed, according to Irigaray, is the development of a female symbolic in which women's 
bodies might be symbolised differently, without reference to the phallus as orgarnsmg 
principle. And for this to happen, a female imaginary is also necessary. 4 
The imaginary in Lacan is implicitly introduced with his paper on "The Mirror Stage" 
(although the relation of the terms imaginary and symbolic, along with the real, is not fully 
elaborated until a later stage of his work), insofar as this account of the formation of the ego 
concerns "the first images of the self' (Marini 1992, 35). In Speculum, Irigaray de constructs 
the Lacanian imaginary, arguing that the image of the self represented by Lacan depends upon 
the female to stand in for the male-model subject's lack. For Irigaray, a female imaginary and 
a female symbolic are both indispensable and interconnected aspects of attaining 
representation for female bodies. As Whitford writes: "the creation of a female imaginary [is] 
a social process, involving intervention in the symbolic .... The symbolic is structure (form) 
which is given content by the imaginary, and the imaginary pours itself into the available 
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structures to form representations" (Whitford 1991 a, 90-1). 
The divine in Irigaray's work is intended as a resource for the construction of a female 
imaginary on a level with the male. She states that: 
We women, sexed according to our gender, lack a God to share, a word to share and 
to become. Defined as the often dark, even occult mother-substance of the word of 
men, we are in need of our subject, our substantive, our word, our predicates: our 
elementary sentence, our basic rhythm, our morphological identity, our generic 
incarnation, our genealogy. 
To be the term of the other is nothing enviable. It paralyzes us in our becoming. As 
divinity or goddess of and for man, we are deprived of our own ends and means. It 
is essential that we be Godfor ourselves so that we can be divine for the other, not 
idols, fetishes, symbols that have already been outlined or determined. It is equally 
essential that we should be daughter-gods in the relationship with our mothers, and 
that we cease to hate our mothers in order to enter into submissiveness to the father-
husband. We cannot love if we have no memory of a native passiveness in relation 
to our mothers, of our primitive attachment to her, and hers to us (Irigaray 1993a, 
71). 
The concern with language evidenced in this passage is linked with the need to construct a 
female imaginary as a resource for the development of a female symbolic. Since in Irigaray's 
view God serves to endorse male subjectivity at the expense of the female - an equation which 
permeates the structures of language and society in the "west" - women must elaborate an 
alternative conception of the divine as a means of articulating new modes of identity in terms 
of body, language, and relationships, particularly relationships between women (Irigaray 
1991 b, 65-6; 1993b, 68-9; 1993d, v). 
The development of a concept of a feminine divine - as exemplified by Irigaray's idea of the 
sensible transcendental - is a means of intervening in primary relationships which are currently 
figured in phallic terms, or which remain unsymbolised for women; for example, relationships 
between mothers and daughters or between women in the symbolic. Whitford helpfully 
expands on the concept in the following way: "it allows for ethics and for responsibilities, a 
symbolic home for women in the [female] genre which does not limit their capacities 
arbitrarily. It provides a framework for thinking further the problems of identity and negativity 
(violence)" (Whitford 1991a, 144). 
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Irigaray's divine, then, is an attempt to address simultaneously women's alienation from the 
structures of language and their inability to achieve specific bodily representations of their 
own (i.e, to signify in non-phallic terms). The current near-impossibility of "speaking as a 
woman" in the phallocentric order results from the fact that the achievement of active 
subjectivity is legitimately open only to male subjects, while female subjects must occupy 
positions, as described above, which reflect the illusory mastery of men. That is, only male 
subjects have a representable "other" while women must occupy the position of the "other of 
the same" (Irigaray 1985a, 118; Whitford 1991a, 50). 
Rosi Braidotti connects the specific cultural silences of women with these processes of 
subject-formation: 
Women's theoretical silence must be put down to man's appropriation and violation 
of their bodies .... Psychoanalytic theory ... reveals the link between the image of 
woman and death, that is to say material and temporal limitations. As if every 
woman stood for, was a figuration of the mother whose symbolic murder is the 
condition of entry into the symbolic order (Lacan) (Braidotti 1991, 142). 
And Irigaray: 
If women's bodies must act as the form of exchange between men, it means that 
women ensure the foundation of the symbolic order, without ever gaining access to 
it, and so without being paid in a symbolic form for that task. It is their silence, 
their silent bodies - but yet productive - which regulates the smooth exchange 
between men, and the social mechanism in general (Irigaray 1977a, 71-2). 
The divine in Irigaray is a means of countering Lacan's claim that women cannot "speak as 
women" because of the way in which social relations are instituted by the phallus. That is, it 
is both a questioning of the construction of "the female body" in phallic terms and an attempt 
to elaborate an alternative understanding of female embodiment. 
Irigaray connects the divine, for example, with the notion of thresholds, such as those 
suggested by the mucous membranes of the body which are integral in the functioning of 
female sexuality, and the female genital lips which are "neither open nor closed" (Irigaray 
1985a, 209). While phallomorphic logic represents female sexuality as lack, Irigaray depicts 
as divine the process-oriented nature of female sexuality, which remains unrepresented within 
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an economy privileging teleology, discharge and a return to stasis, as she argues 
psychoanalytic theory does (Irigaray 1985c, 81; 1993b, 106, 124). A divine for women is 
described as a means of symbolising the physical characteristics of female sexuality in such 
a way that they would attain cultural status as male sexuality does. The divine would serve 
as a "resurrection and transfiguration of blood, of flesh, through a language and an ethics" 
belonging to women (Irigaray 1993b, 129). According to Irigaray, female sexuality intimates 
a model of sexual exchange which exceeds the phallic and offers a constructive alternative to 
a sexual economy based on singular forms: 
As for woman, she touches herself in and of herself without any need for mediation, 
and ,before there is any way to distinguish activity from passivity. Woman "touches 
herself' all the time, and moreover no one can forbid her to do so, for her genitals 
are formed oftwo lips in continuous contact. Thus, within herself, she is already two 
- but not divisible into one(s) - that caress each other (Irigaray 1985a, 24). 
A divine for women might represent this "self-touching" positively, "Could it be," Irigaray 
asks, IIthat one of the qualities of [the] divine process is to leave woman open, her threshold 
free, with no closure, no dogmatism?" (Irigaray 1993b, 118). The divine, traditionally figured 
as mediation between men, is suggested as a means of giving female sexuality legitimate 
symbolic status, of acknowledging and working with rather than negating through 
appropriation its communicative, mediatory properties (Whitford 1991c, 28). Whereas 
conventionally, "God is always entrusted to the look and never sufficiently imagined as tactile 
bliss" (Irigaray 1993b, 162), lrigaray reimagines the divine as tactile mediation: 
Immanence and transcendence are being recast, notably by that threshold which has 
never been examined in itself: the female sex. It is a threshold unto mucosity. 
Beyond the classic opposites of love and hate, liquid and ice lies this perpetually 
half-open threshold, consisting of lips that are strangers to dichotomy .... Approached 
in this light, where the edges of the body join in an embrace that transcends all 
limits and which nevertheless does not· risk falling into the abyss thanks to the 
fertility of this porous space, in the most extreme moments of sensation, which still 
lie in the future, each self-discovery takes place in that area which cannot be spoken 
of, but that forms the fluid basis of life and language. 
For this we need "God," or a love so scrupulous that it is divine. Perhaps we have 
not yet witnessed such a love, which delays its transcendence in the here and now, 
except in certain experiences of God (Irigaray 1991a, 175-6). 
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Irigaray's work on the representation of "the female body" interconnects strongly with recent 
debates in feminist theory on the issue of "embodiment": what it means to inhabit a sexed-
female body in a patriarchal world. My interest in the intersection of female embodiment with 
Irigaray's concept of the divine is impelled by a recognition of feminist theory's constant need 
to create or imagine alternative theoretical and activist spaces from and within which to 
critique the pervasive constructs of patriarchal dominance. In the rest of this section I will 
discuss the relation of recent feminist "body theory" generally to a "visionary feminism" like 
Irigaray's. 
As a mC!vement based on shared aspects of individual experiences of living as female under 
patriarchy, feminism assumes a degree of commonality in the bodily experiences of women 
whose experiences may in fact be more different than similar. To "speak from our Ovvn 
experience" is rendered uncertain by the ways in which "we" call the notion of "experience" 
into question through ffoue' critique of patriarchal models of selfhood, and to add the phrase 
Has women" further complicates by oversimplifying the issue, masking the repressions of 
individual differences which are intrinsic to the use of the collective ftwe fl I've just employed. 
In order to uncover and interrogate ways in which certain kinds of female bodies attain their 
specific cultural status and how hegemonic discourses organise these differentially poses, then, 
an ongoing problem for an identity politics such as feminism. For it's evident that while we 
must continue to "situate" ourselves as female speaking subjects in terms of our specific 
cultural attributes so as not to replicate the totalising and silencing gestures of phallocentrism, 
we cannot yet afford (and here again I'm calling on the falsely homogenising flwe") to do 
away with the category "woman. ff In fact, while the phrase "postfeminism" is being bandied 
about by the male/mainstream media, presumably to signify that women have now gained all 
the available privileges which once were unique to men, it would seem to be of primary 
importance to continue to work to provide the term "feminism" with a wider and more 
valuable currency (Modleski 1991).5 
Consequently, to critique the notion of embodiment-as-a-woman within feminist theory from 
a feminist perspective requires, like the task of the visionary/mystic, taking up a highly mobile 
position on the margins of current critical understandings of sexual "identityH in terms of its 
"performance" or construction in and through categories of sex and gender. The idea of gender 
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as performance has been provocatively elaborated by Judith Butler in her book Gender 
Trouble and subsequent work (Butler 1990; 1991; 1993). Butler utilises a radical Foucauldian 
approach to critique naturalised notions of sex and gender and deconstructs the workings of 
a number of psychoanalytic approaches to sexual identity. Her theory of concepts of sex and 
gender as performative positions in culture is the result of her in-depth critique of 
"essentialistlt notions of embodiment, which tend to assume a naturalised material base of 
sexual identity, or an essence, to which gender labels are then applied. 
The issue of "essentialism" has proved to be a somewhat vexed issue also with regard to the 
reception ofIrigaray's writings on working for the articulation of sexual difference as a means 
of broader cultural change, particularly amongst her American audience. While many of the 
charges levelled at Irigaray seem to be based on misunderstandings about the poststructuralist 
situation of her project (e.g., Plaza 1978; Jones 1981; Moi 1985, 127-49; Riley 1988, 102, 
107), which investigates the social construction of the category '\voman" in terms of its 
position as always-already having been appropriated by the category of "man" (at least thus 
far in our cultural history) (Whitford 1991a, 135), the debate has certainly had the effect of 
highlighting some of the more common anxieties felt by women about the representation and 
experience of female bodiliness in patriarchy. 
While Diana Fuss, in her deconstruction of the essentialist/constructionist dualism and 
exploration of what she calls Irigaray's "strategic use of essentialism" in Essentially Speaking 
(Fuss 1989), states her belief "that there are ... \vays to elaborate and work with a notion of 
essence that is not, in essence, ahistorical, apolitical, empiricist, or simply reductive," she goes 
on to note that the bulk of negative critical responses to Irigaray's work are connected with 
a "fear of essentialism" (Fuss 1989, 55).6 And Vicki Kirby identifies the fear which founds 
a binarism - essentialism/constructionism - that then outlaws the experience of the physical 
body, as a fear of limitation, of immurement in the irremediably physical and as evidence of 
what she describes as the 
pervasive belief that the anatomical body is indeed the unarguably real body, the 
literal body, the body whose immovable and immobilising substance must be secured 
outside the discussion. This improper body is quarantined for fear that its ineluctable 
immediacy will leave us no space for change, no chance to be other-wise, no place 
from which to engender a different future (Kirby 1991, 91. Emphasis added). 
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In contrast, Irigaray's divine is envisaged as a means of providing this "space for change" 
between the current unsymbolised immediacy of female bodily experience and the desire to 
have this experience mean different things. Her divine is an agent of symbolic extension and 
mobility which is imagined as enabling movement beyond the feared "immovable and 
immobilising substance" of the body Kirby describes. 
As Kirby makes clear, the "ineluctable immediacy" of "our" experiences as female subjects 
forces anti-essentialist arguments to confront their own unacknowledged (but essential) 
"essence" in the physical realm, although ideas about how this "immediacy" is to be 
lmderst~od will inevitably (and most productively) be unstable. As she goes on to state: 
Essentialism is the condition of possibility for any political axiology: the minimal 
consensual stuff that political action fastens onto is already essentialism's effect. 
There is no "outside" this entanglement. However, the task is not to dream of 
deliverance, of yet another theology that promises to transcend this contamination. 
Rather, it is to begin to real-ise that we are inextricably immersed within that 
contamination and that our fundamental complicity with it is, strangely, its enabling 
moment (Kirby 1991, 93. Emphasis added).7 
Like Kirby, I would claim that "theologies of transcendence" in the standard sense are 
necessarily misplaced in the task of seeking to re-form from within, as it were, the cultural 
significations and women's understandings of their embodiment. However I would also argue 
that notions of "contamination" and It complicity" have everything to do with religion's role 
as a cultural instrument in shaping these understandings8 and that, therefore, a "theology of 
transcendence" might also be reworked in just this way: to locate, underscore and open up for 
exploration points of intimate connection between the outlawed excess that is signified by 
female physicality in I1 western" culture and the excess of transcendence (or divinity) which 
so often makes its physical return through the bodily behaviours of women.9 
Kirby's l1 enabling moment" of 110ur" realised complicity with naturalised constructions of 
bodiliness marks the body as an active site of cultural change, which is fundamental to the 
symbolisation of the body in Christianity. To quote Elizabeth Castelli: 
The paradox of early Christianity .. .is that its apparent rejection of the body as a 
shadowy and passible shell of the immortal soul is located within an ideological and 
practical matrix thoroughly focused on the body. Every important dimension of early 
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Christian thought and practice is mediated through language and ideas about and the 
material realities of the (human or mystical) body .... The early Christians were 
absolutely obsessed 'with the fact of human-being-in-flesh. The foundational myth 
of Christianity, the death and resurrection of Jesus, requires a human body (Castelli 
1991, 137). 
And so the followers of Jesus could not afford to ignore their human bodies either, especially 
as the main impulse of Christianity (and, arguably, of all religions) is to enact bodily those 
moral and spiritual precepts which will ensure the coming of the kingdom of God on earth. 10 
Christianity works through the bodily conduct of its followers to produce (bodily) change in 
the present, which presages the resurrection and transfiguration of the body envisaged as 
taking place in the future. There is a remarkable potential within such a system of belief for 
the activities of women, traditionally guardians of the body and the flesh in patriarchal 
cultures, to be represented, by themselves as well as others, in surprising, empowering and 
radical ways. Karma Lochrie observes for example that, while in traditional Christian 
discourse "the ultimate purpose of [Christ's] Passion is the redemption of mankind, woman 
seems to be privileged as the means for this redemption" in the late middle ages, in imagery 
which connects "the bodily, the physical, and the female" (Lochrie 1991 b, 118), as described 
in the Introduction. 
I will be examining the effects of symbolic connections between "the bodily, the physical, and 
the female" in relation to medieval religious discourses more fully in Chapter Two. At this 
stage I would like to discuss the special status of mystical discourse as a site where this 
combination is highlighted, and suggest some affinities between mystical discourses and the 
visionary feminism articulated by Irigaray which I will be taking up in later chapters. I will 
also discuss Irigaray's interest in "hysterics" and her alignment of female mysticism with 
hysteria, in relation to her views on transforming female embodiment in the symbolic. 
1. 3 Mystics and hysterics: Visionary/feminist foremothers? 
Mysticism is a discourse which has a privileged place in all religious systems and a highly 
charged relationship to religious and cultural understandings of the body (which may, 
however, be concealed in orthodox religious discourse and in the work of commentators on 
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mysticism).l1 Michel de Certeau states that "mystic discourse is obsessed" by the status and 
meaning of the body and that "mystical literature composes scripts of the body" (de Certeau 
1992, 80-1). The privileging of the body in mysticism is evidenced by the unusual bodily 
behaviours or experiences which normally accompany claims to mystical intelligence, and by 
which such claims are often judged. In fact Lochrie notes that, in the middle ages, "the body's 
capacity for amazing transformations marks and measures the soul's capacity for imitating 
Christ's Passion" (Lochrie 1991a, 14), and hence its holiness. 
De Certeau contends that mystical discourse is distinct from similar modes of utterance about 
the divine (such as theology) because it is not focused on producing a set of criteria which 
will function as statements of "truth" in the sense that the basic theological precepts of 
institutionalised religion must do (de Certeau 1986, 89-90; Lochrie 1991a, 61). In this sense 
it functions as a discourse in excess of the institutions of religion, and therefore is in a 
position of possible disruption or invasion of their boundaries. But it is also, in de Certeau's 
analysis, a site of special "lack": '''Communication' (communications from God or those 
established among the saints) is everywhere a void to be filled, and forms the focal point of 
mystical accounts and treatises. They are writings produced from this lack" (de Certeau 1986, 
88). That this is a "feminised" model of the origins of mystical speech in the soul is made 
evident by the Annunciation of Christ's birth to the Virgin Mary as an example in the 
Christian tradition for the reception of mystical confidences, as Lochrie observes: "The Virgin 
retires from the world of objects, alone and apart, thereby making a space for the divine will 
to speak. She only wills to hear. The Word is conceived in this speech-hearing act" (Lochrie 
1991 a, 62). However, the mystical encounter, while bred of a void in the soul of the seeker, 
is essentially a dialogic one, and in this sense the physical locus of the mystic becomes all-
important (Lochrie 1991 a, 63). 
Now if mystical discourse functions as a site of simultaneous lack and excess in relation to 
the dominant structures of religion, then it simulates the position of women in phallocentric 
culture. And when the person who participates in the mystical encounter is a woman, the 
potential for her mystic speech to (re)articulate "feminine" excess and lack together, through 
an abundance of physical behaviours - functioning as excess - which are characteristically 
allowed no site of legitimate symbolic expression in phallocentric culture - their status as lack 
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- is radically mobilised. This would explain why so much of late medieval lay women 
mystics' affective piety mimics the physical expressions of female sexuality in orgasm or 
childbirth (and frequently both),12 experiences which are denied symbolic representation in the 
phallocentric order as it exists. 
But mystical discourse, I would argue, provides an avenue for transformation as well as 
expression of these experiences, not only because such demonstrations of female desire, 
otherwise outlawed, disrupt on expression the phallocentric symbolic system and thus alter 
their own status in relation to it, but because of their privileged relation to the special status 
accorded the ?ivine. Mystical discourse represents a claim by the receiver of divine 
communications to be in a position both inside and outside the conventional structures of 
religion, both orthodox in the sense of adhering to traditional doctrine and unorthodox in the 
sense of professing a unique and personal insight into these basic truths, received direct from 
the divine. It is no wonder that, as Steven Ozment remarks, mystics typically "set forth what 
can fairly be called the latent revolutionary possibilities of the Christian religion" (Ozment 
1973, 1). 
Lochrie, following de Certeau, notes that "the measure of the truth of mystical utterance is 
its position and presence at the place of the mystical subject," which is, naturally, in the soul 
of a necessarily humble recipient, never enough to completely quell the mystic's doubts about 
the validity of herlhis inspirations (Lochrie 1991 a, 63). In fact, given the troubled positioning 
of the body (and particularly the female body) in Christian discourses, it is not surprising that 
this "measure of truth" should be both the source of destabilisation of the mystical text. and 
its claim to divine authority: 
Divine utterance is both what founds the text, and what it must make manifest. That 
is why the text is destabilized: it is at the same time beside the authorized institution, 
but outside it and in what authorizes that institution, i.e., the Word of God. In such 
a discourse, which claims to speak on behalf of the Holy Spirit and attempts to 
impose that convention on the addressee, a particular assertion is at work, affirming 
that what is said in this place, different from the one of magisterium language, is the 
same as what is said in the tradition, or else that these two places amount to the 
same (de Certeau 1986, 92-3, qtd. in Lochrie 1991a, 63). 
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And so it is the mystic's (re)construction of self as revealed through her bodily participation 
in the mystical encounter (and recorded in her mystical text) which literally constitutes the 
difference between these two places. The mystic's physical manifestation of the presence of 
God in her soul is simultaneously the site of her particular claim to divine authority and, 
through this claim, the place of a symbolic reformulation of her culturally assigned 
"femininity." This occurs most obviously, for example, when the female mystic claims to be 
driven involuntarily to imitate the physical sufferings of Christ through bodily behaviours 
which simulate sexual climax and childbirth. 
The sit\ng of mystical authority in the bodily response of the female mystic to the divine 
allows, then, an explosion of sexual difference which, according to Irigaray's analysis of 
women's accession to subjectivity within a phallomorphic model, is otherwise inexpressible 
in culture. Through the mystic's imitation of the symbolically ambiguous, feminised Christ, 
her female sexuality - outlawed in the discourses of medieval religion and society - is 
redefined and made acceptable. The female mystic's identification with the suffering Christ 
who is both feminine and masculine, like and unlike herself, opens up a passage between her 
unsymbolised female physicality (or a physicality symbolised only as "lack," to put it in 
psychoanalytic terms) and a bodily transformation which enables this physicality to be 
expressed and to gain new meaning. 
The physically excessive behaviour of female mystics is clearly not a manifestation of a 
"femininity" constructed as passive and docile (like the Virgin Mary receiving the divine 
Word in her soul at the Annunciation). It may be seen instead as an intensely physical, 
mobile, and excessive re-production of what it might mean to be female in a patriarchal 
culture which is both inside and outside the domain of religious orthodoxy. As a consequence 
female mysticism and its attendant "excesses" have historically proved troubling to male 
religious authorities and the social structures they oversee. As I will show in the next chapter, 
the English mystic Margery Kempe endured many censorious responses from male clerics to 
her passionate mimicry of the sorrows of Christ and his mother, particularly to her 
uncontrollable fits of tearsY However, Kempe's Book presents the mystic's justification of 
her behaviour through her intimate relationship with Christ, who becomes her bridegroom and 
grants her a new identity (Kempe had formerly been a wife and mother) as his own daughter, 
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mother and spouse (Kempe 1988, 126-7). 
As Sarah Beckwith observes in reference to the case of Kempe: "Christ's words to Kempe 
license her to refashion her present and hence herself! (Beckwith 1992, 175). As a result, 
"identity comes to be perceived not as an inevitable destiny, but as a choice [so that] the past 
itself is rendered relative, and a critical distance between the immediate and the historical is 
opened up which coincides with the self differing from itself! (Beckwith 1992, 175). 
Beckwith perceptively identifies this "self-division" as the focus of the desire shown by a 
number of modem critics to judge as authentic or fraudulent (and most commonly the latter) 
Kempe's claims to divine authority, an effect I will discuss in Chapter Four: 
Making a self in this instance must mean faking a self since self-production is itself 
an inadmissible category. Since the self should be simply given (and accepted) and 
not made, revealed or discovered but not fabricated or constructed, self-making is 
seen as usurping and destabilizing divine prerogative (Beckwith 1992, 178).14 
Kempe's self-representation has been and continues to be a vexed critical issue precisely 
because her portrayal of herself as divided also necessarily disrupts the univocity of the 
divine, who speaks through her and whom she characterises, in the authorial voice of her text. 
At this point I would like to detour into a brief but broader discussion of modern readings of 
medieval texts as a way of explaining further why I am reading Kempe with Irigaray in a 
substantial proportion of this thesis. 
If the responses of more traditional critics to the fundamental instability of Kempe's text 
(what David Aers has called its "resistance to sublimation" of the painful processes by which 
"female identity might be made in a particular community and class" (Aers 1988, 74)) reveal 
typical liberal humanist anxieties about threats to the self-sufficiency of the (male) subject, 
I would argue that the Book is especially susceptible to poststructuralist readings. These tend 
to find in such destabilisation the potential for articulating other ways of being than the 
eventually unsustainable isomorphism of the male self. I would also argue that it is because 
mystical discourses privilege "the feminine" and articulate fundamental alterations in the 
(female) mystical subject's understanding of herself - through her intimate engagement with 
a divine other she strives to emulate and with whom she ultimately desires to achieve a 
pseudo-sexual union - they exhibit a radical potential for producing alternative understandings 
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of female selfhood to the norm. It has long been the institutional Church's task to legislate 
over and attempt to control the exploration of such alternatives. IS 
Critics and writers on mysticism have traditionally striven to perform a similar legislative task, 
as my deconstruction of aspects of the critical reception of Kempe's Book in Chapter Four 
reveals. In recent years there has been a vast increase in medieval scholarship which embraces 
poststructuralist theories of subjectivities and cultures. 16 There have inevitably been some 
antagonistic reactions to this work, and my own sense of this response (as produced in 
published and unpublished formats) is that it centres around two related types of charges of 
academic "failure!!: that of "anachronism" and "ahistoricism" (e.g., Higgs 1981; Nolan 1983). 
Both words function similarly to outlaw a particular historical (late twentieth-century 
IIwestern") critical approach which the makers of the charges refuse to countenance by 
themselves "ahistoricising/' in many such cases, their own critical methodologies. 17 In other 
words, the rejection of poststructuralist and psychoanalytic models of interpretation can 
sometimes be seen to take the place of a historical contextualising of a writer's own critical 
framework, of the particular nature of their claims to true or legitimate "historical 
understanding. II 18 Patterson describes this situation as a tautological one which serves to 
hide lithe essentially political nature of the values that govern the modern definition of the 
Middle Ages" (Patterson 1987, 39): 
Knowing what history means, we know what the text means. Established as an 
interpretive grid, this inevitably oversimplified history thus serves to stigmatize 
discordant textual elements as interpretive errors, modem sUbjectivities to be put 
down to a failure of historical knowledge (Patterson 1987, 45). 
David Aers likewise notes the eliminating of "discordant elements" in traditional work by 
IIspecialists in medieval language and literature [who] .... have tended to present the period as 
one unified by Christian faith and a common moral theory, the antithesis to a 'modem' world 
riven by competing ideologies, conflicts, and tensions" (Aers 1988, 6). If such a view of the 
middle ages is intrinsically conservative (Aers 1988, 7), studies which embrace contemporary 
literary theories more often (and perhaps predictably) find "a world of material reality whose 
boundaries (from our viewpoint) seem amazingly fluid,n as Stephen Nichols observes (Nichols 
1991,2). My point is obviously not to claim that either of these approaches is more "accurate" 
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a means of viewing a medieval past from a late twentieth~century present than the other, but 
nor will I attempt to gloss over where my own political investments lie in the course of this 
study where it deals with Kempe. 
Conversely, I intend to initiate an encounter between "the present" and "the past" such that 
what appears to me as the "otherness" of the past (or its most apparent differences from the 
present) is allowed to challenge and disrupt my modem sensibilities at the same time as my 
twentieth~century assumptions inevitably produce that particular past. Far from professing 
belief in the necessary ahistoricism of psychoanalytic theories, I concur with Jane Flax's view 
that IIfor all its shortcomings, psychoanalysis presents the ... most promising theories of how 
a self that is simultaneously embodied, social, 'fictional,' and real comes to be, changes, and 
persists over time ll (Flax 1990, 16). Furthermore, the counter~transference element in 
psychoanalytic practice provides a useful model by which the feminist critic can engage in 
'''tracking [her] own desire' and [her] own attitude towards the analysand's [or the other's] 
discourse" (Lechte 1990, 212), even as she engages with that discourse in criticism. This 
process is something I attempt to articulate in the final section of Chapter Four. 
In my view the universalising and ahistoricising tendencies of traditional psychoanalytic 
theories may be effectively countered by setting up a dialogue between feminist reworkings 
of some of these ideas (such as those produced by Irigaray) and textual material from a distant 
past. This is an especially productive exercise if the text from the past concerns mysticism, 
itself a discourse that has typically claimed to be beyond representation, universal and not 
subject to the vagaries of time (Beckwith 1993, 7-18). Thus, two systems of thought which 
enact a masking of their own male bias (traditional psychoanalysis and traditional (scholarly) 
discourse on mysticism) may, in a feminist analysis, shed light on each other. 
In stressing Irigaray's status as a visionary thinker with regard to the female body, and the 
visionary and "excessively" physical experience of a mystic like Kempe, I suggest that it is 
possible (and productive) to bring these past and present representations of female bodiliness 
to a sense of constructive crisis. I have in mind here Gayatri Spivak's description of crisis as 
the moment at which 
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things .. .lose their proper names. The moment of the proper name is a transitional 
momenL .. These things must bring each other to crisis all the time because that is 
the relationship between theory and practice. What I mean by crisis is the moment 
at which you feel that your presuppositions of an enterprise are disproved by the 
enterprise itself. These are not necessarily moments of weakness ..... The relevant 
outcome .. .is a problem and a moment when you must think about negotiating 
(Spivak 1990b, 138-9). 
In the context of this comment, presupposition is theory, enterprise is practice, yet both are 
interdependent upon each other. If we take presupposition to stand for the attitudes we have 
towards the past without being fully aware of them because they (and we) are the products 
of our particular present, then enterprise would stand for the consideration of present attitudes 
along with objects of study from the past, in a mutually interactive relationship which would 
make the "otherness ll of the past also extend to the present. That is, being aware of how 
present attitudes to the past shape our understanding of that past can make the present seem 
"other ll too and so possibly more open to constructive change, a central facet of any feminist 
cultural analysis. 
Patterson also depicts the unavoidability of negotiating in this way, when he describes the 
unsettling process in which the writer who treats the past in herlhis work faces the paradoxes 
of "historicism" at every tum: 
While wanting to do justice to the otherness of a distant past, the historian is 
unavoidably conditioned by his (sic) own historical situation; while concerned to 
incorporate and understand as much of the material relevant to his chosen problem 
as he can, he is also aware that that material is never raw data but rather produced 
by elaborate processes of interpretation - many of which are so much second nature 
as to be unrecognizable as interpretations at all; and while attentive to the 
particularity and detail in which the significance of the past resides, he also knows 
that for that detail to be significant at all it must be located within a larger, totalizing 
context. These are oppositions that can never, in my view, come to resolution; on 
the contrary, they must be continually negotiated and renegotiated. Like Freud's 
civilization, historicism both issues from and entails discontent; the insufficiency of 
the present directs us to the past, but what we recover fails to satisfy. And so history 
continues to be rewritten (Patterson 1987, ix-x). 
I want to argue that in the absence of a singularly reliable version of history, if any IIreal" 
history exists then it does so, like the mystic's body, somewhere in the constantly shifting 
space of the encounter between current interpretive ideas and past objects of study. However, 
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as with the mystic's body, to describe this space as mobile is by no means to mistake the very 
concrete political effects of the exchanges it allows. Catherine Belsey, too, describes an 
encounter with the texts of the past as that which may assist in "the construction of the history 
of the present" (Be1sey 1983, 24), a present whose political interestedness she readily admits 
in the service of belief in possible changes for the future: 
The history of the present is not a history of a fall from grace but of the 
transformations of power and resistances to power. The claim is not that such a 
reading of literary texts is more accurate, but only that it is more radical. No less 
partial, it produces the past not in order to present an ideal of hierarchy, but to 
relativise the present, to demonstrate that since change has occurred in those areas 
whi~h seem most intimate and most inevitable, change in those areas is possible for 
us (Belsey 1983, 26).19 
Therefore, Margery Kempe's Itdestabilizing [of] the divine prerogative" by means of her "self-
making" is a process which I intend to submit to a thorough historical analysis. I will argue 
that it is the destabilisation of both processes - that of Itself-making" and of representing the 
divine - which highlights the materiality of Kempe's bodily experiences of God and her 
understandings of them and which, in terms of my project, requires a reading of the past 
which will in turn relativise the present and produce it as open to physical change. Kempe's 
de stabilisation of the divine is as integral to her recreation of a self within her text as the 
relationship with God which initiates the whole endeavour. As Beckwith points out: "That the 
spiritualization of God and the promptings of Kempe's ego should be so difficult to 
distinguish is itself a product of the internalization of God interlocuted by that very self, and 
one is quite inconceivable without the other" (Beckwith 1992, 197). 
In this respect the divine who shows himself to the mystic is caused to function in her 
discourse in a somewhat similar fashion (obvious differences notwithstanding) to Irigaray's 
"visions" or envisioning of the divine as a resource for twentieth-century women in their 
emergent possibilities for present and future "becoming." The following quote from Beckwith 
makes the resemblances clear: 
Potential, transformative, neglecting the confinements of the past for the possibilities 
of the future, Christ's words to Margery Kempe provide her with the opportunity to 
change the relationship between the past and the future, in the only place that they 
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can meet, the present in its moment of becoming that future (Beckwith 1992, 175). 
Similarly Irigaray describes a divine for women as an "incentive for a more perfect 
becoming." She states that "the only task, the only obligation laid upon us is: to become 
divine men and women, become perfectly, to refuse to allow parts of ourselves to shrivel and 
die that have the potential for growth and fulfillment" (Irigaray 1993a, 68_9).20 As Beckwith 
suggests, Kempe's mystical encounters are also dynamic occasions where her understanding 
of her "self' is radically put into question through her imitation of a loving, divine other, and 
the only place that past and future meet in the present of these encounters is in her own 
experience as a female subject. 
In the mystical colloquy the female mystic'S body becomes an "essentially" destabilised place 
because of its traversal by an alien economy of sacred desire. As Lochrie states: "The 
[mystical] text can only circulate desire and utterance without ever settling into them. Like 
the mystic's body, the text becomes a spectacle of desire and utterance, of bodily and textual 
memory, and of affective excess" (Lochrie 1991a, 69). This is no doubt why Irigaray sees 
such visionary potential in the figure of the medieval female mystic, as she, too, aims to 
destabilise conventional understandings of female bodiliness in the interests of an other, 
hitherto inexpressible desire. 
Irigaray, as described in the Introduction, has shown a fascination with the figures of both 
medieval female mystics and hysterics, depicting them as transgressors who strive to articulate 
a form of female embodiment and desire for which the phallocentric order has no legitimate 
symbolic outlet. In Speculum of the Other Woman Irigaray deconstructs the IIwestem" 
metaphysical thought-system and reveals its dependence upon the body of "woman," which 
serves a reflective or mimetic function for man (Irigaray 1985b). In an essay which forms one 
of ten at the centre of Speculum, Irigaray aligns both female mystic and hysteric as figures 
who confound this passive-reflective female function through their bodily excesses (Irigaray 
1985b, 191-202). Female mystics and hysterics, in Irigaray's view, disrupt or exceed the 
masculinist system by mimicking their own assigned feminine-mimetic (i.e., passive-reflective) 
role. Hysterics commonly "[defy] through excess, through overcompliance," as Elizabeth 
Grosz puts it, and produce a "parody of the expected" (Grosz 1989, 135). Medieval female 
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mystics, many of whom were engaged in "taking to extremes" imitative devotional practices 
recommended by the Church and their culture, may be seen as enacting a similar excessive 
perfonnance (Lochrie 1991 b, 129-38). 
Irigaray describes mimicry as the path "historically assigned to the feminine" (Irigaray 1985a, 
76) which, if a woman consciously adopts, she mayuse for subversive purposes: "To play 
with mimesis is ... for a woman, to try to recover the place of her exploitation by discourse, 
without allowing herself to be simply reduced to it" (Irigaray 1985a, 76). In later chapters I 
will argue that Kempe, in taking to extremes the practices of mimetic identification with 
divinity recommended by her culture in her mysticism, is able to find a place from which to 
speak which is otherwise denied her, and one which unconsciously enacts a possible challenge, 
by means of the divine, to a masculinist system of representation. 
The popular practices of late medieval devotion are sites where "playing" in the dramatic or 
theatrical sense and an emphasis on the somatic experience of both believers and the divine 
figures who are the objects of their devotion conjoin. Margery Kempe's mystical practice, for 
example, aligns her with the hysteric, who "speaks," by means of strange bodily symptoms, 
in protest at her "annihilation as active subject" (Grosz 1989, 138). As Grosz points out: 
"Hysterics mime the disorders of others ... according to ... common cultural ideas," such as the 
Passion of Christ in the late medieval "west," for example (Grosz 1989, 135). Kempe's 
mysticism, like lrigaray's writings and like hysterical mimesis, enacts a disturbing drama 
which contains its own subversive potential. 
Kempe has also been consistently charged with exhibiting "hysterical" behaviour (in an 
-
uncritical, contemporary and colloquial sense) by modern critics, most of them male (see. 
Thurston 1936, 570; Underhill 1936, 642; McCann 1937, 113; Knowles 1964, 147; Turna 
1977, 43; Howard 1980, 34-5; Medcalf 1981, 114-5; Hussey 1989, 117. I discuss these 
responses in Chapter Four) and the epithet has usually been linked with the great "cryings" 
which she enacted in empathy with Christ's Passion and death. I will be arguing that Kempe's 
mimetic and tearful engagements with the Passion of Christ and the sorrow of his mother in 
her visions may usefully be seen as "hysterical" in terms of the hysteric's propensity to an 
excessively troubling mimesis (see Chapters Two (2. 2. 4), Three and Five).21 Jennifer Ash 
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also notes the unusual and imitative parallel in bodily activity between the medieval woman 
mystic and the female hysteric. She observes that in late medieval mystical practice: 
The body of the worshipper, the mimic, would be inscribed with the pain and 
suffering of Christ's dying body; the stigmatised body of the worshipper would be 
marked in total identification with the body of the Divine Other, would participate 
in the hol(e)y wounding of (a) grand Passion. Freudian psychoanalytic theorising 
names such a display of mimicry of bodily identification with an-Other, hysteria 
(Ash 1990, 92). 
Both medieval female mystics and hysterics, then, engage in "excessive" bodily activities and 
both types of behaviour are made the object of recording and analysis by men.22 As Jacqueline 
Rose makes clear, psychoanalysis begins with the (female) hysteric and her bodily symptom's 
challenge to conscious processes: Freud used "what he uncovered in the treatment of the 
hysterical patient as the basis of his account of the unconscious and its universal presence in 
adult life" (Rose 1991b, 97; Irigaray 1981a, 55; 1985a, 45-6). And Jean Laplanche and Jean-
Baptiste Pontalis observe that lIit was .. .in the process of bringing the psychical aetiology of 
hysteria to light that psycho-analysis made its principal discoveries: the unconscious, phantasy, 
defensive conflict and repression, identification, transference, etc ll (Laplanche and Pontalis 
1988, 195). 
Likewise, it was necessary for medieval lay women mystics to gain the support of male 
clerical overseers, men who often acted as the female mystics' scribes. Such priestly 
authorisation of the women's visions helped endorse their charges' sanctity and save them 
from charges of heresy and death at the stake. Irigaray makes the point that the priests who 
supported female mystics in this way were in fact using women to gain access to divine 
secrets, a special kind of "truth" (Irigaray 1985b, 191-2). And yet Irigaray also sees her own 
position (and arguably that of all women) as being similarly "compromised": lithe female 
subject" can only speak through a masculinised superstructure of representation; her efforts 
to "speak as a womanH are always in danger of being re-appropriated. She writes that: 
This is moreover the danger of every statement, every discussion, about Speculum. 
And, more generally speaking, of every discussion about the question of woman. For 
to speak of or about woman may always boil down to, or be understood as, a 
recuperation of the feminine within a logic that maintains it in repression, 
censorship, nonrecognition (Irigaray 1985a, 78). 
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Insofar as Irigaray reads female mystics and hysterics as women who challenge or question, 
through their bodily excesses, the recuperative qualities of the masculinist system even as they 
are re-presented within it, her own reading of their behaviour may be said to be both 
"mystical" and "hysterical" too. It can be read as mystical in the sense that her focus is 
prophetic and forward-looking: Irigaray outlines the way in which she sees "the feminine" 
being produced in masculinist discourse in the present so that women may perfonn specific 
interventions in this system which will enable them to signify "otherwise," actively and in 
their own right. Her reading of the mystic and hysteric is also "hysterical" in the sense that 
the way in which she understands (feminine) intervention as a means of producing change 
depends upon, a copying and displacement of the way "woman" functions in the masculinist 
system. This mimetic displacement (which mirrors the excessive bodily activity of the mystic 
and hysteric) is in Irigaray also body-based. 
Of this mimetic strategy of displacement, Irigaray writes, continuing the quote from This Sex 
Which Is Not One above: 
In other words, the issue is not one of elaborating a new theory of which woman 
would be the subject or the object, but of jamming the theoretical machinery itself, 
of suspending its pretension to the production of a truth and a meaning that are 
excessively univocal. ... [Women] should not put it, then, in the form "What is 
woman?" but rather, repeating/interpreting the way in which, within discourse, the 
feminine finds itself defined as lack, deficiency, or as imitation and negative image 
of the subject, they should signify that with respect to this logic a disruptive excess 
is possible on the feminine side (Irigaray 1985a, 78). 
While in the phallocentric system "woman" reflects to man an ideal image of himself - she 
is his "other" - her body perfonns a mirroring function: "the female condition" is "nothing but 
a possibility that the philosopher may exploit for (self-)reflection .... the mirror of the subject" 
(Irigaray 1985a, 151). "Woman" can only question this mirroring function that she (as 
unsymbolised materiality or body) perfonns for man by exceeding her assigned role, which 
is to reflect, to mimic or copy. Irigaray describes this excess in the following way: 
If she ["woman"] can play that role so well. .. it is because she keeps something in 
reserve with respect to this [mediating] function. Because she still subsists, otherwise 
and elsewhere than there where she mimes so well what is asked of her. Because her 
own "self' remains foreign to the whole staging. But she doubtless needs to reenact 
it in order to remember what that staging has probably metabolized so thoroughly 
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that she has forgotten it: her own sex. Her sex is heterogeneous to this whole 
economy of representation, but it is capable of interpreting that economy precisely 
because it has remained "outside" .... Because it remains somewhere else than in that 
general repetition where it is taken up only as the otherness of sameness (Irigaray 
1985a, 152). 
Because what "woman" might be "remains foreign to the whole staging" of the masculinist 
symbolic system, "woman" can't avoid "reenacting" that which she is said to be in patriarchy. 
As said earlier, it is not a question of "elaborating a new theory." Rather, in Irigaray's view, 
women must explore the nature of the "excess" which they constitute in the phallocentric 
system, the "elsewhere" that women represent, in order to discover how this excess might 
challenge the system by returning to it or (re)appearing in its inevitable gaps and spaces.23 
This "elsewhere" or site of feminine excess is described by lrigaray as being bound up with 
"matter," "female pleasure," and also, significantly, "the transcendental" (Irigaray 1985a, 76-7). 
These three elements are combined in her proposal regarding how a "woman" might undo or 
challenge the passive mirroring function that she currently serves for man. The outlawed 
"matter" which women represent in the phallocentric order forms, as Irigaray has shown in 
Speculum, the material substance of the mirror by which man constitutes himself as proto-
subject: "Re-semblance cannot do without red blood. Mother-matter-nature must go on forever 
nourishing speculation" (Irigaray 1985a, 77). But Irigaray suggests that this outlawed 
materiality (which constitutes "the female body" as passive and lacking) might attain its own 
sexual pleasure - also outlawed in phallocentrism - by an exploration of what a feminine 
divine might be: Irigaray uses "the divine" in her feminist revisionist sense to describe how 
the male as transcendental subject might be challenged and a "feminine pleasure" might 
simultaneously be expressed. 
Irigaray explains how the mirroring function that women perform for men is masked in the 
phallocentric symbolic system by "God": God becomes the mirror which reflects man to 
himself as transcendent, separate subj ect, but at the expense of women. Consequently "that 
'elsewhere} of female pleasure" that is masked by "mother-matter" (which is itself hidden), 
might be found, according to Irigaray, "in the place where it sustains ek-stasy in the 
transcendental. The place where it serves as security for a narcissism extrapolated into the 
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'God' of men" (Irigaray 1985a, 77). Thus the discovery of a distinctively female pleasure 
involves a questioning of IIGod" as the mask for masculine transcendence at the same time 
as it reenvisions God as a means of representing this female pleasure. Irigaray's point is 
apparently that this God which mirrors man to himself through "woman" is a decidedly 
unstable construct and so possibly useful for the elaboration of a feminine specificity: 
That "elsewhere" of feminine pleasure can be found only at the price of crossing 
back through the mirror that subtends all speculation. For this pleasure is not simply 
situated in a process of reflection or mimesis, nor on one side of this process or the 
other: neither on the near side, the empirical realm that is opaque to all language, 
nor on the far side, the self-sufficient infinite of the God of men. Instead, it refers 
all these categories and ruptures back to the necessities of the self-representation of 
phallic desire in discourse. A playful crossing, and an unsettling one, which would 
allow woman to rediscover the place of her II self-affection." Of her" god, It we might 
say (Irigaray 1985a, 77). 
Contrary to the view of Lacan and Lacanians that "crossing back through the mirror" which 
constitutes human SUbjectivity is always a regression (Whitford 1992, 181-2), Irigaray posits 
a connection between female pleasure and the divine which works to undo the singularity 
(phallocentrism) of the male proto-subject. Thus, she challenges the mirroring structures 
described by conventional psychoanalytic theory and by Lacan, arguing that not only is the 
physicality of the mother hidden by the mirror as figure for emergent subjectivity, but also 
that the mirror is supported by a proto-transcendental subject in the form of "God." 
But the purpose of this argument in Irigaray is clearly direoted towards women finding a way 
to accede to specific sexual representation, the possibility that female bodiliness might be 
differently signified and expressed. Revealing the materiality of the Christian God through 
bodily behaviours (like hysteria) that challenge the "excessive equation" of God and "woman" 
effectively transforms the (phallocentric) notion of vision. Whereas in phallocentric 
representation - and in traditional psychoanalytic accounts of the system's workings -
"woman" is the object of the male gaze (Irigaray 1985b, 47-8),24 lrigaray's suggestive 
challenge to this system through the idea of a god for women makes vision not only visionary 
(Le., looking forward to the possibility of specifically female representation) but also 
something that women do: "crossing back through the mirror" means that the mirror - formed 
from the representation of women as passive materiality that is masked by God - also, with 
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the aid of a(n other, feminine) god, might look back (Irigaray 1985b, 135). 
The female mystic, the hysteric, and the visIOnary feminist (Irigaray) all inhabit 
writing/speaking positions that are dictated by their cultures while their challenges to these 
constructions produce a visionary stance. All of these figures "perform" as artful dancers on 
the edges of culturally constructed subject positions, a situation which Elizabeth Castelli 
describes with regard to the female mystic as an experience of acting simultaneously as 
visionary and as object of vision/the male gaze (Castelli 1991, 148, 151n). While female 
mystics receive divine visions and are themselves - along with their visions - subjected to 
(male) ~crutiny and judgement, their ability to envision potentially recasts their traditional 
relationship to the specular economy in which they are always-already the object of the phallic 
100k.25 
Female mystics and hysterics can be seen as exemplifying the type of cultural boundary-
crossing that lrigaray recommends. But to explore mystical and "hysterical" texts in relation 
to Irigaray can also shed light on her project by highlighting the different strategies employed 
by women in pre-twentieth-century times. What the mystic, hysteric, and the visionary 
feminist have in common is their production of an excessive discourse of the female body, 
that is, a language of the body which is unlike anything dictated by cultural norms. lrigaray's 
conflation of mystic and hysteric at the heart of Speculum re-presents a divine figure (Christ) 
as the means of articulating this excessive bodily speech. The mystic's embodying of Christ 
through imitation (hysterical mimesis, in Irigaray's terms) effectively spiritualises her body 
and enables it to be experienced and perceived in new and more empowering ways. This two-
way function of the divine - its traditional use to hide the appropriation of femininity and yet 
its potential to be engaged in the transformation of "the female body" - may be seen as a kind 
of symbol for Irigaray's account of (hysterical) mimesis as mirror-crossing. The divine in the 
form of God/Christ, aligned with "the female body" whose appropriation by man it masks, 
both alters and is altered by female mimetic activity. It is thus revealed as a productively 
unstable symbolic category or space. 
Hysterical mimesis, according to lrigaray, always produces a physical excess (Irigaray 1985a, 
138). When this excess is connected with the divine then the body appears "spiritualisedll : 
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where the spiritual and transcendent have traditionally endorsed male selfuood at the expense 
of the female (body), in female (mystical) hysteria they can become a means of 
simultaneously returning God (and man) to flesh and re~figuring female physicality. This 
double act of deconstructing and exceeding the symbolic confmes of female bodiliness 
through a mimetic overplaying of what is culturally expected may itself be seen as an attempt 
to "spiritualise" the female body, to grant it representation or tltranscendenceH (agency) such 
as men more readily achieve. In the final section of this chapter I will explore what this 
notion might mean in relation to Irigaray's work and her position as a "visionary feminist" 
concerned with the meaning of "the female body." 
1. 4 Spiritual materialism 
Now we have to spiritualize the biological, and that's a work in itself to be done, 
to spiritualize precisely those things that belong to the category of wildness, 
regression, sickness, symptoms, etc. Because the body is lacking spiritualization, it's 
lacking a language (Chawaf 1991, 30). 
The body, in tandem with the divine, is an active locus of the central agendas of both 
Irigaray's particular feminism and late medieval female mysticism, and functions as a 
producer ~ strategically or consciously in Irigaray's case - of an excess of symbolic meanings 
in both. In considering this alignment between the two discourses I find myself returning 
continually to the extract from Spivak quoted earlier, in which a "productive crisis" is 
precipitated by the encounter between past and present, theory and practice. For Spivak, the 
sense of crisis which results from the transitional convergence of different discourses means 
that they "must lose their proper names," and the brief moment of connection which brings 
about this productive event constitutes the shifting site of the dynamic "relationship between 
theory and practice" (Spivak 1990b, 138). For feminism, certainly, the crisis-ridden place 
which marks the site of the relation between theory and practice is undoubtedly the female 
bodies of feminist theorists and practitioners themselves, just as in mysticism, the reception, 
transmission and enaction of a divine transfigurative message all take place through the 
culturally mediated "texe' of the mystic's body. 
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Both mystics' and theorists' bodily texts are, according to a feminist psychoanalytic reading, 
further mediated by their necessary efforts at communicating their thoughts or insights in 
speech or writing which can only be understood via a phallogocentric linguistic system built 
on a repressed formulation of female bodiliness as disempowered and dangerous. However 
in a range of feminist approaches to the question of the body (not just psychoanalytic ones) 
the task of "rethinking the body" necessitates both physical and political activism and an 
awareness of theorising as a physically grounded and mediated event. 
Both feminism and mysticism can be seen as utopian movements which are committed to an 
alternative vision of society and so mystify, in order to avoid foreclosure, the eventual 
outcomes of their statements and concerns in the present. In a recent article, Kathryn Bond 
Stockton explores several poststructuralist feminists' - including Irigaray' s - use of deliberately 
mystifying, mystical andlor spiritual metaphors in their attempts to figure alternative 
conceptions of female bodiliness in a dual move which Stockton names a new kind of 
"spiritual materialism" or "real-bodies mysticism" (Stockton 1992, 123). Stockton pinpoints 
the philosophical place of my own fascination with both mysticism/spirituality and feminisms 
of the body in her discussion of a "real-bodies mysticism" by which "spiritual materialist" 
feminist thinkers reserve a discursive space in their 'writings for the material and as yet non-
representable excess which constitutes female bodies. Stockton shows how the deliberate 
mystification of this discursive space - through the thinkers' "poeticizing" and "spiritualizing" 
of the figures of female bodies - claims the benefits of "transcendence" for extending the 
representational possibilities of physical materiality, again, through and for the bodies of 
women. 
Stockton astutely observes that Irigaray's writings foreground the cultural constructedness of 
women's experiences of their bodies in order to suggest interventions into and revisionings 
of this experience capable of producing real change: 
Irigaray's uniqueness lies, if anywhere, in the explicitness with which she 
spiritualizes - not just poeticizes - bodies in order to get to them. Pointedly mystical 
moves, which effectively locate lack and God between "woman'" s genital lips (no 
small moves, these), make possible her bold belief in women's bodies that escape 
the dominant constructions that would suture them. Irigaray, on some level, seems 
to understand, and to dramatize, what I am calling real-bodies mysticism. This is the 
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belief (not the certainty) that real bodies may exist on their own terms but that we 
can reach them only by the same visionary means that separate us from their reality 
(Stockton 1992, 124). 
In a sense, then, Irigaray's poststructuralist, psychoanalytic vision of the artificiality of 
assumed "bodily experience" mirrors the medieval mystic's sense of the physical, mortal 
world as a poor shadow of that redeeming alternative, the afterlife, in which she necessarily 
believes. 
Nonetheless, both mystics and feminists like Irigaray have persisted in their attempts to speak 
an as yet impossible discourse of the body and to recoup the symbolic excess of the divine 
to this end. While their aims are in many ways different, the textual processes they engage 
in are remarkably similar, not least because both discourses centre on symbolically ambiguous 
bodies. For mysticism, the central focus is the Incarnation of the suffering, bleeding, 
"feminised" Christ who is figured as simultaneously female and male and who, in the mystical 
dialogue, acts as model and love-object for the female mystic in her bodily excesses. For 
"spiritual-materialist" feminists, the body represents the incarnational possibilities of 
contemporary women, many of whom strive to express an autonomy of physical being in a 
world that is still largely male-defined. Both medieval female mystics and feminists such as 
Irigaray aim to communicate ideas which extend the perceptible and possible limits of their 
physical worlds. It is in the manifest desire to be able to represent a body and an experience 
which has not yet been, to effectively "speak as women," that the impulses of the two 
visionary movements conjoin. 
In these attempts to "speak as women," dominant cultural models of bodily experience - that 
is, phallomorphic ones which figure all bodies according to their reflection of a masculine-
coded model of intactness and singularity - are challenged and destabilised. But both kinds 
of texts also reveal an urgent desire to establish a dialogue with their readers, and their 
mystifying qualities frequently serve as a cryptic kind of invitation to "likeminded" souls to 
unravel the mysteries of the. text and thence to attempt to apply them in everyday life. My 
own experience of reading Irigaray has been not unlike that of reading more overtly 
"mystical" texts, in the sense that both kinds of texts make ordinary things (bodies) seem 
foreign and strange. In order to try and understand such enigmatic discourses, I must consent 
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to be mystified, to simultaneously delight in and experience frustration when encountering 
ideas that challenge conventional ways of knowing. 26 
Lochrie's description of "the fissured texts and flesh which rupture the masculine integrity of 
the body in order to make rapture possible" in mysticism reveal that this rapture is always also 
impossible insofar as "the mystical text only reproduces [the] hiatus [of Christ's sacrificial 
death] in and through language" (Lochrie 1991a, 75. Emphasis added). In contrast to 
exegetical readings, the necessarily open-hearted or dialogical reading of the mystical text 
which the mystic desires (that is, a reading that is open to the possibility of mystical 
experience, the embodying of divine communication) challenges "the enclosure of occult 
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truths in external language" (Lochrie 1991a, 75) through the reader's willingness to be 
physically moved to a spiritual encounter whose consequences cannot be foreseen. Lochrie 
notes that readers of (medieval) mystical texts "are expected to be able to read the body, not 
only the displaced mystical body but the body of Christ" in the text (Lochrie 1991a, 75). She 
argues that the act of seeking to read the body of both mystic and Christ in the mystical text -
bodies which necessarily exceed written discourse and create a fissure in language - leads to 
the recognition of the possibility of mystical experience in the reader: /tIt is the fissure 
between flesh and word, utterance and desire which initiates the reader's rapture/t (Lochrie 
1991a, 75). As Lochrie goes on to state: "Mystical texts traverse this linguistic boundary when 
they stray across cultural limits assigned to the body" (Lochrie 1991a, 75). Likewise, Spivak 
observes that "language is not everything. It is only a vital clue to where the self loses its 
boundaries" (Spivak 1992a, 178), and thus where movements of productive change may be 
envisaged and begun. 
The body, then, as it appears and disappears in the linguistic media of mystical and feminist 
theoretical texts, is constantly refigured through the readings produced by female subjects 
which refonnulate /toccult truths" as moveable boundaries for the constructions of alternative 
selves. It is this productive exchange between writers and readers which Margaret Whitford 
describes as essential to the impact of Irigaray's work. She claims that: 
It is necessary to stress that the women's movement is what gives Irigaray's work 
its major contemporary significance, and that we cannot judge her with the eyes of 
posterity. We simply do not know how important she will turn out to have been, in 
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retrospect. There is no sense in which we can definitively arbitrate on priorities -
there is too much to be done, everywhere, both in theory and in action. Trying to 
think the unthought is an enterprise of colossal difficulty and unpredictability. I want 
to argue that Irigaray needs her readers and interpreters, and that this need is 
inherent in her theory (Whitford 1991a, 5).27 
Whitford describes the relationship between Irigaray and her readers in terms uncannily like 
those which apply to the mystic and her audience, when she states her view that "the effort 
needed to read [Irigaray] may be part of the cost of change," and her desire 
to reject the idea that immediate intelligibility is always and under every 
circumstance a desirable goal, since it does not allow for the possibility either of the 
reader changing over a period of time (and understanding at one moment what was 
obscure at another), or of being changed as a result of reading, not in an immediate 
flash but in a slow process of making connections (Whitford 1991a, 5).28 
This seems to me to be an insightful caution, particularly in view of the fact that Irigaray 
remains a practising psychoanalyst and so much of her work has a psychoanalytically-oriented 
base, in which processes involving remembering and reformulation of women's experiences 
are highlighted. Ultimately, I believe Irigaray's feminist pronouncements are of most use as 
ideas which provoke her readers and destabilise the conventional understandings of female 
embodiment and female experience that we inherit in "western" cultures. Her focus on divinity 
seems designed to produce the possibility of a symbolic shift for women in which present 
forms of embodiment might be represented and understood in more empowering ways. 
Her focus, then, and mine in this study, is on the possibile implications of a female divine for 
the future experiences of female subjects in female bodies. Irigaray is plainly interested in 
envisioning and articulating new possibilities for the regenerative transformation of individual 
women's bodily experiences in all their diversity and difference, and wants to rescue the 
divine - along with the female sex as it resides and is represented within patriarchy - from a 
position of near-total incorporation within phallogocentric systems and suggest its 
redeployment as a means of diverse empowering, as a divine which is not one, to this end. 
In the following chapter I will focus mainly on The Book of Margery Kempe (whom I then 
read with and against Irigaray in Chapter Three) in order to explore possible meanings of 
"speaking as a woman" in the text of a late medieval, lay woman mystic. I hope that exploring 
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in some depth the specific cultural discourses of Kempe's time will help clarify what is at 
stake in Irigaray's intention to deconstruct divinity in the Christian tradition, as well as reveal 
where the (Christian) divine as a cultural construct is most open to redeployment and 
(reconstructive) change. 
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1. As Margaret Whitford writes, "a sensible transcendental is the condition of an ethics 
of sexual difference," that is, "an ethics which recognizes the subjectivity of each sex 
[and which] would have to address the symbolic division which allocates the 
material, corporeal, sensible, 'natural' to the feminine and the spiritual, ideal, 
intelligible, transcendental to the masculine" (Whitford 1991a, 149). 
2. In An Ethics of Sexual Difference Irigaray describes "woman" as "situated on the 
side of the abyss" which she figures as "perhaps, that other slope of the 
transcendence of God?" (Irigaray 1993b, 139). In another essay in the same volume 
she describes how God enables men to displace recognition of maternal origin onto 
a belief in the neutrality of language. God functions symbolically to underwrite the 
allegedly neutral metalanguage of men: tlFrom the start, discourse would be for man 
that other of nature, that mother, that nature-womb, within which he lived, survived, 
and risked being lost.. .. His home within the universe .... Language ... would dimly 
reprysent for man the all-powerful and ever-unknown mother as well as the 
transcendent God. Both (Irigaray 1993b, 113. See also 84-5). In an essay on 
Merleau-Ponty in Ethics Irigaray also asks whether God doesn't in fact function as 
the symbolic counterweight to immersion in intrauterine touching" (Irigaray 1993b, 
162). 
3. Margaret Whitford points out that this term is much stronger in French than in 
English, and connotes a primal sense of lostness such as "the state of being 
abandoned by God" (Whitford 1991a, 77). In "The Poverty of Psychoanalysis" 
Irigaray expresses women's "homelessness lt in the symbolic order in the following 
way: "For themselves, women are nowhere, touching everything, but never in touch 
with each other, lost in the air, like ghosts. Dissolved, empty, abandoned, gone -
gone away from themselves" (Lemoine-Luccioni 1976, 154; 1987, 129-30, cited in 
Irigaray 1991g, 91). And in An Ethics of Sexual Difference she describes women's 
lostness as "the suffering and abandonment of the fusional state which fails to 
emerge as a subjectll because "no space-time is available for experiencing it" 
(Irigaray 1993b, 70). Thus women remain in some sense aligned with the "pre-
objectar and the unsymbolised maternal relation because they cannot mediate their 
own drives in the symbolic so long as they represent the outer limits of subjectivity 
for men. See Whitford (1991a, 78-9, 125). 
4. On the concept of the imaginary in Irigaray, see Whitford (1986, 3-5). 
5. In The Location of Culture Homi K. Bhabha writes that: "If the jargon of our times 
- postmodernity, postcoloniality, postfeminism - has any meaning at all, it does not 
lie in the popular use of the 'post' to indicate sequentiality - after-feminism; or 
polarity - anti-modernism. These terms that insistently gesture to the beyond, only 
embody its restless and revisionary energy if they transform the present into an 
expanded and ex-centric site of practice and empowerment. For instance, if the 
interest in postmodernism is limited to a celebration of the fragmentation of the 
'grand narratives' of postenlightenment rationalism then, for all its intellectual 
excitement, it remains a profoundly parochial enterprise It (Bhabha 1994, 4). lrigaray 
would doubtless be in agreement with this statement, since in her view the purpose 
of feminist endeavour is to "transform the present" through a focus on the possibility 
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of a specifically female future, challenging in the process the phallocentric master 
narratives which void the present through an insistent forward-projection and a blind 
belief in the necessity of "progress." See Irigaray (1986a, 15-16; 1993k). 
6. Elizabeth Grosz counters this fear by explaining that "for Irigaray, not only is 
subjectivity structured with reference to the (symbolic) meaning of the body, but the 
body itself is the product and effect of symbolic inscriptions which produce it as a 
particular, socially appropriate type of body .... The body is thus the site of the 
intersection of psychical projections; and of social inscriptions. Understood in this 
way, it can no longer be considered pre- or acultural. Common feminist objections 
to theories utilising notions of the body - the charges of essentialism, naturalism and 
biologism - are not appropriate in this case" (Grosz 1989, xv). 
7. This point is also well made by Fuss (1989, 1-21) and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(1990a, 45). 
8. Kristeva's Powers of Horror (1982) builds on the work of anthropologist Mary 
Douglas in this regard, and is discussed by Grosz in "The Body of Signification" 
(1990b). The work of Alphonso Lingis (1983) also deals with similar issues and is 
likewise treated by Grosz in "Inscriptions and Body-Maps: Representations and the 
Corporeal" (1990c, 62-74). 
9. By "excess of transcendence" I mean the materiality of the (male) subject which is 
symbolically repressed in and by the setting up of a masculine God as guarantor of 
a patriarchal social system. Peter de Bolla also describes, from a somewhat different 
theoretical perspective, the unique propensity of what he names "the discourse of the 
sublime" to "produce to excess" as it attempts to formulate commentary on the 
"excessive experience" of the divine (de Bolla 1989, 12). 
10. See such standard Gospel commands as that from Mark 12: 28-31 (The Jerusalem 
Bible 1974) concerning the greatest and second greatest of all divine commandments: 
"First .. .Israel...you must love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your 
soul, with all your mind and with all your strength," and "second .... You must love 
your neighbour as yourself." See also the parable of the sheep and the goats in 
Matthew 25: 31-46, which has Christ claiming, on the day of judgement, that those 
who gave food, clothing shelter and compassion to the needy on earth did this to 
him and will be saved, whereas those who neglected to do these things will endure 
damnation. And Luke 17: 20-1: "The coming of the kingdom of God does not admit 
of observation .... For, you must know, the kingdom of God is among you." Irigaray 
also makes this point about the bodily focus of Christ's teaching, claiming that, in 
the gospels, "the course of Jesus's life appears close to the teachings of certain 
Indian sages, the Buddha, for example," in that "spiritual becoming and corporeal 
becoming are inseparable. Every stage in the life of Christ is noted and described in 
the Gospels as an event of the body .... His life cannot be reduced to speeches .. .in 
which the body is lost to lessons in tact" (Irigaray 1989a, 65). 
11. Lochrie states with regard to positive or affective Christian mysticism, which 
privileges the human emotions and senses as the means of devotion to and 
communication with the divine: "Whether the tokens are inscribed outwardly on the 
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mystic's body or inwardly on her heart and mind, the activity of meditation and 
particularly remembrance produces the physical effects of [Christ's] Passion image, 
rendering the mystic's body itself a kind of mnemonic of that suffering. From 
meditation on images comes the translation of the mystic's own body into image of 
suffering and yet another sign of remembrance" (LochrieI991a, 35). Bynum notes 
that women's mysticism privileges the body profoundly: "Women regularly speak. 
of tasting God, of kissing Him deeply, of going into His heart or entrails, of being 
covered by His blood. Their descriptions of themselves or of other women often, 
from a modern point of view, hopelessly blur the line between spiritual or 
psychological, on the one hand, or bodily or even sexual, on the other" (Bynum 
1989, 168). Lochrie also points out that, "while mystical scholars endeavor to 
distinguish between 'spiritual' and 'literal,' or 'physical,' mystical terminology, the 
integrity of these fields, like that of the body, sometimes breaks down" (Lochrie 
1991a, 70). Examples of scholars who reveal this kind of somatophobia are Riehle 
(19~1) and Stargadt (1985). 
12. Stargadt gives some examples of this behaviour, though she professes to find it 
"embarrassing" (Stargadt (1985, 299-300). See also Bynum (1986, 274; 1989, 165); 
Lawton (1992, 113); Weissman (1982, 217). 
13. These first began on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem in about 1413, near the middle of 
Kempe's life, and continued frequently thereafter. 
14. As I have attempted to show elsewhere (Bremner 1992) and will elaborate in 
Chapter Four, critical anxieties such as those shown by an earlier generation of 
Kempe scholars who pronounced Kempe's claim to mystical validity misplaced echo 
those shown by clerics in Kempe's Book. Where the medieval clerics betray their 
discomfort with the mutable version of self and divine which the mystic represents 
and through which she claims authority, several twentieth-century critics also reflect 
an investment in the concept of "the self' as a stable entity which mimics a divine 
being that is likewise an unquestionable given. 
15. It seems to me that this fundamental instability in (female) mystical texts may be 
another reason for the near-absence of critical commentary on mystical discourse as 
such and the general reluctance to grant mystical texts a status of their own which 
Lochrie notes in reference to The Book of Margery Kempe (Lochrie 1991a, 59-62). 
Lochrie points out that there is a tendency in medieval scholarship to analyse 
mystical texts according to the same criteria as more consciously "literary" ones, and 
that such conventional studies tend towards "a taxonomy of mystical devotion 
without much attention to mysticism as a discourse." In Kempe's case, for example, 
this has led to a "collapsing of hagiographic and mystical discourses" which has led 
many scholars "to focus only on her life" (Lochrie 1991 a, 59). Lochrie cites de 
Certeau (1986; 1992) as the main exception to this rule with regard to mysticism 
generally. See also Bosse (1979, 9-10); Aers (1988, 74). This insistent focus on the 
personal and tendency to categorise personalities may well have arisen, in my view, 
from the prominence of women in medieval mystical texts, which has in the past 
provoked critical anxiety among medieval scholars. See Underhill (1936, cited in 
Beckwith 1993); Knowles (1955, 222-3); Riehle (1981, 118). 
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16. To mention only some examples of this work, see the essays included in the 
following collections: Aers (1986); Finke and Shichtman (1987); Wasserman and 
Roney (1989); Frantzen (1991); Brownlee et al (1991); McEntire (1992); Lomperis 
and Stanbury (1993). For examples of individual books, see: Kristeva (1987); Aers 
(1988); Noakes (1988); Leupin (1989); Bums (1993). See also the recent (1992) 
Special Issue of Exemplaria 4 (1) (Spring) on Feminisms, Theory, and Medieval and 
Renaissance Texts. For work specifically on mysticism, see Finke (1988); Lochrie 
(1988; 1991a); Ash (1990); Antonopoulos (1991). 
17. Barbara Nolan, for example, begins a review of Aers' Chaucer, Langland, and the 
Creative Imagination in Speculum with the statement that the book is "severely 
limited by an anachronistic thesis" (Nolan 1983, 139), and goes on to reveal her 
investment in supposedly "objective," scholarly historical analysis by damning Aers' 
readings as "partial"; "polemical"; "eccentric"; and "showing political bias." Nolan's 
, own inevitable partialities are glossed over through the assumption of a critical 
community's unproblematical access to the past. She writes: "To discover each 
poet's voice we must share ... their grounding in the literary, artistic, intellectual, and 
religious idiom of their time," and claims that, in Aers' case, "a lack of historical 
understanding leads to ... distortions." Elton Higgs produces a similar judgement upon 
the same work. While he censures Aers' book for revealing "the intrusion of the 
author's personal biases" he suggests that it should instead "countenance the common 
assumptions of the age of Langland and Chaucer" (Higgs 1981, 121). Both Nolan 
and Higgs fail to address the difficulties involved in pursuing legitimate historical 
knowledge and the "distortions" "we" are thereby unwittingly compelled to produce. 
18. This is not always the case, of course. I am describing a tendency to reject as 
"political" certain readings of texts from the past which implies that a non-political 
reading is possible. This topic is well treated by Belsey (1983) and Eagleton (1983, 
194-217). Beckwith, for example, although she rejects psychoanalytic theory as a 
suitable tool for reading The Book of Margery Kempe (Beckwith 1986, 41), provides 
an impressive account of the construction of subjectivity in Kempe's time and place, 
one which does not claim to be non-politically engaged (Beckwith 1986; 1992; 1993, 
78-111). 
19. Similarly, Ruth Evans and Lesley Johnson note the importance of affirming ways 
in which "engagement with the literature of the past is of value for feminist critical 
practice," and quote Gillian Beer thus: '''The encounter with the otherness of earlier 
literature can allow us to recognise and challenge our own assumptions, and those 
of the society in which we live .... The study of past writing within the conditions of 
its production disturbs that autocratic emphasis on the self and the present as if they 
were stable entities'" (Beer 1989, 67, qtd. in Evans and Johnson 1991, 172). And 
Chandra Talpade Mohanty suggests that "historicizing and locating political agency 
is a necessary alternative to formulations of the 'universality' of gendered oppression 
and struggles" in contemporary feminist theory (Mohanty 1992, 75). Finally, 
Griselda Pollock affirms "the necessity to grasp persons as living, specific 
configurations of historical placement around deeply and mutually interactive 
categorizations - race, class, gender - which are never discrete totalities, but complex 
formations operative as much at the level of psychic as of socio-economic 
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construction" in both the present and the past (Pollock 1992, 164). 
20. The 1986 English version of "Divine Women" (translated by Stephen Muecke) reads: 
"don't let any parts of us be amputated that could be expansive for us" (Irigaray 
1986b, 9, qtd. in Gross 1986, 17). 
21. Hope Phyllis Weissman is one of a growing number of critics of Kempe's Book to 
have observed that "to diagnoze [Kempe's] case as 'hysteria' need not be to 
trivialize her significance or reduce her Book's value as cultural testimony. On the 
contrary, social historians have become increasingly aware that the pervasive hysteria 
of nineteenth-century women cannot be regarded merely as a symptom of individual 
maladjustments; it was also symptomatic of repressive social and sexual attitudes and 
of rigidly defined sex roles" (Weissman 1982, 201-2). See also Partner (1991, 63-5); 
Johnson (1992); Wilson (1992); Long (1994). 
22. The medieval female lay mystic had also to deny her female sexuality (which in 
many cases constituted prior sexual experience) in order to achieve mystical 
authority and the support of the Church, and reinscribe it into her love-relationship 
with Christ, just as the hysteric'S symptoms are, in a feminist reading, the result of 
a culturally imposed repression of desire. 
23. In the essay "Sexual Difference" lrigaray states her view that women should explore 
what is left out of masculinist cultural constructions as this lack pertains to the 
feminine: "I search for myself among those elements which have been assimilated. 
But I ought to reconstitute myself on the basis of disassimilation, and be reborn from 
traces of culture, works already produced by the other. I should search for the things 
they contain and do not contain, and examine what has and has not given rise to 
them, what are and are not their conditions. Woman ought to rediscover herself, 
among other things, through the images of herself already deposited in history and 
the conditions of production of the work of man, rather than through the work itself 
or its genealogy" (Irigaray 1991a, 168-9). 
24. In lrigaray's critique of phallocentric culture, a libidinal economy - a structure or 
dynamics of desire - based on a morphology of the masculine body is bound up with 
"an age-old oculocentrism" or privileging of the visual over the other senses 
(Irigaray 1978, 50; 1985b, 48; 1993b, 175). As a result, "the contract, the collusion, 
between one sex/organ [the penis] and the victory won by visual dominance .. .leaves 
woman with her sexual void, with an 'actual castration' carried out in actual fact" 
(Irigaray 1985b, 48). lrigaray notes that "psychoanalytic discourse on female 
sexuality" endorses a phallic model of sexuality which "shares the values 
promulgated by patriarchal society and culture, values inscribed in the philosophical 
corpus: property, production, order, form, unity, visibility ... and erection (Irigaray 
1985a, 86. Emphasis added). Angela Grooten also treats this issue with regard to 
Freud and Lacan (Grooten 1991). 
25. Castelli describes the situation of a fifth-century saint named Syncletica who, "at the 
end of her life ... is described not only as the recipient of visions but as having 
become 'as if one herself,' as though her elevated status on the brink of death 
recreates her relationship to the specular positions lt (Castelli 1991, 148). The elevated 
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status of this particular female saint in early Christianity may be an example of 
"crossing back through the mirror" in the sense of a connection with the divine 
which is acknowledged by the Church as special and yet also transforms the ways 
in which women were understood through Christian discourse as excessive to (and 
passive within) that system (see Chapter Two). 
26. The "foreignness" of reading Irigaray has also, of course, to do with the fact that I 
initially read her work in English translation in a New Zealand university (reading 
and discussion group) context, where "French" theoretical ideas can generally be said 
to have been under suspicion, a suspicion which at the time I shared. I then laboured 
my way through the French as an adjunct to the more proficient, published 
translations, but with the sense that in the eyes of many New Zealand feminists the 
whole enterprise (reading Irigaray and the efforts required to gain understanding) 
was something of a worthless task. The persistence of an "anti-theory" camp in New 
Zealand feminism (Jones and Guy 1992), combined with my own contrariness in 
relation to identity groups of any kind has no doubt shaped my particular experience 
of reading Irigaray as a kind of "initiation" to special status. 
27. Teresa Brennan provides another (also psychoanalytically inspired) comment on 
"trying to think the unthought ll in the preface to her book History After Lacan, 
where she describes "the propositional mode" in (critical) writing as a style more 
tolerated in lithe French academic world ll than outside it, in England, for example, 
where "the secondary mode" consisting of IIresearch, exegeses, and critiques" is more 
the norm. Brennan articulates these two modes compellingly in psychoanalytic terms: 
"A certain kind of confidence is as much a symptom of the ego's era as the diffident 
dependence on the other's social approval. The ego can be original, but if the ego 
alone governs writing, it will demand that the reader do all the work required to 
understand what it writes. Either the ego trusts that the other's (like the mother's) 
main aim in life is to understand it, or the ego believes in and defers to an ideal 
other with whom it identifies as an imaginary part of itself.. .. The question of course 
is how to combine the propositional and secondary modes and thus transcend them. 
To combine them is to regard yet disregard the other, to regard the right to 
understand, and thus communicate, to disregard the desire for recognition, and thus 
risk going beyond the fixed points governing social approval at the time of writing. 
It is to balance confidence and context, the movement of ideas and fixed points. And 
that can only be done if one gives out more than one takes inti (Brennan 1994, xii-
xiii). While Brennan is writing in this context about (academic) writing, her 
statements can also, I think, be applied to the process of reading Irigaray. Both 
Brennan's and Whitford's terms have spiritual or religious overtones and argue for 
a willing suspension of the desire for comforting forms of knowledge, a kind of 
"charitable" reading (or writing) which is prepared to risk a stable sense of self in 
the interest of (future) discovery. 
28. Trinh T. Minh-ha also describes the benefits of such a process of reading in relation 
to pedagogy, in terms which likewise connote a "mystical" sense of actively awaiting 
new kinds of knowledge or inspiration. She says that Ilstudents often find it very 
difficult to assume freedom; when you give them freedom they experience it as 
chaos. It is very hard for many of them to accept that we can be confused together 
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and because of that strain of being confused together, we can move somewhere else, 
with and beyond the place in which we have been confined. The difficulty lies in 
accepting that this moment of so-called confusion, the moment of blankness and of 
emptiness through which one necessarily passes in order to have insight. In other 
words confusion can be a mode of receptivity if one does not simply try to bypass 
it" (Trinh 1994, 20). 
CHAPTER TWO 
"SPEAKING THE BODY": MEDIEVAL IDEOLOGIES AND 
THE BOOK OF MARGERY KEMPE 
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But God forbid that you should say or assume that I am a teacher. .. for I am a 
woman, ignorant, weak, and frail.. .. But because I am a woman, ought I therefore 
to believe that I should not tell you of the Goodness of God, when I saw at the same 
time that it is his will that it be known? (Julian of Norwich 1978, qtd. in Petroff 
1986, 26-7) 
"God Almighty does not forbid ... that we should speak of him" (Kempe 1988,164), 
2. 1 Conflicting Voices: Women speaking/speaking of "woman" 
So an old monk, who had been treasurer to the Queen when he was in secular 
clothes, a powerful man and greatly feared by many people, took her by the hand 
saying to her, "What can you say of God?" 
"Sir," she said, "I will both speak of him and hear of him," repeating to the monk 
a story from scripture (Kempe 1988, 63). 
The Book of Margery Kempe is the story of the life and spiritual experiences of Margery 
Kempe (c.1373-c.1438), an English woman born in the prospering East Anglian town of 
King's Lynn (then Bishop's Lynn), following her dramatic spiritual conversion in middle age. 
The Book is a retrospective account of Kempe's life as a visionary, \Vfitten with the help of 
male scribes since the mystic herself is thought not to have been able to read or write.1 As 
such it is a record of Kempe's speaking about or dictating to supportive clerics the events of 
her extremely active and by no means trouble-free existence. 
At the beginning of her illuminating study of Kempe's Book, Karma Lochrie quotes the 
fifteenth-century Chancellor of the University of Paris, Jean Gerson, on the dangers of 
women's speech, a quotation which I would like to reproduce here. In De probatione spiritum 
(1415), a work which Gerson wrote in response to the declarations of female mystics, he 
asserts: 
There is hardly any other calamity more apt to do harm or that is more incurable 
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than the unbridled speech of women. If its only consequence were the immense loss 
of time, this would already be sufficient for the devil. But you must know that there 
is something else to it: the insatiable itch to see and to speak, not to mention ... the 
itch to touch (Gerson 1960-, 177, compare art. 11, qtd. in Obrist 1984, 236, qtd. in 
Lochrie 1991a, 1. Emphasis added). 
As Lochrie observes, Gerson connects women's "unbridled speech" with the "something else" 
which constitutes "incurable" female bodily excess. Gerson's statement is, in fact, a denial of 
women's right to teach, preach and prophesy on the basis that, in women, to speak at all is 
to speak a female body. And in the middle ages this body is figured as a place of disruption 
and danger. 
Reading The Book of Margery Kempe, two things are most evident and have been remarked 
by critics: the centrality of Kempe's voice - what Barry Windeatt calls "her strengths as a 
strikingly individual and vivid talker and rememberer" (Windeatt 1988, 24; Lawton 1992, 
102) - and the importance of the physical body in her accounts of everyday events and 
mystical engagements, what Sarah Beckwith has described as "a very material mysticism" 
(Beckwith 1986). Thus Gerson's pronouncement is by no means irrelevant to Kempe's life 
and text. However, as a dictated account of Kempe's celebration of her love for Christ in 
unashamedly physical terms, the mitten result of an unusual and courageous life already 
lived, the Book is a challenge to the male view that the corporeal qualities of women's speech 
annul its purpose. In fact, I consider Kempe's Book to be deeply subversive of medieval 
notions of the unreliable and thoroughly sexualised speech of women, not least because 
Kempe's sexuality is reformulated by her taking Christ as her (mystical) lover in place of her 
husband after her conversion, an act which gives her voice new authority.2 
In this chapter I examine the ideological construction of female bodiliness in England in the 
late middle ages, as it is represented in four particular types of discourse, and discuss The 
Book of Margery Kempe in relation to these. The four discourses are medieval sermons (2. 
1. 1); accusations of heresy (2.1. 2); the European tradition of saints' or holy women's lives 
(2. 1. 3); and (broadening the focus of enquiry somewhat) the Virgin Mary and the 
"feminised" Christ as central and inspirational figures in medieval popular devotion (2. 2). In 
all of these discourses, women's bodies are in one way or another central, and female 
sexuality and female desire become bound up with the representation of the divine. My 
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analysis of the first three discourses will consider how they represent the topic of women's 
speech and how they reflect, to varying degrees, conventional medieval understandings of 
female bodiliness which make women's speech suspect. For any medieval woman who desired 
to assert herself through public speech or writing, these attitudes served to undermine her 
attempts to re-present herself as a speaking being. However, late medieval depictions of the 
feminised Christ and his grief-stricken Mother, the Virgin Mary, enabled increasing numbers 
of lay, visionary women to find an authorised voice through their engagement with holy 
figures in imagined scenes of worship according to the popular notion of imitatio Christi, and 
through recording these encounters in written form. My attention to this fourth, more 
generally-operative discourse, will consider how it allows for a kind of subversion of Christian 
doctrine with regard to the female body by mystical women. 
As a married, lay woman mystic, Margery Kempe was something of an anomaly in fifteenth-
century England. While uncloistered lay women living both singly and in groups were not 
uncommon in continental areas (i.e., Germany and the Low Countries) in the later middle 
ages, England produced a stronger tradition of anchoresses and anchorites (individual, 
enclosed female and male religious), especially in the northeast, where the mystic spent much 
of her life (Clay 1914, cited in Atkinson 1983, 183; Hughes 1988, 355).3 The large number 
of pilgrimages Kempe undertook; her constant visiting and discussions with religious 
authorities in England and abroad; her public proclamations and especially her notorious 
weeping and wailing in public when recalling Christ's sorrows made her stand out in a society 
where women who felt the call to the religious life were encouraged to shut themselves away 
in silence. 
Kempe's family background may shed some light on the radical path she later chose. 
Although nothing is known of her mother's life, her father was perhaps the most important 
person in Lynn in the late fourteenth century (Goodman 1978, 351). As ~larissa Atkinson 
notes, he was five times mayor of the town, the leader of a powerful merchant guild, "six 
times Member of Parliament, coroner, and Justice of the Peace" (Atkinson 1983, 15). Margery 
Kempe was thus born a member of the rising middle-class (Delany 1975, 107; Aers 1988, 73). 
At the age of about twenty she married John Kempe, also a powerful citizen ofLynn although 
a less notable figure than her father. Her marriage was, then, a step down in status, and her 
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own reflections on her failure to play the part of the "good wife" (Kempe 1988, 43-4; 
Goodman 1978, 353) imply some disillusionment with her new role. It seems probable that, 
as a medieval woman from a family of reasonably high social expectations, Kempe was 
unable to find a suitable outlet for her ambitions until she created her own as a mystic and 
follower of Christ.4 
Kempe's becoming a "professional" lay religious enabled her to speak and "write" (at least 
via dictation), claiming the authority of Christ through her relationship of special devotion to . 
him. But in order to achieve this singular status she had to negotiate with her husband John 
her right to "own" her own body, before she could attempt to escape the limitations on 
women's speech implied in Gerson's proclamation through her visionary role. Chapter 11 of 
the Book documents an encounter between Kempe and her husband which marks a turning 
point in this process of negotiation and exemplifies the earthiness or prominence of physicality 
in the Book's narrative style. This aspect of the text arises from Kempe's status and 
experience as a merchant wife, which is translated into the Book in the form of domestic 
imagery and concerns (e.g., Kempe 1988, 127, 236). I will use the passage from Chapter 11 
to introduce the topic of medieval attitudes to women's speech and my discussion of Kempe' s 
challenges to this construction to follow. 
The extract begins thus, in familiar story-telling fashion: 
It happened one Friday - Midsummer Eve, in very hot weather - as this creatures 
was coming from York carrying a bottle of beer in her hand and her husband a cake 
tucked inside his clothes against his chest - that her husband asked his wife this 
question: "Margery, if there came a man with a sword who would strike off my head 
unless I made love with you as I used to do before, tell me on your conscience - for 
you say you will not lie - whether you would allow my head to be cut off, or else 
allow me to make love with you again, as I did at one time?" (Kempe 1988, 58) 
John Kempe's loaded question has arisen from the context of his wife's recent entry into "the 
way of everlasting life"(Kempe 1988, 45) in special devotion to Christ, which has involved 
her in various bodily privations in penance for former sins, sexual relations with her husband 
among them, as well as an increase in spiritual activities. Kempe's desire to discontinue sexual 
relations with her husband has met with resistance before this point, despite her petitions, to 
both God and man, to be allowed to "live chaste." 
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What seems most striking to a modem reader about the representation of both husband and 
wife in the above piece is the centrality of the bodies whose apposite desires are at issue. The 
opening scene is a good example of the wealth .of concrete, physical imagery which is a 
pervasive feature of the entire chapter and, indeed, the Book in generaL The text focuses 
directly on the appetites of Kempe and her husband as we are told of the hot weather on the 
road from York, the bottle of beer in Kempe's hand and the cake against John's chest, which 
is followed by John Kempe's hypothetical question of lovemaking and decapitation - sex and 
death. The debates over issues of bodily control described here by Kempe are crucial to her 
becoming a mystic at all and so, in tum, an "author." The passage thus symbolises the 
difficult position Kempe had to negotiate in the construction of the Book between maintaining 
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the endorsement of a priestly scribe (because her female body was seen as denying her 
authoritative speech) and telling the story of her revelations which involve (imagined) bodily 
encounters with Christ. In the chapter, Kempe wrangles with her husband over who - God or 
John - should have right of access to her body. The symbolism of body-bargaining in which 
the female body - Kempe's - is figured as an exchange-object between two subjects who are 
effectively male, underscores the importance for Kempe of being able to intervene in the 
exchange process in a bodily manner: first to claim her body back from her husband and 
dedicate it to God, and thence to record her bodily activities in book form. Kempe's recording 
her life and revelations, thereby putting her clerically endorsed words into public circulation, 
is the tangible sign that she has managed to remove herself from - or at least reconstitute 
herself within - the patriarchal economy of female commodity exchange. 
John Kempe's inquiry is revealed to have some basis when his wife, answering that she would 
rather see John killed than that the couple should "tum back to ... uncleanness" (Kempe 1988, 
58), asks why he hasn't insisted on making love to her recently as he did before. John replies 
that an intense fear, plainly of supernatural origin, has stopped him from doing so, which 
Kempe cites as evidence of her prophecy, three years earlier, that her husband (or at least his 
desire for sex) IIwould suddenly be slain" (Kempe 1988, 58). However, Kempe's answer that 
she would rather see her husband killed than resume sexual activity elicits a typical response: 
'''You are no good wife'" (Kempe 1988, 58). 
In the middle ages a lay woman such as Kempe, born the legal property of her father, was 
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transferred to the ownership (if not of the Church) of another man through marriage, and was 
expected to perform the role of "good wife" - which included availability for sexual activity 
when desired by her husband, and motherhood - as her spiritual vocation (Erickson 1976,204; 
Labarge 1986, 27).6 The wife's role as a sexual possession is made clear in the popular 
medieval treatise, Speculum Christiani, which states that, although: 
fleshly knowledge between husband and wife is sinful and deadly when it is the 
result of the fleshly lust of lechery ... whomsoever has a lawful wife ... [should] make 
use of her lawfully at appropriate times, that they may receive the blessing of our 
Lord on bringing forth the fruit of children (Speculum Christiani 1933, 28-30. My 
translation). 
, 
Marriage was in fact the least prestigious of three main vocational options for medieval 
women, in terms of the spiritual literature of the time. The thirteenth-century treatise of advice 
to young virgins, Hali lvleidhad, sets this out quite plainly: 
Of these three states - virginity and widowhood, and marriage is the third - you can 
tell by the degrees of their bliss which one is superior to the others, and by how 
much. For marriage has its reward thirtyfold in heaven; widowhood, sixtyfold; 
virginity, with a hundredfold, surpasses both. See then from this, whoever descends 
from her virginity into marriage, by how many degrees she falls downwards (Hali 
Meidhad 1990, 20-1).7 
The argument which has arisen between Kempe and her husband and is treated in this chapter 
of the Book is the result of Kempe's desire to cross the boundaries which demarcated one 
form of patriarchal containment of female sexuality - marriage - from another - the life of a 
"professional" religious - in the middle ages. Virginity was the normal requirement for 
medieval women who desired to pursue a religious life, a state which was figured in the 
literature of advice to intending nuns as Han integritas of all the sensesH which led to "bodily 
closure and silence (Lochrie 1991b, 126).8 Whether she married a man or was wedded to the 
Church, a woman's seductive speech and sexuality, viewed by theologians and preachers as 
readily aligned with the devil (like that of her mythical foremother Eve (Phillips 1984)), made 
her suspect as a vehicle of divine grace. Hence women were directed towards ways of life 
which confined them physically and placed strictures on their speech through the working out 
of what Lochrie calls the doctrine of the enclosed female body (Lochrie 1991 b, 124). If a 
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woman chose not to pursue the path of the enclosed religious life, she was generally expected 
to direct her energies towards her husband, household and children. Kempe had been married 
to her husband for twenty years at the time at which the above scene took place (Windeatt 
1988, 11), but her desire to pursue a spiritual life of independent devotion to Christ conflicted 
with her prior marital experience. Her choice to live as a pilgrim and mystic, a vocation 
traditionally reserved for women Who were virgins in the middle ages, challenged the strict 
channelling of female speech and sexuality on which the suppression of women in patriarchal 
societies depends. 
To return to Kempe and her husband on the Friday, Midsummer Eve, on which their dispute 
occurs. Faced with his wife's determination to continue in chastity, John Kempe attempts to 
strike a bargain with her, which involves the couple sleeping in the same bed, Kempe paying 
his debts before she goes on pilgrimage, and breaking her regular Friday practice of fasting 
from food and drink (Kempe 1988, 59). The importance to Kempe of achieving control over 
what is required of her body in the bargain is revealed by her answer, in which she states her 
flat refusal to break her fast "as long as [she] live[s]" (Kempe 1988, 59), although in response, 
John threatens to have sex with her again. At this point Kempe begs to be allowed some time 
for prayer, and, kneeling down beside the road, articulates a plea to God which requests 
knowledge of how to weigh up the detriment of the demands which are being made upon her 
physical being. '" Lord God, '" she says, 
"you know what sorrow I have had to be chaste for you in my body all these three 
years, and now I might have my will and I dare not, for love of you. For if I were 
to break that custom of fasting from meat and drink on Fridays which you 
commanded me, I should now have my desire" (Kempe 1988, 59). 
The fasting in obedience to God is a sign of the mystic's reserving her body for him, of 
which chastity is the most central means. Thus giving up either of these forms of devotion 
threatens to immure Kempe once more in the life of fleshly "uncleanness" which, since her 
conversion, has caused her such pain and remorse. In answer to her prayer, Christ tells Kempe 
to ask her husband once more for her wish, which he says will be granted as she is 
empowered by that very fleshly abstinence which she requires. Christ also releases her from 
the need to fast, the purpose of which, he states, will now be achieved (Kempe 1988,59-60). 
Kempe then makes with her husband the following agreement: 
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"Sir, if you please, you shall grant me my desire, and you shall have your desire. 
Grant me that you will not come into my bed, and I grant you that I will pay your 
debts before I go to Jerusalem. And I make my body free to God, so that you never 
make any claim on me requesting any conjugal debt after this day as long as you 
live - and I shall eat and drink on Fridays at your bidding" (Kempe 1988, 60). 
Thus Kempe uses her financial assets9 to "buy back" her body which has been under her 
husband's control since her marriage (Delany 1975, 111-12). It is significant that this bargain 
is struck before the mystic leaves on her Jerusalem pilgrimage, as on this journey she 
dramatically embodies the purpose of her vocation, which is to travel both inside and outside 
her country, proclaiming Christ's Gospel and encouraging his followers. It is also on this 
journey that she receives the gift of tears in identification with her Saviour's sorrows which 
is to become her spiritual trademark and is, as I will later explain, a sign of the complexities 
of the "bodily transformations" which her Passion imitatio enacts. A bodily transformation of 
a kind has, in fact, already been effected by the monetary exchange which has taken place 
between Kempe and her husband in Chapter 11. By means of this transaction Kempe accedes 
to the status, if not of virgin, at least of widow, in terms of the role in life she is henceforth 
freed to take up (Fienberg 1989,139).10 Thus the cultural meaning of her bodiliness changes 
on the striking of the marital bargain and she is able to claim her body as her own insofar as 
she may now dedicate it wholly to Christ. ll 
An important part of Kempe's quest for spiritual sustenance in her new life involved listening 
to sermons, both in her local parish and in places she passed through on her travels. Popular 
medieval sermons, however, revealed considerable anxiety about women's speech and 
sexuality, focusing frequently on the perceived need for them to be enclosed in anchorhold 
or home. Kempe's efforts to "speak as a woman" in ways other than those suggested by the 
negative construction of women in medieval theology appear in her text, then, in sometimes 
confrontational interaction with ideas about the female body propagated in sermons. Kempe's 
Book itself contains sermon-like anecdotes, evidence of the great number of sermons the 
mystic listened to in her lifetime and which helped construct and focus her special devotion 
to her Saviour. But it also contains what official, popular medieval sermons excluded: a record 
of the difficulties and anguish involved in carving out an identity which exceeded the 
categories of legitimate selfhood prescribed by the Church for women. 
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2. 1. 1 Popular preaching: The appropriation of female voices 
Sermons were one of the main devotional discourses which prescribed ideologies of gender 
through the teachings of the medieval Church to lay people like Kempe. An increase in 
control over the "private lives" of individuals by the Church was evidenced by the Fourteenth 
Lateran Council's decree of 1215 enjoining yearly confession by all Christians to their parish 
priest (Barratt 1984, 413). As de Certeau states, this action had the effect of "introduc[ing] 
Church legitimacy into the orderly or haphazard course of private experience" (de Certeau 
1992, 88). The Church's aim of regulating the physical behaviour of lay people was 
maintained by the public, educative discourse of sermons - and often by exempla (exemplary 
tales) presented therein (Heffernan 1984Y2 - and the private discourse of confession, in which 
believers spoke about their (sexual) sins in officially prescribed ways. Jacquart and Thomasset 
note that the penitentials, compiled for use by parish priests in the confessional situation, "may 
be considered as the earliest systematic exploration of the many manifestations of sexual 
desire" in "western" culture (Jacquart and Thomasset 1988, 194). Thus the Church's 
intervention into the lives of the laity was enacted through discourse about bodily activities 
in the domestic sphere which then became the basis of public pronouncement in sermons. De 
Certeau states that: 
Verbal exchanges in the confessionals or parlors ... furnished the religious "directors" 
with material from which to construct a literature of edifying "lives" or practical 
"exercises." Far from subverting ecclesiastical authority, this massively distributed 
material permitted the authorities to reconquer and "inform" the Christian people. 
The "privatization" of discourse, analogous to the personalizing of products in our 
present-day economy, had a social function: it articulated privacy within Church 
language. Hence, from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, the pastoral resorts 
to such privatization (de Certeau 1992, 88. See also Rubin 1992a, 48-53). 
Sermons were a central means of education of the laity as to the required conduct of their 
daily lives (Atkinson 1983, 115). The Church's concern with the boundaries of the private 
lives of the laity focused, in a number of ways, upon the bodies and sexuality of women, 
which had long served as figures for the disruptive influence of all that was outside Christian 
orthodoxy both in the individual lives of believers and in the "mystical body" which 
constituted Christ's Church. 
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Peter BrovVl1 observes that, in early Christianity, the notion of "the flesh" as a disruptive force 
for evil within the fallen human person "suffused the body with disturbing associations: 
somehow, as 'flesh,' the body's weaknesses and temptations echoed a state of helplessness, 
even of rebellion against God, that was larger than the body itself' (Brown 1988, 48). 
Moreover, the individual believer's body was frequently symbolically aligned with the 
Christian body of the Church. 13 Bynum and Lochrie have further noted that, in medieval 
theological writings, the flesh was figured as female (Bynum 1989, 179-97; Lochrie 1991 b, 
120-5). Hence, women came to represent the "gap" or "influx" of earthly passions between 
the human will and God's, all the possibilities of sin aroused by human disobedience. They 
were identified with "breaches in boundaries," as Bynum puts it; with extreme vulnerability, 
passivity, and physical excess (Bynum 1989, 186). Since women became the figures for that 
which exceeded the control of the human person in pursuit of the will of God, as well as the 
body politic of the medieval Church, they represented the site of severe anxieties about the 
forces of evil within both individual Christians and the Church as a whole. 14 This attitude to 
female sexuality helps to explain some of the concern with curtailing the speech and 
movement of women revealed in sermons as well as in other devotional literature of the 
middle ages (Lochrie 1991 b). 
A further explanation for the masculine desire to "contain" women which was evident in 
sermons lies in the fact that the position of women in the emergent capitalist economy of 
fifteenth-century England was changing and therefore the subject of specific aIL'(ieties 
regarding their status in the home and in the wider culture. Many of these anxieties are played 
out in The Book of 1vlargery Kempe (Delany 1975; Aers 1988, 86-7), as we shall see. The role 
of the middle-class wife was increasingly becoming that of a domestic asset to her husband, 
and her own opportunities for professional self-actualisation seemed to be diminishing (Howell 
1986, 181). Judith Bennett has recently and compellingly questioned the notion of a "great 
and negative transition for women" over the late-medieval to early-modern period (1300-1700) 
(Bennett 1992). However, whether the late middle ages was a period of decline in women's 
working status or not, it remains true to say that women in this era were essential to the 
patriarchal economy but were largely represented as the domestic property of men (Bennett 
1992). 
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As Peter Stallybrass notes, with reference to the society which arose as a result of the period's 
changes: "In early modem England, 'woman' was property not only in legal discourse but also 
in economic and political discourse. Economically, she is the fenced-in enclosure of the 
landlord, her father, or husband" (Stallybrass 1986, 127). Aers, citing Sylvia Thrupp, states 
that: "the primary role of the merchant-class wife was to be 'amenable to male authority' and 
useful in the family unit under the husband's rule" (Thrupp 1962, 169-74, cited in Aers 1988, 
87). The negation of women's domestic productivity through their recuperation as property 
or assets of their male overseers is reflected in the Church's interest in curtailing female 
speech, evidenced in many sermons. Stallybrass points out that, in early "western" capitalist 
cultures: 
the surveillance of women concentrated upon three specific areas: the mouth, 
chastity, the threshold of the house. These three areas were frequently collapsed into 
each other .... Silence, the closed mouth, is made a sign of chastity. And silence and 
chastity are, in tum, homologous to woman's enclosure within the house (Stallybrass 
1986, 126-7). 
In their concern with the private lives of individuals, medieval sermons revealed a strong 
desire to limit women's activities to the domestic sphere and to curb their speech. Hence, the 
physically active life Kempe depicts in her Book - and the Book itself, as a spiritual 
"autobiography" and record of Kempe's speech - is in conflict with a major source of 
devotional material concerning the life and Passion of the Saviour to whom she is dedicated, 
Christ. "Woman .. .is the confusion of Man, an insatiable beast, a continuous anxiety, an 
incessant warfare, a daily ruin, a house of tempest, a hindrance to devotion," asserts the author 
of the Speculum Laicorum, an encyclopedia of sermons and exempla (Speculum Laicorum 
1914, qtd. in Owst 1961, 377-8),15 asserting these "truths" in the manner of proverb and 
clearly reflecting the way in which medieval "woman" served as a figure for all manner of 
disturbance to male-defined order and government. 16 According to another late medieval 
sermon, "women's speech ... often incites men and women to lechery" (MS. Harley 2398, fol. 
366, qtd. in Owst 1961, 382. My translation)Y In their constant warnings against the evils of 
women speaking and their equation of women's speech with unbridled passions, medieval 
sermons constructed a female body understood as both voracious and permeable. "Woman," 
as Bynum and Lochrie have shown, was equated with the frailty of the human will and the 
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body as site of the disruption of the concupiscent flesh (Lochrie 1991b, 122). In appropriating 
women's speech by branding it inherently fleshly, the sermons themselves fashioned an absent 
female body which was invested with considerable symbolic force and whose carnal 
corruption was seen as threatening the boundaries of Church discourse. 
However there is another absent body, also constructed as feminine, whose physical suffering 
and shame is celebrated rather than condemned in sermons, and that is the body of Christ, 
descriptions of which Margery Kempe attended so many sermons to hear. '''If I had money 
enough, '" Kempe claims in conversation with God in Chapter 58 of her Book, "'I would give 
a noble every day to have a sermon'" (Kempe 1988, 181), and the mystic's enthusiasm for 
encountering Christ and his Word in this way increased as she progressed in her spiritual life 
(Atkinson 1983, 115). Kempe frequently had extreme reactions to hearing sermons on Christ's 
Passion (Kempe 1988, 188, 190,204, 221-2, 225), and Passion sermons provided a dramatic 
spectacle for a lay audience accustomed to lingering on the graphic details of Christ's 
Crucifixion, a theme which was similarly played out in popular books of devotion, lyrics, 
plays, stained glass windows and rood screens (Gray 1972, 125-6; Bennett 1982, 39, 54; 
Hughes 1988, 234-5, 288-9). The "feminisation" of Christ in late medieval popular culture 
was enacted through his portrayal as physically passive (suffering), excessive and boundaryless 
(bleeding), and nourishing (in the form of the Eucharist) at the same time (Ash 1990, 86). 
In the following excerpts from late medieval Passion sermons, Christ's body is described in 
terms which liken it to the permeability of the feminine flesh: 
Behold, then, that good Lord shivering and shaking, his entire body naked and 
bound to a pillar; wicked men standing around him, beyond reason, excessively 
scourging that blessed body, without pity. Look how they fail to stop their angry 
strokes until they see him stand in his blood up to the ankles. From the top of his 
head to the sole of his foot, they leave no piece of skin whole (MS. Harl. 2398, fo1. 
186b, qtd. in Owst 1961, 508. My translation). 
He was beaten and buffeted, scorned and scourged, so that there was scarcely any 
portion of skin left, from the top to the toe, that a man might have placed a needle's 
point upon. But his entire body ran out as a stream of blood (MS. St Albans Cath. 
fo1. 20 (=MS. Laud Misc. 23), qtd. in Owst 1961, 508. My translation). 
Lochrie points out the similarities between the construction of the female body and the body 
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of Christ which are operating here: "In the Crucifixion, the scientific and theological theories 
of the feminine and the flesh find their most graphic expression .... Christ becomes female and 
mother on the cross when he suffers bodily and when he surrenders his flesh as the materia 
of new life" (Lochrie 1991b, 118). Sarah Beckwith also makes some convincing analogies 
between representations of Christ and medieval women in terms of Christ's "position in the 
psychic structure of the Passion story" thus: 
In his Passion, Christ is acted upon rather than acting, and his body becomes the site 
onto which desire is projected. Like woman (as constructed by patriarchal discourse) 
he is the "gateway to the infinite and the measure [of a man's] finite nature" (de 
Beauvoir 1976, 75). His submission to the Father acts as a public token that God's 
, power is unchallenged and he functions as an exchange object to guarantee and ratify 
the mutually beneficial hierarchy of God and man. To understand this as a. 
feminisation, we may trace a series of parallels between these structures and the 
position of women in medieval patriarchal society. Women were traditionally acted 
upon rather than acting, their bodies were the site onto which desire was projected 
(as in the vast literature of courtly love). Marriage for medieval women was an 
exchange from one man to another, from father to husband. Women's bodies in 
every way functioned as substitute objects to act as a locus for desire as a guarantee 
to underwrite complex property deals between families (Beckwith 1986, 48). 
Not surprisingly, similar sorts of parallels can be seen in the treatment of the body of Christ 
and the female body in popular sermons. Both bodies are constantly spoken about but never 
(officially) speak, both are graphically described as objects of desire. As mentioned earlier, 
women's bodies acted as the locus of aTI.,'(ieties of a culture experiencing class-conflict and 
rapid social change (Delany 1975, 109-13; Stallybrass 1986; Aers 1988, 83-9). Furthermore, 
popular late medieval representations of Christ and the Holy Family reflect the status of the 
emergent and increasingly powerful bourgeoisie, and are concerned with "the sanctifying and 
absolutising of social roles" in middle-class families through what Beckwith calls "the Holy 
Family Romance" (Beckwith 1986, 46. See also Duffy 1990, 192-3; Sheingorn 1990). 
Beckwith argues that this trend "appears to be both a response to the potentially subversive 
nature of female desire and new way of domesticating and internalisingitlt in late medieval 
patriarchal society (Beckwith 1986, 46). 
However, The Book ofJyJargery Kempe frequently challenges the recuperation of female desire 
suggested by official directives for devotion. In Chapter 6 of the Book for example, Kempe 
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imagines herself travelling with the Virgin Mary and her husband Joseph to Bethlehem for 
the birth of the Christ child. Once in Bethlehem, in her imagination, Kempe busies herself 
finding places for the couple to stay, begging clothes in which to wrap the newborn, and 
procuring food and arranging a bed for mother and child (Kempe 1988,53). Here she follows 
devotional injunctions such as those set forth in The Mirror of the Blessed Life of Jesus 
Christ, which commands believers to "imagine and set our mind and thoughts as though we 
were present in the place where this was done at Bethlehem" (Love 1992,43. My translation). 
While this episode could be seen as evidence of the domestication of female desire, a 
transplanting of Kempe's former familial responsibilities to the realm of orthodox Christic 
devotion, the Mirror's command to imagine oneself present at Mary's side is the same licence 
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Kempe uses to take on Mary's and Christ's grief in envisioning the Passion in other parts of 
her Book, an identification which causes consternation to onlookers and clerical authorities. 
I will describe one such episode shortly, as it relates directly to the politics of the 
representation of Christ in popular sermons. 
One way to read The Book ofj\4argery Kempe in relation to its social context and the question 
of the recuperation of female power is with or in contrast to Irigaray's analysis of women's 
function as commodities in patriarchal capitalist culture(s). Irigaray sets out the negative 
effects for women of the kind of social organisation described specifically by Beckwith above 
in terms of an emergent capitalist economy and its exchange of women (e.g., Irigaray 1985b, 
170-97); but Kempe's text, while revealing aspects of this cultural situation, also shows that 
empowerment could be attained in such a system. Whereas Irigaray is writing in a period of 
advanced capitalism about the effects of this cultural set-up for women, and of her desire to 
transform it - particularly through a reworked concept of the divine ~ Kempe's Book depicts 
cultural interventions achieved through Christ and her relationship with him, which suggest 
a transformation of her appointed social role as domestic asset to her husband. Kempe's Book 
witnesses, as lrigaray's work does also, to a volatile potential in cultural representations of 
divinity which escapes official attempts to contain it. 
Perhaps the most notable way in which Kempe manages to bypass or extend the 
commodification of women in late medieval culture and its prescriptions for devotion is 
through her excessive weeping. While her tears have an orthodox basis, they also escape 
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clerical regulation, and, as Beckwith puts it, "make her a competitor to the very functional 
centrality of the clergy in the saving of souls" (Beckwith 1993, 89). In Irigaray, too, "fluidity" 
as expressed by women tends to disrupt and threaten the masculinist linguistic system which 
is based on an economy of stable forms (Irigaray 1985a, 106-18,205-18). The threat felt by 
the clergy from Kempe is expressed in an episode from Chapter 61 of her Book through her 
wild weeping and the response it arouses. The scene suggests points of comparison between 
the late medieval understanding of Christ's flesh as excessive and as object of speech/desire 
and the representation of female physicality as an excess to be warned against in sermons. On 
this occasion Kempe's tears are set off by a sermon on the Passion preached by Ita holy man," 
a famou,s friar (Franciscan) who visits her home town ofLynn. IS The episode reveals not only 
the profound importance to Kempe of hearing sermons for the development of her devotion 
to Christ, but also the threat which women's "unbridled" expression presented to medieval 
clerics, even - or perhaps especially - when that speech arose from their (clerically 
encouraged) identification with their Saviour. 
While Kempe's tears constitute a kind of passionate bodily speech, in this episode it is 
persistently claimed that they are a gift from God and therefore not subj ect to ordinary 
control. However her loud crying during the preaching friar's sermon is plainly felt by the 
friar as a threat to priestly authority, and this is evidenced by the number of times during the 
entire scene in which prestigious men speak on Kempe's behalf, taking it upon themselves to 
explain in a diplomatic fashion and re-present her tears to the friar. Even before the friar first 
preaches in Lynn, for instance, the local parish priest warns the visiting preacher that "a 
woman will come here to your sermon who often, when she hears of the Passion of our 
Lord ... weeps, sobs and cries" (Kempe 1988, 188). 
The friar preaches on the Passion and Kempe cries "amazingly bitterly," which he bears 
patiently as requested. When, however, he preaches at the church again and Kempe once more 
falls into "violent weeping," the friar declares: "'I wish this woman were out of the church, 
she is annoying people'" (Kempe 1988, 188). Instead of addressing her directly he represents 
her to the congregation - as preachers traditionally represented women - in somewhat 
objectifying terms. The trend is continued as, following this event, various people, almost all 
of whom are male, continue to mediate on behalf of Kempe and her wondrous gift to the 
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friar: firstly, her friends; secondly two "good priests" (one of whom has conversed 
substantially with her); followed by a highly respected "doctor of divinity"; Kempe's 
confessor (a "bachelor oflaw"); and finally, a "most worthy burgess" (Kempe 1988, 188-90). 
While all of these defenders present, more or less, the same message - that Kempe's tears are 
a gift from God and so cannot be constrained - the friar sees this very statement as 
threatening. Kempe claims at the end of the chapter that the friar was the only preacher to try 
to exclude her from sermons on the basis of her loud crying, and his responses to her 
supporters' defence of her gift reveals something of the reason why. 
First, the friar refuses Kempe access to the Word of God unless she takes up the traditional 
female position and listens in submissive silence to his words. Next, he aims to strike a 
bargain with the mystic: if she will take back her claim to divine authority and call her tears 
a sickness (with implications of the gift being an affliction from the devil) then he will allow 
her to hear the sermon (Kempe 1988, 189). Kempe's own voice in defence of her provocative 
gift is notably absent from the negotiations between her defenders and the preacher which 
occur in the episode. The situation is not dissimilar to that which occurs in sermons more 
generally, where preachers warn against the destructive nature of women's bodily speech and 
women themselves for related reasons may not speak. The friar, in demanding firstly Kempe's 
listening silence and secondly an admission of lack of control over her speech (which would 
then appear divorced from legitimate spiritual origins and become instead aligned with 
demonic ones) reveals his desire to construct Kempe as the typically calamitous female figure 
of Gerson's invective. This is the figure of "woman," an "insatiable beast," regularly presented 
in sermons, and whose speech, with its "insatiable itch," is dangerous precisely because it is 
physically excessive. 
While Kempe's tears do at times appear excessive to other people besides the friar, he in 
particular is reluctant to accept her claim that they come from God, despite the authority (and 
the gender) of her allies. 19 He thereby denies the mystic's assertion of alignment with her 
Saviour and the authority she declares as a result, by denying the connection of the two bodies 
- Christ's and Kempe's - from which Kempe says her tears arise. Kempe maintains that her 
tears serve as a sign or reminder to others of Christ's Passion (Kempe 1988, 106-7; Petroff 
1986, 302) so that, in effect, her sorrow stands in for her Saviour's and her body, racked and 
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convulsed with the pains of his suffering, stands in for his. It is clear that this sort of 
statement could be disturbing to a famous preacher such as the friar in question, authorised 
as he is to (re)present the body of the absent Christ, the Logos, to the people through the 
Eucharist and the Word of God in the words of his sermon. Kempe's tears, which "burst out" 
with amazing bitterness, violence and volume (Kempe 1988, 188, 190), seem to compete for 
the listeners' attention and so the friar engages in battle with Kempe, treating her, in fact, as 
a rival. 
The drama enacted by Kempe's tears in this episode may be seen as a challenge to the 
mediev~l Church's central drama of the Eucharist, by which it asserted its power as sole 
dispenser of the faith. From the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries the Church created an 
elaborate system of lay education centred around the Eucharist (Rubin 1992a). However, as 
Miri Rubin points out, the "sacramental world-view" propounded by the clergy, along with 
"the very ubiquity, the success of its teaching ... exposed the symbolic system to ongoing 
interpretation, to uses, to attempt at its appropriation" (Rubin 1992a, 51). Kempe's dynamic 
tears may be seen, on one hand, as a legitimate response to the construction of the Mass in 
the period, which led believers to experience the Eucharist as a participatory and visionary 
affair. But her own involvement in the Church's representation of Christ's body through 
identificatory tears has the effect of allowing her to participate in Christ's suffering through 
herself "embodying" Christ in a disturbing fashion which is seen by the preaching friar as 
challenging his authority. In the above scene, Kempe embodies Christ not only through 
recalling the events of the Passion but also through becoming an object of derision - as Christ 
was at the Crucifixion - in the eyes of clerics such as the preaching friar. Rubin observes that 
in Kempe's case generally, the Eucharist as the literal embodiment of Christ "allowed her an 
escape from expectations in family and neighbourhood, it provided the pretext for travel and 
self-exploration, and most importantly it allowed her an identification of the female as object 
with Christ, the ultimate object, sacrificed, mutilated, all forbearance" (Rubin 1992a, 58). 
Forbearance is exactly what Kempe displays in the Chapter 61 scene: her VOIce, so 
disruptively evident during the sermon (and also evident in her own defence elsewhere in the 
Book, e.g., Kempe (1988, 153-4, 158, 160, 163-6)), is silent on her own behalf here - thus 
reinforcing her identification with the passive, suffering Christ portrayed in sermons - while 
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authoritative men take up her claim. While powerful men speak for Kempe in this episode, 
just as priests speak of women in sermons and thereby exclude them from official speech, 
depicting their bodies and voices as needing to be restrained (Owst 1961, 387-8), Kempe's 
alignment with Christ recasts the meaning of her exile from clerical discourse in more positive 
terms. 
Because Kempe only "speaks" in this episode through her importunate tears, their function as 
a special gift - to which a number of influential men defer - is reinforced. Kempe is able to 
exploit the identification of medieval "woman" with excessive fluidity and moisture, and 
circumvent the recuperation of women into forms of devotion which were non-threatening to 
male clerical power. Elizabeth Robertson describes Kempe's subversion of medieval medical 
views of female sexuality thus, a subversion which represented a challenge to the Church: 
Told by theory that she can only experience God through the body, [Kempe] 
recounts extreme bodily experiences in her quest for union with God. Told that she 
has too much moisture, [Kempe] cries excessively, which makes those around her, 
especially those in power who are challenging her authority, uncomfortable. The 
very excesses of her writing, her extremes of tears and sensual expressiveness, 
suggest a destabilization of those assumptions (Robertson 1993, 158). 
Irigaray's work on "the 'mechanics' of fluids" (Irigaray 1985a, 106-18,205-18; 1985b, 227-
40; 1989b, 199-200) is provocative in relation to the the alliance Kempe suggests in her Book, 
through her tears, between herself and Christ. Irigaray describes female speech as prone to 
"fluidity" in the sense that the masculine symbolic economy depends upon the representation 
of stable forms, of which fluidity is the necessary and unrepresented other: "whence the 
resistances to that voice that overflows the 'subj ect.' Which the 'subj ect' then congeals, 
freezes, in its categories until it paralyzes the voice in its flow" (Irigaray 1985a, 112). Thus 
the friar responds to Kempe's disruption of his sermon. Irigaray claims that God is the site 
in which the unrepresentability of fluids in a masculine economy is posited, and by which this 
fluid excess (understood as the boundaryless feminine) is contained. That is, the masculinist 
symbolic system which privileges stability, singularity of meaning and an "objectivity" based 
on the disavowal of the body, is rendered unquestionable through the idea of God who stands 
in as transcendent, invisible representative for the male subject. As a result, God 
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simultaneously marks the place of the masculine subject's repressed physicality, which he 
projects onto women, and his projection of masculine subjectivity itself into the position of 
the universal, the transcendent.20 God, then, effectively contains the residue of masculine 
physicality which has been disavowed in the construction of masculine subjectivity. Thus: 
"what is left uninterpreted in the economy of fluids - the resistances brought to bear upon 
solids, for example - is in the end given over to God" (Irigaray 1985a, 109). 
However, phallocentric discourse cannot entirely legislate a relationship consisting of "excess." 
That is, women can exploit the way in which God contains and neutralises that which is 
excessive in the masculine symbolic through their own excessive nature. This is because 
women's physical excess, while it functions as "not-all" in the masculinist symbolic economy, 
must also exist "elsewhere" (Irigaray 1985a, 109, 77), perhaps in relation to the excess that 
is constituted by God: 
It is already getting around - at what rate? in what contexts? in spite of what 
resistances? - that women diffuse themselves according to modalities scarcely 
compatible with the framework of the ruling symbolics. Which doesn't happen 
without causing some turbulence, we might even say some whirlwinds, that ought 
to be reconfined within solid walls of principle, to keep them from spreading to 
infinity (Irigaray 1985a, 106). 
These words from Irigaray echo, perhaps not unintentionally, the position of women in 
medieval theology and Church discourse. Medieval theological descriptions of female 
physicality seek to confine women "within solid walls," both metaphorically in the sense of 
formulating authoritative, restrictive discourse on their nature, and literally in the sense of 
recommending their containment within convent, anchorhold or domestic home. In Chapter 
13 of Kempe's Book an old monk tells her, '''I wish you were enclosed in a house of stone, 
so that no one should speak with you'" (Kempe 1988, 63). That Kempe succeeds on some 
level at "diffus[ing herself] according to modalities scarcely compatible with the framework 
of the ruling symbolics," in Irigaray's terms (Irigaray 1985a, 106), is reflected in her text 
through male responses to what is perceived as her "vagrancy" or relative physical freedom 
as well as her troublesome tears, a topic I will take up again in the following section. 
A "diffusion of self' is perhaps best explained in reference to Kempe through a consideration 
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of how she takes up so enthusiastically and in a number of different ways the practice of 
"meditation on the life of Christ" recommended by her culture (Gibson 1989, 49). Thus, as 
Rubin states above, Kempe's travels (representing a "diffusion" of self in the sense of a 
challenge to patriarchal efforts to "contain" her) are carried out in relation to her quest for 
greater devotion to Christ, whether in the form of the Eucharist; sermons; conversation with 
holy women and men; pilgrimage to holy places 'and the transfiguration in her visions of 
various objects into mnemonics of Christ's Passion and life (e.g., Kempe 1988, 113, 227). 
Kempe was perceived as excessive both in terms of her speech - for example the fluidity of 
her tears - and wandering ("'I wish you were enclosed in a house of stone, so that no one 
should speak with you"') together, two allegedly female traits which were regularly denounced 
in sermons. 
As well as condemning women's speech, medieval popular sermons showed a marked concern 
with women's "vagrancy," and persistently described women as creatures apt to wander from 
their appointed sphere, the home, through an excess of lustful desiring: "When her proper 
place is in the home, she will wander abroad, like the Wife of Bath, 'walkinge out by nighte' 
as well as by day - 'and for to see and eek for to be seye of lusty folk,''' as G. R. Owst puts 
it, quoting Chaucer's Wife (Chaucer 1983a, 80-1, qtd. in Owst 1961, 388). The phrase "and 
even to be seen by lustful men," reproduced in this context by Owst, sounds remarkably like 
contemporary charges that women who go out at night and dress in a certain way "ask to be 
raped," an idea which is made explicit in another sermon, and shows how the attitude has a 
long history linked to cultural developments which restrict women to the home: 
As Dinah, Jacob's daughter, who walked out of her inn to see women of the country 
that she lived in, and was ravished and raped and lost her virginity .... So do foolish 
girls who walk around in meadows and in fair places leading dances and singing, 
displaying themselves as it were in order to lose their virginity (MS. Harl. 2398, fol. 
39b, qtd. in Owst 1961, 119. My translation).21 
This passage highlights another central aspect of the representation of women in medieval 
preaching, the constant disapprobation of "female vanity" and concern with fashion, which is 
connected with women's alleged tendency to "wander abroad. ,,22 As Owst once again informs 
us, in a tone of some relish, "it is woman par excellence as a lover of finery, the mirror of 
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fashion, the decked and painted idol of Maytide, that calls down the full fury of the English 
preachers in satire and complaint" COwst 1961, 390; Blench 1964, 241, 275).23 This too is a 
commonplace which Kempe subverts in her Book through the portrayal of herself as a vain, 
overly fashion-conscious woman in the earlier days before her conversion (Lochrie 1986a, 40-
1). She uses the traditional caricature of the sinful woman, propagated in medieval sermons, 
to represent the woman she once was but is no longer, following the dedication of her life to 
Christ. 
After the madness which follows her first difficult experience of childbirth, and after the 
healing vision of Christ which terminates it, Kempe relates how she "would not leave her 
pride or her showy manner of dressing" (Kempe 1988, 143), despite the admonishments of 
her husband and other men. She describes the "gold pipes" and fashionably fringed hoods 
which she wore on her head, and her slashed cloaks underlaid with many colours to attract 
the attention of passers by. Kathleen Casey points out that these were the popular fashions of 
the period's new bourgeoisie and an expression of the progressive feeling and increasing 
wealth fostered among them by an emergent capitalist society (Casey 1976,238). Traditionally 
however it was women's endeavours in this field which were held up by contemporary 
preachers as examples of sinful pride: "The expense and presumption of their bizarre 
headgear, evolving through a swift and bewildering succession of fantasies, and their use of 
cosmetics drew the most sustained harangues" (Casey 1976, 238). Kempe continues the 
portrait of her loftiness with the description of the unsuccessful business ventures of brewing 
and milling which she undertook at this time, as she says: "for pure covetousness, and in order 
to maintain her pride" (Kempe 1988, 44). 
Kempe thus constructs an ingenious description of herself as a typical medieval woman on 
the path to perdition, requiring God's grace. She then (over)tums this portrayal to her 
advantage when she says, at the end of the chapter: 
And then this creature, seeing all these adversities coming on every side, thought 
they were the scourges of our Lord that would chastise her for her sin. Then she 
asked God for mercy, and forsook her pride, her covetousness, and the desire that 
she had for worldly dignity, and did great bodily penance, and began to enter the 
way of everlasting life as shall be told hereafter (Kempe 1988, 45)~ 
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By this method Kempe presents herself as a woman intent on holiness, having learned from 
her past mistakes and rejected the ways of the world. Lochrie describes her achievement: 
"Kempe's use of the antifeminist image of the proud woman allows her to reverse it, to 
dismantle it, so to speak, through her conversion - and to take up her struggle against many 
of the antifeminist ideas about women which pose a threat to her search for " [the way of high 
perfection]" (Lochrie 1986a, 42). 
Irigaray's speculations on the feminine love of fashion and women's problematical relation 
to their own bodiliness shed some light here on connections between women as lovers of 
fashion and women as wanderers in medieval sermons. In Irigaray's analysis, "traditionally, 
in the role of mother, woman represents a sense of place for man" and is "used as a kind of 
envelope by man in order to help him set limits to things" (Irigaray 1991a, 169). The 
appropriation of maternity so that it serves as a symbolic starting place for man, deprives 
women of a symbolic "place of [their] own" (Irigaray 1991a, 169), which they attempt to 
compensate for with the trappings of conventional femininity. Irigaray states that: 
"Woman ... cannot be located, cannot remain in her place. She attempts to envelop herself in 
clothes, make-up and jewellery. She cannot use the envelope that she is, and so must create 
artificial ones" (Irigaray 1991a, 169-70). Female adornment, in Irigaray's view, is a symptom 
of women's lack of "symbolic space," the way in which the symbolic order - the public 
domain of society - serves male subjects and, in order to do so, confines women to private, 
domestic environments. 
Owst quotes a medieval preacher who claims that, "the women of our time, when they are at 
home with their husbands take no trouble over their own adornment, but when they display 
themselves in public, they wish to go forth adorned" (MS. Camb. Dniv. Libr. Mm. ii. 10 (Cat. 
No. 2305), col. 4, qtd. in Owst 1965, 218). In an Irigarayan reading, sermonic diatribes 
against women's alleged love of fashion and their tendency to wander are related to each 
other: they can be seen as symptomatic of the appropriation by men of women's physicality 
in the construction of patriarchal, public space, and the masculine fears to which this 
appropriation gives rise, fears that women will try (through an excess of artificial coverings 
or through wandering) to articulate a space of their own. This is seen as threatening to 
patriarchal society because, in her view, its social organisation depends upon the appropriation 
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of the female/maternal (Irigaray 1985a, 184-5; 1991b, 64; 198; 1991h, 199-200; 1993b, 71). 
Thus in medieval sermons, women's wandering is aligned with their wandering speech, the 
twin focus of patriarchal suppression of the female sex. In the preachers' view "woman," 
however carefully enclosed, exhibits "a fatal attraction to the outside world, its freedom, its 
publicity, and its scope for yet more pleasant gossip" (Owst 1961, 388), as another sermon 
proclaims: "it is fitting for maidens to be hidden and still. .. and not standing nor walking about 
in the streets" (MS. Harl. 2398, fo1. 39b, qtd. in Owst 1961, 119. My translation). While man 
"robs femininity of the tissue or texture of her spatiality," he simultaneously encloses her 
within t:Q.e home: "he envelops her within those walls while he envelops himself and his things 
in her flesh" (Irigaray 1991a, 170). "Femininity" becomes the symbol of male property and 
possession (Stallybrass 1986, 127).24 
"Without her knowledge or volition, then, ["woman"] threatens by what she lacks: a 'proper' 
place" (Irigaray 1991b, 169). In Irigaray's view, women's "homelessness" in the symbolic 
order consists of "the absence of adequate symbolisation" for their libidinal desires (Whitford 
1991a, 125, 78). Whitford, coI11lIientating on Irigaray, observes in the masculine cultural 
imaginary "a nostalgia for the original home" of the mother's body, 
an attempt to keep it for himself, Ovvn it and control it, in order to be able to return 
to it in phantasy (by keeping women in the home, for example, or ensuring their 
social dependence). But this phantasy, in symbolic form, prevents woman from 
acceding to her own separate being; she must always be for-men, available for their 
transcendence (Whitford 1991a, 153). 
Kempe may be seen to challenge this masculine phantasy through her resistance to the 
traditional enclosure of women within the domestic realm. 
As we shall see in the next section, Kempe is experienced as "threatening" to male civil 
authorities as well as clerical ones because she lacks a home in the sense that she is a 
visionary and pilgrim for Christ. She has to convince men to intervene on her behalf with 
other men (as in the scene of the preaching friar's sermon), a sign of her lack of public power 
and authority, and yet she is branded as a danger to patriarchal society, so much so that she 
is terrorised with the threat of being burned at the stake (Kempe 1988, 64). Kempe's Book 
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reflects the way in which "western" patriarchal society constructs "woman" as excessive by 
constituting her as the other of male government. Thus women tend to experience themselves 
as dispersed and relational: "woman always tends towards something else without ever turning 
to herself as the site of a positive element.. .. [She] remains in motion but possesses no 
'proper' place" (Irigaray 1985a, 168). In Kempe's culture, however, the experience of 
connection between self and other was integral to the dynamic and personal relationship with 
Christ that was encouraged among believers in a variety of ways. Kempe's "self-dispersion," 
enacted physically in terms of her giving up her patriarchally-designated "proper place," the 
home, is relocated in a more empowering fashion in her life as a pilgrim-mystic. Kempe in 
fact makes Christ the means of a redefinition of female vagrancy as sacred wandering. 
The depiction in Kempe's Book of Church (and civil) authorities' negative responses to this 
sacramental mode of life, based as it is on the desire to embody, act out and imitate the life 
of Christ, suggests both that the Church desired to contain the possibilities for subversion 
inherent in this kind of devotion and was increasingly unable to do so. Rubin writes that in 
the middle ages "the dissemination of the sacramental language of religion was accompanied 
by ongoing attempts to establish its hegemonic status through an appeal to what was taken to 
be the 'popular mind'" (Rubin 1992a, 52). However by Kempe's time "the success of [the 
Church's] enterprise of instruction was so great that most people possessed sufficient 
knowledge of the language of sacramental religion with the eucharist at its centre to attempt 
further departures from it" (Rubin 1992a, 59). Kempe's "departures" from domestic life, both 
literal and figurative, involved the manipulation and extension of symbolic norms, and so were 
experienced as threatening patriarchal hegemony by the male authorities of her culture. In a 
contemporary reading The Book of lvJargery Kempe demonstrates Irigaray's contention that 
women in a patriarchal economy repeatedly escape restrictive systematisation. In medieval 
terms, it reveals that in Kempe's culture the Incarnation of Christ provided opportunities for 
women to re-present their association with vagrancy and physical excess as spiritually 
empowering. 
Kempe's speaking of Christ in the places where she travels is an integral part of her life's new 
mission, but it causes her to be perceived as a threat to masculine power on several occasions, 
and disputes with clerics on the subject centre around the issue of the orthodox distinction 
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between preaching and teaching.25 Medieval preachers are emphatic on the subject of a woman 
preaching. One writer claims that, however "learned, holy and 'prelatical'" she may be, a 
woman must never preach "where men are present" (MS. Harl. 4968, fol. 42, qtd. in Owst 
1965, 5). Another justifies women's exclusion from the pulpit on the grounds that "woman" 
is: first, insufficiently intelligent to instruct men and women; second, her subordinate role in 
life is divinely ordained; third, her .fleshliness would lead to immoral behaviour (presumably 
among the listening and watching men) were she to take up such a position; and fourth, 
because Eve is her predecessor and the first woman's speech "brought ruin to the whole 
world" (Max. Bibl. Patr. vol. 25, 435, cited in Owst 1965, 5). 
The issue seems to be primarily one of authority. A woman is a man's divinely placed 
subordinate, and her first virtue, as the preachers tell us, is to obey (MS. Add. 21253, fol. 89, 
cited in Owst 1961,389). While a woman's right to instruct was limited to private places such 
as nunneries and the home, and the teaching of children and of other women, the subversion 
of the God-given order was seen to be effected by a woman's preaching in public to men 
(MS. Harl. 31, fo1. 196r, cited in Aston 1984a, 58. See also Beriou 1987, I: 9n, 2, cited in 
Berlioz and Beaulieu 1990, 41). The God-given order appears here unmistakeably as the 
masculine social order, in which women's words are constructed as dangerous and are 
banished from the public arena. 
The official distinction between preaching and teaching, while long established in the 
Christian tradition, was not always easy to mark in practice, especially when those suspected 
of preaching unlawfully claimed to be fulfilling the Gospel injunction to share the faith with 
all people (Murphy 1974, 278). In Chapter 52 of her Book Kempe quotes scripture in her 
defence when she is commanded not to teach the Archbishop of York's people, and this may 
be viewed as a defiant attempt at teaching in itself. As Margaret Aston notes, Kempe's great 
zeal for sermons contributed not only to her personal devotions but also to "her ability to hold 
her own with priests" (Aston 1984b, 120). Kempe quotes the Gospel episode when Christ 
replies to the woman who says: '''Blessed be the womb that bore you and the breasts that gave 
you suck, '" that they are more blessed who hear the Word of God and keep it (Luke 11: 27-
8). Kempe makes her argument on the basis that Christ does not forbid the woman speaking 
out in this way, and claims that '''God Almighty does not forbid ... that we should speak of 
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him'" (Kempe 1988, 164). The Speculum Christiani furnishes the argument Kempe puts 
forward when she claims her right to use "communication and good words" while she lives. 
It makes the distinction between preaching and teaching thus: 
There is a great difference between preaching and teaching. Preaching occurs where 
there is a calling or gathering together of people on holy days in churches or other 
such places and at times ordained for that purpose. And it is fitting for those who 
have been ordained to do it, who have jurisdiction and authority, and for no others. 
Teaching is such that everybody may inform and teach their brother in every place 
and at the proper time, as they see it to be profitable. For this is a spiritual alms-
deed, to which every person that has knowledge is bound (Speculum Christiani 1933, 
2, qtd. in Owst 1926, 4, and in Lochrie 1986a, 47. My translation). 
In the face of ' the charge of preaching unlawfully, Kempe claims only to be fulfilling her 
spiritual duty as a believer in sharing her faith with others, and as such cannot be officially 
condemned. 
Despite conventional prohibitions of female preaching, some preachers' comments reveal that, 
due to the increasing popularity of the Lollard movement in England in the late middle ages, 
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lay women as well as lay men were "teaching and spreading the Word of God" (MS. Camb. 
Dniv. Lib. Ii. iii. 8, fol. 149, cited in Owst 1965, 5-6. 135). This was undoubtedly a factor 
in the troubles Kempe encountered in her travels as she spoke about the Gospel. While in her 
Book Kempe describes herself being several times tried and declared innocent of Lollardy, she 
does, as Lochrie affirms: "call into question the antifeminist tradition which forbids women 
to preach and which further discourages them from reading and interpreting the Gospel." As 
a result her "personal battle with church authorities becomes a political battle as she attempts 
to assert her religious orthodoxy at the same time that she overturns orthodox antifeminism" 
(Lochrie 1986a, 42-3). 
In Chapter 52, prior to Kempe's audience with the Archbishop, a monk specifically denounces 
her in a sermon he preaches to a vast crowd of people in York, having heard that she will be 
present. When questioned about this, Kempe claims that she is blessed by God through 
suffering such slander. Kempe's turning public defamation to her vocational advantage in this 
way is common in the Book and is part of her defence of her life as an imitation of Christ. 
As Gibson notes, it is shaped by her "attempt to participate in the martyrdom pattern of Christ 
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and his saints; indeed, her qualifications for sainthood depend upon that participation" (Gibson 
1989, 48). Following this event Kempe is detained in York and brought for questioning before 
the Archbishop and many clerics. They test her for heresy and, finding her orthodox in her 
beliefs, remain reluctant to let her go, because, as they say: '''the people have great faith in 
her talk, and perhaps she might lead some of them astray'" (Kempe 1988, 163). The 
Archbishop grants Kempe leave on the condition that she swears not to teach people in his 
diocese, but she refuses, first quoting the Gospel and then, when St Paul is quoted against her, 
responding with the words: '''I do not preach, sir; I do not go into any pulpit. I use only 
conversation and good words, and that I will do while I live'" (Kempe 1988, 164). 
Aston remarks that Kempe's education through heard and seen images of the Gospel in 
sermons and other media equipped her not only with "a good grasp of the Gospel story" on 
which she drew for her meditations, but also Ita fund of moralistic tales, which sometimes 
came in useful" (Aston 1984b, 120). Kempe has recourse to one such tale in Chapter 52 of 
her Book, during the York interrogation. Her story concerns a wicked priest (in the. guise of 
a bear for the purpose of the story) and when she has finished telling it the Archbishop 
commends the tale, but a cleric who has previously interrogated her expresses discomfort with 
it. Having pleased the Archbishop with her story which reveals that priests as well as lay 
women must take care to live moral lives, Kempe presses home her advantage and furthers 
the levelling by identifying herself with "a good preacher" from her home town, who, she 
says, often claims from the pulpit: "~if anyone is displeased by my preaching, note him well, 
for he is guilty'" (Kempe 1988, 166). She then informs the cleric who has responded 
negatively to her story that he has behaved in the same way with her, and that his reaction 
to her words reveals the suspect state of his own heart. The priest is speechless in the face of 
this rebuke, and the Archbishop calls for someone at last to lead the mystic from him. 
In addressing the powerful figures before her with the words of a preacher from the pulpit, 
Kempe herself takes on the role of preacher and casts the listening priests as ordinary 
believers. Following the wrangle about preaching, teaching and her respective rights, the 
mystic's placing herself in the preacher's position is a bold as well as a subversive move. She 
thus demonstrates her ability to make use of the official, male-orchestrated media of her faith 
for her own ends. In "preaching" to the Archbishop and his companion, Kempe reverses the 
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traditional pattern whereby male clerics speak on behalf of women within a 
divinely-sanctioned discourse. She can be seen to demonstrate Irigaray's argument that to 
outlaw women from official social structures is to limit but never to wholly appropriate their 
speech. 
2. 1. 2 Accusations of heresy: Outlawed women 
While medieval sermons produced a prescriptive account of women's alleged weaknesses and 
bodily speech which Kempe can be seen to confront in certain scenes depicted in her text, 
charges of heresy are also central in her Book and constitute a far more insidious threat to her. 
The negative construction of "woman" as inclined to wander in body and speech put forward 
in sermons served as an educative warning to medieval lay women as to how to tread the path 
of Christian orthodoxy and avoid allegations of deviance (i.e, heresy) which could lead to the 
extreme consequences of imprisonment or death. Since, as I have shown, Kempe takes issue 
with several of the antifeminist attitudes expressed in popular preaching, it is not surprising 
that accusations of heretical beliefs, "the next stage" or degree of efforts at female 
containment, as it were, should be used against her. 
Of course, unlike preaching which depicted a somewhat "mythical" view of the female sex 
designed to forestall the "vices" feared by men and keep women ( especially wives) in line, 
the Church's antiheretical discourses were focused on actual movements of religious dissent, 
the most pervasive and influential of which, in fifteenth-century England, was Lollardy. There 
is evidence that women were active in the Lollard movement, particularly in East Anglia 
where Kempe lived. Claire Cross notes that a considerable amount of material has survived 
"relating to a Lollard community in East Anglia in the 1420s," and that "there can be no 
shadow of a doubt that there women took a vigorous part in heresy alongside men" (Cross 
1978, 362). It is easy to understand the attraction of heretical religious movements for 
medieval women, since the circumscribing of women's public roles within orthodox 
Christianity was and remains a consistent historical phenomenon. In contrast, as Stephen J. 
Wessley points out: 
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Some heresies provided avenues for female advancement. Catharism established a 
female perfecta .... Some Waldensians made women priests .... The Guglielmite 
ideology, which we can interpret as a reaction to an exclusively male priesthood 
based on a male incarnation, offered female enthusiasts justification for exercising 
priestly office and promised them ecclesiastical roles beyond their limited 
opportunities in the medieval church (Wessley 1978, 300. See also Wilson 1984, 
xiii-iv; Aston 1993, 25).26 
And in England these continental varieties of heresy were mirrored in the views of some 
Lollards, who claimed that women should not be denied the office of priesthood (Aston 
1984a, 52). Aston states that, as this view suggests, there are grounds for assuming that 
Lollard groups had considerable support for women, as Cathars and Waldensians did (Aston 
1984a, 49). The several charges of Lollardy, arising from both clerical and civil sources, 
which Kempe reports being made against her suggest that through Lollardy English lay 
women were achieving a degree of education and autonomy otherwise unavailable to them, 
which was found threatening by Church and town authorities alike. 
Several aspects of Kempe's calling and behaviour seem to align her (at least outwardly) with 
Lollard ideas, a view plainly held by the clerical and civil authorities who attempted to 
convict her of heresy. Lollard activities inclu~ed teaching, evidently undertaken by women 
as well as men, and producing and distributing copies of vernacular sermons which would 
have aided in this project (Owst 1965, 5-6, 135, cited in Aston 1984a, 49-50; 1984b, 128). 
Kempe's claim to lawful teaching and spreading the Word of God, outlined in the section on 
sermons, obviously inspired suspicions that she had heretical connections.27 Her vociferous 
efforts at self-defence, often put to use in the very act of resisting charges of heresy, may also 
have deepened suspicions of Lollard involvement on her part. In his famous anti-heretical 
work, The Repressor, Reginald Pecock complained that Lollard women "delighted to argue 
and dispute against clerks" (Pecock 1860, i, 123, qtd. in Aston 1984b, 130), a tendency which 
the mystic demonstrates on more than one occasion. Lochrie also notes that Kempe's 
argument in Chapter 52 about her right to teach in the face of the charge of illicitly preaching 
was taken up by Lollards, specifically by Walter Brute, who was submitted for trial on a 
heresy charge in 1393. Although Kempe shows her claim to be orthodox, it nonetheless has 
heretical associations (Lochrie 1986a, 45). 
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The Chapter 52 episode, discussed in the previous section, is an example of the fine line 
between orthodoxy and subversion which Kempe presents herself walking in many of the 
encounters with figures of authority portrayed in her Book. Despite being questioned on issues 
of Church doctrine on several occasions, Kempe always managed to satisfy her questioners 
as to her orthodoxy and so was never arrested on a heresy charge. In fact the most hostile 
behaviour the mystic encountered in relation to suspicions of heresy arose from ordinary 
townspeople and urban authorities. As John Thomson observes, Kempe's case reveals that 
"popular opposition [to LollardyJ was far more virulent than the criticism of the clergy" in 
the period, and her experiences "show clearly the success of the clergy in rousing popular 
opposition to religious eccentricity" (Thomson 1965, 195). But the alliance of civil and 
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Church forces against the "eccentric" figure of Kempe also reveals the extent to which she 
was perceived as a threat to her culture as a whole. And the ways in which official authority 
was used to oppose her make evident that this threat was felt as a direct challenge to such 
authority and to the doctrine of the enclosed and silent female body which was central to 
medieval patriarchal society. 
Atkinson points out that Kempe's answers to questions of Church doctrine are probably 
carefully shaped by her scribe in defence of his own doctrinal orthodoxy as well as that of 
his charge (Atkinson 1983,107). Thus the presentation in Kempe's Book of the episodes in 
which she is suspected of heresy are clearly intended as a defence of her life and person. 
However the extremes of violence - both physical and verbal- that allegations of heresy posed 
to Kempe make her body a central and troubled locus of the text. While the discourses of 
medieval preaching were intended in part to warn against and restrict women's physical 
movement and speech, heresy charges were designed to implement punishments against 
women (and men) who exceeded official confines and did not heed this message.28 The 
specific target of the accusations was the subversive gospel of belief in the powers of 
individual (including female) convictions and speech. Kempe's responses to the ideas put 
forward in popular preaching are naturally less urgent than her engagements with charges of 
heresy since her desire to "own her own body" and yield it to Christ becomes, with these 
allegations, contestable through the threat of death, the contemporary punishment for heresy. 
Kempe's avoidance of this fate depends upon her claim that her body is in the care of Christ, 
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which she endorses by evidencing devotion to the Church. But it is the freedom and 
singularity of her way of life, her moving where she pleases and speaking where she wishes 
- itself bound up with her dedication to Christ - which some Church and lay officials seek to 
curb. Not surprisingly, then, the scenes in Kempe's Book which record accusations of heresy 
reveal a striking subtext which dramatises patriarchal desire to reduce female autonomy. It is 
this subtext which shows "speaking as a woman" in the pejorative sense of Gerson's complaint 
to be an activity which exceeds masculine definition. The "something else" to Kempe's speech 
when she is charged with heresy is a female body which repeatedly escapes patriarchal 
containment, becoming for Kempe a place of productive, if frightening, crisis and the means 
by whic? she attempts to define and articulate her freedom and her relationship with Christ. 
That charges of heresy against independent women often primarily served as attempts at social 
regulation is revealed by the time Kempe is questioned in Leicester as to the nature of her 
doctrinal beliefs (Chapter 48). When examined by clerics in the town Kempe reveals her 
orthodoxy initially by stating her acceptable belief in the value of the Eucharist, which was 
the first question applied to anyone suspected of Lollardy. Following this she reports that she 
"went on answering on all the articles [of the Faith] as many as they wished to ask her" 
(Kempe 1988, 153). Windeatt remarks that, in general, Kempe's "devotion to the sacrament, 
frequent confession, fasting, pilgrimages and holy images, all of which were questioned in 
Lollard writings," ought to have more than adequately proven her innocence of anti-Church 
views (Windeatt 1988, 11-12). However, although she reveals the correctness of her doctrine 
according to Holy Church, Kempe suffers a much more severe attack from the secular 
authority of Leicester, the Mayor, who, she says, "rebuked her and repeated many reproving 
and indecent words, which it is more fitting to conceal than express" (Kempe 1988, 153). 
Prior to her interrogation for heresy, she had been brought for questioning before the Mayor, 
who asked where she came from and, typically, who her father was (Chapter 46). Although 
Kempe listed the impressive credentials of her father and husband, the mayor called her '''a 
false strumpet, a false Lollard, and a false deceiver of the people'" (Kempe 1988, 149), and 
threatened to throw her into prison. As David Aers points out, in this encounter, 
the terms of abuse are not random. They assert that [Kempe] subverts the dominant 
powers' official version of correct sexual, religious, and social order, a threat to 
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major and interlocking areas of control.. .. As for the charge "fals strumpet," it takes 
us into the familiar realm of male projections onto women, ones given full 
indulgence in the anti-feminist tradition as well as in the daily life that sustains 
this .... Here the Mayor who immediately charges [Kempe] as a "strumpet" shows the 
male propensity to sexualize all that a woman can do or say, something he would 
not do to a male (Aers 1988, 100). 
During the exchange which follows this accusation Kempe reports that the Mayor says "many 
evil and horrible words to her" before she is locked away in the gaoler's house. Next, she is 
brought before the Steward of Leicester, who, after questioning her before many priests, takes 
her into his chamber and tries to rape her, speaking "many foul, lewd words." Kempe pleads 
to be spared because she is "a man's wife" and, after more "filthy signs and .. .indecent looks," 
the Steward finally releases her, but only when the boldness of her claim to be empowered 
to speak by the Holy Ghost astonishes and frightens him into so doing (Kempe 1988, 150-1). 
The civil authorities of Leicester were clearly disturbed by Kempe's travelling and teaching 
alone, and their making her a sexual target served as an attempt to curtail this independence. 
It was only when the mystic claimed that Christ spoke through her that they were silenced, 
just as her evident doctrinal orthodoxy satisfied and silenced the clerics. As Aers notes, 
"[Kempe] catalyzes specifically masculine atL'(ieties about potential female autonomy, the 
potential freedom of will to select life-projects in which servicing males is not on the agenda" 
(Aers 1988, 100-1). This is starkly revealed by the Mayor's statement which follows her 
clerical interrogation in his town: '''I believe you have come here to lure away our wives from 
us, and lead them off with you'" (Kempe 1988, 153). It is evident here that the charge of 
heresy masks a deeper fear, less easily articulated, about the powers of women's words and 
female freedom. The Mayor's fear that Kempe will lead away the town's wives reflects how 
the exchange of women as objects in the patriarchal sexual economy of the middle ages so 
restricted women's exchanges with each other that a woman who spoke freely was perceived 
as inciting female rebellion. In claiming her divinely sanctioned right to live an unenclosed 
and relatively autonomous life, unowned by any man, Kempe also embodies a direct challenge 
to the patriarchal organisation of sex/gender roles which ensures masculine freedom by 
appropriating women's bodily space. 
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In Chapter 13 of the Book fears of female insubordination are given a different kind of violent 
expression. In a monastery church in Canterbury Kempe arouses the ire of monks and priests 
with her weeping, which leads her husband (to whom she was still evidently attached at this 
stage)29 to abandon her through shame. Next, she angers an old and very powerful monk by 
claiming to both hear and speak of God, and repeating to the monk a story from scripture. He 
is the one who unequivocally declares: "'I wish you were enclosed in a house of stone, so that 
no one should speak with you'" (Kempe 1988, 63). At Kempe's answer that the monk should 
support rather than rebuke her as one of God's servants, a young monk proclaims that the 
mystic is certainly possessed either by the devil or the Holy Ghost (because of her confidence 
in reciting scripture), and when she at last leaves the monastery, a crowd of people follows, 
threatening to burn her as a "false Lollard" and heretic. 
While, as Atkinson points out, Kempe's telling a biblical story on this occasion may have 
fuelled mistrust, "given the Lollards' fondness for Scripture," the passage reveals something 
else to be at issue, and more markedly shows "an ancient suspicion of religious women who 
were not safely enclosed" (Atkinson 1983, 107-8). The young monk's belief that Kempe must 
be possessed either by the devil or the Holy Ghost is based on the fact that what she speaks 
"is Holy Writ," which knowledge she cannot "have of [her]self," since she is a woman. Here 
is a direct reflection of the medieval understanding of women as permeable, both physically 
and spiritually, and therefore easily open to suggestion of all kinds and especially of heretical 
ideas.3D 
The construction of women as physically and dangerously exceSSIve achieves its most 
frightening consequence, however, when Kempe is surrounded by an angry mob shouting, 
'" You shall be burnt, you false Lollard! Here is a cartful of thorns ready for you, and a barrel 
to burn you with!'" (Kempe 1988, 64). The Book states that the mystic, standing completely 
alone, "her body trembling and quaking dreadfully ... did not know where her husband had 
gone" (Kempe 1988, 64), a significant aspect of her threatened situation as elsewhere she 
attempts to escape bodily harm by claiming to be "a man's wife," her body under his 
ownership and rule (Kempe 1988, 150, 160, 171). Here, Kempe prays for help and two young 
men ask if she is "a heretic" or "a Lollard." When she says that she is neither they escort her 
"home" to her lodgings where she is safe upon finding her husband. The entire scene is a 
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graphic example not only of the threat that clerics felt at a woman's speaking (of) scripture, 
but of the even more violent response aroused among ordinary townspeople by the figure of 
a lay woman without her husband who dares to speak publicly of God and on her own 
behalf.3l 
As Hope Weissman remarks, the fact that women as well as men found threatening the 
mystic's crossing of the boundaries marked by expected roles for women suggests that she 
probably reminded many of their own unvoiced or unacknowledged desires and fears 
(Weissman 1982,216; Aers 1988, 201n). In Hessle (Chapter 53) the Book reports that while 
"men called her Lollard ... women came running out of their houses with their distaffs, 
~ 
crying .. .'Burn this false heretic'" (Kempe 1988, 168). And when she reaches Beverley the 
local men advise her to '''give up this life that you lead, and go and spin, and card wool, as 
other women do, and do not suffer so much shame and so much unhappiness'" (Kempe 1988, 
168). Plainly, the charge of heresy functions here as a means of civic policing of "vagrant" 
or unclassifiable women rather than a method of deciding spiritual orthodoxy. 
The old monk's desire that Kempe should be enclosed in a house of stone, like the 
townsmen's injunction to "spin and card wool," reflects the anxiety caused by a woman who 
is "out of her place" and who challenges the established system based on the appropriation 
of female bodies and speech. The fact that women as well as men turned against Kempe 
reveals that her behaviour contravened accepted codes of "womanhood" by which medieval 
women understood and identified themselves. Kempe appears as an anomaly and an outlaw 
of the patriarchal order, a person who fulfils the criteria for neither sex and whose strange 
mode of life can and should be eradicated as "hereticaL" 
In This Sex Which Is Not One Irigaray answers a question about "speaking as a woman" in 
terms which make clear the challenge to traditional female roles felt by women's public 
speech, a challenge evidenced in scenes from The Book of Margery Kempe. She says: 
How can one be a "woman" and be "in the street"? That is, be out in public, be 
public - and still more tellingly, do so in the mode of speech. We come back to the 
question of the family: why isn't the woman, who belongs to the private sphere, 
always locked up in the house? As soon as a woman leaves the house, someone 
starts to wonder, someone asks her: how can you be a woman and be out here at the 
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same time? And if, as a woman who is also in public, you have the audacity to say 
something about your desire, the result is scandal and repression. You are disturbing 
the peace, disrupting the order of discourse (Irigaray 1985a, 144-5). 
In contrast to such disruption, the medieval ideal for women, the role in life which offered 
the highest spiritual reward, involved bodily stillness, invisibility, and silence. In medieval 
texts of advice to female virgins (such as Hali Meidhad, the Ancrene Wisse (both c. 1190-
1230), and the Institutione Inclusarum of Aelred of Rievaulx (1160-2)), the figure of the 
anchoress, enclosed in a cell of stone, herself functions as a symbol of the necessary barrier 
between the outside world and the rampant possibilities of the (female) flesh. As Lochrie 
notes, "the religious life for women consists primarily in adopting boundaries and maintaining 
an unbroken body" (Lochrie 1991 b, 125), which serves as a physical symbol of the possibility 
of sanctification for all. 
In the Ancrene Wisse for example, Christ is described as a shield by which humankind -
figured as a courtly lady besieged in a castle by enemies - is saved from destruction (Ancrene 
Wisse 1990, 112-17). The Christ who functions as a shield of salvation is presented as the 
model for the anchoress' discipline, as that which stands between sinful people (the lady in 
the castle) and the worldly perils which threaten to invade them. That ordinary sinners should 
be represented as female in the figure of the lady is not surprising given medieval beliefs 
about women's alignment with the fallen flesh. But while the anchoress who imitates Christ 
is the metaphorical barrier between the human condition and worldly temptation, she herself 
partakes of both these obstacles to holiness. "The flesh," that part of human beings which is 
always vulnerable to disruption from within and temptation from without, exists in a sense 
both inside and outside the human person, but the borders separating inside and outside are 
especially unstable in women. Thus "female chastity preserves the 'invisible frontier' between 
body and world, a sacred space that resists the condition of abjection posed by the'heaving 
powers of the flesh'" (Brown 1988, 354, 349, cited in Lochrie 1991b, 126).32 
The overdetermined relationship between the flesh of sinners, the world and the anchoress' 
chastity means that she stands in for all three components of her situation as it is scripted in 
the Ancrene Wisse. She represents fallen humankind, worldly perils and the barrier between, 
hence her position as a symbol of the hope of sanctity is an ambiguous one. The limits on an 
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anchoress' sensual engagement with the world in terms of speaking, seeing and touching, as 
articulated in the literature advising her, are, then, necessarily strict. If women are seen to be 
essentially fluid and infinitely suggestible, their position guarding the boundaries between sin 
and redemption may at any time become subversive if they fail to keep the rules which 
restrain their bodies and define their role. Speech and sexuality, as forms of exchange with 
others which breach the borders of the anchoress' enclosure, are outlawed. Thus Aelred of 
Rievaulx depicts the anchoress' state of chastity as a form of "solitary living above the 
conversation of the world" (Aelred of Rievaulx 1984, 9. My translation). Here, as Lochrie 
observes, "the metaphor of conversation ... works at the level of speech and sexuality, levels 
that Aelred collapses" (Lochrie 1991 b, 126). 
The female mystic's symbolising both disruption and boundary, sin and salvation, and 
inhabiting the fragile space between through union with Christ makes her Christie relationship 
itself appear easily open to change and, by extension, to subversion. Kempe, in choosing to 
deviate from tradition through the terms on which she allies herself with Christ and the space 
from which she speaks, makes her spiritual relationship a direct challenge to the ideology of 
the enclosed female body. She is threatened with the fate of the heretic because she claims 
the freedom in Christ to reshape the female mystical role. And she does this in terms which 
exploit medieval understandings of the female body as a place of ambiguity and disruptive 
excess. 
Kempe's Book also reflects internal anxieties on her part about the singularity of her visionary 
role. She describes reassurances she is given by Christ that her spirituality and her non-
virginal status are acceptable to him (for examples of the latter, see Kempe 1988, 84-8, 126, 
247, 253). These conversations with Christ help provide her with the courage to defend her 
cross-category mode of living vigorously when she is challenged by priests and town rulers. 
In Kempe's rearticulation of the English female mystic's calling, her status as a wife, 
combined with her desire to speak publicly, necessarily involve her in "conversation [in and] 
of the world, II much of it with influential and sometimes hostile men. 
Beckwith notes that the foregrounding of conversation and dialogue in Kempe's Book is a 
reflection of its production under "conditions of deep anxiety as to who were to be the keepers 
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of the WordH in her culture (Beckwith 1992, 185; Windeatt 1988,25). Kempe's reporting of 
her dialogues with influential men - including interrogations for heresy - serve as evidence 
of her orthodoxy in a climate where "the monopoly of the clergy over the transmission of the 
Scriptures was being fundamentally challenged" through the activities of Lollards and the like 
(Beckwith 1992, 186).33 As Beckwith points out: 
Where the distinction between clerical and lay, tllemedtl and IIlewed," is watertight, 
mystic speech will not necessarily threaten or disrupt the clerical function. But in an 
environment where the clergy no longer uniquely or legitimately transmit the Word 
of God, who hears God's voice and who is entitled to speak it is a very vexed issue 
(Beckwith 1992, 186). 
The grounds of accusations of heresy against Kempe appear, then, to be the charge of 
"producing herself," in Beckwith's words (Beckwith 1992, 178), in a role outside of those 
instituted by the Church. This, by extension, is seen to be threatening to the ordering of her 
society through its possible influence upon other women, especially wives. While the 
construction of Kempe' s Book as a doctrinally orthodox tltreatise,,34 must largely suppress the 
aspect of other lay women's words and records in detail only the mystic's conversations with 
men, there are favourable references to other mystical women writers in the Book, which I 
will discuss in the following section. These women also sought clerical endorsement and 
spiritual authority and faced similar difficulties and pursued aims similar to Kempe's. 
Although most of these writers lived outside of England, they provide a more favourable 
context for Kempe's own treatise than either the discourses of preaching or of heretical 
activities, although they reveal pressures that arise from these two sources like those which 
bear on Kempe. In the vitae or lives of these holy women (which formed a new literary genre 
by the late middle ages (Bynum 1989, 169)), conversations with religious authorities and with 
people in the world are an integral part of their relationships with Christ. And their encounters 
with their Saviour, like Margery Kempe's, arise from and are intimately related to both 
physical and verbal conversation in the world. 
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2. 1. 3 Mystical foremothers: The continental tradition of holy women's lives 
A reference to one of Kempe's continental foremothers occurs after the series of conversations 
between the English woman's allies and the preaching friar, when Kempe has disrupted his 
sermon with her weeping (Chapter 62). The Book tells how during this period of strife many 
former supporters had deserted Kempe, including the priest who had been acting as her scribe. 
However, upon reading in the life of Mary of Oignies (1177-1213) of "the wonderful 
sweetness that she had in hearing the word of God, of the wonderful compassion that she had 
in thinking of his Passion, of the abundant tears that she wept" (Kempe 1988, 191) as a result, 
he is moved to Kempe's support once again. The record of Mary's gift of weeping in her 
clerically endorsed text thus serves to verify Kempe's. 
The similarities between the two women's experiences of Passion( ate) weeping extend to 
include Mary's also being banished from a sermon because of her unstoppable tears,35 and, 
after reading about this Kempe's scribe finds other evidence of the virtues of compassionate 
weeping in "The Prick of Love"; the writings of Richard Rolle; and the vita of the visionary 
Elizabeth of Hungary (Kempe 1988,192-3).36 The reference to Mary's life (which is repeated 
again in Chapter 68, by a supporter of Kempe who has read it and mentions it to another 
preacher in defence of Kempe's weeping during his sermon (Kempe 1988, 205-6) functions 
as a textual strategy - whether on Kempe's part or her scribe's, or both - for representing an 
episode in which Kempe was much maligned according to the example of that of a saintly 
woman, a foremother whose life was much like the English mystic's own. 
While Mary's text serves here to authorise Kempe's physical response to Christ's Passion, 
seen by many as excessive and bizarre, it was originally written in defence of Mary's own 
mode of living, and its fervent devotion to the Passion of Christ. While Kempe faces continual 
accusations of Lollardy, Mary's life was written as a defence of a particular female way of 
life - that of the Beguines - which was held suspect by official authorities for some time and 
eventually condemned (Neel 1989, 324). The book itself was, as Roger Ellis states, "a clear 
response to the troubled times in which its author was living" (Dictionnaire de spiritualite 
1937, VII, 60-2, cited in Ellis 1990, 171). It was written by Mary's constant supporter, 
Jacques de Vitry, to endorse the Beguine way in the face of the Cathar heresy (Neel 1989, 
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326), and Mary is herself the model of orthodoxy upon whom this defence is founded. 
Petroff s description of the characteristics of the Beguine calling shows how these women's 
mysticism was similar to Kempe's: 
What Marie d'Oignies and her associates had in common were the practice of 
evangelical poverty, a willingness to support themselves by the work of their hands, 
ascetic self-sacrifice in the service of others, and a tendency to have visions. They 
were ... mystics of a new sort who focused their meditative effort on the suffering 
humanity of Christ, on dedication to the Eucharist, and finally on mystical marriage 
with Christ (Petroff 1986, 174). 
Cited in'the Book as marking the turning point in Kempe's scribe's renewed support of his 
charge against opposition, Mary's life is then both a standard for Kempe's way of life and a 
textual model for the necessary clerical alliance out of which her Book is produced. Through 
its citation, both Kempe and her scribe place themselves in an orthodox, antiheretical mystical 
and textual tradition, of which Mary of Oignies is an early exponent. Mary's life may be seen 
as a model for Kempe's "very material mysticism" (Beckwith 1986) and her physical 
independence, as well as the clerical support she required to escape charges of heresy. Mary 
represents a tradition of European women mystics who achieved a limited empowerment 
under the watchful eyes of male clerical benefactors. 
Kempe's continental predecessors help the modem reader make sense of her own devotional 
"excesses" - her loud weeping and Passion(ate) imitatio - as some critics have suggested 
(Atkinson 1983, 159-82; Dickman 1984). Susan Dickman writes that, not only were there 
"hundreds, if not thousands, of women like [Kempe] ... attempting to live quasi-religious lives 
in the middle ages, while remaining in the world," but their piety "was concentrated on three 
particularly 'human' moments in the Christian story: the infant Jesus, Christ the Bridegroom, 
and the dying Christ" (Dickman 1984, 152; Bynum 1982, 18, 147). This emphasis on Christ's 
bodiliness led to the special devotion to and physical miracles associated with the Eucharist 
performed by female visionaries which were described in the Introduction (18-19n; Dickman 
1984, 152; Lagorio 1984, 172-3; Bynum 1989, 165-6). 
Such excesses are documented in continental women's piety (particularly in the regions of 
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Germany and the Low Countries) in far greater numbers than in England, and it was also on 
the continent that women grouped together or chose individual clerical overseers to support 
their efforts to live lives of special devotion to Christ, often without taking formal vows 
(Dickman 1984, 154; Petroff 1986, 171-3). The Beguines are a clear example of this trend. 
Margery Kempe's life echoes the desires of her foremothers in terms of independence of 
living as well as in the graphically physical contents of her visions. As Petroff points out, 
from the thirteenth century onwards, more and more European women sought: 
a life of evangelical poverty; they wanted the opportunity to work, to a self-
sufficiency not based on the income from property but on the work of their hands; 
they wanted a daily religious practice and the education to pursue that practice 
inte11igently and the opportunity to discuss spiritual ideas among themselves. They 
desired flexibility of commitment and lifestyle, so that there would be the possibility 
for active charity in the world as well as for a solitary contemplative existence when 
the need arose. They were eager to live chaste lives in completely female 
communities, but they preferred not to take permanent vows of chastity, and they 
resisted strict enclosure (Petroff 1986, 171). 
For medieval women mystics, writing a visionary text was a complex and often difficult 
process which involved circumnavigating, by means of male supporters (who were often the 
texts' scribes), the centuries-old associations of women's words with damnable and deluding 
bodily passions. This meant that the mystics' texts had to contain a doubleness of voice in that 
they needed to Incorporate orthodoxy as well as a claim to special sanctity. The women's lives 
contain record of the many passionate physical activities they performed in devotion to Christ, 
such as those Kempe records in her Book. But as Kempe's Book also reveals, particularly 
through the example of the preaching friar's sermon, these physical excesses could still be 
viewed as potentially troubling, hence the need for continued clerical sanction. 
The female mystics who succeeded in avoiding conviction for heresy and maintaining 
orthodox status cast their lives into a narrative at least partly as a strategy of physical survival. 
Their texts, as "bodies of work" themselves, are in a sense both a record of their bodily 
experiences and a way of overcoming or transmuting the normal restrictions on women's 
speech, and particularly on the speech of women who were sexually experienced, as a number 
of Kempe's continental foremothers were.37 This in itself is evidence that their identification 
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with their Saviour was in direct contrast to that prescribed as the feminine ideal through the 
doctrine of the enclosed female body. 
Indeed, the women whose lives I briefly discuss in this section were all empowered, through 
the intimacy and fervour of their relationship with Christ, to "speak as women" in the sense 
that together they and their writings formed a community of female visionaries whose 
concerns and activities differed from those of most men (and other lay women). However they 
had also to negotiate the derogatory terms in which women's speech was held to be suspect 
because "womanly," in the sense of being easily contaminated by currents of heresy and sin. 
The mystics' empowerment was nonetheless wide-ranging, including not only the act of 
"writing" and the achievement of clerical support necessary to it but also, in many cases, the 
freedom to lead lives of unenclosed devotion to their Saviour, to teach, travel and talk with 
likeminded others about spiritual things. 
Of course, while the immediate means of this empowerment was Christ, its maintenance was 
bound up with more ordinary but powerful men.38 As Beckwith notes, medieval mystics were 
a source of anxiety to the Church, in its role as '''keeper of the Word,' an anxiety intensified 
in a period of increasing lay literacy, where mysticism was a vital form of distress and 
dissent.. .. Often mystics and the mystical experience could ... readily be used as a 'bulwark 
against heresy'" (Beckwith 1986, 40).39 Petroff notes that Mary's arch-supporter, Jacques de 
Vitry, was so impressed by the ideals and activities of her Beguine community at Liege that 
he gave up his career at the University of Paris to become one of her followers (Petroff 1986, 
173). The Beguines, like the Humiliati in Lombardy and the early Franciscans in Umbria, as 
well as several other groups mentioned by Petroff,40 all had certain attitudes in common 
concerning religious life in the world, including a belief in self-supporting work and a degree 
of freedom to travel, and all were "viewed with mistrust by the ecclesiastical establishment" 
(Petroff 1986, 173). Petroff points out that de Vitry was theologically conservative and 
anxious about the spread of Catharism in the region; hence his relationship with Mary and her 
group benefited both parties. His association with the community at Liege was an important 
factor in his ascent in the hierarchy of the Church. However Petroff also claims that, because 
of his activities and writings, we now know much about "holy women" who lived unenclosed 
lives in the middle ages (before and during Margery Kempe's time), information which might 
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not otherwise have been recorded (Petroff 1986, 173-4). 
In a sense, then, the relationship between lay women mystics and their male supporters was, 
like the discourses of preaching and heresy charges, based on an appropriation of women's 
words and the material of their lives. And Margery Kempe's Book is certainly not immune 
to such a reading. And yet, in an atmosphere in which the Church with its male hierarchy was 
continually reasserting the boundaries of orthodoxy against the activities of those it labelled 
heretics - many of whom were women - the comparative freedom some female visionaries 
achieved is impressive. Just as Kempe may be said to engage with the discourses of popular 
preaching and allegations of heresy in her text, turning them on their heads and confounding 
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their messages about women, so her text reveals engagement with the texts of her foremothers 
and contemporaries which is equally tactical. Explicit as well as suggestive references to her 
mentors' lives serve to place her Book in a more comprehensible context than that evoked by 
the devotional and penitential traditions created solely by the English Church to guide the 
laity. But these references also highlight the contradictions inherent in "writing" a female life 
the authority of which depends upon maintaining the continued favour of men. 
The reference to Mary's weeping discussed above, for instance, occurring at the point in 
Kempe's Book when her tears are seen as most challenging to priestly authority, ironically 
serves as both a strategic authorisation of the gift and an accentuation of its transgressive 
aspect, since even the tears of an acknowledged holy woman like Mary were seen as 
disturbing enough for her to be sent out of church. The Book goes on to tell how Kempe's 
scribe reads that the priest who banished Mary from church was himself afflicted with violent 
weeping, so that Kempe's gift of tears is endorsed at least three times: first by Mary's priest's 
weeping; secondly by Mary's scribe's recording of it; and lastly by Kempe's scribe's 
reaffirming his charge's sanctity and noting the whole incident in the Book. 
Petroff suggests that the reason that female visionaries' tears were so unsettling to others 
(especially male authorities) was because they functioned, as .well as reminders of Christ's 
Passion, as signs of the women's frustration over having to use male scribes at all, and having 
to goto such lengths to ensure that they were seen as orthodox and escaped the stake. She 
describes the experiences of Kempe, Mary and a thirteenth-century Franciscan tertiary (a 
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member of the third (lay) order of Franciscans), Angela of Foligno: 
It seems that [their] violent. crying .. .is the inarticulate cry of one needing a voice, 
needing to have words, in a world that would deny that voice. All three were 
married women - which made them unlikely candidates as images of purity and 
sanctity. All three had unusual vocations that caused them to live on the periphery 
of religious society .... All three ... had to choose ... men to write their words for them .... 
All three women were in part crying in humiliation at their helplessness to 
communicate, at their dependence on others, their desire to handle and control words 
(Petroff 1986, 39-40). 
If this was so, the circumscription of the women's words and cries was also felt to be 
necessary because, serving as a reminder of Christ's Passion and arising out of devotion to 
him,their tears and bodily convulsions functioned as "a claim to a privileged language, the 
Word made flesh and uttered through the flesh," as Lochrie points out (Lochrie 1991b, 137). 
And this language may have threatened to bypass, through the mystics' intimate relationship 
and physical identifications with a IIfeminised" Christ, the authority of their male scribes and 
overseers, the official "keepers of the Word. II 
Kempe's prolific travels would have been the means by which she received some information 
about her predecessors. Another source was the reading of visionary texts done by her scribe 
and other clerical supporters, which they communicated with her. Kempe reports being read 
a copy of St Bridget of Sweden's Revelations (Kempe 1988, 182) which would have been one 
of several in circulation in England at the time.41 Hope Emily Allen records that there are at 
least seven English translations of parts of the Revelations to be found in fifteenth-century 
manuscripts (Kempe 1940, 276n). 
St Bridget was probably the most well-known continental woman saint in Kempe's England. 
Her cult became widespread and influential in the century following her death, when the order 
which she founded spread throughout Europe. A Bridgettine house was first established in 
England in 1415, at Syon abbey in Twickenham (Atkinson 1983, 172-5). Monks and nuns 
from Sweden who came to England to teach new members of the order while awaiting its 
official endorsement passed through Lynn, and as Allen notes, Kempe would have known of 
the saint from infancy (Kempe 1940, 280n). She would also have been touched by the current 
enthusiasm surrounding the new order, and records a visit she made to the abbey in 1434 at 
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Lammas time (Kempe 1988, 290) for a special indulgence obtainable there. The Bridgettine 
order was, as Atkinson points out, not only Ita center of mystical devotion ll in England, but 
of "continental influence, and of feminine piety" (Atkinson 1983, 173). As Windeatt suggests: 
liThe pattern of [Bridget's] life as a married mystic, the transition from wife to Bride of 
Christ, the sustainedly visionary experience of her life - all such things would have appealed 
to [Kempe] in vindicating the potential of the female mystic II (Windeatt 1988, 18). 
Although Bridget was of a much higher social class than Kempe and so had higher spiritual 
ambitions, her activities advising and criticising Church authorities, founding an order and 
leading political campaigns (including working for the Papacy to be returned to Rome from 
, 
Avignon during the period of its exile there (1309-77) prior to the Great Schism of 1378-
1417) (Atkinson 1983, 170; Petroff 1986, 55n; Windeatt 1988,18) were undertaken at God's 
command but in necessary alliance with male rulers and her spiritual director. In these 
diplomatic endeavours and relationships, too, she was an important model for the English 
mystic, since without allies in high places she would never have achieved such success and 
renown. 
While specific references to the texts of Bridget, Mary and Elizabeth of Hungary occur in 
Kempe's Book, influential works by male mystics from Germany and the Netherlands were 
also known in England during her lifetime (Windeatt 1988, 17, 299n).42 Other continental 
women's texts in circulation in England were Mechtild of Hackbom's Booke of Gostely 
Grace; Marguerite Porete's J.vIirror of Simple Souls; the visions of Elizabeth of Schonau, and 
the lives of Elizabeth of Spalbek and Christina the Marvellous (McNamer 1990, xxxvn; 
Windeatt 1988, 20). The Book also reveals a strong association throughout Kempe's life with 
IIDewchlond" - the German-speaking regions and the Low Countries (Windeatt 1988, 17) -
where women's mystical piety flourished. 43 Furthermore, in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries Kempe's home base, King's Lynn, was a busy port town and centre of 
communication and trade with the rest of Europe. News of devotional trends on the continent 
circulated in the town to add to the stories of the lives of her foremothers Kempe may have 
heard in the places she visited. In addition, Norman Tanner notes that there were communities 
of lay women in Norwich in the fifteenth century which "closely resembled beguinages" 
(Tanner 1984, 64), although enclosed religious vocations for women were more popular in 
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England than such groupings. Kempe, however, may have been inspired by these women and 
their departure from English conventions, while eschewing a community life for herself. 
Other mystics whom Kempe may well have perceived as models include Blessed Dorothea 
of Montau and St Catherine of Siena (1347-1380). Both women, like Bridget and Mary, 
achieved wide recognition leading to cult status by aligning themselves with astute and 
ambitious men (Atkinson 1983, 167-8; Kieckhefer 1984, 31). Some information on St 
Catherine is included in the one surviving manuscript of an English version of Mary of 
Oignies' life, which also contains versions of the lives of several other saintly women 
(Windeatt 1988, 20). Windeatt points out that this sort of collection is suggestive of the 
material Kempe's clerical advisers would have read, and Catherine's Dialogue was translated 
into English and circulated in late medieval England (Hodgson 1965; Catherine of Siena 1966, 
cited in Windeatt 1988, 20). Kempe also visited Danzig, where, the Book states, "she was 
warmly welcomed by many people for our lord's love" (Kempe 1988, 275). Dorothea would 
have become quite famous in her home town by this time, so Kempe would no doubt have 
heard tales of her life there (Kempe 1940, 258n). 
Catherine, like Kempe, faced familial opposition to her choice of religious vocation, which 
she persevered against and overcame, eventually experiencing a mystical marriage with Christ, 
as Kempe does (Atkinson 1983, 48n). St Bridget of Sweden and Mary of Oignies, too, 
achieved vows of chastity in cooperation with their husbands, and \vere important models for 
the English woman in this respect (Atkinson 1983, 169; Windeatt 1988, 19), whereas Angela 
of Foligno had to get rid of her family by more devious spiritual means.44 Dorothea of 
Montau, again like Kempe, had many children and had to try and persuade her husband to let 
her embark on a life of chastity. He was less compliant than Kempe's husband, however, and 
Dorothea only achieved her goal after his death, four years before her own (Atkinson 1983, 
179; Kieckhefer 1984, 22). While the Prussian mystic makes of her sufferings at her 
husband's hands a sign of sanctity and blessing, the roles of wife and mother are played down 
in her biography, which reveals no attachment to her husband and children (Kieckhefer 1984, 
32). Kempe's text likewise follows this trend. 
On the subject of family and friends, Richard Kieckhefer observes that the whole of 
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Dorothea's life, as her confessor John of Marienwerder depicts it, "was one of singular 
alienation." Kieckhefer claims that "it is possible that a theological bias lies behind this 
picture: the ascetic ideology of the era could lead to disparagement of friendship, and even 
familial affection could become a sign of worldliness" (Kieckhefer 1984, 31-2). However the 
downplaying of Dorothea's marital and maternal experiences is more likely to be a strategy 
necessitated by the Church's attitudes to female sexuality, which placed mothers on a level 
far below virgins as vehicles of divine communication. Dorothea's acts of excessive corporeal 
devotion to Christ's suffering take the place of ordinary maternal and familial concerns in her 
vita and may be seen as a form of atonement for past sexual "sins" which transmutes them 
into a higher form. 45 This occurs most specifically in her text when she experiences a mystical 
pregnancy. As Clarissa Atkinson observes, "[Dorothea] identified maternal anguish not with 
the suffering of the mother, Mary, but with the passion of God" (Atkinson 1991,186). In this 
way, like Kempe, the pain of Dorothea's maternal experience was transformed into an 
identification with the pain of Christ. 
. Kieckhefer also notes that all the versions of Dorothea's life present her "as a woman of 
exceptionally strong emotion, which her culture, even while ambivalent, encouraged her to 
channel in the direction of overwrought piety" (Kieckhefer 1984, 23). Like Kempe's, 
Dorothea's "overwrought piety" disturbed many of those around her, but it also earned her 
a reputation of spiritual privilege. Her gift of tears, for instance, is cited in her vita as 
evidence of her sanctity (Atkinson 1983, 180), a claim also appropriated by Kempe. 46 As 
Kieckhefer acknowledges, Dorothea's moving from her home town of Danzig to 
Marienwerder on the death of her husband, where she submitted to the direction of her 
confessor and scribe, was a maj or factor in the popularity she and later her cult achieved. 
With her confessor's help she was able to create a new identity as anchoress and holy woman, 
sidestepping the prejudices she would have had to confront in her home town where she was 
known through her husband as a wife and mother (Kieckhefer 1984, 31). 
F or the female visionaries who had been married and had also had children, the devotion to 
Christ which is recorded in their texts thus involves, as Kempe's does, a continuation of their 
former physical experience, albeit on a more spiritually rewarding plane. As Petroff states, 
while virginity or at least celibacy was essential for these women's spiritual development, the 
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proof of that growth "was not virginity, but visions" (Petroff 1986, 35), visions which, for the 
fonnerly married women, were signs of a life transfonned but nonetheless embodying the 
conflicts of its past. Margery Kempe's Passion visions, during which she twisted and writhed 
like a woman in childbirth (Kempe 1988, 105-6), may be seen in this light. While her 
physical emulation of Christ's suffering in her visions in Jerusalem and elsewhere reflects 
orthodox devotional practice, it also serves as an expression of her own sorrow and grief at 
her fonner sins and trespasses. Given that she was no virgin, these sins clearly include her 
prior life of sexual activity and childbearing.47 In Mary of Oignies, too, similar extremes of 
physical devotion are recorded. Her vita states that, like Kempe during her weepings in 
Jerusalem, Mary "cried as a woman in childbirth" (qtd. in Kurtz 1988, 193), and that in 
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meditation - again like Kempe - she mothered the infant Christ (Petroff 1986, 9-10). 
Angela of Foligno's piety and life experiences resemble Kempe's more closely than almost 
any other of her continental predecessors. She, like Kempe, came of a successful family, 
married while quite young and had several children (Underhil11912, 89). She also lived a life 
of worldly vanity before her conversion in middle age. Dickman notes that Angela's post-
conversion spirituality presents the closest parallel with Kempe's in her commitment to 
suffering and shame for the sake of Christ (Dickman 1984, 164), a style of devotion which 
reflects the difficulties medieval female mystics found in reconciling a sexually experienced 
past with a chaste and holy vocation. 
Angela's devotion to Christ is similar to Kempe's in that it is manifested in extreme physical 
behaviours which may be seen, following the suggestions put forward in Chapter One, as 
"hysterical." Lochrie notes how Angela's piety, like Kempe's, involves an outright rejection 
of the doctrine of the enclosed female body, and she engages instead in public displays of 
"mystical abjection that draw upon the heaving powers of the flesh to experience rupture, 
discontinuity, excess" (Lochrie 1991b, l30). Whereas Kempe writhes on the ground in a 
Passion imitatio which recalls her experiences of childbirth, Angela (as well as weeping 
violently) strips off her clothes before the Cross, and offers her body to Christ in a parody 
of "the manner of [the] wanton woman!! (Angela of Foligno 1966, 4; 1927, II. 8-10, cited in 
Lochrie 1991 b, 134) she had formerly been. Both these behaviours enact a caricature of the 
medieval understanding of women's bodily being as excessive and seductive, a double act of 
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mImeSIS which overloads conventional representations of femininity with an excess of 
meaning(s). As Lochrie observes, "[Angela's] meditations focus on the wounds, ruptures, 
dislocations in the body of Christ" (Lochrie 1991b, 134), as do Kempe's Passion visions in 
Jerusalem, where the physical dislocation and wounding of Christ's body is replicated in 
Kempe's own anguished convulsions on the ground (Kempe 1988, 105-6; Lochrie 1991a, 
174). 
The wounded body of Christ becomes the space in which the mystics' bodies and cries are 
reinscribed as holy, and in which their otherwise unrepresented physicality is offered 
expression as well as redemption. Miri Rubin notes that in the fifteenth century "Christ's 
wounds were hailed as the essence of Christ's humanity," and "for mystics they were literally 
an entry into Christ" (Rubin 1992b, 303. See also Gougaud 1927, 80-91; Gray 1963). Thus: 
"Experience was drawn into Christ's vulnerable form, which was at once accessible through 
pity and also the source of all that was good" (Rubin 1992b, 304). Through identification with 
the wounded Christie body, women like Angela and Kempe were able to transform the 
meaning of their excessive and boundaryless female flesh. 
While Kempe's responses to the discourses of medieval preaching, heretical allegations, and 
the vitae· of her foremothers reflect the ways in which each textual system represents the 
female body differently - the discourses of preaching and heresy negating its activity and the 
vitae showing evidence of its production in visions - her text's portrayal of her direct 
engagement with popular representations of Christ and his mother appears to be most 
empowering. In the final section of this chapter I will discuss how and why this empowering 
identification was enacted. I will proceed to lay the ground for the following chapter by 
tracing the connections between Kempe's Passion(ate) theatrics and popular medieval 
understandings of the sorrowing Virgin and the feminised Christ. 
115 
2. 2 The flesh of Christ and the bodies of women: The Virgin Mary and the 
feminised Christ in the discourses of popular devotion 
And perhaps He has chosen her body to inscribe His will, even if she is less able to 
read the inscription, poorer in language, "crazier" in her speech, burdened with 
matter(s) that history has laid on her, shackled in by speculative plans that paralyze 
her desire (Irigaray 1985b, 198). 
And then our Lord's body shook and shuddered, and all the joints of that blissful 
body burst and broke apart, and his precious wounds ran down with rivers of blood 
on every side, and so she had ever more reason for more weeping and sorrowing 
(Kempe 1988, 233). 
2. 2. 1 The heterogeneous flesh 
Medieval scientific thought manifested the erasure of sexual difference which Irigaray sees 
as endemic to the history of "western" ideas in that it took the male body as the paradigm for 
human physicality. As Bynum indicates: 
It was the form or pattern or definition of what we are as humans; what was 
particularly womanly was the unfomiedness, the "stuffness" or physicality of our 
humanness. Such a notion identified woman with breaches in boundaries, with lack 
of shape or definition, with openings and exudings and spillings forth (Bynum 1989, 
186). 
Or, in psychoanalytic terms, with "lack." While European societies in the late middle ages 
revealed a fundamental concern with the embodiment of the human person - scholastic 
thought from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, for example, focused increasingly on the 
human as a unity of body and soul in which the boundaries between the two often became 
blurred - there was also a strong fascination with the limits of corporeality. This interest on 
the part of male thinkers in "the nature of bodiliness at its very boundaries" (Bynum 1989, 
188-91) meant that "woman" came to symbolise the fascinating and dangerous borderlands 
of the mortal body, as I outlined briefly in section 2. 1. 1.48 
As we have seen, "the flesh," site of human frailty and will to evil since the Fall, was figured 
as female by male theologians; for example, as Lochrie reveals, in the image of a wife who 
must be ruled by her husband; as the disobedient Eve; and as an old woman in thrall to 
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corrupting passions (Bernard of Clairvaux 1841-64, ch. 7, par. 12, 182, col. 841d, ch. 6, par. 
10, 182, col. 840b-c; 1987, 74, 76, cited in Lochrie 1991b, 121). Peter Brown observes that 
the theological notion of "the flesh" implies a particular way of regarding the body and its 
passions. In the Pauline view, 
the body was presented as lying in the shadow of a mighty force, the power of the 
flesh: the body's physical frailty, its liability to death and the undeniable penchant 
of its instincts toward sin served Paul as a synecdoche for the state of humankind 
pitted against the spirit of God (Brown 1988, 48). 
Lochrie notes that for both St Bernard and St Augustine, "woman" represents "influx itself, 
where the boundaries of body and soul are continually erased" by dangerous passions. She 
also shows how medieval medical views of women joined with theological ones to depict 
women's bodies as the ground of "the fissured flesh," the site within the human person 
through which sin enters through the body to corrupt the soul (Lochrie 1991b, 122): 
The key to the representation of woman in the Middle Ages ... was ... the flesh, the 
senses and the recalcitrant will. Woman was the "heaving powers of the flesh," the 
place of disruption, the breach in the harmonious unity of man and God and the 
flesh and spirit.. .. The flesh in its Augustinian and Bernardian senses is neither 
spiritual nor corporeal, but heterogeneous. It is that which cannot be divided, but 
neither is it unified or harmonious. it is already impure (Lochrie 1991b, 127). 
The notion of the flesh as it developed in early Christianity was, as Brown makes clear, 
suffused with negative female associations at the same time as it was understood as standing 
between the integrity of the body dedicated to Christ and the surrounding (pagan) society 
(Brown 1988, 194-5). It was "feminine" in the sense of connoting a state of helpless passion 
butfemale virginity was also the metaphor behind the idea, fundamental to the early Church, 
of virginity (integritas, literally "intactness" (Bugge 1975, 115-35)) as saving Christians from 
"the polluting 'admixture' of the outside world" (Brown 1988,48,354). Women were figures 
for that which simultaneously exceeded and sanctified the early Church, an attitude reflected 
in the later portrayal of the anchoress in works like Ancrene Wisse. Specific female bodies 
such as those of enclosed female religious were thus the literal, physical ground of the 
metaphor on which the ideas of the flesh and salvation from it were based. 
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In its violent power and its "liability to death," the flesh, symbolised by "woman," has 
affinities with what goes by the name of the death drives in Freudian psychoanalytic theory: 
the potentially destructive, unsymbolised affects in individuals which can erupt in expressions 
of violence in society. In Speculum of the Other Woman, Irigaray describes women's 
association with death for men as that which assures men an adequate sublimation of the death 
drives necessary for a stable existence. Irigaray's account of women's alignment with death 
in the masculine economy sounds like the description of the role of the female flesh in 
medieval culture outlined above. Both death in psychoanalytic terms and the flesh in medieval 
terms are integral to masculine transcendence, that is, the projection of God as male and the 
concomitant construction of male subjectivity as godlike which exists in the history of 
"western" culture: 
In this proliferating desire of the same, death will be the only representative of an 
outside, of a heterogeneity, of an other. Woman will assume the function of 
representing death (of sex/organ), castration, and man will be sure as far as possible 
of achieving subjugation (Irigaray 1985b, 27, qtd. in Whitford 1991a, 115-6). 
And Elisabeth Bronfen describes the association of "woman" with death in the following way: 
Like the death drive, which articulates that death is not outside but rather 
inextricably inhabiting life, femininity also is not a reassuringly canny opposite to 
masculinity, but rather is inside the masculine, inhabiting it as "otherness, as its own 
disruption" (Felman 1981,41). As manifestations of such a force of oscillation, both 
death and femininity not only call into question rigid categories, but also mark the 
absence of a fixed place within culture. They function as the foundation and 
condition of culture's representational systems, as telos and origin, yet themselves 
exist nowhere as reference for this representation (de Lauretis 1984, l3, cited in 
Bronfen 1992, 53). 
While women are engaged in safeguarding the violent effects of the death drives for men, 
they are unable to sublimate their own, and this can have self-destructive results for them. As 
Whitford notes, these drives can become, for instance, "the traditional self-sacrifice of the 
woman" (Whitford 1991a, 115), or be expressed in masochistic behaviours. If death is, in 
Irigaray's terms, "the only representative of an outside," of something possibly other which 
would call into question the self-sufficiency of "man, II then women are prevented from 
accessing and activating this "other/outside" by being made to stand in for it as well as by the 
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unsymbolised nature of their own destructive impulses. 
In medieval terms this ambiguous "outside" is "womanll represented as the heterogeneous flesh 
which stands between man and God and mediates the tumultuous forces within the human 
(male-model) person. The Freudian death drives may be seen as a contemporary correlative 
of the downward pull of the postlapsarian body/self in medieval culture. Medieval women's 
experience of their own "fleshliness" would seem to be without the kind of mediation 
available to men, as represented in their portrayal as the "shield of salvation," the enclosed 
female body as symbol of the sanctification of the world. Perhaps this lack of representation 
for their specifically female fleshliness explains why so many more medieval women 
visionaries than men engage in acts of physical "masochism"49 in devotion to their Saviour. 
But perhaps they also perceived in the figure of a man whose flesh was vulnerable like theirs, 
a mediator for their own fleshly weakness. 
2. 2. 2 The sorrowing virgin and the feminised Christ 
The new emphasis given to flesh in the late middle ages was reflected in Christ's bodily 
existence becoming the main focus of popular devotion. The Passion, Christ's suffering and 
death and the grief of his Mother, the Virgin Mary, increased in importance in the period so 
that, as Gail McMurray Gibson remarks: "The relevant central image of the late middle ages 
is a suffering, human body racked on a cross .. .its secrets red, fresh, and bleeding" (Gibson 
1989, 6). And according to Jennifer Ash: "The Christianity of the later Middle Ages was a 
discourse constituted through a rhetoric (both visual and verbal) of violence and death, of pain 
and suffering: a discourse of the body and the bodily, revelling in the fleshliness of the Word" 
(Ash 1990, 76). These developments were of course an expression of values that had always 
inhered in Christianity, whose deity's gift of salvation involved the taking on of human flesh. 
They culminated in the period in a distinct emphasis on those moments in Christ's life when 
his humanity was most evident: his birth and death, or the Holy Nativity and Passion. His 
Mother's presence with and subjugation to her Son on these occasions led to an increase in 
devotion to her also. 
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Believers' emotional and affective responses to these events in Christ's life were channelled 
into the notion of imitatio Christi, as described in the Introduction (7). The imaginary 
identification of the individual Christian with the human Christ, his Mother and other saints 
was assisted through a wide range of media which interconnected within the cultures of 
particular regions of England (Atkinson 1983, 92-3; Gibson 1989,1-18; Gray 1990). These 
included religious drama in the forms of liturgical processions and cycles of plays produced 
by town guilds; religious lyrics which formed interludes in popular sermons; paintings; church 
windows and murals; and books of devotion such as the immensely popular Meditationes 
Vitae Christi and its English version, Love's Mirror (Love 1992). As Lochrie observes, this 
kind of spirituality "perceive[dJ a profound relationship between human cognition through the 
semiotics of the imagination and the life of Christ.. .. [and] the key to both Christ's Incarnation 
and imaginative cognition is that spiritual intention becomes wedded to corporeal similitude" 
(Lochrie 1991 a, 31). In other words, in acting out scenes from their Saviour's existence, 
believers were encouraged to engage in a physical remembering of Christ's Passion - not 
unlike the practice of eucharistic communion, itself the model for this sacramental spirituality 
- in which the body became the site of an experience of (inward and outward) spiritual 
transformation. The increase in devotion to Christ's humanity in the late middle ages meant 
that popular forms of piety were increasingly scripted onto the bodies of women and men, as 
the Mirror and the Meditationes reveal, so that "the tokens of suffering in the body 
commemorate what the memory, imagination and flesh know" (Lochrie 1991a, 36), and re-
member it afresh. 
Although given little credence in the Church's official stories the Virgin was also presented 
as a model for believers in the devotion of the period. As Marina Warner notes, the 
Franciscan movement had, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, harnessed the image of 
the Virgin Mary to its ideals, so that Mary's quintessential lowliness was portrayed as the 
prime example of the imitation of Christ's humility in consenting to take on human flesh for 
the salvation of humankind: liThe image of the Virgin of Humility compresses the new strain 
of poignant intimacy that men ( sic) were then feeling about the highest mysteries of 
Christianity" (Warner 1985, 182). Grosz observes that, traditionally, "Mary is represented 
entirely in the light of, and as a complement to Christ," and lithe son himself is the model on 
which the mother is based," so that "in a sense he is her mother and she, his daughter" (Grosz 
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1989, 83). By means of a symbolic reversal in which the Virgin's motherhood is wholly 
appropriated by her Son, the Virgin as Christ's first "follower" becomes the primary model 
for all Christian believers as well as for all women. Her desire is subsumed within that of her 
Son, and she emulates him in the most theologically important and highly charged moments 
of his earthly existence, as Christian believers must also seek to do (Miles 1986, 200-1). 
In Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche Irigaray argues that Christ's death reflects the prior 
death of fertility in Mary, who becomes a sexless vessel for the Father's Word and foregoes 
her own desire: "To the Virgin who lives forever because she dies to her generation in order 
to become merely the vehicle for the Other, corresponds, in a sort of mimetic representation, 
, 
the murder of the man she loves." And in her emulation of Christ, "she follows the man 
before whom she carne" (Irigaray 1991d, 166, 168).50 In Irigaray's terms it is the material 
nature of the Virgin's motherhood, that disturbing physical excess which threatens to escape 
and disrupt masculinist systems, that is appropriated and displaced onto the representation of 
Christ as feminine and, more specifically, Christ as mother to humanity in the religious 
devotion of the later middle ages (Ash 1990, 97),51 
Caroline Bynum's work has demonstrated the extent to which medieval cultures perceived "an 
association of woman with the body or the humanity of Christ" (Bynum 1989, 175), and Ash 
outlines some of the specific features of this association: 
The crucified body of Christ is constructed as the maternal. body in its capacity to 
nurture and nourish the human soul...in the eucharistic capacity of Christ's 
corporeality to sustain also the body (usually a woman's body)/2 to provide the basic 
requirements necessary for (physical) survival. The bleeding (side) wound as a 
source of nourishment is a lactating breast; but it is more than this, it is also a 
womb. The agonising pain of the crucifixion, the suffering of Christ in His passion, 
was the suffering, the "passion" of a woman giving birth (Ash 1990, 86. See also 
Bynum 1986,262-3; 1989, 175-9; Petroff 1986,17). 
Women's affinity with Christ's physical being was endorsed through the development of the 
doctrines of the Virgin Birth, including the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption, 
which posited Mary as the sole but passive contributor of Christ's bodiliness (Bynum 1989, 
181). Such a notion was informed by medieval scientific understandings of female physicality 
and the female role in human generation, which held that the male contributes the soul or 
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substance of the human person while the female serves as the passive physical base (Bynum 
1982, 133; Keller 1986, 48; Ash 1990, 90). Thus women were aligned with Mary (as well as 
with Christ) and were urged, most notably in popular representations of scenes of her Son's 
Passion and death, to emulate her as she himself emulated him. 
In the Meditationes the Virgin is present in all the scenes from Christ's life (Gibson 1989, 49-
50), and is set forth as a model of compassionate identification with his suffering through her 
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unrestrained weeping (Love 1992, 176). Kempe's tears, then, are in the late medieval 
devotional tradition in which believers, by imitating Mary, sought to inscribe into their own 
bodily being the sufferings of Christ. In Kempe's envisioning of scenes from Christ's 
Crucifixion, the Virgin goes mad with grief, so that the mystic feels compelled to offer to 
bear her sorrow for her (Kempe 1988,234).53 The Virgin becomes "the primary reader at the 
Crucifixion and the model for all subsequent mystical readings of the Christie body," 
including Kempe's (Lochrie 1991a, 177. See also Miles 1986, 20In). 
As the proto-mimic of her Son's suffering (which is also the source of her own), the Virgin 
is reduced to a position as hysterical spectator of the Passion drama, which is evidenced by 
the frenzied physical movements she displays in popular representations of her sorrow such 
as those in lyrics, plays, painting and sculpture of the late middle ages (Weissman 1982, 211-
2; Lochrie 1991a, 181-91). While, as Lochrie notes, the physical excesses of shrieking and 
self-mutilation on Mary's part belong to the "eastern" tradition, they were obviously being 
taken up by medieval women in the '\-vest" since they were condemned in "western" writings 
(Lochrie 1991a, 180, 184, 187). And even in England, the Virgin as portrayed in a wide range 
of devotional media is a creature whose entire physical being is racked with inarticulate grief 
(Lochrie 1991a, 180-92). The sorrow of the passive, mute body of her Son has been displaced 
onto her body and, like the hysteric, she mimics behaviour which provides an outlet for 
anguish she cannot otherwise voice, because there exist no channels for an articulation of 
female suffering or female desire. 
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2. 2. 3 The abject body 
The female physical excess which, in the Virgin's (and in Kempe's) case, lacks symbolisation 
is what Grosz, commentating on Kristeva, describes as the "unrepresented residue in maternity 
which has not been adequately taken up in religious discourse, a residue that refuses to 
conform, as Christianity requires, to masculine, oedipal, phallic order." She adds that it is, 
however, "occasionally touched upon by discourses of the sacred and is experienced as 
religious ecstasy, in bliss, in surrender of a most corporeal kind" (Grosz 1989, 84). The 
corporeality of the surrender Kempe describes in her Passion visions is displayed in the 
extremes of uncontrollable weeping and physical paroxysm as she runs "continually to and 
fro" like "a woman without reason," and cries so violently that "[her] body fail[s]" and she 
falls to the ground (Kempe 1988, 234, 239). 
The "unrepresented residue" of maternity in Kempe's text may be seen as the result of the 
denial of her maternal experience that she must enact in order to become a visionary. Here 
it provokes a situation in which the abject, defined by Kristeva as that which threatens the 
boundaries of the individual subject, the "clean and proper body" or self (Kristeva 1982, 91), 
is given tortured expression. As Grosz describes it, "abjection is a reaction to the recognition 
of the impossible transcendence of the subject's corporeality, and the impure, defiling 
elements of its uncontrollable materiality" (Grosz 1990b, 87-8), the materiality from which 
it originated and grew. In Irigaray's view, transcending one's corporeality is especially 
difficult - as yet impossible - for women, since women's bodies function in phallocentric 
culture as unsymbolised agents of the transcendence of men. 
The excess of female physicality which fails to achieve coherent expression in language is 
realted to the state of abjection which, marking the border between the existence of the 
individual subject and the forces of its obliteration, is Kristeva's term for the disturbing 
awareness of the human subject's ambiguous, mortal position. In psychoanalytic terms, she 
claims that: "abjection preserves what existed in the archaism of a pre-objectal relationship, 
in the immemorial violence with which a body becomes separated from another body in order 
to be" (Kristeva 1982, 10). While the abject has obvious connections with women and with 
mothering, it is also intimately bound up with the sacred, being expressed through dietary 
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taboos or exclusions in monotheistic societies (such as in ancient Hebraic or Old Testament 
culture). These function as attempts to purify or maintain the boundaries of the self and of 
the society as a whole. Thus Kristeva asserts that "abjection accompanies all religious 
structurings," and that "the various means of purifying the abject. .. make up the history of 
religions" (Kristeva 1982, 17), an idea which corresponds with lrigaray's belief that "western" 
patriarchal religions such as Christianity are attempts to cover over and expiate the symbolic 
order's unrecognised debt to maternity. 
Abjection also has a special relation to the Christian concept of the flesh. Kristeva argues that 
New Testament spirituality makes the abject part of the internal condition of the believer, and 
this divided inner state is ascribed to the flesh or "fallen" self. However: 
maternal principle .. .is not for that matter revalorized, rehabilitated. Of its nourishing 
as much as threatening heterogeneity ... theological posterity will keep only the idea 
of sinning flesh .... The brimming flesh of sin belongs, of course, to both sexes; but 
its root and basic representation is nothing other than feminine temptation (Kristeva 
1982, 117, 126). 
Despite Christianity's negative cast on "woman'''s alignment with the heterogeneous flesh, 
abjection at least helps provide an outlet for the expression of a kind of bodily protest at this 
attempted recuperation.54 As Grosz points out: 
Abjection is the body's acknowledgement that the boundaries and limits imposed on 
it are really social projections - effects of desire, not nature. It testifies to the 
precarious grasp of the subject on its own identity, an assertion that the subject may 
slide back into the impure chaos out of which it was formed. It is, in other words, 
an avowal of the death drive, a movement of undoing identity (Grosz 1990b, 90). 
As the force behind the excessive behaviours by which the body articulates what exists 
beyond or outside of its sy~bolic representation, the abject is implicated in the "hysterical" 
or disturbingly physical aspects of female mysticism, that which escapes the borders of 
patriarchal discourse. Kempe's Passion(ate) imitatio, following that of the Virgin, exploits the 
possibilities of subversion at the site of the intersection of female and maternal physical excess 
with the sacred. As Lochrie encouragingly asserts: 
Abjection poses a continual threat to the human subject. Yet it also offers a radical 
notion of perfection. The excess of drives - those heaving powers of the flesh -
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topples over into the love of God .... The mystic who insists on that which has been 
exluded in medieval Christianity - namely, the feminine, the pervious flesh, and 
defilement - takes abjection for the sublime (Lochrie 1991b, 128-9). 
2. 2. 4 Mystical hysteria 
To speak as a woman means to .... speak with meanings that resonate, that are tactile 
and corporeal as well as conceptual, that reverberate in their plurality and polyvocity 
(Grosz 1989, 132). 
By articulating her pain and sorrow at Christ's death in the manner of the Virgin, Kempe 
gives expression to aspects of her female experience - sexual and maternal - otherwise denied 
representation: "in effect, she displaces the secret text of ecclesiastical culture with her own 
bodily reading of Christ's Passion" (Lochrie 1991a, 196). Her behaviour is "hysterical" in the 
sense of translating into culturally comprehensible terms the excess that is female sexuality 
in her culture (Grosz 1989, 134). While Kempe's mystical "hysteria" consists of orthodox 
devotional behaviour given an unusually dramatic form, it also caricatures, through excessive 
mimicry, the way in which the Virgin was held up to medieval women as a model of self-
abnegation and submission to the Father'slher Son's desire. Mary was presented as a model 
of feminine virtue because her silence prevailed over the traditional female vice of evil 
speech, and her submissiveness in the face of the divine purpose for her body triumphed over 
"woman'''s sexual lusts (Maclean 1987, 61). But in Kempe's imitation of the Virgin's sorrow 
for her Son, following popular representations of the "hysterical Virgin" previously described, 
both women's absence of speech becomes an inarticulate and violent wailing which is more 
disturbing than speech itself, and their "chastity" explodes into ecstasies of passionate writhing 
in identification with Christ, whom they love, in his death throes. However transmuted into 
a recognisable form of worship, in such imitative activity the outlawed experience of 
maternity returns to Christian discourse in all its physicality and pain. Kempe's crying and 
shaking on the ground is unmistakeably also the suffering of a woman in labour (Weissman 
1982, 210-12; Lochrie 1991a, 192; Wilson 1992, 234). 
In "La Mysterique," one of Speculum's central sections, Irigaray claims that the medieval 
woman mystic is enabled, through her intimate contact with the divine, to express bodily 
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variations of her female experience which empower and lead her beyond the castrating 
confines of patriarchal law. She writes, in a dialogue between the mystic and "that most 
female of men, the Son,n of the mystic's recognition of her sex in the passive, gaping, and 
bleeding body of the Saviour she rapturously contemplates: 
In this way, you see me and I see you, finally I see myself seeing you in this 
fathomless wound which is the source of our wondering comprehension and 
exhilaration. And to know myselfI scarcely need a "soul,n I have only to gaze upon 
the gaping space in your loving body .... Now I know it/myself and by knowing, I 
love it/myself and by loving, I desire it/myself. And if in the sight of the nails and 
the spear piercing the body of the Son I drink in a joy that no word can ever 
express, let no one conclude hastily that I take pleasure in his sufferings. But if the 
, Word was made flesh in this way, and to this extent, it can only have been to make 
me (become) God in my jouissance, which can at last be recognized (Irigaray 1985b, 
199-200). 
Kempe's identification with the suffering Christ who is both feminine and masculine, as 
previously described (Introduction, 8; Chapter 2, 77-8), enables her female physicality to be 
transformed by means of a divine "third term." The somatic convulsions she exhibits, similar 
to those which constitute hysterical expression, allow a movement 1I0utside [of] herself' so 
that she is able to see herself imitating Christ (or at least to recall this experience in memory), 
even while out of her mind with sorrow, and to set it down in her Book. Irigaray's flamboyant 
version of the mystic'slhysteric's behaviour depicts the experience in the following way (an 
image I will take up in Chapter Three): 
The "soul" escapes outside herself, opening up a crack in the cave (une 
antr' ouverture) so that she may penetrate herself once more. The walls of her prison 
are broken, the distinction between inside/outside transgressed. In such ex-stasies, 
she risks losing herself or at least seeing the assurance of her self-identity-as-same 
fade away (Irigaray 1985b, 192). 
The alignment of medieval "woman" with the flesh, that heterogeneous site of disruption 
which exists inside the human person, threatening to breach the borders of the self by 
temptation from without, is exploited in the medieval woman mystic'S inscription of her body 
into Christ's. As Lochrie asserts, this imitatio is "a semiotics of suffering," as is hysteria; "a 
complex system of signposts and tokens that do not always observe the boundaries of the 
physical, imaginary, and symbolic" (Lochrie 1991a, 36). The believer's sorrow "fares across 
the borders of mind, flesh, and spirit like an infusion or contagion," producing "its own 
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insignia in the body, thereby perpetuating a semiotic system of remembrance" (Lochrie 1991 a, 
37). Christ's Passion is remembered and re-membered in the mystic's corporeal sorrow. The 
divine is displayed, through imitation, to other believers, but the mystic who sees herself 
impersonating Christ/the Virgin is displaying herself as a female construct too - "woman" as 
pervious flesh, like Christ's/the Virgin's - and the seeds of her own bodily transformation lie 
in this double act of divine mimesis. 
lrigaray's joyous celebration of the mystic as inspired mimic is, of course, itself a visionary 
and hysterical reading. It neglects to outline the factors circumscribing the lives and works 
of medieval women, concerning itself primarily, like the behaviours of female hysterics, with 
lodging a protest within phallocentric discourse which argues for a space for change. 
Irigaray's vision of the divine involves a passage from the self understood as a model of the 
self-as-same to a self which can incorporate the possibility of response to an other (Whitford 
1991a, 143). And yet it does not seem to me too far-fetched to say that the medieval female 
mystic's imitatio, which represents Christ to the rest of the world so that they too might be 
transformed in his love, articulates this desire also. 
While Irigaray's celebratory reading in Speculum does not explore how the changes allowed 
by her envisioning of the divine could be articulated, especially by medieval women, Margery 
Kempe's text does reveal how the spiritual changes which arise from her discovery of the love 
of Christ are put into practice. And these changes inevitably involve challenging aspects of 
the construction of female bodiliness in late medieval culture which leads to transformations 
at once disturbing and empowering. In the following chapter I will trace in greater depth how 
Kempe gives expression to the changes in her life which her conversion requires of her, 
producing a reading of her Book which teases out some of the implications of Irigaray's 
hysterical reading of the mystical text in Speculum. . 
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1. In the Introduction to his translation of the Book, Barry Windeatt states that 
"[Kempe] could neither read nor write, as is indicated on a number of occasions in 
her Book" (Windeatt 1988, 9). However David Lawton produces some interesting 
and provocative qualifications on "the extent of Kempe's learning," as in whether 
she had knowledge of Latin as well as her considerable education in the lay practices 
and vernacular discourses of her faith. Lawton also discusses the commonplace 
notion of clerical mediation in the construction of Kempe's Book, and suggests that 
she may have been more learned than scholars have traditionally believed (Lawton 
1992). William Provost, in tum, expresses the following view: "I have never been 
at ease with the common assumption that Margery Kempe was illiterate. She 
certainly would not have undertaken the huge task of writing her Book out herself, 
and so her references to having someone write for her can be seen as specifically 
referring to that task alone, or in some instances, perhaps, to the writing out of 
longish letters. And there is no doubt that many of her allusions to Scripture or to 
, writings of her contemporaries could have come from preaching she had heard. But 
still, I think that such an energetic, strong-minded, curious and intelligent woman of 
her age would very likely have been able to read and probably to write as well, and 
I think that Margery Kempe indeed could" (Provost 1992, 15n). 
My own view is that modern definitions of (il)literacy need to be qu~lified by a 
consideration of the meaning of "reading" and "writing" to a person of Kempe's time 
and place, before a definitive statement about her Itilliteracy" can be made. Susan 
Noakes points out for instance that, in the middle ages, "silent reading was the 
exception rather than the rule," and that, because of the relative scarcity of books, 
reading was more often than not a shared activity, especially among lay readers. She 
writes: "It is clear that when reading normally employed the faculties of speech and 
hearing as well as sight, it was not only a slower but also a more active process than 
it is now, when silent reading is the norm" (Noakes 1988, 26). Thus the fact that 
Kempe mentions being read to by her scribe may not necessarily have meant, in 
medieval terms, that she could not read, since listening to and looking at words 
could not be so easily separated as now. See also Stock (1990, 19-24, 34-40). 
Furthermore, Church prohibitions on reading by literate lay people due to fears of 
Lollardy would have made reading a less suspect activity when done via a cleric 
than alone. The laity were forbidden to read the Bible privately as early as 1229 by 
the Synod of Toulouse and again in 1408 at the Synod of Oxford (Despres 1985, 
15). They were also prohibited by decree from translating on their own (Hughes 
1988, 230). I am prepared to concede that Kempe either could not write or felt it 
was not in her best interests to do so, since a show of clerical endorsement was 
certainly necessary to her life's endeavours, but I think that her reading ability must 
remain more of an open question. 
2. Following her mystical marriage to the Godhead in Rome, Christ, appearing in a 
vision, tells Kempe: '''For it is appropriate for the wife to be on homely terms with 
her husband.... Therefore I must be intimate with you, and lie in your bed with 
you .... You may boldly, when you are in bed, take me to you as your wedded 
husband, as your dear darling, and as your sweet son'" (Kempe 1988, 126). In the 
same chapter in which Christ tells Kempe that she should take him into her bed, he 
states that he "will not be displeased with [her] whether [she] think[s], say[s] or 
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speak[s]" (Kempe 1988, 126). For further endorsements of Kempe's words from 
Christ see Kempe (1988, 61, 199). 
3. There are no extant records of particular English women who lived as Kempe did; 
however, Eileen Power notes that, while a considerable number of widows in 
medieval England joined convents on the death of their husbands, there were 
probably more who took a "simple vow of chastity" and remained in the world 
(Power 1922, 38). Edith Ennen confirms this, observing that "there were many 
women living on their own in the middle ages: widows, maidservants," and so ori 
(Ennen 1989, 281). It seems that medieval women who chose to live alone were 
tolerated provided they stayed in one place and were publicly silent, as the particular 
charges most often laid against Kempe's activities reveal. 
4. However as a bourgeois wife Kempe was able to work and in fact began two 
business ventures before her radical conversion, although they were unsuccessful 
(Kempe 1988, 44). After her conversion Kempe represents these experiences as the 
result of excessive pride (Kempe 1988, 44-5). Deborah Ellis has written about the 
extent to which Kempe's life and spirituality may have been shaped by her family 
connections (Ellis 1992). 
5. This is Kempe's usual appellation of herself in the narrative of her Book. 
6. While, as Carolly Erickson observes, sexual relations between couples were outlawed 
by the Church on many days of the year by the fourteenth century, because 
"lovemaking made a couple unclean, and unworthy to take the sacrament" (Erickson 
1976, 197), women's sexuality was certainly seen as passive in regard to men's 
when sexual activity did take place. As Danielle Jacquart and Claude Thomasset 
comment: "As soon as a man and woman came together as a couple, the person of 
the woman was alienated and subjected to waiting for the male semen. It is clearly 
easy, as in the majority of cases, to draw a parallel benveen her dependency, her 
absence of any erotic existence and her situation within society" (Jacquart and 
Thomasset 1988, 154). Sheila Delany describes the years of compulsory sexual 
activity Kempe endured with her husband as "legal rape," and David Aers points out 
that "her gender demanded extreme self-subordination before [her] husband's 
desires" (Delany 1975, 88, cited in Aers 1988, 90). 
7. Although specifically addressed to female virgins, these works, as Millett and 
Wogan-Browne point out, were adapted as spiritual guides for a much wider 
audience and were circulated in England until the early sixteenth century (Millett and 
Wogan-Browne 1990, xii). 
8. Lochrie further notes that "it was no coincidence that female sanctity in the late 
Middle Ages was often manifested through miraculous closure of the body" (Bynum 
1987; 1989, 165, cited in Lochrie 1991b, 126), since the literature of advice to 
virgins drew on arguments which placed women symbolically at the boundary-line 
between the Christian body and the outside world. As Bynum states, women who 
survived on nothing but the Host were "reputed neither to excrete nor to menstruate" 
(Bynum 1989, 165). See also Brown (1988, 153-4, 354). 
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9. As Windeatt notes, these are possibly the result of a legacy from the death of her 
influential father (Kempe 1988, 30Sn). 
10. Christ, in fact, declares to Kempe in a revelation: '''You have ... great cause to love 
me because you have your will in the matter of chastity as if you were a widow, 
although your husband is still living and in good health'" (Kempe 1988,200). While 
the passivity fostered in a medieval woman in childhood was offset in marriage by 
the acquiring of necessary household and organisational abilities, widowhood, if a 
woman had financial means, offered her "the possibility of an exercise of personal 
power" and the making of important individual decisions, usually for the first time 
in her life (Labarge 1986, 27-8). 
11. While Kempe does have to continue to care for her husband later in the Book, at 
Christ's command, when John Kempe is disabled as the result of a bad fall (Kempe 
1988, 219-21), and the development of her relationship with Christ reflects a 
continuation rather than a rejection of her marriage relationship and role, in terms 
of vocational enablement her "buying back her body" frees her to offer it in service 
to Christ, an essential element in pursuing her new calling as a pilgrim-mystic. 
12. The exempla used in sermons frequently contained images drawn from the lives of 
the listeners, which would have helped concretise the messages issuing from the 
pulpit. See Owst (1961,149-209; 1965,299-305); Berlioz and de Beaulieu (1990). 
13. Brown cites Cyprian as an example of this tendency, and states: "Church and body 
alike were both presented in terms of ever-vigilant control, from which the relentless 
pressure of the saeculum gave no . respite. It was a somber message, whose 
implications were not lost on Cyprian's successors in the Latin world, Ambrose and 
Augustine" (Brown 1988, 95). 
14. This description of the human person as a "spiritual" being can not, of course, be 
divorced from a medical and scientific understanding of the nature of human 
bodiliness in the middle ages. Both medieval medical and theological views of 
women understood their bodies as "airy" and permeable and beyond women's 
control, as well as being an inferior model of men's. See Lemay (1978, 391-400); 
Maclean (1987, 10-11,30); Jacquart and Thomasset (1988,66-7). 
15. The Speculum Laicorum is a thirteenth-century work believed to be of English origin 
which, as Owst states, frequently turns up in fifteenth-century manuscripts (Owst 
1965, 217, 300-2). 
16. This attitude is evidenced in the Book when Kempe is pursued by a crowd of 
townspeople at Leicester who perceive her as a disruptive civil influence (Chapter 
48), as I will show in the next section. 
17. In the Speculum Laicorum, the base qualities of women's speech are also figured in 
their being likened to dogs, however differentiated by class: "There are two kinds 
of dogs.... The well-bred ... are silent and free from guile; the low-bred are ill-
tempered and fond of barking. So it is with women: the daughters of nobles are 
artless, silent, and lovers of solitude ... the ignoble to be sure are loud and roamers in 
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the streets!! (Cap. XXI, Speculum Laicorum 1914, 33, qtd. in Owst 1961, 386-7). 
References to "loudness" and "roaming in the streetsll connote (ignoble) women as 
physically excessive, speaking and moving in places where it is believed they should 
not be. 
18. Windeatt observes that a marginal note in Kempe's text names the friar as "Melton" 
(Kempe 1988, 322n), and Atkinson identifies this preacher as William Melton, an 
Oxford doctor (Atkinson 1983, 143; Aston 1993, 123). 
19. Tears were in fact considered a legitimate response to the pathos of Christ's Passion 
in the late middle ages (Beckwith 1993, 89; Glasscoe 1993, 278) and are even 
attested to as such in sermons (McEntire 1984, 88). 
20. In "The Language of Man" Irigaray writes that, "without fluidity, [the philosophers'] 
thought would have no possible unity ... fluid always subsists between solid substances 
to Join them, to re-unite them. Without the intervention of fluids, no discourse would 
hold together. But the operation of fluids doesn't state itself as a condition of truth, 
of the coherence of the logos. To do that would be to reveal the instability of its 
edifice, the moving ground beneath if' (Irigaray 1989b, 199-200). 
21. A similarly violent attitude is expressed in another sermon cited by Owst, concerning 
a wandering wife. who would not obey her husband. The husband, desiring to "rid 
himself of a faithless wife," presented her with "two boxes of sweetmeats, one 
containing good and the other poisonous sweets. He had merely to bid her eat the 
good and avoid the bad to bring about her death at her 0\\111 stubborn hands" (MS. 
Add. 18364, fol. 62, cited in Owst 1961, 390). The husband was presumably 
absolved of guilt for plotting murder by the greater sin of the wife's disobedience. 
22. Chaucer's Wife of Bath is of course depicted as vain as well as apt to wander 
(Chaucer 1983b, 21). The connection of the two "weaknesses" in Chaucer's 
caricature of the bourgeois wife attests to both wandering and vanity as 
commonplaces in the medieval representation of womanhood. 
23. The basis of this decrial was St Paul's injunction, supported by the church fathers' 
attacks, against women's alleged love of adornment and pride in physical 
beautification (1 Tim. 2: 9), cited in Lochrie (1986a, 40-1). See also MS. Harl. 45, 
foL 113 et seq., qtd. in Owst (1965, 172). 
24. In "Divine Women" Irigaray describes women's adornnlent-compulsion in terms of 
the need for a specifically feminine divine, a mediating term for female physicality 
in the symbolic. This account also has similarities with the medieval notion of 
"woman" as connoting "breaches in boundaries" and the dangers of the feminine 
flesh. Irigaray writes: 'The impotence, the formlessness, the deformity associated 
with women, the way they are equated with something other than the human and 
split between the human and the inhuman (half-woman, half-animal), their duty to 
be adorned, masked, and made-up, etc., rather than being allowed their own physical, 
bodily beauty, their own skin, their own formes), all this is symptomatic of the fact 
that women lack a female god who can open up the perspective in which their flesh 
can be transfigured" (Irigaray 1993a, 64). 
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25. Fears of Lollardy, medieval England's most popular heresy, which encouraged 
individual lay reading of the scriptures and independent spiritual enquiry, would also 
have informed negative responses to Kempe, as I will show in the following section. 
26. The thirteenth-century sect known as the Guglielmites, based on what was believed 
to be a "female incarnation of the Holy Spirit" in Guglielma of Milan, proclaimed 
universal salvation through a woman (Wessley 1978, 289). On the Cathars and 
Waldensians see Leff (1967, 450-85); Lambert (1992, 62-77, 105-46). 
27. The Norwich heresy trials of the 1430s reveal that Lollardy, or, at least, "Lollard-
like individualism of religious conscience" (Gibson 1989, 30) was prevalent in East 
Anglia both before and at that time (Tanner 1977, 29; Cross 1978, 362), and the 
East Anglian Lollards also seem to have supported the more extreme forms of belief, 
involving a rejection of the sacraments of the Church along with the usual opposition 
~o pilgrimage, relics and images (Thomson 1965, 127, 129), which would have 
increasedantiheretical suspicion in the area. Gibson notes too that in fifteenth-
century East Anglia Lollardy served as "a convenient label that was invoked for 
nearly any kind of religious nonconformity" (Gibson 1989, 30). Suspicion of 
religious eccentricity increased dramatically after the Oldcastle rebellion of 1414, 
prompted by the arrest for heresy and escape of John Oldcastle, Lord Cobham 
(Kempe 1988, 320n), and much of the opposition was expressed on the level of lay 
and civil rather than clerical authority, as Kempe's experiences show. See Thomson 
(1965, 5-6, 195, 221). While Kempe is no candidate for anti-sacramental beliefs -
her Book shows her to be ardently devoted to pilgrimage and holy images - she does 
reveal considerable "individualism of conscience" on many occasions as well as a 
thorough education in popular methods of devotion prescribed by the Church for the 
laity, as seen for example by her use of sermon-like stories to answer back to angry 
priests. As Aston comments, the Lollard emphasis on private investigation into the 
truths and doctrines of the Church helped produce some well-educated women in the 
fifteenth century (Aston 1984a, 51), and Kempe, despite her avowed illiteracy, may 
be said to be one of these, although she seems to have received her education by 
more orthodox means. Lawton discusses Kempe's considerable learning in the 
methods of popular devotion (1992, 99-100), as does Gibson (1989, 47-65). 
28. The most extreme outcome of this trend was, of course, the European witch hunts 
which lasted from the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries (Heinsohn and Steiger 
1982, 193). The discourses of the hunts were intimately connected with the 
appropriation of female sexual knowledge and female fertility by male doctors 
through the extermination of midwives as heretics (Heinsohn and Steiger 1982). 
Claudia Honegger also points out that the witch hunts and their literature were the 
result of an extension of prior attitudes to women and heresy on the part of the 
Church: "A ... specific precondition to the craze was the systematic appropriation of 
demonology, sorcery, heresy, and popular religion by the Catholic clergy .... The 
most important precondition to the development of witchcraft seems to have been 
the linkage of heresy and sorcery .... The Malleus [Maleficarum (The Hammer for 
Witches, 1486)] sealed the identity of heresy and sorcery, tied together loose 
particles of subcultural traditions and limited the 'new heresy' to the female sex" 
(Honegger 1979, 796). 
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29. The structure of Kempe's Book, while not without its own kind(s) oflogic, does not 
adhere to the conventional chronology of experience expected in modem 
autobiography. Hence the separation between Kempe and her husband recorded in 
Chapter 11 does not necessarily precede, in a narrative sense, the events she endures 
in Chapter 13, when her husband is absent. Kempe states in the proem which 
precedes the Book proper that the matters contained in the text were written down 
as she remembered them when the time came for writing (Kempe 1988, 36-7). Sue 
Ellen Holbrook has argued convincingly for two systems of understanding the 
structure of the Book in medieval terms (Holbrook 1985). 
30. As I have noted, medieval medical and scientific views of women were constructed 
in conjunction with theological ideas so that, "according to the physiological model, 
woman [was] identified 'with breaches in boundaries'" of the human person and, 
in theological terms, with the feebleness of the flesh and fallen will (Bynum 1989, 
186,.qtd. in Lochrie 1991b, 124). See also Jacquart and Thomasset, who note that 
in the medieval treatise of Giles of Rome, "one cannot but be struck by ... the 
irresponsibility of the woman. Her body lies outside her control; she is mere 
fertility" (Jacquart and Thomasset 1988, 66-70). "Woman'''s lack of control over her 
bodily boundaries (and indeed the fluidity of the boundaries themselves) was seen 
to be connected to her moral debility. Thus Eve was held up to medieval women as 
their foremother and described by Tertullian as "the door of the devil," a figure for 
women's believed propensity to loose morals and wayward speech (Maclean 1987, 
15). 
31. Kempe's absent husband is mentioned three times in this short episode, which 
suggests that his unavailability is the ·cause of some if not most of the trouble she 
encounters in the scene. In Chapter 52 the Archbishop of York makes clear the 
connection between Kempe's independent status and her association in the public 
mind with heresy when he asks her why she goes about in white clothes and whether 
she is a virgin. As Douglas Gray points out, white clothes were variously associated 
in the middle. ages with "virginity, purity, persecuted innocence or martyrdom, 
penitence ( ... ) and the remission of sins" (Gray 1990, 22n). Hope Emily Allen notes 
in addition that the sect known as Flagellants wore white clothes and were prohibited 
by decree from entering England in 1399 (Kempe 1940, 314-5n). However they had 
little in common with the path followed by Kempe, and the Archbishop's assumption 
that Kempe is a virgin because· of her white clothes signifies that in his mind she 
cannot be an independent woman in public, a wife who dresses in white, for to him 
white garments are the sign of a virginal woman dedicated to God in enclosed 
circumstances. Therefore he claims that she is a heretic when she states that she is 
in fact a man's wife (Kempe 1988, 16). 
32. The paradox of the anchoress' representation as "invisible frontier" is also described 
by Linda Georgianna: "Though apparently invisible or hidden, the anchoress is ... told 
she is a visible model of sanctity to all Christians and a reliable and steady support 
for the whole Church" (Georgianna 1981, 51-2). 
33. Of course Kempe also converses with women, but the specificities of these 
exchanges are seldom given and the conversations are reported in a more casual 
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manner (e.g., Kempe 1988, 163,213, 243). Attitudes such as those reflected in the 
Mayor of Leicester's paranoid fear that Kempe will lead away the town's wives, 
voiced aggressively during a heresy interrogation, perhaps explain the absence of 
specific content of this kind. Women, however, do come to the mystic's aid when 
she has incurred the wrath of male authorities (Kempe 1988, 169), and given the 
absence of detail about her encounters with other lay women, the reader of her Book 
can only speculate about how much basis (if any) the Mayor's fears have in fact. See 
Aers (1988, 102-3). 
34. Kempe's Book contains two prefaces (or a preface and a proem, as Windeatt labels 
them), the first of which begins by presenting the Book as "a short treatise and a 
comforting one for sinful wretches" (Kempe 1988, 33), and the second: "a short 
treatise of a creature set in great pomp and pride of the world" (Kempe 1988,38). 
35. _ Further similarities include physical mortifications; fainting on hearing people speak 
. of Christ's Passion or beholding an image of his suffering; wearing white clothes 
and being informed by the Holy Spirit that her soul will be spared the pains of 
Purgatory. She also has a miraculous vision of the eucharistic Host and a vision of 
the Virgin at Candlemas, as does Kempe (Windeatt 1988, 19). 
36. Windeatt notes that "The Prick of Love" is "perhaps a Middle English translation of 
the Stimulus Amoris; cf. The Prickynge of Love" (Kane 1983, ch 2, 20), and that the 
reference to Rolle denotes The Fire of Love (Rolle 1972, ch 34, cited in Kempe 
1988, 323n). Windeatt follows Hope Emily Allen's view that the "Elizabeth" 
referred to in this chapter, who "cried with a loud voice, as is written in her 
treatise," is "St Elizabeth of Hungary (b. 1207), daughter of King Andrew II of 
Hungary and wife of Landgrave Ludwig IV of Thuringia" (Kempe 1940, 324n). 
Alexandra Barratt suggests another contender, the saint's great niece Elizabeth of 
Toess (c. 1294-1336), whose life was rewritten by Elsbet Stagel (c. 1300-60) (Barratt 
1992a, 1992b, 71). And there is a third text which exists in various versions and, as 
Allen notes, "is often ascribed to St Elizabeth of Hungary" (Kempe 1940, 324n). 
Both Barratt (1992a) and Roger Ellis (1990) examine in some detail the claims of 
the various texts. Barratt has also written an essay which deals exclusively with 
connections between Elizabeth of Hungary's Revelations and The Book of Margery 
Kempe (Barratt 1992c). 
37. Bynum observes that the increase in the number of lay saints throughout the later 
middle ages correlates strikingly with a marked increase in the number of women 
saints so that "by the end of the middle ages the lay male saint had virtually 
disappeared" (Weinstein and Bell 1982, 220, cited in Bynum 1987, 21), and most 
lay women in the middle ages were or would once have been married. Blessed 
Angela of Foligno (1248-1309); St Bridget of Sweden (1303-1373); and Blessed 
Dorothea of Montau (1347-1394) were mystics who influenced Kempe and had been 
married and had borne children before turning to a religious life. 
38. Caroline Bynum observes that "in late fourteenth- and fifteenth-century hagiography 
women appear more and more isolated and male-oriented. Their stories are ... usually 
told by their confessors .... Although holy women were, by the fourteenth and 
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fifteenth centuries, more likely to be lay and married, to reside in the world and to 
have opportunities for significant geographical mobility through pilgrimage, they 
were also more subject to male scrutiny and in greater danger of being accused of 
heresy and witchcraft. By the time of Catherine of Siena, Bridget of Sweden, and 
Joan of Arc the influence ~ even the survival ~ of pious women depended almost 
wholly on the success, in ecclesiastical and secular. politics, of their male adherents" 
(Lerner 1972; Vauchez 1981; Weinstein and Bell 1982, 228-32, cited in Bynum 
1987, 22-3). 
39. Valerie Lagorio writes that: "As saintly vitae were the favored reading of the Middle 
Ages, the lives of the ll1ystics, usually written by a close associate, also were sources 
of ... ethical instruction and spiritual guidance. Such biographers as Jacques de Vitry 
and Thomas Cantimpre for the Lowland ecstatics, Fra' Arnaldo for Angela of 
Foligno, Raymond of Capua for Catherine of Siena, John of Marienwerder for 
D9rothy of Montau, and Alphonse de Pecha for Birgitta of Sweden wrote to 
publicize the sanctity of the beata, sometimes in the interests of canonization, but 
always to present a holy and heroic figure for the emulation of the faithful" (Lagorio 
1983, 102). 
40. These include "the Pauvres Catholiques in the Midi, the Papelards in the north of 
France, the Bizocche in northern Italy, and the Coquenunnen in western Germany" 
(Petroff 1986, 173). 
41. In Chapter 20 of her Book, Kempe also cites St Bridget as a spiritual authority and 
places herself in the textual tradition of continental women saints. She reports firstly, 
after seeing a eucharistic vision, God's statement that even St Bridget was never 
granted this favour: '''My daughter Bridget never saw me in this way'" (Kempe 
1988, 83). Next, after informing the mystic of an earthquake that will occur, God 
assures Kempe that he speaks to her just as he spoke to Bridget, and declares the 
truth of every word in Bridget's book. Lastly and most significantly, he affirms 
Kempe as a follower in the saint's footsteps by claiming that the truth of Bridget's 
Revelations shall become known through Kempe herself, presumably through her 
own life and Book. 
42. In addition to the works already cited, Kempe mentions that "Hilton's book" was 
read to her by her scribe, along with "Bridget's book" and the Bible with 
commentaries upon it. "Hilton's book" is a work by an English writer, Walter Hilton 
(1923), but Windeatt lists several works by male writers on the continent which were 
available in England, including texts by Blessed Jan van Ruysbroeck and Henry Suso 
(Windeatt 1988, 17; Kempe 1988, 299n). 
43. Kempe's son, referred to in the Book, marries in Germany and later returns to 
England (Kempe 1988, 266-7). A substantial number of Germans are also mentioned 
in the Book, including Kempe's first scribe (who wrote in an amalgam of bad 
English and German) and various hosts, confessors, and people she meets on her 
travels, many of whom she finds helpful. See Stargadt (1985, 305). 
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44. In her Book of Divine Consolation Angela states: "In that time and by God's will 
there died my mother, who was a great hindrance unto me in following the way of 
God; my husband died likewise, and in a short time there also died all my children. 
And because I had commenced to follow the aforesaid way and had prayed God that 
He would rid me of them, I had great consolation of their deaths, albeit I did also 
feel some grief' (Angela of Foligno 1966, 5). 
45. Alexandra Barratt notes that St Elizabeth of Hungary, that is the Elizabeth to whom 
the late middle ages attributed the Revelations, "a popular figure throughout Europe, 
including England," had also been a wife and mother before becoming widowed and 
a visionary (Barratt 1992c, 199-200). Barratt argues for this Elizabeth as a model for 
Kempe insofar as she joined the third order of Franciscans who lived unenclosed 
while pursuing a life of poverty and performing charitable deeds (Barratt 1992c, 
200). For Elizabeth, as for Dorothea and Kempe, this calling may will have 
represented an extension of as well as a kind of atonement for the lesser spiritual 
'value associated with her prior married life. . 
46. Further likenesses to Kempe's spirituality include the Virgin Mary presenting the 
Christ child to her; frequent communion and ecstatic experiences on receiving the 
Host; and visions of Christ as her lover and bridegroom (Kieckhefer 1984, 29). 
47. In a vision recorded in Chapter 22, for example, Kempe says: '''Ah Lord, maidens 
are now dancing merrily in heaven. Shall I not do so? Because I am no virgin, lack 
of virginity is now great sorrow to me ... '" (Kempe 1988, 86). She expresses the wish 
that she had died as a child before losing her virginity, and continues in this vein 
until Christ reassures her of his love for wives. Barratt points our that Christ's 
response to Kempe is similar to that made to Elizabeth of Hungary who also reveals 
anxiety about her non-virginal status (Barratt 1992c, 196). See also Kempe (1988, 
84). 
48. Stephen Nichols draws attention to the fact that the middle ages "appeared as 
preoccupied with the matter as with the method[s] of representations," and reveals 
"something like an attempt to seek ways for extending the range of what was known 
of the material world and the world beyond through alchemy, through science, 
through physical and psychical voyages." He comments that boundaries of all kinds 
seem to be especially fluid in medieval symbolisation, and states that: "These 
boundaries may be spatial - as in the cases of heroes of lay and romance who cross 
over from the real world to the irreel of the Celtic other world; they may be 
ontological boundaries like the polymorphous corp orality of heroes of some of Marie 
de France's Lais" - or of the body of Christ in popular piety - "or the dual identity 
as alternately Christian and Saracen of certain characters in epic and romance; they 
may be social boundaries, boundaries of orthodoxy in matters of faith, or boundaries 
of gender, as chronicles, accounts of heresy trials, and legal documents reveal. [And] 
all of these examples may be said to have correlates in the ever-changing political 
and religious boundaries that make medieval geopolitics so fascinating" (Nichols 
1992, 2). 
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49. While almost no religious activity from the late middle ages would escape the charge 
of "masochism" from a late twentieth-century perspective, and modem notions of 
"self-abusive" behaviour are not to be found as such in medieval contexts, there is 
considerable evidence that women engaged in more consciously self-inflicting and 
physically self-destructive behaviours than men. See Bynum (1986, 259; 1987, 114, 
209; 1989, 166-7); Petroff(1986, 7). Interestingly, Petroff notes that "the two central 
images for women's bodies in [femaleJ devotional texts are virginity and illness," 
and the two are not readily separable (Petroff 1986,37). It seems that women's close 
association with the body and the passions made physical pain a frequent marker of 
stages on the mystic path, whereas for male mystics more active experiences tended 
to serve this function (Petroff 1986, 37-44; Bynum 1986, 273-7). 
50. In her essay "Stabat Mater," Julia Kristeva notes that Mary's rare appearances in the 
Gospels reveal that her relationship with her Son depends upon "the name" and not 
','the flesh." Thus "any possible matrilinearism is to be repudiated" and Mary's 
maternal role denied (Kristeva 1987, 237). See also Ochshorn (1981, 164-5). 
51. The anchoress Julian of Norwich for example, claims that "our saviour is our true 
Mother, in whom we are endlessly born and out of whom we shall never come," and 
that the Virgin Mary is an inferior mother to Christ (Julian of Norwich 1978, 579-
80, qtd. in Bynum 1991, 97). Bynum writes that "to Julian ... Mary is our mother 
because her flesh is Christ's; but she is a shadow of the truer mother, Christ himself, 
who gives to us our humanness by taking it on" (Bynum 1987, 267). And St 
Bernard, writing two centuries earlier, but whose work helped form the basis of later 
developments in affective piety, makes a clear distinction between ordinary mothers 
and Christ's mothering in a letter of advice to monks: "He [ChristJ will be your 
mother .... but a man's household are his own enemies [Matthew 10: 36J .... Do not 
be moved by the tears of demented parents who weep because from being a child 
of wrath you have become a child of God" (Bernard of Clairvaux 1841-64, Letter 
322, 182, col. 527c-d, trans. James, letter 378, 449, qtd. in Bynum 1982, 145-6). 
52. Documentation of miracles in which saints and mystics (most of whom were 
women) survived without consuming anything but Christ's body in the form of the 
eucharistic Host increased from the thirteenth century onwards (Bynum 1989, 165). 
53. The Mirror recommends that believers should comfort the Virgin in their 
imaginative recreation of the scene of Christ's death (Love 1992, 190), and this 
Kempe does, even going so far as to offer the Virgin a nourishing drink (Kempe 
1988, 236). 
54. As will be evident to anyone familiar with Karma Lochrie's work, I am indebted to 
her pinpointing of the connections between the idea of abjection and the female flesh 
in medieval mysticism. See Lochrie (1991b; 1991a, 37-47). 
137 
CHAPTER THREE 
FLESH MADE WORD: KEMPE'S AND IRIGARAY'S HYSTERICAL TEXTS 
How strange is the economy of this specula(riza)tion o/woman, who in her mirror 
seems ever to refer back to a transcendence (Irigaray 1985b, 201). 
There is trickery in the game mystical women play (David-Menard 1989, 190). 
We have seen that as a lay woman and would-be visionary, Margery Kempe's speech was 
considered suspect because female and therefore "bodily," a charge which was exacerbated 
by her pilgrim's mode of living, her refusal to allow her body to be enclosed in patriarchal 
spaces designated for women. Kempe's adherence td the concept of imitatio Christi, a 
culturally endorsed foim of spirituality which privileged the body, allowed her to escape 
heresy charges and to have her life preserved in book form. To Kempe, imitating Christ was 
both salvation and empowerment. Her imitatio was to her the means of gaining holiness but 
also enabled her to transgress cultural norms regarding women in orthodox ways, an irony 
which is encapsulated in her text where the "proof' of her orthodoxy lies in the preservation 
of her life in written form, achieved through the aid of her scribe. And yet Kempe's extreme 
bodily behaviours form focal points in her text: they are sites where the "excess" of medieval 
female physicality is celebrated and performed. As such, these occasions display how the 
written record of Kempe's life proceeds from the physical in obvious ways: the clerically 
endorsed written text serves on some level to justify her somatic extremism, yet the written 
text is the result of experiences which were articulated primarily through the body, inscribed 
on the body through performances in which onlookers were intended to read the Passion and 
pain of Christ (Lochrie 1991a, 75, 195-6). With regard to Kempe, it is the tension between 
these two "texts" - the written and the bodily - that I want to explore specifically in this 
chapter. 
In the preface to her Book Kempe introduces her life as a "short treatise of a creature set in 
great pomp and pride of the world II (Kempe 1988,38), thereby deferring at the outset of her 
narrative to the "creator" whose example she must follow in her living, and on the basis of 
whose authority she presumes to speak. As Laurie Finke points out: 
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The female mystic of the Middle Ages did not claim to speak in her own voice. 
Because women could serve no ministerial or sacerdotal functions within the Church, 
they could claim no spiritual authority in and of themselves, nor could they claim 
it - as the clergy did - from the institutional Church. Rather the source of the 
mystic's inspiration was divine; she was merely the receptacle, the instrument of a 
divine will (Finke 1988, 448). 
What the medieval woman was as "receptacle" was body, or, as we have seen, the unstable 
"flesh" which commonly made itself evident through "woman'" s vulnerable physical being. 
With this initial announcement of her text as the record of radical divine transformation in the 
life of a mere "creature," Kempe places herself at the intersection of the dynamics of body 
and language which, "speaking as a woman" in medieval terms, she problematises throughout 
her text. 
Finke claims too that: "linguistic empowerment for women ... was tied to certain attitudes about 
the body prevalent in the Middle Ages. The discourse of the female mystic was fashioned out 
of disciplines designed to regulate the female body and it is, paradoxically, through these 
disciplines that the mystic consolidated her power" (Finke 1988, 441). Karma Lochrie also 
attests to the potential of mystical discourse for articulating otherwise inexpressible aspects 
of women's experience, claiming that, through Kempe's Book, we may "discover and 
describe ... ways in which female spirituality reconfigures women's relationship to language" 
(Lochrie 1988, 15). Lochrie further contends that "the language of affective spirituality as it 
was used by female mystics needs to be examined for its ... fundamentally different 
uriderstanding [as opposed to that of traditional, "male" mystical discourse] of the relationship 
of the physical - the bodily - to language itself (Lochrie 1988, 15). Body and text, then, are 
inseparable for the medieval female mystic, particularly if she could not write, as seems to 
have been the case with Kempe (Chapter Two, 127n). Here I would like to return to a point 
made earlier which has inspired the present chapter's explorations of this theme. 
The contention that human bodies themselves function as "texts" within cultures, and are 
"fictionalised and positioned within those myths that form a culture's social narratives and 
self-representations," in the words of Elizabeth Grosz (Grosz 1990c, 64), is of course seminal 
to this study. Grosz's further point that body-texts remain "site[s] of resistance" to social 
domination by means of "a materiality that is an active ingredient in the messages produced" 
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(Grosz 1990c, 64, 72) is of particular relevance to the mystical text, in which the mystic's 
body is the receiver of divine communication which slhe must in turn make known by her 
acts. Finke claims that, in effect: 
any visionary experience made public is always, ipso facto, a revisioning of that 
experience, an attempt to represent the unrepresentable. Medieval women mystics 
claimed the power to shape the meaning and form of their experiences. Their words, 
and even their bodies when necessary [I would say: especially their bodies], became 
the sites of a struggle to redefine the meaning of female silence and powerlessness 
(Finke 1988, 448-9). 
In this chapter I will continue my exploration of the active recalcitrance of the female body 
to sublimation within the female mystical text, and the radical potential of that text for 
re-envisioning the female body. 
Lochrie's argument, cited above, that medieval female mystics articulate a relationship to 
language which "carnalizes" speech, "return[ing] language to the sensual" at the same time as 
they re stor [ e] .. .language to physical pleasure" (Lochrie 1988, 16), also applies to the writings 
of lrigaray. The French philosopher, like the medieval woman mystic, attempts to provide a 
language for female subjects (female bodies) in phallocentric discourse, while at the same time 
pointing out how female bodies exist within language as the unrepresented substrate of the 
masculine symbolic. Although the circumstances of production of Kempe's and lrigaray's 
texts are markedly different, both writers present female bodies in their works as sites of 
excess, and in depicting these excessive bodies in writing they simultaneously draw upon and 
subvert received notions of female embodiment from their respective cultures. While, as I 
have argued, Irigaray self-consciously undertakes "hysterical" strategies in her writing, 
mimicking to a disturbing extreme the roles assigned to "the feminine" by phallic law, 
Kempe's Book too employs mimetic tactics through its representation of her life as imitating 
Christ's. While this method enables Kempe to attain orthodoxy there are aspects of her 
imitatio, notably its privileging of the female body, which have been read as unsettling, both 
in her own time and in the present. 
I would like to reiterate at the outset of this chapter that· I by no means wish to argue that 
Kempe can be claimed as a "hysteric" in the modern (or at least the nineteenth-century 
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psychoanalytic) sense of the word. Insofar as Kempe's Book is based on a physical imitatio 
which exceeds the written text, it may be read as figuratively hysterical: female hysteria 
commonly generates a physical surplus in the form of the unusual bodily behaviours which 
constitute its symptoms, a surplus which is based on a culturally-recognised form of physical 
expression. Anorexia nervosa, an eating disorder in which women exceed the late-twentieth-
century obsession with dieting by starving themselves to a state of dangerous thinness, is a 
contemporary example. In a feminist reading female hysteria also represents the inadequacy 
of patriarchal discourse to articulate female sexuality and female desire. Prior to becoming a 
visionary Kempe had been a wife and mother, which experience set her outside the bounds 
of Church requirements for authentic female speech, that is, virginity. Her official "outlaw 
status" as a visionary who was not a virgin suggests that her wild weeping, her most notable 
form of public expression which was regarded even by her contemporaries as extreme, may 
be seen as a medieval correlative of hysterical behaviour; that is, as a return to religious 
discourse of repressed female sexuality. Kempe's intense physical responses to Christ's 
Passion can be read - like hysterical body-language - as articulating the pain of her exile from 
the dominant discourse as well as an attempt to communicate through the body in culturally 
recognised terms, an attempt which produces a language of outlawed female "excess." The 
following lines from lrigaray could be used to describe the behaviour of Kempe, whose tears 
and writhings highlight the inadequacy of language to convey her passion: 
Turn everything upside down, inside out, back to front. Rack it with radical 
convulsions, carry back, reimport, those crises that her "body" suffers in her 
impotence to say what disturbs her .... Overthrow syntax by suspending its eternally 
teleological order, by snipping the wires, cutting the current, breaking the circuits, 
switching the connections, by modifying continuity, alternation, frequency, intensity 
(Irigaray 1985b, 142). 
However, in this chapter I do not want to reduce Kempe's Book to an object to be viewed 
through a "French feminist" lens, to celebrate her "hysteria" unequivocally as empowered 
protest (even lrigaray sees hysteria as a mode of suffering as well as a challenge to 
phallocentric speech (Irigaray 1985a, 136)). Rather, I read Kempe's text as "hysterical" in this 
part of the thesis as a means of exploring both its points of commonality with and points of 
divergence from the self-consciously hysterical texts of Irigaray, chiefly where the French 
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theorist writes about (medieval) female mysticism. In section 3. 2 I read Kempe and Irigaray 
both together and against each other, interrupting one text with the other (Spivak 1990b) in 
order to highlight specific aspects of the textuality of bodies and the physical origins of 
written texts in the work of each. I hope that this dialectical reading will be productive, and 
that reading Kempe with Irigaray and Irigaray with Kempe will help to "historicise" both 
writers while providing mutually revealing insights into the workings of their texts. 
In what particular sense, then, do I read the works of two women so far apart in time and 
intention as "hysterical"? While Irigaray's deliberately hysterical stance has been outlined in 
the first chapter, and aspects of Kempe's Christic imitatio have been treated under the heading 
"mystical hysteria" in the second, this chapter is directly concerned with the textual processes 
out of which Kempe's Book was produced as they relate to the representation of her 
troublesome physicality within it, and with Irigaray's intentional troubling of masculinist 
discourse through her attempts to reinscribe "the female body" in contemporary "western" 
culture. 
Whereas Kempe's bodily excesses serve in her Book as the means of her gaining orthodox 
status and having her text preserved for posterity, Irigaray's, as I have said, are designed to 
initiate changes which proceed beyond the written text(s). One could say that Kempe's and 
Irigaray's texts represent opposing dialectical explorations of the same theme: the excess 
constituted by female physicality in "western" discourse, a discourse which each writer 
recognises - in necessarily different ways - as the product of a transcendental subject, God. 
For Kempe, the task of transposing body into text requires a kind of apology for the excessive 
behaviour of her body: the written text marks the achievement of clerical endorsement of her 
life, yet it was a life which articulated a female physicality generally outlawed by Christian 
doctrine, hence a process of negotiation with clerical approval shaped the production of the 
text. The Book is "hysterical" in the sense that is based on an already excessive female body 
whose actions challenge medieval versions of the acceptable (i.e., enclosed) female body-text. 
We saw in the previous chapter how Kempe, through her mystical imitatio, re-presents her 
culture's version of female physicality by aligning herself with the distraught figure of the 
Virgin and the sexually ambiguous body of Christ. This imitative devotional activity, which 
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in its extremest forms I named "mystical hysteria," is presented throughout the Book as 
evidence of Kempe's saintliness and yet it is also disturbing in its effects, as the negative 
responses to her behaviour documented in the text make clear. The emphasis on physical acts 
of devotion to holy figures which I described in the first chapter as central to late medieval 
popular religion is the crux of Kempe's plea for sanctity through her own rather extreme kind 
of mystical practice. Moreover, Kempe's claim to be illiterate and her need to receive 
endorsement from clerics and, more particularly, her scribe, cause her text to be dependent 
upon the physical not only in terms of her devotional gifts (weeping, writhing, participatory 
visions and so on) but also in terms of her speaking voice. In this manner, too, she resembles 
the hysteric, whose conversations and bodily speech are reproduced in the printed text of her 
analyst, but whose symptoms form the volatile centre of the written text. Both female mystical 
and hysterical texts characteristically highlight the masculine inscription of female experience 
which is a general feature of phallocentric discourse. 
Irigaray's writings, however, unlike Kempe's, express a self-consciously hysterical stance. In 
Irigaray the fact that the female body must exceed patriarchal discourse - including written 
texts which must be read within the terms of that discourse - is the starting point for a project 
which aims to make of this excessive aspect a point of re-entry into subjecthood. She 
specifically sets out to challenge "the female body" as a (sub)text of the phallocentric order 
- "woman" as object, as lack, as the other of the male same - so that women may themselves 
become subjects and agents of culture and so that the specificities of women's bodies may be 
symbolised. Both Kempe and Irigaray, however, engage in textual manoeuvres which may be 
read as figuratively hysterical insofar as they present female bodies in a theatrical fashion, 
playing up their respective cultures' constructions of "woman" as fleshly excess and affirming 
that female bodies may have other meanings, themselves in excess of this notion. 
The main difference between the "hysterical" or excessively bodily qualities of the two texts 
lies in their different intentions, the result of the writers' respective cultures and those 
cultures' attitudes to women. Kempe's Book has a female literary community which 
contextualises it - the vitae of her mystical foremothers and contemporaries in England and 
abroad - but the transformation of body into written text is necessarily male-directed: she must 
maintain scribal and priestly support and present her story in terms of her understanding of 
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Christian orthodoxy, just as she lived her life. lrigaray's texts are also informed by a female 
context, that of the women's movement of the late twentieth century. lrigaray desires to 
communicate with an audience of female readers as part of her project to initiate social 
change. As well as celebrating and seeking to reinscribe the excessive qualities of female 
bodies in "western" culture in her texts, she insists on the political reality which both informs 
that culture historically and which must be confronted by women in the present. 1 Like 
Kempe's Book, Irigaray's writings reflect a tension between lived experience and written 
language: that which exceeds the written text - a legitimately female voice, "speaking as a 
woman" (which happens, "but not in meta-language" (Irigaray 1985a, 144») - is what has not 
yet been culturally recognised concerning women's experience, although it has been lived. 
Correspondingly, if women's speech were to become expressible within patriarchal discourse, 
thus changing completely the nature of that discourse, then women would have greater 
opportunities to live in a more empowered fashion, to "embody" femaleness in new and 
alternative ways. 
Irigaray's "excess," then, is strategic not just in an authorial sense but in the sense that her 
challenge to female readers is to take her ideas into the realms of living: to experiment with 
reading female bodies - starting perhaps with one's own - in different ways. Kempe's text of 
physical excess is also directed to readers who she assumes will want to articulate in their 
own fashion the pursuit of God or holiness (Kempe 1988,33; Chapter Three, 147). These are 
very different cultural orientations but the engaging of the female speaking voice as a tool of 
"outlaw communication" - transcribing a message of (female) desire and infinite possibility 
within the boundaries of the text - is present in both Kempe and lrigaray. For myself it is 
inevitable that I will read Irigaray's texts more sympathetically than Kempe's, as the context 
of late twentieth-century "western" feminism in which lrigaray writes is my own. Yet both 
kinds of texts fascinate me with their desire to transcend the limitations on "speaking as a 
woman" that exist within patriarchal cultures. They engage the female body in their writings 
in such a way that the reader is forced to consider how language constructs and limits that 
body, and to consider also how that body which exceeds patriarchal language might be given 
compelling and regenerative expression. 
In the first part of this chapter (3. 1), I explore the specific circumstances of production of 
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Kempe's text by focusing on the mimetic, physically exceSSIve behaviours which are 
fundamental to it. My analysis of the Book by recourse to a discussion of female hysteria is 
an attempt to deal with the complexity of the relationship between body and written text in 
Kempe, and this means exploring her specific textual achievement in terms of the relationship 
she had with her scribe, without which the Book would not have been written. The extent to 
which the mystic's words (and indeed her sanctity) are her own has been the subject of 
considerable speculation among Kempe scholars (Hirsh 1975; Goodman 1978,347-9; Provost 
1984, 297; Erskine 1989; Gray 1990, 10-11; Lawton 1992). However, I hope to shed new 
light on the issue by treating not only the obvious dependence of Kempe upon her scribe 
(which is evident throughout the Book) but also the dependence of the scribe upon Kempe. 
The latter becomes clear when the mystic's strategies of "writing," the transcribing of unusual 
bodily experience into words, are seen to emphasise the irreducible physical basis of the text 
- and by extension all written texts - in the body. 
This too is the point that Irigaray is so concerned to make, albeit in a broader context: that 
the unsymbolised activities of female bodies create pressure points in masculinist discourse 
which bring to the fore that which is disavowed in its construction. The example of Kempe, 
however, presents a challenge to Irigaray's utopian logic as the mystic's text is ultimately 
dependent upon the authoritative stamp of a male cleric, a fact which informs the Book's 
composition and the entire narrative. Within these textual constraints, how subversive can 
Kempe's llhysterical" discourse be? 
Specifically in the chapter's first part, I examine three aspects of the interaction between 
Kempe and her scribe and/or other male figures which are central to the clerical authorisation 
of her text: the Book's dependence upon her body and voice (3. 1. 1); Kempe's own 
identification of her tears with God's Word (3. 1. 2); and the dramatic performance of her 
imitatio Christi through participatory visions of Christ's Passion (3. 1. 3). In each of these 
areas Kempe's Book presents the theatricality of her behaviour as bound up with her need 
to attain authorisation from clerics. And although her dramatic imitatio acquires an approving 
response on one level (shown by the fact of the Book's existence), it also produces an 
unassimilable physical excess which is troubling to authorities. It is this disturbing somatic 
quality to the Book which I then take up in the second section, where I read Kempe with and 
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against Irigaray's depiction of the female mystic in Speculum. 
While the first section of the chapter (3. 1) examines how Kempe negotiates the relationship 
with her scribe and other members of the male audience before whom she performs her 
imitatio, the second (3. 2) focuses on what she inscribes in her text by this means. Here I read 
Kempe's imitatio, endorsed by Christ's institution of her as a "mirror among men," in 
conjunction with the subversive mirroring put forward by Irigaray in Speculum. I explore to 
what extent Kempe's imitation of Christ is subversive in the "hysterical" sense described by 
Irigaray and, in turn, how Irigaray's celebration of female mystical discourse serves her 
particular kind of visionary feminism. When Irigaray aligns the female mystic and hysteric 
, 
in one of Speculum's central sections (Irigaray 1985b, 191-202), she claims both as arch-
strategists who challenge the symbolic system with an articulation of outlawed feminine 
desire. Her use of the mirror figure in the book is designed to show that the female 
physicality on which the symbolic order depends - "woman" as reflection of man, the 
unsymbolised substance of masculine transcendence - is disturbingly unstable and apt to 
escape or resist its function as "mere matter" because it is a phantasmatic construction 
(Irigaray 1985b, 134-5). 
Irigaray makes the mirror mutable, moveable; specifically, she insists upon the unrepresented 
physical qualities of the mirror which women constitute for men in patriarchal culture; she 
thus puts the figure of the mirror to hysterical use. The female mysticlhysteric, present at the 
centre of Speculum, is Irigaray' s subversive mirroring figure par excellence. She mirrors God 
in the form of Christ, the ultimate in masculine transcendence, through her physically 
excessive behaviour which in its immediacy abolishes the mirror set up by masculine 
subjectivity and calls into question transcendence itself. I will return to Irigaray's hysterical 
manoeuvrings in Speculum later in the chapter. Now, I will examine the "mysterical" 
(mysticallhysterical) activities in which Kempe engages, strategies she enacts as part of the 
process of recording her life and translating body into text. 
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3. 1 Body into text: Mysterical strategies in Tlte Book of Margery Kempe 
3. 1. 1 Scribe, body and voice 
Recognition of the centrality of voice in women's writing marks much recent feminist 
theorising. Helene Cixous declares that she senses "femininity in writing" by: 
a privileging of voice: writing and voice are entwined and interwoven and writing's 
continuity/voice's rhythm take each other's breath away through interchanging, make 
the text gasp or form it out of suspenses and silences, make it lose its voice or rend 
it with cries (Cixous and Clement 1986, 92). 
According to Cixous, the dynamic, destabilising quality of the recognisably female text 
depends upon the material excess which constitutes the female body and voice. This might 
be seen as literally the case in Kempe's Book, where her voice dictates the content to another 
who writes, but the more unsettling qualities of the mystic's voice - such as her outbursts of 
tears - also inhere within it and may be read as markers of a femininity which is denied 
expression in the Church's official speech. The tears, for example, through which Kempe's 
narrative voice is momentarily silenced and her text rent with unsignifiable cries, can be seen 
to form points of eruption of her outlawed femininity within it and to function dramatically 
as signs of a body restively noncompliant with the dictates of phallic law. At least, an 
lrigarayan reading might view Kempe's devotion in this way. We saw this disruptive effect 
in the episode from Chapter 61 when Kempe's tears break into the preaching friar's sermon, 
causing him to demand her exclusion from the church and from the Word - that is, from 
Christ in the form of both Eucharist and Gospel. 
Nonetheless, no modern reader and critic of the Book can ignore the fact that it is a clerically 
mediated work; given the anti-heretical climate of Kempe's time and place, it could not have 
been written and preserved otherwise. The proem which precedes the text outlines Kempe's 
search for a scribe willing to collaborate with her on her revelations, and the account is given 
further treatment in Chapter 89 of the Book itself. In the prologue (the proem in Windeatt's 
translation) we read that it was twenty years after the time of her first revelations that Kempe 
sought to have them set down, and that she only did so when commanded by God, although 
others had suggested it previously (Kempe 1988, 35). The first writer, we are told, worked 
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on the revelations until his death, upon which a second scribe found the text an indecipherable 
mix of "neither good English nor German.1! He stated that, in his view, "nobody would ever 
be able to read it, unless it were by special grace" (Kempe 1988, 35). Next this scribe went 
through a four-year period of avoiding Kempe, while there was "evil talk" about her and her 
tears. She took the project to a third man, who could not understand it, and eventually the 
second priest, troubled by his conscience, agreed to take up the task again. 
It is clear from the prologue that at this point, the requisite "special grace" was achieved 
through Kempe's prayers (Kempe 1988, 36), and these also helped remedy the failure of the 
priest's sight which occurred once he started the task of writing in earnest, and is described 
as a hindrance from the devil. While as Lochrie notes, "this account of the writing of 
[Kempe's] Book is a literary convention, it perfectly illustrates the point of [her] prologue: 
the priest is like the reader who, through lack of charity or lack of courage, is unable to 
receive. the profit of Kempe's narrative" (Kempe 1988, 33; Lochrie 1986a, 36). Kempe's 
scribe is depicted here at the outset of her story as the first reader of a text which claims to 
present "for our example and instruction" - that is, for that of all believers, the intended 
readership of the text - an account of the workings of divine grace. This work is to lIour 
profit," in the words of the proem, as it was to the scribe, only on the condition that "lack of 
charity be not our hindrance" (Kempe 1988, 33). 
The role of the priest as clerically authorised speaker - in his work as preacher of sermons and 
purveyor of official Church doctrine - is here reversed by Kempe in the same manner we 
observed in the previous chapter, specifically in the section on preaching. Kempe claims 
authority for her particular voice by restaging the story of the Book's transcription in terms 
of herself as medium of God's grace. If the scribe is the first reader, who exemplifies the 
most profitable reading approach to the Book (Lochrie 1986a, 36-7), then Kempe's own 
distinctive voice must carry the authority of the narrative. In fact David Lawton suggests that 
in reading Kempe's text: 
we reverse the notion of editorial control. Here, the text constructs its editor, and it 
places him in the role of reader. ... It is conventionally acceptable for a woman 
mystic not to write. Positively, it is a helpful generic attribute of a woman mystic 
to dictate. But there is a radical dislocation here between writing and speech. In the 
medieval vocabulary made newly familiar by Alastair Minnis, the most that the 
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second scribe claims to be is compiler, and that leaves Kempe - the illiterate of the 
book - in the role of author.2 Generically, the editor is there as part of Kempe's 
story, the male cleric is subordinate to the laywoman. Authority thus passes from 
what is written to what is spoken: to voice (Lawton 1992, 102. See also Harding 
1993, 178). 
Windeatt, too, notes the import of Kempe's voice within her narrative. He writes that it is 
"human speech itself which continually catches and sharpens the attention" of the reader of 
the Book, and remarks that, "as an illiterate person, the role of human speech seems central 
to [Kempe's] remembering of past events, and happily central to her dictated account of that 
past" (Win?-eatt 1988, 22, 25). Speech and words are certainly a vital preoccupation of 
Kempe's throughout the Book, and she experiences profound anguish (resulting in behaviours 
which can also be seen as "hysterical" protests) whenever her access to sanctioned verbal 
discourse, in the form of sermon (Chapters 42, 62) or confession (Chapter 1) for example, is 
denied. Kempe frequently recounts in direct speech episodes in which she was required to 
defend herself verbally (Windeatt 1988, 25), recreating the drama of these situations with 
herself as central actor. Windeatt argues that "if we imagine ourselves with [Kempe's] 
unlettered awareness, her ability 'to answer every clerk' is clearly a reflection of the favour 
shown her and of her extraordinary vocationll (Windeatt 1988,25). She effectively stages her 
life as a dramatic reenactment of her encounter with God's grace, in which the responses of 
others are seen to endorse her experience. 
Kempe's manner of referring to herself in the third person in relation to her encounters with 
others in her Book also creates a narrative distancing by which she constructs herself as a 
character in her life's story, as more than one critic has noted (Mueller 1984, 129; Lochrie 
1986b, 237; Erskine 1989, 81-3). This narrative method casts the mystic in a defensive, vocal 
and dramatic role in relation to other people, notably her immediate critics, so that she appears 
as principal actor in the depiction of her life as a series of scenes. Janel Mueller observes that 
Kempe's constant reference to herself in the third person as "this creature" and "she" instead 
of "I" is apparently a manoeuvre by which she litakes up and sustains an outside perspective 
on herself," which is "that of other persons and how they react, judge, and behave regarding 
her" (Mueller 1984, 129. See also Gray 1990, 12). The "hysterical" elements of this move are 
twofold. Firstly, depicting herself as the object of others' derision is a fundamental aspect of 
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Kempe's imitatio and the working out of her salvation - Christ tells her that she suffers shame 
and slander as he suffered (Kempe 1988, 34, 195); like the hysteric she performs according 
to a culturally acceptable model of behaviour. Secondly, the mystic's presentation of herself 
as the dramatic centre of her text, especially when onlookers are troubled by her tears, is 
similar to the physical performance occasioned by the hysteric's symptom(s). Like the 
hysteric, Kempe portrays herself - in devotion and dispute - as the unruly object of others' 
gaze. 
In Chapter 12 for example, Kempe recounts an episode in which the actorly qualities of the 
third-person authorial voice, as described above, are to the fore. The scene emphasises the 
power of the spoken word, divine and human, to unsettle and to influence people's actions, 
but it also highlights the mystic's dependence on God and the unstable qualities of human 
speech. The text makes Kempe the focus of the narrative in such a way that her own body 
and voice defer to the authority of the divine; it is an example of the imitative rationale of 
the Book, Kempe's life as record of God's works in one of his creatures. On this specific 
occasion Kempe was forced to defend herself to a monk "who held great office" in his 
community, who despised her and "set no value on her at all" (Kempe 1988). Kempe tells 
how she had been seated next to the community's abbot at a meal at which the monk was also 
present, during which "she uttered many good words as God would put them into her mind" 
(Kempe 1988, 61). 
The monk shows a strong interest in her speech and later when they are in church together, 
he accosts her with the words: '''I hear it said that God speaks to you'" (Kempe 1988, 61). 
He demands to know whether he will be saved and that Kempe describe to him his gravest 
sins, positing knowledge of the latter as evidence of the validity of her communications with 
God. Weeping in prayer, Kempe asks Christ for her answer, declaring, when it is given, that 
she fears being taken for a liar and that the words are '''hard [for her] to say'" (Kempe 1988, 
61). Christ reassures her with the command to speak confidently in his name, assuring her that 
the monk will achieve salvation if he abandons his sinful ways and follows her advice. When 
Kempe tells the monk of his sins, he tests her by demanding to know whether he has sinned 
in lechery with single women or with wives (Kempe 1988, 62). Having proved her authority 
on the monk's terms, Kempe answers his question concerning his salvation with the answer 
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that he will achieve it only by following her advice, which she proceeds to gIve. The 
exchanges between Kempe and the monk, as well as those between Kempe and Christ in this 
scene are related in direct speech, and it is through her presentation of herself responding in 
spoken dialogue to others' questions and commands that the authority of Kempe's advice is 
reinforced and ultimately shown to be powerful and worthy of respect. The transcript of 
spoken language, however, reflects the dependence of Kempe's Book on her voice on two 
levels: firstly on her memory of the words spoken in the encounter but ultimately on the 
relationship with Christ in which God speaks to her and claims responsibility for the words 
which she herself must speak. 
, 
This episode recalls the account of the writing of the Book in which Kempe's depiction of 
herself and her scribe as characters in a textual drama in which she is the protagonist 
represents the text as dependent on her speaking voice. It also exemplifies the self-conscious, 
ironic stance that Kempe takes up within the narrative: she tells her own story, based on her 
experience of God, while presenting herself within it as one voice among others, a mere 
vehicle for divine communication. And yet in the act of dictating her narrative to the scribe 
she privileges her voice against those of her detractors. 
Both Mueller and Sidonie Smith refer to Kempe's constant "self-consciousness of expression" 
(Mueller 1984, 129; Smith 1987, 50) which results from the Book's split point of view. Smith 
cites the "doubled ambivalence" of the text while Mueller goes on to state that the 
third-person trope "remains constant even in the subjective disclosures and probings where .. .it 
produces a simultaneous, double view - interior and exterior - of [Kempe] and her 
experiences" (Smith 1987, 83; Mueller 1984, 129). Lochrie also argues that the "good game" 
Kempe employs in her narrative, her playing up of the instability of language, "exploits this 
duality," as does the gap in time separating experience from recording (Lochrie 1986b, 237). 
The result is that we, the Book's readers, perceive Kempe as an enigmatic figure. Her 
presentation of herself as a speaking voice in contest with other voices renders the narrative 
voice itself more elusive, so that, like the hysterical body in the texts of psychoanalysis, it 
seems to escape or exceed the text. As Lawton holds: "Margery Kempe as historical subject 
recedes further from view, split between the writing and the voice, neither the writing nor the 
voice being stably or consistently hers" (Lawton 1992, 105).3 
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I contend that the elusive quality of Kempe's textual voice is the result of its issuing from a 
female body, a body which, having borne children, has forfeited the limited conditions 
available to a medieval woman for authentic visionary speech. While the unmistakeable 
presence of a lively personal voice pervades Kempe's text and testifies to the fact of its origin 
in an unenclosed female body, the Book's third-person construction and distanced perspective 
is a sign of the process of the translation of this experience into text. The third-person 
narrative format works effectively as a strategy to distance Kempe as author or speaker from 
the unruly body represented in the text. Her staging within the narrative of the dialogic 
dynamics of the Book's construction - where her voice is in frequent contest with others -
testifies to the cultural climate in which a woman's (and especially a wife's) speech was held 
suspect due to the contaminations of her physical being. Because the Book is constructed 
around the fault-line or space between the excessive female body/voice and the masculine 
authorisation of the narrative, its dialogic qualities are central. It reads as a destabilised 
narrative because Kempe's authority can rest neither solely on her own behaviour nor on 
priestly endorsement. With regard to the Book's dialogic aspect, Sarah Beckwith asserts that 
"Kempe's book provides a massive variety of different ways of incorporating the voices of 
others, from abasement before the authoritative word to a profaning and parodic decrowning 
of that same word." She claims that "it is in every sense double-voicedness which this book 
most deeply dramatizes" (Beckwith 1992, 189). 
There is undoubtedly some clerical shaping of the narrative, specifically of the scenes in 
which Kempe defends herself from charges of heresy (Atkinson 1983, 107). Kempe's 
authorial voice with its origin in a female body connoting excess and danger is necessarily 
mediated through the relationship of the mystic and her scribe. Her Book is quintessentially 
"double-voiced." For Kempe it is not possible to "speak as a woman" specifically - she must 
speak in a clerically authorised mode - and yet her more extreme mimetic acts exploit the 
equation of the feminine with fleshly excess, as we have seen. Therefore there is inevitably 
a narrative distancing between Kempe's authorial (speaking) voice in the text and the 
disturbing physical behaviours portrayed in it, a product of the necessary representation of 
these experiences through the medium of clerical authority. However the paradoxical effect 
of this mediation is to highlight Kempe's physical acts of devotion as excessive performances 
when they are described, since they appear separated from her narrative voice by the requisite 
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intervention of male scribal authority, and yet male authority cannot wholly contain their 
disruptive effects. 
This ironic emphasising of the female physical "excess" of the text within its masculinised 
frame also occurs in the psychoanalytic case studies of hysterics, which are likewise written 
representations of the female body mediated by men. In both kinds of texts the appropriate 
male authority (priest/analyst) mediates the speaking voice of the mystic/hysteric, thus 
displacing it or highlighting its separation from the strange actions of the female body which 
are central to the text. In this sense mystical texts and psychoanalytic texts on hysteria 
dramatise the production of the feminine in patriarchal discourse. The masculine-appropriated 
space between female body and voice, however, is an unstable one which cannot be 
completely recuperated, since both Kempe's scribe and the female hysteric's analyst depend 
upon female bodily performance to provide the material for their work of 
transcription/analysis. I will make a brief detour from Kempe's text at this point in order to 
explain in more depth the relevance of the connection between texts depicting hysteria and 
the female visionary's work. 
The case studies of hysterics are based on dialogues between patient and analyst which, as in 
Kempe's Book, involve the documenting of an unusual physical performance or expression. 
However the performance is recorded as such through being. classed as hysteria, interpreted 
by an analyst (usually male) in such a way that it achieves "authority" only through the 
endorsement of the masculinised written text. And yet, while hysterics outwardly aim to 
please their analysts (Evans 1991, 159), their bodily symptoms articulate another story, which, 
despite the analyst's attempts to encode it in narrative (the case history in Freud, or in the first 
instance the talking cure), tends to exceed the terms of the analytic situation. This is because 
the conversations between the hysteric and her analyst which form the basis of the "cure" and 
the written record of their encounter occur as a result of the activities of a necessarily twice-
absent female body, as I will explain. 
The hysteric's attacks can be seen as an attempt to stage a protest at the unrepresentability of 
female desire in phallic discourse; this is the first absence of the specifically female body in 
patriarchal representation that is suggested by hysterical behaviour. Such a protest is, however, 
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representable only in symptoms which indicate but cannot alter phallocentric culture's blind 
spot regarding femininity. The hysterical symptom as impossible narrative of female desire 
challenges a patriarchal system in which, "to acknowledge the possibility of a satisfied sexual 
desire, [the female hysteric] would have to acknowledge as well the reality of castration, that 
is, the difference of the sexes based on a loss" (Evans 1991, 182), a loss which is inscribed 
on the body of "woman" herself. The female hysteric attempts to express a kind of plenitude 
(David-Menard 1989, 130) which resists the signification of "woman" as lack through the 
excessiveness of the physical symptom, but the symptom exceeds representation and so is 
absent from the text. The analyst seeks to unravel and decipher the mysterious story 
articulated by the hysterical symptom, yet because the symptom characteristically overwhelms 
and obliterates language,4 it engages the analyst in a search which proceeds outside the text. 
The symptom's trace nonetheless pervades the record of the analytic encounter, a dialogue 
founded on its unsettling performance. 
In psychoanalysis the narrative of inadmissible female desire which the hysteric struggles to 
express is made into another, authoritative narrative by the analyst: the case study. The case 
study is the tangible sign of that which cannot be represented and which the hysteric strives 
to express: female desire unconstrained by the phallic imperatives of the symbolic. There is 
a similarity between this process of textual transcription and what takes place with regard to 
Kempe, as the story of her life - including the most bizarre elements of her imitatio - exceeds 
the text; yet her account must be recast by the appropriate male authority in order to be 
accepted and made known. However unlike the hysteric Kempe consciously requires the 
support of her scribe; she willingly collaborates with him in the task of transforming excessive 
experience into written form. Her scribe, in tum, accepts that her mystical imitatio is 
spiritually valid. He seeks to understand the narrative of divine intervention she dictates and 
which her physical behaviours exemplify. He enables a textual representation of the mystical 
relationship, a relationship which, like the symptoms of female hysteria, must exceed ordinary 
discourse. However it is because Kempe's body is female that, like that of the hysteric, it 
forms the simultaneously excessive and absent central component of her text. Her bodily 
experience cannot appear in the text on its own terms since in medieval religious discourse 
representations of both Christ and "woman" must be authorised by male clerics. Hence the 
narrative produced from the encounter between Kempe's body and the body of Christ is 
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mediated by priestly authority. Like the case study of the hysteric, it is the sign of that which 
cannot appear in an unmediated form; the encounter between God and "woman" must be 
circumscribed by the Church. The scribe endeavours to translate the meaning of Kempe's 
excessive behaviours into a comprehensible narrative, a story from which readers will be able 
to receive spiritual edification. 
Freud perceived that the hysteric had a story to tell through her body when he claimed that: 
local diagnosis and electrical reactions lead nowhere in the study of hysteria, 
whereas a detailed description of mental processes such as we are accustomed to find 
in the works of imaginative writers enables me, with the use of a few psychological 
'formulas, to obtain at least some kind of insight into the course of that affection 
(Freud 1955, 160-1, qtd. in Bernheimer 1985, 10). 
Charles Bernheimer points out that Freud's hysterics caused him to become "implicated 
inextricably in the complexities of narrative creation. He tells the stories of the stories told 
him" (Bernheimer 1985, 10), and, in effect, Kempe's scribe must do the same thing. Mary 
Jacobus notes that, in Studies on Hysteria, Freud expresses surprise that his case studies of 
female hysterics should read like literary texts, implying that their literary qualities are 
"imposed on him by the nature of his subject; almost as a form of hysterical utterance" 
(Jacobus 1986, 197). Jacobus continues: 
The story of the patient's sufferings, [Freud] discovers, is intimately connected with 
the patient's symptoms. As hysteria produces symptoms, so symptoms produce 
stories. The body of the hysteric becomes her text: the body of Freud's text becomes 
a short story. The hysterical "conversion" from mind to body and from body to text 
- from hysteria, via symptom, to narrative - implicates the narrator himself in the 
"splitting of consciousness" or hysterical estrangement which (in Breuer's and 
Freud's own terms) characterizes the original illness. Hysteria, Freud seems to say, 
generates hysterical narrative, and hysterical narrative makes strange reading 
(Jacobus 1986, 197-8). 
Kempe's scribe, like Freud, is also necessarily implicated in the "estranged" or split position 
that Kempe takes up as both speaker and performing body in her text; in fact, he is the link 
between them, the symbol of the estrangement that the patriarchal order produces in women 
who speak publicly and which, in the middle ages, was specifically prescribed by the Church 
and its priests. The scribe, as the necessary mediator between Kempe's relationship with 
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Christ and its public portrayal as a sanctified life, can be seen, like Freud, as constructed in 
part by the mystic's (hysteric's) unsettling performance, which he endorses as male authority 
but also responds positively to and seeks, as do others of her contemporaries, to understand. 
While Bernheimer posits a connection between the narrative process and the construction and 
treatment of hysteria, I suggest that in Kempe's case, as in the cases Freud inscribed into text, 
we must read the Book as a double narrative, the "strange reading" which many critics have 
claimed it to be. Kempe's need to have her life preserved required that she "perform" verbally 
andlor physically before a vast audience of priests, scribes, and civil authorities, defending her 
right to a special relationship with Christ. These men effectively acted as "analysts" before 
whom she played her mimetic, desiring role. They, and particularly the scribe who eventually 
wrote down the mystic's life, represent the official side of the narrative, the "case history," 
we might say. But like Freud's narratives, the Book's gaps, omissions and ambivalences invite 
us to read it in search of the "hysteric," Kempe herself, as a "symptomatic narrative" 
(Bernheimer 1985, 18) by which she tells a double story: that of the devoted visionary who 
is also a once-married (sexually experienced) woman. The latter aspect must be disavowed 
in her Book but reappears in the most intense moments of her Passion imitatio, where (female) 
bodily excess overwhelms both the distancing of the narrative voice and the (male) scribal 
authority which puts it in place. 
In order to inscribe her voice into her text, Kempe must show that God speaks and works 
through her physical being, and this process itself must be set forth in terms of her 
interactions with God's representatives, male clerics. This makes Kempe's authorial voice 
seem evasive and dispersed - "Margery Kempe as historical subject" (Lawton 1992, 105) 
continually evades the reader's grasp - however the overwhelmingly physical actions of her 
body in imitation of Christ's Passion challenge this masculinised construction. Whereas the 
mystic's voice circulates evasively in the encounters with authoritative others documented in 
the Book, being presented as one voice among many and dramatising the conditions of the 
Book's production, her body (re)appears dramatically in the centre-stage of her visions of 
Christ's Passion. Kempe's narrative voice, then, like that of the female hysteric in the classic 
texts of psychoanalysis, is present yet duplicitous (because mediated by a male scribe) in 
relation to the excessive activities of her body. 
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In her text the actions of Kempe's body in direct imitation of Christ are represented 
differently from the charged encounters with others documented in the Book; when Kempe 
imitates Christ's Passion she breaks through the clerical layers of the text suggested by her 
disputes with priests. She is totally consumed by her encounter with Christ, and onlookers -
including clerics - are mystified by her behaviour (e.g., Kempe 1988, 105, 239). In her 
Passion visions the exorbitant actions of Kempe's body, then, belie the distanced quality of 
her narrative voice at the same time as they theatricalise - mime and caricature - the outlawed, 
unruly female body of medieval clerical discourse itself. Kempe's "mystical hysteria," her 
dramatic, imitative behaviours which can only be suggested in the Book, thus represent a kind 
of challenge to orthodox discourse, constituting the return of that which it seeks to repress or 
circumscribe. 
In the opening scene of the Book, Kempe tells how she desired to confess a sin which had 
long been on her conscience, but the priest to whom she spoke cut her off before she could 
do so (Kempe 1988, 41). The repression of the undeclared sin drove the mystic mad and 
manifested itself in wild, destructive behaviour ranged against herself, her family and friends 
(Kempe 1988, 41-2). While this behaviour itself may be seen as "hysterical" - an extreme 
physical articulation of something which cannot be said5 - the rest of Kempe's Book may I 
think be read as a "hysterical," or displaced, confession too, the inevitable outcome of a taboo 
on female speech.6 The scribe, a cleric like the man to whom Kempe first desired to confess, 
is implicated in the "confession" of Kempe's sanctity through the transcribing of her 
revelations and is, along with the mystic herself, cast in an ambiguously dependent 
relationship with the narrative of her text. 
As Dianne Hunter reminds us with regard to hysteria, analytic interventions into hysterical 
suffering "are considered 'translations' of the unconscious into the conscious. The 'talking 
cure' is the 'translation of affects into words, '" and "repression for Freud is a 'failure of 
translation'" (Freud 1953,277, cited in Hunter 1983,484-5). Insofar as the task of Kempe's 
scribe is to translate the mystic's imitatio into book form, he assists with her "talking cure"; 
he aids in the representation of a "confession" of Christ which could not be depicted so 
publicly without his assistance. And yet the body of the hysteric, like the body of the mystic, 
is resistant to masculine control. The production of Kempe's Book does not, of course, 
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produce a "cure" for her Passion/ate afflictions or her wandering style of living (itself also 
suggestive of the kind of familial disruption to which Freud's hysterics were prone). 
Transcribing her life into text may ensure her sanctity and survival but there is always 
something of female experience which cannot be adequately confessed in Church discourse. 
Kempe's text may also be seen as a "hysterical" confession in the sense that it dramatises the 
derisive reactions of others to her tears and wandering as part of her own imitatio Christi. The 
excessive behaviour shown by the female hysteric generally provokes a response from others 
(usually family members), and this audience response is a necessary component of the 
outlawed feminine desire which she struggles to express through her symptoms. Likewise, in 
Kempe's text the responses of others to her spirituality are represented as integral to her 
justification of her life as the record of an imitation of Christ. Kempe's life in general - her 
public speech and her "vagrancy" as well as her wild tears - were seen as excessive because 
medieval women were generally expected to be silent and enclosed. Kempe exploits the 
outlaw component of her experience in the Book by portraying the inevitable - because she 
is a woman - negative responses to both her loud crying and her wandering as evidence of 
her holiness. They become part of the inscription of her life into Christ's through imitation: 
she suffers as he suffered. 
This suffering is an ongoing aspect of her vocation and in this sense her confession of Christ 
is always incomplete. But this also means that her female experience continually disrupts the 
orthodox account of her life, since her suffering shame and slander is the result of her 
excessive female actions, albeit performed in the service of devotion. The "unconscious" of 
the text - the physical excess of female experience on which it is based - is translated into its 
conscious or outward form but the unconscious is never exhausted. The analyst can never 
fully translate the female hysteric's behaviour; an aspect of her protest will continually remain 
opaque to his discourse of mastery. Nor can Kempe's scribe represent her experience fully; 
it appears mediated through the responses of others to what they perceive as her excessive acts 
of imitation. These responses, especially when they are negative, serve as indications of her 
Christlikeness through longsuffering and as more material for the representation of a saintly 
life. 
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The Book, then, reproduces outlawed femininity as saintly narrative, a "confession" which 
Kempe articulates, with the help of her scribe, to a far wider audience than the priest who first 
refused her speech.7 The passage of the mystic's words from the place of clerical refusal, 
through clerical agency to sanctity refigures the original priestly refusal as part of her imitatio. 
Kempe's holiness, as articulated in her Book, derives from such negations; she suffers as her 
Saviour did. The first refusal becomes a model for the rest of the Book and at the same time 
a challenge to priestly discourse and its alienation of women. When Kempe is first refused 
confession and manifests her words in wild behaviour she challenges priestly authority in 
"demonic" mode (the Book states that she was "tormented with spirits" (Kempe 1988, 41)), 
but her later orthodox Passion imitations are also sometimes seen as a threat to clerical 
speech, as we saw with the preaching friar and his sermon. And yet, the difference between 
the two modes of expression is profound. The first leads to Kempe's being silenced and 
literally confined within her home (Kempe 1988, 42). The second leads to her gaining a 
public following and an audience for her actions and words. 
The whole of Kempe's Book may be seen, like her first "hysterical" display of madness, as 
a spoken (dictated) confession mediated primarily through the body; the written life is a 
confession of Christic devotion which incorporates a physical supplement to speech. Even the 
scribe, after all, required a physical sign of God's favour - in the form of his healed sight -
before he was convinced to write the revelations down. Kempe's Passion imitatio, constituted 
by that same physicality which formed the initially outlawed physical surplus of the text, 
becomes the generator of the narrative, as in the texts of hysterical women, and the means by 
which clerical authority is implicated in the showing forth of God's intervention in the 
mystic's life. 
While the volatility of the relationship between scribe, body and authorial voice in Kempe's 
situation, described in the preceding pages, shows similarities with the case narratives of 
Freud's hysterics, it also exhibits significant differences from them. Like the ambiguous tales 
of female somatic symptoms penned by Freud, the medieval mystical text has specific 
destabilising qualities of its own. As the arguments put forward by Lawton previously about 
the construction of the Book make clear, the relationship between "author" and text in the 
middle ages was by no means seen to be a stable one. Generally speaking, the vagaries of 
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medieval methods of copying texts meant that "medieval textual production accepted many 
ambiguities which twentieth-century editing does not" (Allen 1989, 102), and as Edmund 
Reiss reminds us, "that language was implicitly deceptive and those who used it deceivers 
were common beliefs in the fourteenth century" (Reiss 1989, 115). While Kempe's narrative 
effectively dramatises the production of the female body in patriarchal discourse, it necessarily 
does so through a dramatisation of the conditions of medieval textual production which make 
her text a de stabilised narrative. Both the body in and the body o/Kempe's text testify to the 
source of representation outside the text - the body of the mystic herself - as a culturally 
mediated and mutable one. The deceptiveness of language which is shown in the dialogues 
in Kempe's text, frequently to her advantage, as we saw in her arguments with clerics 
, 
described in Chapter Two (Chapter Two, 91-4; Lochrie 1986b, 231-2; 1988, 14-15), 
ultimately serves as a sign of the impossibility of representing truth in human words. In the 
middle ages this task is reserved for God alone, who speaks through physical means in the 
person of Christ the Incarnate Word. 
Of course Christ's Incarnation is figured most directly in the Book through Kempe's imitative 
Passion visions, and the mutable nature of the relationship Kempe has with words and speech 
reflects the dynamic quality of her relationship with Christ which underwrites the text. This 
relationship is exemplified by the mystic's tears, her special sign from God that he is actively 
and publicly present in her life. The tears are like a hysterical symptom in that, while 
described in the Book's narrative, their disruptive properties gesture towards an unsignifiable 
somatic excess, the non-virginal body of the mystic herself which is traditionally denied 
specific representation in orthodox discourse. In the next section, I will trace some of the 
connections which are made in the Book between Kempe's tears and the authorisation of the 
words of her text, while continuing to address the implications of the "hysterical" or 
dramatically self-conscious qualities of her speech. 
3. 1. 2 Tears and the Word 
Frequently endorsed by Christ in her visions (Kempe 1988, 67, 197-8, 201, 216, 225, 245, 
254), Kempe's tears represent her strongest claim to divine authority.s They are also the 
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manifestation of her devotions most difficult to ignore and so form a central focus of the 
dramals of clerical interaction portrayed within the Book. As shown in the first chapter (48), 
negative reactions to Kempe's voluble gift have not been confined to the fifteenth century but 
have surfaced in early- to mid-twentieth-century criticism of the Book as well, where the 
colloquial use of the word "hysteria" continues to represent the debate - begun and set forth 
in the text - about who can claim to speak with divine authority in terms of gender and, more 
specifically (the female) body.9 
Kempe's visionary calling is plainly one that disturbs the conventional arrangements of her 
own family and society at large. And her gift of tears, as the central focus of her role as a 
pilgrim-mystic, serves as the holy sign which validates her assumption of this role, in contrast 
to the one she previously assumed at the dictates of patriarchal society, that of wife and 
mother. Her vocation requires that she become more or less a professional pilgrim, so that the 
unsettling, "hysterical" behaviour she exhibits through physical convulsions and tears when 
meditating on Christ's Passion is reflected on a broader scale through the physical movement 
which constitutes her travels. The itinerant way of life Kempe undertakes may be seen as 
"hysterical" too in that, while it imitates Christ's homelessness, it simultaneously gives voice 
to her own desire for freedom and physical independence, and effectively removes her from 
the culturally approved path of feminine development as wife and mother and thus from the 
circuits of phallic desire, as do female hysterical behaviours (Grosz 1989, 134). 
However the central focus of the "hysterical" gift is Christ himself, who both grants it and is 
most often the 0 bj ect of its expression. Kempe's tears, as the most evident and unusual sign 
of God's favour to her, appear - as I will show - more than once in the Book specifically to 
validate the writing of her life as text while their excessive aspect inscribes her female voice 
within the words of that text, in a disturbing manner not unlike hysterical protest. The 
synergic relationship which exists between Kempe's tears and the Word of God in sermon and 
Eucharist, evidenced by the sermon episode discussed in Chapter Two, is extended elsewhere 
in the Book through this association between tears and the writing of the Book itself. In the 
sermon episode, Kempe's tears function polysemously as an expression of devotion; as a 
vociferous challenge to. clerical authority; and as a protest at her marginalisation. In Chapters 
88 and 89 tears and Word again interact on several levels to articulate her empowerment as 
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"author" of her text. 
At the beginning of Chapter 88 Kempe describes her concern that, when the Book was in the 
first stages of transcription, she had less time to spend at her devotions because she often had 
to remain at home with her scribe. In response Christ declares that: '''though you were in 
church and both wept together as bitterly as you ever did, you still would not please me more 
than you do with your writing, for, daughter, by this book many a man shall be turned to me 
and believe'" (Kempe 1988, 257). Kempe and her scribe are here depicted aligned in tearful 
devotion as in the common task of showing forth the workings of God in the mystic's life 
through the transcription of her revelations. Christ's statement that the writing of the Book is 
as pleasing to him as Kempe's tears confirms the Book as a divine project: Kempe and her 
scribe are, like the mystic's body through which tears function as the expression of divine 
favour, instruments of a higher will. The scribe receives authority here through his association 
with Kempe, whose prior claim to honour through the divine gift of tears is the point of 
alignment between the two in the cooperative task of transcription. Like the analyst's 
representation of the hysteric, the narrative which is recorded is depicted as a translation of 
the "hysterical" (mystical) symptom: the two are necessarily linked, and Kempe's legitimacy 
as "author" or the primary speaker of her text is reinforced by her bodily alignment with the 
Word through her tears. 
In Chapter 89 this theme continues as we are told that both Kempe and her scribe experienced 
"many holy tears and much weeping" (Kempe 1988, 260) while the Book was being written. 
This is followed by Kempe's account of a vision she had at this time in which Christ, his 
Mother and many saints visited her in church and declared themselves "well pleased with the 
writing of [the] book" (Kempe 1988, 260). In the next sentence, Kempe tells how she was 
often physically ill during the transcription of the Book, but would become well whenever she 
set about work on her revelations. Finally, Kempe recounts how Christ, in response to her 
request, informs her in prayer that Master Aleyn, a priest known to her, will preach '''a very 
holy sermon, ", and requires of her that she '''believe steadfastly the words that he shall 
preach, as though I preached them myself, for they shall be words of great solace and comfort 
to you, for I shall speak in him'" (Kempe 1988, 260). 
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Kempe reports this message to her confessor and to two other priests "whom she greatly 
trusted," after which she is visited with fear that she may have been mistaken; as she says: 
"revelations are hard sometimes to understand." However, her feeling is proved "very truth, 
shown in experience" when the sermon is heard and this statement is followed by an account 
of the difficulty of recognising divine from deluded visitations (Kempe 1988,261). Sue Ellen 
Holbrook claims that the episode serves as a demonstration of "the source and power of words 
- [the] priest's in delivering a sermon, [Kempe's] in composing a book. Through this source 
and power, the life of Margery Kempe and The Book of Margery Kempe are made one" 
(Holbrook 1985, 105). By foretelling the holiness of the already officially sanctioned words 
of a cleric, Kempe reverses the power which accrues to the preacher and uses it to endorse 
her own words of prophecy and, by extension, her Book. 
This passage, which concludes the Book's first part and is explicitly concerned with its 
textuality and transcription, returns full circle to its opening. Kempe goes on to describe how 
she was 
sometimes ... greatly depressed about her feelings - when she did not know how they 
should be understood for many days together, because of the dread that she had of 
deceptions and delusions - so that she thought she wished her head had been struck 
from her body until God, of his goodness, explained them to her mind (Kempe 
1988, 261). 
The image of bodily dislocation in this extract recalls the Book's beginning and the torment 
from the devil Kempe suffers when her confession is cut short, which leads to its 
manifestation as a kind of "hysterical," uncontrolled rage: 
Because of the dread she had of damnation on the one hand, and [her confessor's] 
sharp reproving of her on the other, this creature went out of her mind and was 
amazingly disturbed and tormented with spirits for half a year, eight weeks and odd 
days (Kempe 1988, 41). 
The congruence between the state of being "out of her mind ... amazingly disturbed and 
tormented" in the Book's first pages, and dreading deceptions so that "she wished her head 
had been struck from her body until God ... explained [her feelings] to her mind" in Chapter 
89 is, however, belied by the clearly intentional nature of the latter, self-conscious image. 
Physical fragmentation is here associated with the healing power of the divine communication 
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to which Kempe lays claim. Between the Book's opening and the end of its substantial first 
part an immense growth in confidence is shown in Kempe evident in her visions of God, her 
dialogues with him and her defence of these as authorisation of her calling to contentious 
others. The image of deliberate bodily dislocation is presented, as so often throughout the 
Book, as the place/space where God performs his healing activity direct to the mystic's senses, 
without the mediation of a priest. The chapter reverses the Book's opening in which Kempe 
suffers painful self-division, more or less at the whim of a cleric, so that God's affirmation 
of the truth of her "feelings" heals her bodily torment and thereby sanctions the inscribing of 
body into text. To quote Holbrook again: 
, In the final scenes ... [Kempe] is released from the suicidal frenzy that ensued from 
a blocked, an incomplete, creativity. From being bound on the bed of childbirth 
unable to make a priest hear her confession, she has from Christmas to Christmas 
increased in virtue, been made fertile by tears, until vision and the use of language 
are hers, full and potent, effective for herself and all others (Holbrook 1985, 105). 
The transformation of Kempe's former "hysterical" suffering into a later source of authorial 
empowerment through her tears depends upon the development of her relationship with Christ 
which is charted in the Book, and through the imitation, also "hysterical II or excessively 
mimetic, which she enacts therein. Her tears serve throughout the Book as the variable middle 
ground between the Word which is Christ, the sanctioned words of clerics, and the words of 
the text; they initially express personal anguish and later also religious devotion, and they 
point to the extra-textual, mystical relationship between Kempe and Christ which, like tears, 
cannot be represented in words. 
The exorbitant bodily behaviours which frequently accompany Kempe's tears also bear 
witness to the extra-textual - the essentially mystical - aspect of her relationship with Christ. 
Kempe's narrative portrays an audience within an audience as she frequently performs her 
imitatio in the presence of onlookers, later recording the entire episode in the Book for her 
readers' instruction. This theatrical, "hysterical" concern with the reception of her performance 
has the effect of seeming to displace the mystic's body from within the text itself. While the 
focus of the narrative is on audience reaction, the "truth" of Kempe's imitatio becomes a 
matter of reader response, and more particularly the charitable attitude described as necessary 
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for receiving the Book's value at its outset. The mystic's excessive physicality, simultaneously 
absent from and present in her text, appears self-consciously staged in a manner similar to 
what Cixous and Clement, describing hysteria, call "the theatre of the body" (Cixous and 
Clement 1986, 10-14). The "theatre of the body" is the term I will use to describe Kempe's 
wild and kinetic devotions as a spectacle for onlookers, which are then recorded or "staged" 
in the Book as scenes in which the reader might discern the sufferings of Christ. 
3. 1. 3 The theatre of the body 
The "theatricality" or self-consciousness of expression shown in Kempe's Book has been noted 
more generally in the field of women's autobiographical writing by feminist critics (Smith 
1987, 176; Miller 1988, 49, 62n). This self-conscious authorial attitude would seem to be a 
consequence of the female autobiographer's difficult task of negotiating amongst socially 
validated female fictions of self while experimenting with alternative conceptions of selfhood 
from the norm. The wide variety of "roles" inhabited by female autobiographers signal the 
simultaneous self-awareness and dislocation which results from speaking within the textual 
economy formed by masculine desire, in which "speaking as a woman" is as yet an 
impossibility. The female autobiographer's task is, then, necessarily duplicit as well as 
theatrical (both perhaps inseparable features of much women's wTiting). As Sidonie Smith 
observes, women's autobiography characteristically reveals "a complex double-voicedness, a 
fragile hetero-glossia ... which calls forth charged dramatic exchanges and narrative strategies" 
and "a kind of double helix of the imagination that leads to a double-voiced structuring of 
content and rhetoric" (Smith 1987, 50-1). 
We find these qualities abundantly revealed in The Book o/Margery Kempe through the text's 
mimetic rationale - expressed in forms of popular devotion which privilege the female in the 
sense of privileging the body and leading to devotional "excesses" such as weeping - and 
collaborative authorial stance - which privileges the male. This dual aspect of the text requires 
the mystic to represent herself acting out her devotion to Christ and to observe her behaviour 
at the same time. Kempe's imitatio authorises her Book but at the same time destabilises it 
by strategically refusing a final interpretation of her piety and deferring to the responses of 
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those who "read" her mimetic performance, both those figured within the text and those who 
encounter her body's activities through its pages. 
As described in the first chapter, Irigaray claims that self-consciously "acting out" a cultural 
fiction of femininity can displace its terms and make way for an alternative, more autonomous 
version. This is what she claims is happening in the case of female hysteria: 
Hysteria: it speaks in the mode of a paralyzed gestural faculty, of an impossible and 
also a forbidden speech ... It speaks as symptoms of an "it can't speak to or about 
itself' ... And the drama of hysteria is that it is inserted schizotically between that 
gestural system, that desire paralyzed and enclosed within its body, and a language 
,that it has learned in the family, in school, in society .... Hysteria is silent and at the 
same time it mimes. And - how could it be otherwise - miminglreproducing a 
language that is not its own, masculine language, it caricatures and deforms that 
language: it "lies," it "deceives," as women have always been reputed to do (Irigaray 
1985a, 136-7). 
The theatrical qualities of female autobiographical writing may be seen as "hystericar' in that 
they are the result of the necessary split between female experience and the male speaking or 
writing position which the woman writing about her life must take up. This means she has 
to represent her body at a distance while simultaneously owning its experience. The body 
represented in the text "lies": it appears necessarily subordinate to (masculine) public discourse 
but its alien component makes of it a spectacle that unsettles the text. This process can be 
seen to happen in Kempe's Book where the depiction of her body's activities, at their most 
extreme, is made to seem distanced from the voice that speaks in the text. When Kempe's 
devotions are out of control she refuses to try and explain them later, representing them 
instead through the lens of others' variable reactions. Her Passion enactments stand as the 
opaque sign of God's grace which are the basis of her claim to holiness and the basis of her 
text. Her refusal to elaborate on them is part of her general contention that they symbolise the 
Christie or mystical relationship which exceeds normal discourse. 
Chapter 28 of the Book, for example, records Kempe's experiences while on pilgrimage in 
the Holy Land, which includes the first account of her uncontrollable tears. Kempe tells how, 
while visiting places where Christ suffered, she "wept and sobbed as plenteously as though 
she had seen our Lord with her bodily eyes suffering his Passion at that time" (Kempe 1988, 
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104); such immediacy is a characteristic feature of her material mysticism. Her tears occur 
so often that they make her "very weak in her bodily strength" (Kempe 1988, 104). Kempe 
tells how, because of the surprised reaction of others to her cryings, she would try and hold 
back her tears whenever she felt she was about to cry, so as not to annoy people. This 
statement is followed, as in the sermon episode in Chapter 61, by a list of others' speculations 
about the probable causes of the tears: 
For some said it was a wicked spirit tormented her; some said it was an illness; 
some said she had drunk too much wine; some cursed her; some wished she was in 
the harbour; some wished she was on the sea in a bottomless boat; and so each man 
as he thought (Kempe 1988, 105. Emphasis added). 
While "each man" offers his view of the cause of Kempe's crying in a catalogue which may 
be likened to diagnoses by doctors and analysts of women's hysterical symptoms, Kempe 
herself does not reiterate the origin of her tears at this point. She abstains from revealing her 
inner feelings and declares only that these men "knew very little what she felt" (Kempe 1988, 
105). Kempe replaces her own absent verbal interpretation of her tears in the text with a 
further, graphic account of the bodily speech by which she mimics Christ, their source, and 
physically re-members his Passion. In this way she mimics not only Christ's suffering at 
Calvary but also his silence in the face of his tormentors (Matthew 27: 11-14), although she 
does so, paradoxically, through her own vociferous response. The Book continues the account 
of the mystic's behaviour thus: 
And therefore, when she knew that she was going to cry, she held it in as long as 
she could, and did all that she could to withstand it or else to suppress it, until she 
turned the colour of lead, and all the time it would be seething more and more in 
her mind until such time as it burst out. And when the body might no longer endure 
the spiritual effort, but was overcome with the unspeakable love that worked so 
fervently in her soul, then she fell down and cried astonishingly loud. And the more 
that she laboured to keep it in or to suppress it, so much the more would she cry, 
and the louder (Kempe 1988, 105). 
Kempe's tears, like hysterical symptoms, resist repression and break out in tortured bodily 
movements which speak a language indecipherable to most of her observers. The above 
description of the mystic's devotional "attacks" further confounds the prior explanations 
offered by onlookers and it is Christ himself, re-presented through Kempe's behaviour, who 
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must ultimately stand as the authenticator of her behaviour in the absence of any other 
defence. 
In this scene Kempe's body performs a capricious function not unlike female hysteria, for as 
Cixous and Clement remark, historically "one must go through the audience of writers, 
psychiatrists, judges to reconstitute the mythical stage on which women played their 
ambiguous role" (Cixous and Clement 1986, 5). Female hysteria, like female mysticism, 
achieves public expression only through the mediation of masculine authorities. However, as 
Cixous and Clement go on to state, the hysteric has the last word on this "mythical stage": 
"the last figure, the hysteric, resumes and assumes the memories of others" (Cixous and 
Clement <1986, 5), she dramatises that which her male audience has forgotten or repressed. 
Kempe's body enacts a "replaying" of the Crucifixion which alSo dramatises the repression 
of female physicality in her culture and its disturbing results (Cixous and Clement 1986, 5-6). 
Kempe depicts her Passion imitatio at the point in her narrative described above as a 
performance which is easily misread. In her text, as in the discourses of the medieval Church 
more generally, the significance of her physical behaviour is mediated by others, mainly by 
men. Kempe's non-committal portrayal of the import of her actions in this scene is similar 
to the plasticity of hysterical speech, the way in which hysterics are notoriously unreliable in 
the tales they tell their analysts with regard to their symptoms (Evans 1991, 158), and yet 
their symptoms themselves remain open to a variety of readings. The passage, with its account 
of the thoughts of "each man" observing Kempe's behaviour, along with the description of 
the imitatio itself, parodies the way in which the meanings of medieval women's physicality 
were thoroughly defined and transmitted by male voices. Like the female hysteric, Kempe 
makes her body bear the final authority of her text, yet it is impossible to fix that body in a 
definitive reading. It stands in for the suffering of Christ: Kempe's onlookers and the readers 
of her Book must respond to her body as an emblem of spiritual or mystical desire, as 
signifying a relationship which exceeds the text and which is available only to those who 
would follow the mystic's way. 
The passage also dramatises, however, in its "hysterical" or excessively mimetic aspect, the 
cultural construction of "the feminine" in patriarchy as a speaking position without specificity, 
'r,' 
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without boundaries, both through Kempe's "seething" and "burst[ing]" cries and the variety 
of explanations conjured up by her watchers. As I explained in Chapter Two, the boundaryless 
feminine has a specific cultural representation in the late middle ages as the pervious flesh, 
held to be the cause and sign of all that was threatening to the medieval notion of self. 
Kempe's portrayal of her physical acts of devotion as out of her power re-presents this fleshly 
surplus as proceeding from within her soul, the heart of her encounter with Christ. Kempe's 
particular brand of (positive, affective) mysticism is marked by the union of inward and 
outward forms of devotion: she takes a path towards mystical awareness which proceeds 
inwardly through physical forms of remembrance. The meeting of the outward form and the 
inner experience of her piety is rapturously inscribed upon her body, specifically through the 
boundaries of that body breaking down and its manifesting the Christic encounter in the form 
of "seething" and "burst[ing]." The physical excess generated by Kempe's devotion signifies 
the rupturing of the symbolic female body in the form of cries which "burst out" when "the 
body might no longer endure the spiritual effort." It produces a redrawing of the boundaries 
of "the feminine" in medieval culture: the mystic's body, through Christ, becomes the site of 
a cryptic redefinition and endless deferral of what female physicality means. 
By means of her imitation of the absent Christ, from whom she draws her authority and 
power, Kempe, like the hysteric, may be seen as struggling to manifest an/other body or 
bodies, unsymbolisable in patriarchal culture and propelled by her inadmissible feminine 
desire. While Kempe's prior sexual experiences diminish her capacity for mystical union in 
the dominant terms of her culture, the overwrought inscription of Christ's suffering in her 
body and the mystified reactions it produces suggest that her connection with Christ articulates 
a struggle to manifest another body, that is, a body not solely defined as dangerous feminine 
excess but instead as a source of spiritual power. However the essence of this drama must be 
performed offstage in regard to the mystic'S transcribed life, since female desire cannot appear 
as such in the clerically endorsed text. 
Yet Kempe makes this" offstage performance" a source of authorial empowerment. While the 
relationship between the female mystic's body and that of Christ cannot signify on its own 
terms in the Book, Kempe's representation of her Passion imitatio through the medium of 
others' responses has the effect of making the mystical relationship's excess appear in a 
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positive rather than a negative light. This occurs through the Book's suggestion that the source 
of Kempe's empowerment as a mystic is a relationship which by its nature resists 
encapsulation in words and so must be uniquely embodied by other believers in order to fully 
convey its effects to them. Thus Kempe defers the interpretation of her imitatio onto 
onlookers and, by implication, the readers of her Book, whose responses, as she states in the 
proem, are the final measure of the truth of her narrative: "what grace that [our Saviour] 
works in any creature is our profit, if lack of charity be not our hindrance" (Kempe 1988, 33). 
In this way the depiction of her mystical experience escapes recuperation within the text; its 
excess is attributed to the ongoing work of the Holy Spirit in the lives of believers, according 
to which it may attain a wider range of meanings than those restrictively prescribed by the 
Church and its clerics with regard to the bodily activities of women. 
According to feminist psychoanalytic readings of hysteria, the bodily theatre of hysterical 
performance also evokes an offstage, or outlawed, scene. The female hysteric's resistance to 
a process in which her body must signify lack in the symbolic occurs by means of her body, 
which is thus symbolically constrained and actively rebellious. The hysteric's "other body, her 
strange hysterogenic body,t' which manifests itself in motor symptoms, "constructs itself as 
a body of jouissance that prosthetically proclaims its will to pleasure and its lack of a physical 
body on which to experience that pleasure" (Lukacher 1989, xiv). It attempts to express the 
possibilities that are denied it in the symbolic order; it is a place of simultaneous lack and 
excess. Its excess dramatises the lack which the female body must bear in patriarchy and 
connotes the range of experiences which must remain unrepresented. As lrigaray puts it: "In 
hysteria there is .. .the possibility of another mode of 'production,' notably gestural and lingual; 
but this is maintained in latency. Perhaps as a cultural reserve yet to come ... ?" (Irigaray 
1985a, 138). 
Irigaray suggests that the meanings of female hysteria are contained within the language of 
its symptoms but that these must be read with attention to the possibility of "another mode 
of 'production,'" the speech of disallowed female desire (Irigaray 1985a, 138). lrigaray's 
statements on female hysteria thus also implicitly defer to the responses of her readers, as 
Kempe's interpretations of her mystical behaviours do. The effect of this deferral on Kempe's 
part, as I have said, is to mystify the terms on which lithe feminine" is normally understood 
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in late medieval culture; the mystic's devotions challenge the medieval concept of fleshly 
excess with another kind of excess that resists clerical appropriation within her-text through 
its alignment with the mysterious workings of divine grace. In this sense it is like hysterical 
behaviour which is also mystifying to observers and through which the hysteric "keeps her 
inner desires for herself' (Cixous and Clement 1986, 36), preserving the secret source of her 
pain as a kind of strategic symbolic excess and striving to make it reappear elsewhere, 
signifiable in non-phallic terms. Kempe ends the chapter in which this exhibition of her 
mystical "hysteria" has been depicted with a reproach to all who indulge in ordinary, human 
tears instead of weeping for the sorrows of Christ. She retains both her privileged status as 
visionary and her refusal to elaborate on the feelings which gave rise to the tears by defending 
herself as 'one to whom Christ has "entrusted ... secrets" and "endued with love" (Kempe 1988, 
107). 
Karma Lochrie also describes Kempe's Jerusalem visions in terms of the mystic's embodying 
of divine secrets, which she claims are the basis of Kempe's challenge to clerical authority: 
It is in these demonstrations - these spectacles of unspeakable love - that Kempe 
asserts and lays claim to what she calls "Pe secret thyngys of reuelacyonys" [the 
secret things of revelations] and God's "preuyteys" (secrets). In Christ's crucified 
body is inscribed the secret which Kempe reads and reinscribes in her own bodily 
revelations. She also becomes the secretary of Christ's body, a guardian of its 
secrets. The unspeakable love itself authorizes Kempe's access to divine secrets and 
separates her access from that of the Church and its clerics (Lochrie 1991a, 194). 
The "divine secrets" to which Kempe's imitatio testifies are the basis of mystical knowledge 
which escapes clerical rule. But the secret of and in Christ's crucified body, reinscribed in 
Kempe's own account of her suffering, remains "unspeakable." Just as hysterical expression 
stands in for an articulation of female desire, an embodying of active female subjectivity 
which cannot signify in the phallocentric symbolic, so the secret source of Kempe's own 
Passion is continually elusive and yet tantalisingly present beneath the surface of her text: "As 
God's secretary, Kempe's body preserves the text of his suffering without disclosing the secret 
knowledge that comes with the suffering" (Lochrie 1991a, 194).10 Her text contains an excess 
which is continually and strategically made to resist explanation and gestures towards the 
possibility of an empowered mode of female speech, suggesting that female desire can be 
sanctified through mystical experience and rearticulated in the mystical text. 
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In I1La Mysterique," Irigaray dramatically figures the texts of medieval mystical women as a 
place of visionary transformation of the meaning of female physicality (Irigaray 1985b, 191-
202). She claims that such works are called I1mystic" "within a still theological onto-logical 
perspective" (Irigaray 1985b, 191) as a reflection of masculinist discourse's resistance to their 
insights concerning women. She thus takes "woman" as the unconscious of "western" culture 
and rewrites her through the figure of the mystic as hysteric; she asserts that female mysticism 
cryptically signifies the source of masculine subj ectivity (transcendence) in the feminine. The 
"mysteria" articulated by Irigaray enacts a "return of the repressed," a subversive complement 
to masculine appropriation of the divine. 
In describing female mysticism as "that other scene, offstage, that [this perspective] finds 
cryptic" (Irigaray 1985b, 191), Irigaray figures the female mystical experience as a theatrical 
endeavour; however she does so by herself hystericising - mimicking theatrically - the tropes 
offemale mysticism. Irigaray self-consciously sets out to do herself what she claims medieval 
female mysticism does covertly; that is, to make evident in a deliberately opaque fashion 
(which cannot thus be easily recuperated) the way in which masculinist discourse makes itself 
godlike by reference to a male God, thereby suppressing the feminine. Her own representation 
of "the female mystic" is a figurative, deliberately mystifying gesture which aims to tum the 
tables on the phallic system with its basis in a male-magnified God (its "still theological onto-
logical perspective"). "La Mysterique'''s imagery of fire and ice, "unbearable sweetness and 
bitterness ... dizzy horror before the boundless void" (Irigaray 1985b, 194), represents a 
deliberate assumption of "the feminine role" on lrigaray's part as set forth in This Sex Which 
Is Not One (Irigaray 1985a, 150-2). I think: it is important to insist on the self-conscious 
playfulness ofIrigaray's "mystical" rhetoric here, at the heart of Speculum, her self-described 
"fling with the philosophers" (Irigaray 1985a, 150; Chapter Four, 232), especially given her 
views on the potential value of hysterical mimesis as a reading and writing (and eventually 
a signifying) strategy. 
Whereas Beckwith claims that Irigaray forms in this piece a "(mystificatory) association 
[between mystical selflessness and "woman'''s lack of self] which again places 'woman' 
beyond the palel! (Beckwith 1986, 41), and quotes Tori! Moi's view that she must produce 
an image of woman which "is exactly the same as the specular constructions of femininity in 
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patriarchal logic" (Moi 1985a, 138, qtd. in Beckwith 1986, 41), I suggest that Irigaray's 
intention is indeed to "thwart subordination" (Irigaray 1985a, 76) by deliberately mystifying 
her deconstructive philosophical message at its heart. What does it mean for a twentieth-
century feminist psychoanalyst and philosopher to speak in the terms of a medieval mystic? 
What does Irigaray thereby hope to achieve? And does this hysterical (mimetic) strategy 
work? I will go on to address some of these issues in the chapter's following section. 
Irigaray argues in "La Mysterique" that it is the irreducibility of "the feminine" as mystical 
excess which causes the male scribes and confessors of female visionaries to pursue them. The 
medieval female mystic's performance thus becomes the model for Irigaray's own hysterical 
re-staging of the mystic's deeds. For Irigaray, female mysticism is "the only place in the 
history of the West in which \voman speaks and acts so publicly" (Irigaray 1985b, 191), and: 
What is more, it is forlby woman that man dares to enter the place, to descend into 
it, condescend to it, even if he gets burned in the attempt. It is in order to speak 
woman, write to women, act as preacher and confessor to women, that man usually 
has gone to such excesses. That he has accepted the need to take the detour through 
metaphors that can scarcely be called figures. That he has given up his knowledge 
in order to attend to woman's madnesses (Irigaray 1985b, 191-2). 
Irigaray's writings themselves self-consciously articulate this female "madness." They 
intentionally disturb the linear arrangements of conventional grammar and resist singular 
interpretation, as mystical texts do also. Her work theatricalises - mimes so as to thwart 
(Irigaray 1985a, 76) - the masculine construction of the feminine as mystery, as that which 
cannot know itself and is a mere agent of transmission of divine (for Irigaray traditionally 
male-centred) knowledge. 
Whereas Irigaray appropriates the terms of medieval female mysticism for her own 
deliberately hysterical ends in Speculum, Kempe may be described as "hysterical" -
exaggerated, self-reflexive - as a means of having her devotions accepted by her scribe as 
legitimately mystical, which is her chief intention. To this end she must defer or displace the 
conventional medieval understanding of her bodiliness as excessive and dangerous within her 
narrative Gust as she defers a reading of her actions onto the conscience of her readers); hence 
her hysterical, evasive authorial moves, in which her suspect female body as body continues 
173 
to recede from view. Because the "truthll of Kempe's narrative is portrayed as depending on 
the right response to her actions, there is a licence within her text for her devotional activities 
to be presented cryptically. Depending on our willingness to receive divine grace, to read the 
Christic body in the mystic's acts, we can make of her performance what we will. 
This same evasive quality is present in Irigaray but as a self-conscious strategy of 
"repeating/interpreting the way in which, within discourse, the feminine finds itself defined 
as lack, deficiency, or as imitation and negative image of the subject" (Irigaray 1985a, 78), 
in order to displace the terms of this non-representation. This de constructive work on language 
is described by lrigaray as attention to "the specular make-up of discourse't (Irigaray 1985a, 
80), in which intelligibility is the property of the masculine by virtue of its self-reflection in 
the feminine-as-body. In the remaining pages of this chapter I will explore the subversive 
fimction of reflection or "mirroring" in The Book of Margery Kempe and in the "Plato's 
Hysterd' and "Mysterique" sections of lrigaray's Speculum of the Other Woman. While 
Kempe's imitatio explicitly mirrors Christ's Passion, Irigaray subversively mirrors the 
workings of male stream philosophical discourse, and both writers make conscious use of the 
mirror metaphor. In both texts the act of mirroring the divine is figured as actively and self-
consciously (hysterically) performed by a female body in a process which shifts the 
conventional basis of authoritative speech in phallic discourse and revises the status and 
reflective function of "the feminine. II 
3. 2 11 A mirror among men": Authority and re-vision in lrigaray and Kempe 
In the pages of the prologue to her Book Kempe introduces the theme - fundamental to her 
"treatise" - of Christ as her role model and the harbinger of dramatic change in her life. This 
motif is bound up, in the Book's early pages as throughout those to follow, with the theme 
of suffering shame and slander in this world (Kempe 1988,33-5), a fundamental aspect of her 
imitatio. Kempe's Book exemplifies her culture's trend towards physically imitative piety as 
at all moments of heightened realisation of the divine presence she records a concrete 
manifestation of the experience: from the more mundane accounts of journeying and speaking 
with others about God to the extremes of uncontrollable roarings, which arise from visions 
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of Christ that are as clear to her as if she had seen them with her "bodily eye" (Kempe 1988, 
104, 179, 207, 225). As the author of Kempe's new life as a visionary and pilgrim, then, 
Christ is naturally the central figure in her narrative. Kempe's own status as "author" depends 
upon her successful mirroring of him. 
In Chapter 78 of the Book, Kempe describes a vision of Christ she had often on Palm Sunday, 
which caused her to weep and cry aloud (Kempe 1988, 225). She then recounts how Christ 
would prophesy events to her and assure her that those who refused to acknowledge the 
workings of divine grace in her life while living would be forced to do so after their deaths. 
Kempe and Christ are here depicted as aligned in their desire that all people should be saved, 
and Kempe's devotions are further sanctioned by Christ's remark that the most common point 
of failure among believers is their refusal to actively embody the divine love they profess: 
"But you may well observe that they do not want themselves to be saved, for they 
will all sometimes hear the word of God, but they will not always act according to 
. it, and they will not sorrow for their sins themselves, nor will they allow others to 
suffer for them" (Kempe 1988, 226). 
This speech is followed with a statement of specific endorsement of Kempe and one which 
is central to her mission and recorded life. Christ declares: '''Nevertheless, daughter, I have 
ordained you to be a mirror amongst them, to have great sorrow, so that they should take 
example from you to have some little sorrow in their hearts for their sins, so that they might 
through that be saved'" (Kempe 1988, 226). 
In the entire passage several aspects of Kempe's mystical vocation conjoin to be approved by 
Christ's authorisation of her as a "mirror among men" (the Book's original word for "people"). 
The mystic's prophetic abilities, her spiritual influence on the state of others' souls, and 
especially her weeping and praying over the sorrows of Christ are all sanctioned through the 
image of her life as a mirror. The most explicit connection made is that between sorrow and 
the mirror, which is brought home by Christ's final words: '''your tears and your prayers are 
very sweet and acceptable to me'" (Kempe 1988,226). Kempe's vocation as a mirror among 
men thus has a dual role: her sorrows over the suffering of Christ serve mimetically to recall 
to others the pain their Saviour endured on their behalf, while at the same time they are a 
lament at the sins which separate the believer from Christ. They serve as a devotional emblem 
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through which sinners can discern both their need for redemption and the act of this 
redemption which the Passion of Christ has achieved for them. The mystic as mirror, then, 
is depicted in the terms in which the image was used throughout medieval literary, theological 
and scientific writings, as a double-sided symbol "both positive and negative ... showing us 
what we should be and what we are" (Torti 1991, 1. See also Beckwith 1986, 41-2; Regnier-
Bohler 1988, 391-2). 
As Anna Torti observes, the extensive use of the mirror metaphor in medieval literature rests 
on a notion of authority which figures religious books themselves as "mirror[s] to justify the 
rewriting of the Scriptures" (Torti 1991, 12), the mirror par excellence in which sinful human 
beings might see their lamentable state imaged along with the means of their salvation: 
The Scriptures are therefore a corrective mirror: they show man [sic] what he should 
be - pure in heart - but also what he in fact is - a sinner capable of reforming 
himself. Just as the Bible, the Book, is the compendium of God's teachings for man, 
so in the Middle Ages books acted as corrective mirrors for man's moral 
improvement.. .. Medieval authors, even though they do not give their works the title 
of Speculum, feel themselves part of the universal divine design, in which their 
books are written for their didactic function (Torti 1991, 12-13). 
Christ's institution of Kempe as a "mirror," serving chiefly as an endorsement of her sorrows 
over his Passion, authorises her to express outwardly the devotion she feels within. But in the 
process of this devotional lamentation, as we have seen, the mystic's sorrow evokes a "secret" 
(the heart of her encounter with Christ) knowable only in personal terms by those seeking 
grace, and is represented in bodily signs which mystify her observers. Kempe's body is thus 
an opaque mirror; its activities resist sublimation and interpretation in her text. I will examine 
in the next chapter the terms on which mystics as mirrors of the divine have been classified 
and judged (and Kempe's "opaqueness," her ubiquitous physicality, found offensive by 
traditional scholarship), but in the following pages on Kempe I want to explore some of the 
immediate textual effects and consequences of Kempe's intensely physical, "hysterical" 
mirroring of Christ. 
A number of Kempe's mirronng, weepmg VISIOns involve the Virgin, the exemplar of 
sorrowful identification with Christ. Kempe's acts of physical mirroring through emulating 
and making public the Virgin's sorrow may be seen, in an Irigarayan reading, to express 
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female physicality in a subversive fashion, since, in Irigaray's terms, "woman" as the 
reflection of man in patriarchal culture depends upon the symbolic invisibility of the 
maternal/material substance of the mirror (Irigaray 1985a, 77), which invisibility the Virgin 
traditionally represents (Irigaray 1993b, 68). Kempe's vociferous and physical imitation of the 
Virgin excessively dramatises Mary's role in Church doctrine as the inarticulate contributor 
of Christ's physicality. In the chapter which follows Kempe's account of her first loud 
weepings in Jerusalem, she has a mystical encounter with the Virgin. It takes place when she 
and her companions, still in Jemsalem, visit the grave where Christ was buried. On entering 
tlthat holy place," Kempe falls down "as if she would have died for sorrow" (Kempe 1988, 
107). She weeps inconsolably, imagining Christ in his tomb, and this sight is followed by a 
vision of "our Lady in her soul," in which Mary also weeps and mourns. Kempe identifies so 
strongly with Mary's grief at this point that she claims later that "then was our Lady's sorrow 
her sorrow" (Kempe 1988, 107). 
In Irigaray's analysis of Christian myth in particular, as described in Chapter Two (120), 
Christ appropriates the physicality of Mary which remains unrepresented in official doctrine 
(Irigaray 1991 d, 165-90). In Irigaray's view, the walls of Christ's tomb symbolise the womb 
of Mary (Irigaray 1991 d, 166-7); thus Mary enacts the quintessential feminine (and maternal) 
function: she forms the passive body matter which mirrors Christ to mankind (I use the term 
advisedly) while disappearing from the scene of representation herself. Mary is the mirror 
which cannot be seen because Christ's bodiliness overwhelms and erases her own in formal 
and popular representation, and after Christ's birth, in the Church's official stories, she more 
or less disappears from view. 
Kempe's sorrowing for/with the Virgin in Jerusalem dramatically reinscribes Mary's birth-
giving experience into the scene of Christ's death. The mystic's o\Vll "contaminated" status 
as a wife and mother represents the Virgin's sorrow in an insistently corporeal manner; 
Kempe's maternally-inflected sorrow (echoing the postpartum madness described in the early 
pages of her Book) gives graphic expression to lrigaray's claim. A page or two later, Kempe 
records Mary's affirmation of the mystic's public sorrowing for Christ. The Virgin presents 
herself as a model for Kempe of one who was not Ilashamed ... to cry and to weep" for Christ's 
suffering (Kempe 1988, 109). Kempe claims the Virgin's status as a self-acknowledged mirror 
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of Christ's suffering as a model for her own somatic mirroring behaviour. 
Elsewhere in her Book Kempe has further visionary encounters with the Virgin. In Chapter 
82 she recounts an experience she had on Purification Day, which celebrates Mary's ritual 
purification after having borne the child Jesus. Kempe has a striking vision in which "her 
mind was ravished into beholding our Lady offering her blessed son ... to the priest Simeon in 
the Temple,1I after which lIour Lady was purified" (Kempe 1988,239). Kempe claims that she 
envisaged the scene "as if she had been there in her bodily presence to offer with our Lady 
herself' (Kempe 1988, 239). In response to seeing the Christ child offered up to Simeon, 
Kempe describes how she was physically overcome so that she could hardly carry her candle 
, 
to the priest: 
but went reeling about on all sides as if she were a drunk woman, weeping and 
sobbing so intensely that she could hardly stand on her feet, for the fervour of love 
and devotion that God put into her soul through high contemplation. And sometimes 
she could not stand, but fell down amongst people and cried very loudly, so that 
many men wondered at her, and marvelled at what was the matter with her, for the 
fervour of the spirit was so great that the body failed, and could not endure it 
(Kempe 1988, 239. Emphasis added). 
The passage depicts an experience not unlike Kempe's first spiritual-corporeal attacks in 
Jerusalem. Again her inner feeling traverses the boundaries of her physical body, manifesting 
itself in movements and cries which make of her body a spectacle that defies comprehension. 
Her excessive actions cause "many men" to "wonder at her" and speculate as to the likely 
causes of her "madness" but no definitive explanations are provided. 
Kempe follows this description of wild weeping with the claim that she often had such "holy 
thoughts ll when she witnessed actual women being purified after childbirth (Kempe 1988, 
239), a medieval practice which Kempe herself would have undergone many times. She also 
describes seeing the Virgin among these women: "She thought in her soul that she saw our 
Lady being purified, and had high contemplation in beholding the women who came to make 
offerings together with the women that were being purified" (Kempe 1988, 239). Here, 
through recollection, Kempe stages a miniature drama within her text in which she, instead 
of "many men," is the observer who comments on the predominantly female action she 
witnesses. The Virgin appears in her vision amongst a group of ordinary women who have 
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forfeited the virginal purity that Mary herself is miraculously said to retain. They are women, 
in fact, like Kempe herself, and there is no distinction made in the vision between the status 
of those who make offerings to the Blessed Virgin and those who are purified themselves. 
The effect of this representation of Mary in Kempe's text is to make her an ambiguous figure. 
She is seen as the object of ordinary women's offerings but she also appears among the other 
women; she is both Virgin and mother. In Kempe's construction the Virgin is (re)carnalised 
through her identification with birth-giving women; Kempe (re)inscribes female maternal 
experience into the Church's official stories about Mary, of which the feast of Purification is 
a ritual outcome. But this re-presentation of the figure of Mary does not take place only on 
the level of the written text, however: Kempe states that her own extreme bodily responses 
such as the ones described above were regularly set offby such visions. When Kempe enacts 
her devotion to Mary in this way she corporealises the Virgin's act of birth: a mirroring 
representation occurs in both the text of the mystic'sbody and her written text. 
In recording in her visionary text the alliance of female worshippers, the worshipped and 
those undergoing the rite of purification, Kempe indirectly validates her own childbirth 
experiences. Her violent bodily response to the vision - endorsed elsewhere in her Book as an 
expression of her sorrow for Christ through an imitation of the sorrowing of Mary (Kempe 
1988, 109) - "hystericises" the Virgin through her imitative bodily acts. That is, it is a 
mimetic performance which displaces the culturally accepted view of Mary as virginal through 
the excessiveness of its physical response. So Kempe's mirroring behaviour challenges the 
conventional representation of medieval women/mothers but it does so through a challenge 
to the patriarchal version of Mary, her model of imitation. On one level this is similar to the 
way in which female hysterics rewrite cultural fictions of femininity by exceeding the terms 
of the model. Kempe's narrative account of her visions of "ordinary women" and her 
accompanying violent behaviour is also "hysterical" in its split point-of-view, which enables 
her to be both actor and observer in the scene, to orchestrate the action in effect so that her 
own enigmatic performance is not fixed in a singular meaning. 
As explained in Chapter Two (122-3), Christianity's "unrepresented residue" of maternity can 
be connected to abjection, the response of the human subject to the realisation of the physical 
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limits of the self (Gross 199Gb, 87-8), itself a recognition of its maternal/material origin. 
Abjection, in Julia Kristeva's elaboration of the concept, is expressed through religious taboo, 
which serves a purifying symbolic function whereby that which is experienced as threatening 
within and to the boundaries of the self is given a form of symbolisation (Kristeva 1982, 17), 
The medieval practice of "churching" or purifying women after childbirth, a state in which 
they were considered to be radically unclean (Erickson 1976, 196; Barstow 1986, 18), is an 
obvious example of the expression of the abject, but Kempe's version of the ritual revises the 
orthodox view. Mary's virginal status as the model for all women indicates how the Church 
represses maternity and places a taboo on the physical experience of motherhood. However 
Kempe's imaging Mary as an ordinary woman, combined with her own mimetic performance 
of Christ' s and the Virgin's sorrow (the imitative rationale that authorises the Book), reinstates 
maternity within her own clerically ratified text, and by extension within Christian narrative. 
As Lochrie states: "While medieval theology and canon law attempt to ward off abjection by 
placing boundaries on the feminine and by restrictions against impurity, the female mystic 
lodges her speech and her revelations squarely within the taboo. And hence, within abjection 
itself' (Lochrie 1991b, 133), as Kempe may be seen to do in the above scene. 
In performing her grief-stricken imitatio while envisaging Mary in this way, Kempe 
challenges the Church's official masculinised, "God's eye" view. In Irigaray's terms, 
phallocentric culture depends upon an alliance between male subjects and a God in their 
image, a bond itself built upon and enabling the disavowal of materiality (figured by "the 
feminine" and maternal) which guarantees transcendence. Kempe's "hysterical" act of devotion 
which both envisions and embodies Mary's maternity refuses the "view from above" which 
would make the Virgin the passive ground of male self-reflection. Like the hysteric, Kempe 
stages a drama of corporeal suffering which is played out on her body, and thereby articulates 
a disturbingly mobile difference from her culturally recognised model of imitation, re-
presenting the Virgin as an active and excessive female figure. 
While Kempe was surrounded by dramatic directives to imitate Christ and the Virgin, 
medieval drama may have presented the most compelling versions of imitatio Christi to her 
eye. II Medieval cycle drama - so-called because plays were performed in series which 
exemplified the cycles of God's involvement in human history according to the Church - arose 
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from the Church's feast of Corpus Christi. As the name suggests, the feast celebrated the body 
of Christ, not only Christ's specific body in the form of the Eucharist (on Corpus Christi day 
a procession took place in which the Host was carried through towns and cities) but also his 
mystical body on earth, the Church. The performance of scenes, taken mainly from the Old 
and New Testaments, by members of urban communities responsible for putting on the plays, 
then, graphically embodied the notion of Corpus Christi while simultaneously celebrating it. 12 
While it is Christ's body that is, naturally, the central symbol in the plays of the Corpus 
Christi cycles, the Virgin assumed increasing importance in the plays of the fifteenth century 
as the body which represents and makes possible the fleshliness of Christ in Christian 
doctrine.13 The plays depicting the bodily Assumption of the Virgin, a feast over which there 
was substantial controversy in the late middle ages,14 express this focus most clearly. As Gail 
McMurray Gibson puts it, these plays 
daringly stage the annihilation of distance between body and spirit, in which the 
carnal mother who is Mary - more approachable and less problematic a figure than 
the Son of God - receives her glorious triumph and coronation in exchange for what 
is, no matter how transcendentally purified, an act of human creation (Gibson 1989, 
168). 
In the N. Town Assumption play in particular, which came from Kempe's own region, "the 
elaborate music and the liturgical pageantry frame a drama that self-consciously recapitulates 
Christian history in the life of Mary" (Gibson 1989, 168). 
Kempe's Purification vision, in which she is both director and performer, is her own dramatic 
version of Mary representing Christ. Just as Mary's physicality intrudes, theatrically replacing 
and representing Christ's to onlookers in the plays of late medieval Corpus Christi cycles, an 
image which sparked and sustained debate among clerics, Kempe's body replaces Mary's and 
thereby Christ's through her vision and its excessive physical response. As she watches in her 
mind the Virgin undergo an orthodox ritual of maternal cleansing, Kempe subverts the 
Church's official stories about motherhood with the unfettered activity of her own maternal 
body, just as in plays Mary's presence comes "daringly" close to excessively humanising and 
feminising the figure of Christ. 
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It is Kempe's presentation of herself as a mirror, and her Book, in tum, as a reflective account 
of God's works in a mere "creature'" s life, which rationalises her doubled authorial stance. 
In telling simultaneously the story of her visions and her unplanned, dramatic responses to 
them, she strikes a pose which both refuses an authorial overview (the "God's eye" masculine, 
transcendent perspective) and resists total encapsulation within the text (the silent immanence 
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of female flesh). This playful, evasive authorial posture testifies to the Book's "double-
voicedness" (Smith 1987, 50) and its theatrical cast. However, despite its "hysterical" 
malleability, Kempe's staging of the subversive drama of her devotions within the larger 
drama of God's intervention in her life enables her to speak from a self-consciously situated 
space w!lich puts back into discursive circulation the irreducible fact of maternal flesh. 
The above analysis of Kempe's dramatic imitatio bears a number of similarities with the 
mimetic textual practices exhibited by Irigaray. However I do not wish to argue simply that 
Kempe's Book "exemplifies" Irigaray's contentions about the status of "the feminine" in 
discourse, but rather, in the chapter's final pages, to read Irigaray as a self-conscious, 
contemporary reviser of some of the tendencies she sees in the medieval mystical text. The 
deliberately mystifying, grammatically disjunctive writing Irigaray produces in Speculum of 
the Other Woman illustrates her view that the only way to challenge phallocentrisPl in culture 
and language is to beat or exceed it at its own game. As argued in the previous section, she 
de constructs the tropes of conventional philosophical discourse while subjecting them to a 
reading in which duplicities abound. In "Plato's Hystera," for example (the book's third part, 
which follows "Speculum"), she playfully transforms the speculum "as mirror and tool for 
probing the secrets of female sexuality" into "a political tool: mimetic submission becomes 
destabilizing mimicry" (Diamond 1993, 369). 
The articulation of an excessive component of maternity by Kempe in a number of the visions 
recounted in her Book is also present in Speculum. Irigaray's transformation of the speculum 
image involves using it to explore and refigure the "secrets" of female sexuality that have 
been covered over by the construction of masculinist Reason as a philosophical system 
privileging an allegedly neutral or disembodied kind of vision. Generally speaking, in 
Speculum Irigaray contends that Reason has been constructed as natural by virtue of its 
appropriation of the substance of the female-maternal. Reason is thus a mirror in which the 
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male subject sees himself reflected as singular and stable in all forms of knowledge but this 
Reason is built upon a disavowed material (maternal) base. It is the nature of a mirror to 
reflect back to the viewer an image which bounces off its unseen backing: "A thing whose 
very nature is to be lodged in something else cannot exist where the base is lacking - and it 
is the character of a reflection to appear in something not itself' (Irigaray 1985b, 175): 
Every utterance, every statement, will thus be developed and affirmed by covering 
over the fact that being's un severable relation to mother-matter has been buried .... 
And a philosophical discourse that 'will (claim to) take matter as such into 
consideration deserves to be attended to with special care. Somewhere it forgets or 
denies that its subject has already been disguised and travestied by a certain 
speculation. And the less we see and recognize the additional part played in the 
physis by the mirror, the more powerful and insidious is the fiction at work (Irigaray 
1985b, 162). 
Irigaray's rereading of Plato's "myth of the cavern" in Speculum both challenges this system 
of thought and performs a deliberately mystifying kind of mimicry or hysterical response to 
it at the same time. The traditional Platonic notion of the womb-cave of human illusion is, 
she argues, paradigmatic of '\vestern" metaphysics in that it articulates the escape of men from 
the maternal container in a series of events which effectively obliterate the maternal presence. 
Irigaray traces the process in Plato's Hystera according to which the "material support" of 
Ideas/the Truth is made to disappear from view (Whitford 1991a, 108). Eventually, the split 
between "intelligible and sensible" is well accomplished (Irigaray 1985b, 340) as the men 
emerge from the womb-cave into the light of divine Reason. Irigaray focuses on what gets 
left out of the Platonic scenario; she claims that the passage between the sensible (maternal) 
and intelligible (paternal) is erased and forgotten in the projection forward towards Truth. 
More broadly in Irigaray' s reading, this amounts to the unconscious incorporation of maternal 
origin within the male subject who is oriented towards his God (Irigaray 1985b, 294). 
Irigaray's reading, like Plato's, has a theatrical component. In Plato the prisoners in the cave 
see a puppet show in the form of shadows reflected onto the wall of the cave. They proceed 
from the world of illusion upward into the light of Truth (Plato 1985, VII, 209). But Irigaray 
plays up the dramatic aspect hysterically in her deconstruction of the text. In fact, she claims 
that the entire Platonic scenario is just that, a staging of the masculine economy of Truth 
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which is itself an illusion in that it appears to move beyond the physical to a purely objective 
mode of perception. Irigaray insists on the role of the physical/maternal at each stage of the 
Platonic progression towards Truth. As Elin Diamond observes, in this way her de constructive 
restaging of Plato 
gives us a "mimetic system" that completely belies the model-copy, for to the 
prisoners no origin of the image projections is imaginable; or, to put it another way, 
what they experience as origin is always already mimicry, a representation of 
repetition. Hence, mimesis without a true referent - mimesis without truth. With this 
reconfigured "womb-theaterlt Irigaray wittily retrieves and confirms Plato's worst 
fears about theater, female duplicity and, by implication, maternity. Platonic 
philosophy wants to place man's origins, not in the dark, uncertain cave but, instead, 
~ in his recognition of the (Father's) light. The philosopher wants to forget - wants to 
prove illusory - his female origins. But the anarchic effect of that proof, in Irigaray's 
playfully seripus rereading, is the discovery that his mother is a theater (Diamond 
1993, 370). 
Irigaray's theatrical "mirroring" of Plato has multiple unsettling effects which simultaneously 
displace both the notion of specular, phallocentric Truth and that of the mother as 
unsymbolised physical source. Irigaray's mirroring is not only, like Kempe's, highly theatrical, 
it is also completely implicated in the physical fact of maternity/the female body, while it 
simultaneously works - by means of its subversive effects - to displace the notion of that body 
as "mere matter." Irigaray resists the assignation of "woman" to the realm of false copy of 
masculine Truth by her representation of the maternal body as the heart of the illusion which 
constitutes that Truth; that is, the illusion that it is self-constituting. 
Irigaray does not simply point up the unconscious role of the feminine in Plato's text but 
mimes excessively - hysterically - its status in Plato as false representation, an inferior copy 
of Truth. By this means she demonstrates that the Platonic notion of Truth is itself a delusion 
which cannot escape its origins: 
It seems to gave been resolved that the mother's relation to the specular is an issue 
that cannot be raised .... If the "subject" of discourse is the father, he is the resource 
of all specula(riza)tions. The crucial thing is not to know that, one day, the subject 
came into being. That is relied upon a copulative conjunction in order to (begin to) 
be. As a result, you will never see the Father appear, come into life, into existence. 
The father is, always has been, pure speculation. That which escapes the eyes of a 
body. That is, of course, still mortal (Irigaray 1985b, 308).-
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As I have argued, Irigaray's mimetic interventions into traditional philosophical discourse 
have, like Kempe's mystical mimicry, an integral visionary aspect. As Kathryn Bond Stockton 
notes, Irigaray "elaborately mystifies the female body, using blatantly mystical terms to bolster 
it against mystifications that are far more alienating than her own" (Stockton 1992, 136). 
Irigaray's reading of Plato posits that conventionally understood "sensible" and 
"transcendental" elements interact in the production of ideas, although only one side of this 
process currently achieves symbolisation. This is the notion of productive difference elsewhere 
named the sensible transcendental or the divine (Irigaray 1993b, 68-9; 129), which focuses 
on the forgotten, constitutive spaces in "western" discourse. In her reading of Plato in 
Speculum Irigaray reinscribes materiality/maternity into philosophical discourse; the mirror 
formed by the female body is portrayed in her version as active and present, not passive and 
invisible. Like Kempe's reinscription of maternity into Christianity's figuring of the Virgin, 
Irigaray's intervention is woman-centred and its insistent physicality challenges the masculine 
function of God as disembodied Truth. 
Irigaray's mirror is like Kempe's in that it is profoundly embodied but insists on the benefits 
of transcendence. Of course, it is also unlike Kempe's in its intent to recast the masculine 
mode of transcendence (the progression towards divine vision) completely. However both 
Kempe's and Irigaray's texts do call into question the notion of transcendence as divorced 
from the physical since they both highlight physical excess as part of their respective claims 
to authority: Kempe as a mystic in the affective tradition who articulates in physical terms her 
encounters with Christ, Irigaray as a feminist psychoanalyst and philosopher concerned with 
the representation of the female body. The hysterical representation of Plato's cave in 
Speculum reworks masculine transcendence by calling into question objective Truth in order 
that alternative conceptions of vision and "the good" might be articulated, ones which take 
into account the contribution of the feminine. While more direct references to the sensible 
transcendental occur in Irigaray's work after Speculum, the earlier project should be seen, I 
think, as expressing the same general concern with creating a possible space for a female 
contribution to culture and ideas. Irigaray's consistent focus on the "forgotten spaces" which 
make up masculinist discourse and her figuring of them in deliberately excessive, hysterical 
terms is the project which, already put to work in Speculum, she will later represent more 
insistently as "divine." 
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Irigaray's mimeticism, then, seeks to transform the God of Christianity beyond recognition; 
her divine, as articulated in more depth after Speculum (notably in An Ethics of Sexual 
Difference and in the essays in Sexes and Genealogies and Je, tu, nous) is figured as a mirror 
for both sexes which mediates their interaction on the symbolic plane while partaking of the 
physicality of both. As we have seen, it is always embodied, never claiming to be uniquely 
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"transcendental"; but in representing female and male to each other in the symbolic realm, it 
retains a "transcendent" or mediating function (Irigaray 1993b, 86). It is this kind of 
interrelationship of elements traditionally attributed to the feminine and the masculine which 
Irigaray figures as a type of "third term" that would transform the present masculinist 
philosophical paradigm into a model of two-way communication or exchange. In Speculum 
this idea is implicitly suggested through the forcing of phallocentric representation's "blind 
spot" in the maternal body, a blind spot which is concrete if not visible and which remains 
irreducibly present to the masculine subject - and to God - in the form of an internalised but 
undeniable excess: 
Mystery surrounding him on all sides, diagonals or diameters of his circle that 
cannot be calculated, forms-ideas that keep his seeds of truth within their ideal 
closure ... which is not to say that He doesn't retain something - something infinite, 
immeasurable, invisible - of an Other that will not easily be reached in the depthless 
separation of its jouissance. Except, so rarely and so unpredictably, in ex-stasy. Or 
else - they tell us - in an "other" life. An "other" world (Irigaray 1985b, 361). 
While Irigaray's later representation of the divine as an always materialised, but moveable and 
productive site of exchange and interaction between the sexes can be seen as "mystical," her 
most blatant example of deliberately mystifying speech probably occurs in "La Mysterique," 
where she reproduces the medieval female mystic's performance of corporeal/spiritual excess. 
This essay is one often relatively short pieces that occur under the heading "Speculum," itself 
the central section of the Speculum volume. It is thus situated at the heart of Irigaray' s large-
scale deconstruction of "woman" -as-mirror as set up by the masculine imaginary, a mirror that 
she transforms by insisting on both its "sensible" properties and its "transcendental" or 
reflective purpose, for female and male, at one and the same time. 
In "La Mysterique" in particular, the interaction of sensible and transcendental elements in the 
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history and production of "western" philosophical discourse is figured through the relationship 
of the female mystic and her divine lover, Christ. This relationship has obvious 
sensible/transcendental overtones as the mystic is human and, because female, closely 
associated with the corporeal, while Christ is divine in the traditional sense; he is 
"transcendent" as well as having the body of an ordinary man. The mirror also has 
conventional significance in the relationship between the mystic and Christ. As we have seen, 
in "western" mysticism the mirror image serves a dual function of suggesting "both identity 
and difference," a human likeness and unlikeness to the Christie model of imitation (Beckwith 
1986, 42). 
The history of the mirror image in "western" mysticism owes much to the Platonic tradition 
which elsewhere in Speculum Irigaray so cunningly deconstructs. As Sarah Beckwith notes: 
The mirror-image was a crucial one in medieval theological writings. Its enormous 
suggestive power comes partly as a result of the ambivalences it was able to 
represent within a Platonic philosophical framework which viewed the whole created 
world itself as a reflection, a shadow of an ideal form. Christian Platonism 
(combined most influentially in the works of St Augustine) viewed the world as a 
reflection of God's glory .... But it is the human soul itself which must become aware 
of its resemblance to its maker, must make its mirror mind clear and polished, 
transparent and receptive to allow and participate in resemblance to its divine origin 
(Beckwith 1986, 42-3). 
However in "La Mysterique" Irigaray stages an alternative production of the path to mystical 
union or communion as fruitful interaction with the divine. In Irigaray's rereading of the 
discourse of medieval female mysticism, the mystic does not strive to make herself "clear and 
polished" in order to resemble "divine origin"; rather she welcomes God/Christ into her soul 
in an ecstasy of longing which is manifested in wildly physical outpourings and demands. 
Irigaray's hysterical celebration of female mysticism clearly privileges the affective, "positive" 
mysticism of the later middle ages with its physical excesses, the female-dominated piety in 
which Margery Kempe engaged. Just as, in Kempe, "the fire of love" caused by Christ refused 
to remain "within her breast" so that "what was enclosed within would insist on appearing 
outwardly" when she was racked with wild, mimetic tears (Kempe 1988, 225), in Irigaray, the 
mystic's '''soul' escapes outside herself.. .. the walls of her prison are broken, the distinction 
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between inside/outside transgressed" (Irigaray 1985b, 192). Irigaray figures the mystic's 
entering the II darkness, II unknowingness, of mystical encounter as a subversion of conventional 
Reason (a "blind breaching of the philosopher's closed chamber" (Irigaray 1985b, 192», 
articulated in her physically excessive responses to the divine. Irigaray's reading is also 
hysterical in that it mimes the function of "woman" in phallocentrism so as to reserve a space 
for the articulation of the feminine elsewhere ("in hysteria there is ... the possibility of another 
mode of 'production' ... " (Irigaray 1985a, 138». Here that space is figured through the 
mystic's union with the divine, in which both are transformed. 
Irigaray rereads the traditional notion of mysticism - as a journey towards divine likeness -
as a process in which the female mystic gains access to a kind of reconfiguration of "the 
feminine" by means of her pursuit of the God-man, Christ, and their eventual union. The 
female mystic must enter her soul's "dark night," which has itself always been represented as 
feminine: IIShe is cut to the quick within this shimmering underground fabric that she had 
always been herself, though she did not know it" (Irigaray 1985b, 193). The path to God in 
"westernll mysticism has traditionally been figured as feminised, as a way through 
"unconsciousness"; hence the female mystic enters the "essence" imputed to her in 
phallocentrism. In entering her soul's "dark night" she enters the mirror that she herself 
signifies for men, and, encountering "that most female of men, the Son" (Irigaray 1985b, 
199), finds there a lover both similar to and different from herself. The female mystic's 
passage to divine union is thus figured as "mystery, me-hysteria" (Irigaray 1985b, 201), since 
it subversively dramatises through the excessive imitation of a model her own status in the 
phallocentric economy: 
What if matter had always, already, had a part but was yet invisible, beyond the 
senses, moving in ways alien to any fixed reflection .... Thus I have become your 
image in this nothingness that I am, and you gaze upon mine in your absence of 
being .... A living mirror, thus, am I (to) your resemblance as you are mine (Irigaray 
1985b, 197). 
Irigaray's construction of the soul of the female mystic as mirror, "a burning glass ... who in 
her cave joins with the source of light to set everything ablaze that approaches her hearth" 
(Irigaray 1985b, 197), like Kempe's mimetic mirroring, radically implicates the traditional 
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divine in the material, here the "fire" (passion, jouissance, desire) of the female body. But 
whereas Kempe must guard by deferring and mystifying her imitatio's transgressive effect -
the "hysterical" body ever-receding within her text, pursuable only by those who would seek 
God themselves with a charitable heart - Irigaray's mimesis is unashamedly blasphemous. She 
rewrites the female mystic and Christ ("sensible" and "transcendental") by figuring their union 
as an exchange in which each is equally implicated. Thus the mystic passes through her "dark 
night" to a place where "her divine companion never tires of praising her and encouraging her 
(auto)eroticism that has so miraculously been rediscovered" (Irigaray 1985b, 202) in their 
umon. 
The mystic's encounter with the divine is not, however, merely a narcissistic meeting with 
herself but an exchange in which she is able to act as a "subject" because Christ is her 
recognisable "other." The divine can be seen to take on its more radical Irigarayan meaning 
in this piece as third term or agent of mediation (the sensible transcendental) where Christ, 
who has masculine and Godlike characteristics, is at the same time feminised and mirrors the 
mystic back to herself, but differently. He performs the function that "woman" regularly 
performs for man in phallocentric culture, while women currently lack anyone to mirror 
themselves back to themselves as subjects of the symbolic. Women's positions as female in 
the phallocentric symbolic, their status as excess and other to man is hystericised through 
Christ in Irigaray's mercurial reading of the already excessive figure of the medieval female 
mystic. 
In Irigaray's version of mystical process the conventional masculinist stance of authority -
philosophical speculation based on the body of "woman" - is revised. "How strange is the 
economy of this specula(riza)tion of woman, who in her mirror seems ever to refer back to 
a transcendence" (Irigaray 1985b, 201), she writes, positing an insuperable connection between 
the conventional divine - the prime transcendental subject - and the female body. Irigaray 
argues that "woman" is a mirror capable of finding her reflection elsewhere, not in a specular 
logic which presupposes denial and fragmentation of the body but in a process of 
intersubjective exchange with an other in which likeness and unlikeness is for each subject 
a physical and a self-affirming (in this sense transcendent) matter. 
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And yet this kind of exchange is not possible in the phallocentric specular economy as it 
currently exists. Here is where Irigaray's mystic mimicry becomes itself highly mystical and 
visionary. While "'God' will prove to have been [the mystic's] best lover since he separates 
her from herself only by that space of her jouissance where she finds Him/herself," giving 
back to her a sense of "identity" "in the serenity of the spacing that is thus projected by/in her 
pleasure," nonetheless, "at present that pleasure is still hemmed in by representations -
however metaphysical - and by prescriptions - still ethically onto-theological - which 
determined it (and her) and thus limit their extension" (Irigaray 1985b, 201). 
Irigaray's rereading of the figure of Christ in "La Mysterique" points toward the new kind of 
transcendence which elsewhere she figures as a "horizon" that changes constantly as one 
moves towards it (Irigarayy 1993a, 67). It is a "mode of becoming" (Grosz 1989, 180) which 
simultaneously suggests multiple, open-ended means of signifying female bodily experience 
and the siting of those significations within the body itself. It is the nature of a horizon to 
shift, but it shifts only as a human subject physically stands in its place, embodying that 
which was projected forward by the eye; its ever-receding status means that it both escapes 
the eye (the Isubject's physicality) and is part of it, intimately connected with it. Vision in 
Irigaray is then always embodied but always also visionary: vision becomes a matter of 
transformations in the signification of embodiment, the result of allowing the mirror which 
is traditionally formed by the female body to shift in representation, and to imagine further 
shifts as a result. 
Movement, then, is a fundamental aspect ofIrigaray's visionary rethinking of the divine, and 
for Irigaray this movement has a kind of suggestive correlative in the bodily activity of the 
female mystic and hysteric. ls Kempe may be seen to move towards a transmutation of herself 
and the divine through her mysterical engagement with Christ's body and that of his Mother, 
in which she has visions and embodies them simultaneously; for example in the scenes 
depicted in Chapter 28 of her Book or the Purification episode in Chapter 82. \Vhere Kempe 
acts "hysterically" in this way her "other" body, which seeks to constitute itself as other than 
the treacherous flesh through convulsive, mimetic movements, is intimately connected with 
the divine. Consequently, as Jennifer Ash observes: "the crucified body [becomes] the object 
of worship, but it is also the object of desire" (Ash 1990, 82). Kempe's expression of her 
190 
desire for union with this "beloved other" causes her feminine "excess" to become "ecstatic, 
an ex-stasy [or movement], a being beyond herself where she might meet with the Divinefl 
(Ash 1990, 82, 96). This statement recalls lrigaray's description of the residue of 
maternity/femininity ("of an Other") that is retained in God and may be "rarely and 
unpredictably" expressed in "ex-stasy" or else in "an 'other' life," Christianity's eternal beyond 
(Irigaray 1985b, 361). In an Irigarayan reading Kempe's imitatio could be seen as enabling 
her to embody, if only briefly, an/other configuration of selfhood (Hsomething ... 
immeasurable ... of an OtherH) beyond the masculine economy of the same. 
And yet this, too, would be a highly visionary reading. Ultimately, Kempe's "mystical 
hysteria" and Trigaray's "hysterical mysticism" or visionary feminism are presented in terms 
which exploit the female body as excessive in patriarchal discourses to very different 
immediate ends. In hystericising the mysticism of visionaries like Kempe in Speculum, 
Irigaray highlights the most unsettling aspects of female mystical discourse and uses them as 
the starting point for her own destabilising, visionary performance. But although she thus. 
articulates what a medieval mystic like Kempe, plainly, cannot, this is not to deny that 
Kempe's Book also incorporates its own kind of disturbing maternal trace which constitutes 
a resistance to totalising interpretations of both mysticism and her own life. 
The divine Irigaray imagines has in common with Kempe's "mystical hysteria" the qualities 
of fluidity, movement, agency, and re-vision. While the existence of the "other" empowered 
female body to which Kempe strives to give expression is signalled in the destabilising moves 
of her text and will appear in her terms only in the afterlife in which she will achieve union 
with the Christ of her longing, there are strong elements of the "not-yet" in Irigaray too. In 
"La Mysterique" the experience to which the medieval woman mystic looks forward informs 
the developing horizon of Irigaray's utopian vision, and the mysticism of both the feminist 
and the mystic suggests the cryptic "offstage" of the bodily theatre that constitutes hysterical 
performance. 
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1. It is worth remembering that, in Meaghan Morris' words, for Irigaray "the 
importance of discourse is its imbrication in the social," and, to quote Rosi Braidotti 
(as Morris goes on to do): "Irigaray is thus in solidarity with the current of feminist 
thought according to which the oppression of women is simultaneously real, and 
symbolic - that is, that it rests as much on material structures of repression as it does 
on philosophical pre-suppositions" (Braidotti 1981,361-2, qtd. in Morris 1990,46). 
2. According to medieval literary theory as described by A. J. Minnis, the auctor 
(author) of a work is the one who contributes the most material of herlhis own to 
it, while the scriptor (scribe) writes the materials of others and the compilator 
(compiler) may add to the materials of others but nothing of herlhis own (Minnis 
1984, 94). 
3. Mueller writes that, "as author, [Kempe] works deftly to shape and sustain ... blocks 
of narrative which convey the notion that she had no selfhood, no existence worthy 
of naming, before her protracted struggle to clarify and confirm her religious calling 
both to herself and others. Thus she introduces herself in the most minimal terms at 
the opening of her Book by leaving anonymous the two male figures, father and then 
husband, whose dependent she successively was. Her husband is cited only as 'a 
worschepful burgeys' [a worshipful burgess] and her father as 'sum-tyme meyr of 
the town N. andsythyn ... alderman of the hey Gylde of the Trinyte in N. [sometime 
Mayor of the town N. and since ... alderman of the high Guild of the Trinity in N.] 
(Kempe 1940, 6, 9), while she consistently styles herself, here and throughout, as 
'this creatur' - a locution which encapsulates her sense of radical dependency on 
God for her ongoing creation" (Mueller 1986, 159-60). 
4. Monique David-Menard describes the overwhelming quality of hysterical body-
speech thus: "In hysterical symptoms and attacks, the subject uses plastic and 
figurative thought to try to achieve a jouissance in which nothing will have to be 
represented - that is, acknowledged as absent" (David-Menard 1989, 111). The 
symptom marks an attempt to bypass a linguistic system founded on an 
acknowledgement of specific lack. For the hysteric to enter this system as a speaking 
subject, she would have to accept her own castration and allow part of her body to 
signify this lack (Evans 1991, 187). The symptom reflects "her inability to map out 
her body in a defined symbolic system" (David-Menard 1989, cited in Evans 1991, 
213), and the lack of a symbolic system in which her body can be represented as 
other than the lack of phallic attributes. 
5. It is also, clearly, an expression of the retention of guilt which confession would 
have released. There is a parallel here with hysterical behaviour too, since, as Freud 
notes on occasion, guilt plays a part in the construction of the hysterical symptom 
(Freud 1955, 65, 164, 178-9). In the Lacanian formulation of hysteria, the hysteric's 
behaviour is an expression of guilt since she believes herself, counter-logically, to 
be both the cause of castration and "responsible ... for the impossibility of sexual 
relations resulting from her denial of it" at the same time (Evans 1991, 188). 
6. This idea was first suggested to me by Mary Cain, during a discussion of the Book 
as hysterical narrative. 
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7. In reference to the delay between Kempe's spiritual experiences and the transcription 
of her narrative, Wendy Harding notes that, "from [Kempe's] point of view ... the 
refusal of writing implies a reluctance to terminate the exchange between herself and 
Christ. The making of the book implies an end to private communication and to the 
special relationship this entails. It takes Christ's assurance to convince [Kempe] to 
persevere with the book. He insists that writing pleases him as much as tears, since 
it reaches a wider audience" (Kempe 1940, 216, cited in Harding 1993, 178-9). 
8. Kempe's tears are also approved by St Jerome (1988, 136) and the Virgin Mary 
(1988, 109, 201). 
9. Adverse reactions to Kempe's tears in twentieth-century criticism of her Book are 
perhaps better understood in view of the fact that the manuscript was lost for 
centuries prior to its discovery in 1934, although it had been in the possession of the 
Butler-Bowdons, an old Catholic family, for many years. Prior to its discovery parts 
dfKempe's text were already familiar to modern readers because extracts, consisting 
of some of the Book's more devotional material, had been included in a pamphlet 
printed by Wynkyn de Worde in c.1S0l. When these extracts were reprinted twenty 
years later, the printer, Henry Pepwell, described Kempe quite misleadingly as a 
"devout anchoress." Hence there was a context for expectations on the part of 
scholars of mysticism in the 1930s and beyond that the Book would contain work 
of a nature similar to that of a mystic like Julian of Norwich, expectations which 
were disappointed. See Windeatt (1988,9); Lochrie (1991a, 220-6). 
10. Cixous and Clement note that while the hysteric's pains are necessarily made public, 
there is also a sense in which she "keeps her tears for herself and seems to be 
unfeeling and untouched, closed for use .... 'Retention of huge amounts of excitation,' 
Freud says. The hysteric keeps the secretion of jouissance for herself' (Cixous and 
Clement 1986, 36). In the Lacaruan account of hysteria, the source of the hysteric's 
suffering is also a secret to herself, insofar as "her identification with the lack in 
things points to a structure in knowledge that is itself an enigma" (Ragland-Sullivan 
1992, 165). In Lacan's view the hysteric manifests the inability of every speaking 
subject to fulfil the requirements of the symbolic with regard to masculine and 
feminine identifications, and thus the "inadequacy of gender identity" to represent 
the difference between the sexes" (Ragland-Sullivan 1992, 163-4). The hysteric's 
apparent lack of awareness of the subversive import of her behaviour (insofar as she 
is usually entirely taken up with the need to express her symptoms, that is with the 
hysterical behaviour itself) presents a kind of correlative with mystical or intense 
spiritual devotion, which may also have disturbing social impact while the mystic'S 
focus remains inwardly directed. 
11. While Kempe does not mention having seen any performances of plays, there is 
evidence of much dramatic activity in the East Anglian region, and Douglas Gray 
states that in his view it seems "most unlikely that she did not see one" (Gray 1990, 
27). See also Meredith (1987, 9) and Gibson, who claims that surviving manuscript 
evidence qualifies the area as "the most important dramatic center in fifteenth-
century England" (Gibson 1989, 31-2). There was a Corpus Christi guild 
(responsible for performing cycles of plays) at Lynn in the fifteenth century, and 
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references to plays being performed there at this time (Chambers 1903, II, 373, cited 
in Gray 1990, 27n). Stanley J. Kahrl refers to a nativity play being taken from Lynn 
to be performed in Middleton at Christmas 1445, and a Corpus Christi play 
performed in the market square in 1448 (Kahrl 1985, 89). Clarissa Atkinson notes 
that at least twelve [plays] were regularly performed by various guilds in Norwich 
in the late fourteenth century (Atkinson 1983, 95) and more specifically, Jonathan 
Hughes points out that Kempe was in York for the performance of the Corpus 
Christi plays in the summer of 1413 (Hughes 1988, 238). Windeatt, too, observes 
similarities between Kempe's vision of Christ's Crucifixion and scenes from various 
mystery plays (Kempe 1988, 326n). 
12. Mervyn James argues that "the theme of corpus Christi is society seen in terms of 
body; and that the concept of body provided urban societies with a mythology and 
ritual in terms of which the opposites of social wholeness and social differentiation 
< could be both affirmed, and also brought into a creative tension, one with the other" 
(James 1983, 4). See also Beckwith (1993, 33-7); Evans (1994). 
13. Gibson writes for example that "in the N.Town cycle combination, the play called 
corpus Christi is also the play of salvation history heralded by the body of Mary" 
(Gibson 1989, 168). 
14. The tensions generated by Christianity's outlawing of the physical aspect of 
maternity is reflected in these debates, which centre around the Virgin's physical 
body, the basis of Christ's humanity, where it becomes wholly spiritual and is 
assumed into heaven. Gibson claims that the Virgin's Assumption "is the apotheosis 
of the incarnational preoccupations" of late medieval English culture and thus her 
bodily feasts were "the most insistent and most debated element of conflict between 
medieval and Reformation sensibilities" (Gibson 1989, 167-8). She also contends that 
the censorship of plays depicting the Virgin's Assumption which prevailed in 
Reformation England "is to an important degree a history of furious debate over the 
Virgin's bodily feasts" (Gibson 1989, 168). See also Coletti (1993); Evans (1994, 
112). 
15. Beckwith notes that in Kempe's '''theatre of devotion,' God as the Second Person 
forces an imagination of the range of social roles he could play. Kempe ... is Christ, 
but she also exists in a series of fluid, interchangeable relationships which license 
for her an extraordinary mobility and flexibility of identity" (Beckwith 1993, 84). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DIVINE IMAGININGS: BEYOND POSITIVE MYSTICISM 
In the previous chapter I explored themes of mystical encounter and bodily (hysterical) 
performance, particularly in relation to the notion of mysticism and hysteria as giving rise to 
the possibility of an/other kind of female embodiment. This chapter continues the focus on 
dialogue and exchange specifically in relation to a visionary feminism. Like the previous 
chapter, this one has a utopian or visionary cast: it attempts to look beyond the construction 
of mystical discourse by academic and Church authorities to consider more fully the 
implications of a productively utopian philosophy like Irigaray's. While Church discourse 
tends to restrict and outlaw the female body and its conditions for articulation, Irigaray 
focuses her view of the divine on female bodies and the conditions of their authentic speech. 
The chapter begins with traditional, commentative discourse on mysticism and ends with a 
meditation on my own dancing body as a response to Irigaray. The chapter as a whole is an 
attempt to (re)imagine divinity in the simultaneously open-ended, yet physically situated terms 
suggested by Irigaray's writing; "beyond dualities," but reserving an exchange-oriented future 
space for female subjectivity. 
Michel de Certeau's proposition that mystical discourse begins in a linguistic encounter with 
another (de Certeau 1986, 88; Lochrie 1991a, 62) testifies simultaneously to the dialogical 
component of mystical texts and the irreducibility of the mystical subject. In the mystical text 
the mystic herself becomes the unstable locus of the claim to divine authority which exists 
simultaneously inside and outside the bounds of Church orthodoxy. Hence, as I argued 
specifically in the previous chapter, the body is central to the articulation of (women's) 
mystical experience, and the related prohibitions against female speaking of the divine in the 
Christian tradition have required female mystics to maintain the support of male overseers and 
scribes. 
"All women's teaching is to be held suspect.. .. because they are easily seduced and are 
determined seducers, and because it is not proved that they are witnesses to divine grace," 
proclaims Jean Gerson (qtd. in Julian of Norwich 1978, 151, qtd. in Beckwith 1986, 49). In 
me?ieval terms, women's propensity to seduction sexualises their speech by engaging their 
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female bodies in discourse in ways they cannot control or which occur beyond their 
understanding. It was for men to colonise this destructive female fleshliness, in the middle 
ages, by enclosing women's virginal bodies in convents or anchorholds as the condition of 
authentic speech. Medieval lay women mystics, therefore, had to negotiate intensively with 
conventional strictures on female speaking. While their unenclosed vocations allowed them 
abundant opportunities to dialogue with others and share the fruits of their dialogues with 
Christ, they were more inclined to be suspected of heresy or contaminated speech because of 
their intermingling with people in the world. As was shown in the second chapter, Margery 
Kempe was the obj ect of heretical suspicion as a result of her pilgrim's way of life and 
forthright speech. Her living and travelling alone was unusual in her time; since she had once 
been married she was expected to remain under her husband's jurisdiction. When Kempe was 
questioned for heresy, her body was seen as a site of transgression which menaced society and 
so became the object of physical threats from clerics and lay people alike. It is this insistent 
focus on the challenge constituted by Kempe's physical activities, evident in the responses of 
authority figures depicted in her text, which is reproduced in a substantial amount of criticism 
of the Book published in this century. 
The initial aim of this chapter is to interrogate some assumptions about mysticism and female 
bodies which lie behind much of this work, in order to situate Kempe in the tradition of 
affective devotion and flpositive fl mysticism in which her fldalliance fl or dialogues with Christ 
are best understood. Positive mysticism favours the emotions and the senses as means of 
perceiving God and was associated in the late middle ages with visionary women, whose 
devotion to Christ's Passion was frequently enacted through excessive physical behaviours, 
as we have already seen. Kempe clearly belongs in this tradition. Negative mysticism, by 
contrast, understands God as being beyond mortal means of knowledge, and aims at the 
transcendence of earthly symbols and sense perceptions in the approach to the divine. 
Negative mysticism would outlaw the body (and especially the female body) through its 
description of the mystical experience as ultimately mystifying in human terms. As the more 
intellectual (and masculinised) approach to visionary experience, negative mysticism has 
informed the work of scholars of mysticism for most of this century, and it clearly informs 
the response of early criticism to The Book a/Margery Kempe. The chapter's first section (4. 
196 
1) will, then, address this response and its key assumptions concerning mysticism and female 
sexuality. 
The second aim of the chapter is to explore lrigaray's Hmystical" or visionary project of 
rearticulating the Christian divine with women's bodies and their specific representation as 
a central focus. The chapter's second section (4. 2) aims to move beyond the dualities 
described in the first (namely the positive and negative mysti~al traditions in which Kempe 
and her earlier twentieth-century critics are respectively placed) by setting up a series of 
dialogues between lrigaray and other writers with whom she is concerned - or who are 
concerned with her, in my own case - on the subject of the divine and female bodiliness. The 
dialogues, like those Kempe has with Christ, are "seductive" or pseudo-sexual in that they are 
designed 'to provoke an exchange of ideas which might work towards a re-production (or re-
presentation) of female bodies. They are inspired by Irigaray's visions of carnal exchange 
between different subjects who are subjects in their own right, for whom the divine is an 
agent of mediation and contact, of dialogue between irreducible others and selves. 
Both terms, "seduction" and IIdialogue," are intended to convey the sense of mutual 
dependence and interaction which Irigaray articulates through the notion of the sensible 
transcendental. The second half-chapter's sections are clearly not dialogues in a strict sense; 
for one thing, the first three are based on Irigaray's responses to male thinkers and the last 
on mine to Irigaray. I use the term dialogue to paradoxically fix my focus on the teasing out 
of movement between opposites which constitutes the Irigarayan divine or "threshold. If That 
is, I want to suggest movement and extension, to work at articulating Ifspaces between" 
subjects, following the lead of Irigaray's concept of the divine as fruitful mediation, but in 
specific contexts. As well as highlighting difference or the space between subjects, the notion 
of dialogue is intended to connote the way in which each subject always needs an other to 
respond to, an idea which also suggests seduction or fascination. 1 Irigaray needs her male 
philosophers to Ifhave a fling with" (Irigaray 1985a, 150); she is formed by them as much as 
Lacan, Nietzsche and Levinas need to construct "woman" as a silent partner in their search 
for a particular kind of (masculinised) If truth." I need to find ways of responding to Irigaray 
too and, as Whitford states, IIIrigaray needs her readers and interpreters and .. ~this need is 
inherent in her theory" (Whitford 1991 a,S); she writes to initiate productive exchanges among 
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women. The phrase "carnal exchange(s)" conveys a similar meaning, and it implies that bodies 
as cultural artefacts are constructed and read in the social domain where negotiations between 
subjects take place. Carnal exchange is also Irigaray's ultimate figure for the divine leading 
to an age of sexual difference in which women's contribution to culture will achieve equal 
recognition with men's (Irigaray 1991b). 
Irigaray argues that this kind of exchange is outlawed in the Christian tradition as it has 
developed, largely because of a recuperation of the material contribution of the arch-maternal 
figure, the Virgin Mary, into the figure of Christ (Irigaray 1991d, 164-90). Irigaray's views 
on the radical possibilities of the interpretation of Christ as a figure who celebrates fleshliness, 
suggested in her book Marine Lover make her, in a sense, a visionary in the positive tradition 
like Kempe. Irigaray desires to return the considerations of the flesh to discourse on the divine 
and thus her own discourse has affinities with the positive mystical text, in which the mystic's 
body is transformed in the process of mediating divine speech. 
While I will be using Irigaray initially in this chapter to facilitate an engagement with 
Kempe's critics and the ubiquitous physicality of her Book, my dealings with Irigaray's 
writings in the second section will address· more broadly issues that have arisen in the 
discussion of Kempe. It is Irigaray's contention that female sexuality, constructed as "mere 
matter II and the underside of masculine rationality, is simultaneously excluded from and 
represented as excessive to phallocentric discourses (Butler 1993, 37), and so needs to attain 
a space of representation which does not require its erasure, in which it might appear 
differently. Conversely, it is Kempe's ability to largely suppress her sexuality in her text 
(evidenced, for example, by Christ's assurances to her that she is as good as a virgin) which 
enables her to speak in a forum of public expression guarded by men. In exploring Irigaray's 
writings on the divine and female sexuality further, it will become clear that her positing the 
divine as that which enables female sexuality to become expressible shows points of 
continuity with as well as inevitable differences from Kempe's medieval, "positive mystical II 
text. 
Kempe makes the divine the means of her speaking and writing her text, while Irigaray's 
version of the divine, in allowing female sexuality a place and position of its own in 
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discourse, aims to transform the terms of normal communication. Kempe's flcarnal exchangesfl 
with Christ - too carnal for her (clerical) critics - thus presage Irigaray's view of the divine 
as agent of genuinely fruitful exchange between different sorts of selves (female/male, in her 
paradigm). But Kempe's relationship with Christ and the text which arises from it, because 
they must be mediated by a male scribe, also necessarily reveal the limitations of the order 
of speaking and representation which lrigaray desires so passionately to change. The dialogues 
and exchanges in the second section of this chapter are intended to produce questions and 
provoke crises in both the discourses of scholarship on mysticism and of lrigaray' s feminism. 
It is out of such crisis and questioning that identifiable and so possibly workable outcomes 
of Irigaray's visions of female subjectivity might emerge. 
4. 1 Contaminating 'Women: Positive and Negative Mysticism and The Book of 
Margery Kempe 
4. 1. 1 lVlargery Kempe and the critics: Disempowerment and deconstruction 
Describing twentieth-century criticism of The Book of Margery Kempe, David Lawton notes 
the "overwhelming senseI! among critics that Kempe was "excluded from both the literary and 
ecclesiastical canons" as an unsuccessful writer and mystic, and that this "failure 
and ... exclusion require explaining" (Lawton 1992, 94). Indeed most critical "explanations" of 
Kempe's text centre on the mystic's physical behaviour where this is felt to be unorthodox 
and, often, unspiritual. The insistent presence of Kempe's voice, body and personality in her 
Book also seems to have contributed to its "being demoted out of religious writing and 
promoted into literature, into the critic's field of expertise," as Lawton observes (1992, 95). 
Too much physical detail about the mystic in a mystical text evidently renders the text suspect 
as an account of spiritual truths and opens it up to being read as a story where the task of 
judging the II characters II lies with the reader. 
The effect of this trend in response to Kempe's Book since its discovery in 1934 is not so 
different from that of the reactions the mystic evoked in her own lifetime among her critics. 
While the pervasive concern with the physical in the Book makes Kempe into a colourful 
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literary character for modern scholarship, her persistence as a vocal and physical presence in 
her own time, as a wife who lived apart from her husband and yet moved about the 
countryside with relative freedom unsettled religious and civil authorities. Her speaking of 
God and exhibitions of weeping in devotion to him were seen to be excessive and unorthodox 
as a result. 2 Kempe's treatment by Church and town officials while she lived and by a number 
of scholars after her death involves the passing of judgements against her which, as Lawton 
has noted, often find her wanting. A number of modern critical responses to the Book,3 like 
those of the authorities before whom Kempe was called to defend herself, can be seen to 
refuse a dialogic encounter with her text/voice in their autocratic desire to displace her from 
categories of orthodoxy. Charges of eccentricity have come largely from male critics, some 
of them in religious orders (Lawton 1992, 94), who replicate the attitudes of clerics in the 
Book in decrying Kempe's anomalous status. 
By highlighting the specific foci of their judgements, this section aims to deconstruct the 
discourse of clerical authority in its modern and medieval forms, pinpointing the places at 
which the two discourses find women's voices threatening. Both (clerical) critics and critical 
clerics respond severely to Kempe's relatively independent mode of living - her role as a 
"wandering wife" - and are apt to pass sentence on her voluble gift of tears. These aspects 
of Kempe's vocation involve bodily activities which extend beyond those recommended for 
her by the Church. As we saw in Chapter Two, strictures on women's speech and physical 
freedom were an integral part of the medieval Church's work in imaging itself as the sole 
agent of purity and truth. Male priests outlawed and appropriated women's speech and 
sexuality as part of defining holiness in the tradition of a masculine God. Early critics of 
Kempe's Book, working with the assumptions of negative mysticism by which they separate 
!ltruel! mystics from "false, II are likewise led to exclude consideration of female sexuality and 
bodiliness from their texts. Their version of negative truth is a masculine one, founded on the 
silencing of female bodies, and this is made evident by some strong reactions to Kempe's 
vociferousness and related physical "excesses." 
My examination of the critical discourses of scholarship on mysticism follows Irigaray' s 
concern with deconstructing the terms of women's simultaneous production within and 
exclusion from IIwesternli metaphysics, their position as both lack and excess - but not 
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independent subjects - in relation to the masculine norm. Her strategies involve, on one level, 
uncovering and highlighting what patriarchal discourses try to ignore, perceiving that what is 
marginalised, that is, frequently elements of "female eroticism and corporeality" (Grosz 1989, 
109), is potentially threatening to the alleged self-constitution of phallocentrism's male 
representative. Irigaray seeks to make evident the constitutive conditions of masculine 
rationality, i.e., the positing of "the feminine" as both outlawed excess and the recuperated 
(internalised) material ground of phallocentric discourse. Her ultimate intention is to shift the 
terrain of the phallocentric symbolic system so that "womanll as both unrepresented inside and 
outside of that order might take up a(n other) subject position. If this were to happen it would 
mean that masculine subjectivity would have to be differently defined; instead of positing the 
feminine as its unrepresented other, intersubjective exchange - mutual recognition - would be 
necessary. 
The construction of "western" medieval mysticism by twentieth-century scholarship in the 
field effectively celebrates the reign of the masculine, self-sufficient subject. It "concerns the 
unmediated inner self and its relationship to the unmediated transcendent God," in Sarah 
Beckwith's words (Beckwith 1993, 12); the physical mediation of the mystical subject and 
that subject's God is largely disavowed. This disavowal is frequently expressed through a 
marginalisation of female corporeality, a process that was endorsed in medieval theology and 
orthodox religious practice of the middle ages. In a sense, then, twentieth-century scholarship 
on "western ll mysticism maintains the position of the medieval Church with regard to the 
excessiveness of women's bodies, and it does so through its specific (if disavowed) 
construction of medieval mystical discourse and that discourse's transcendent God. Hence, in 
examining the reaction of some twentieth-century scholars of mysticism to The Book oj 
Margery Kempe with the aim of extending the discussion in the direction of Irigaray' s broader 
philosophical concerns, I will attend to critical reactions to the prominence of physicality in 
Kempe's Book. 
Responses to Kempe which focus on this aspect of her text have not been lacking. There has 
been a simultaneous desire to exclude and to focus on female physicality and the female voice 
- an ambivalent fascination - in (modern) critical and (medieval) clerical responses to Kempe. 
It most often takes the form of either an expressed wish or evident assumption that she should 
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(have) live(d) an enclosed life, either as virgins did - in convents or anchorholds - or wives 
and mothers - in the home. I will treat firstly some examples of this sort of reaction to the 
mystic's life from her contemporaries and then proceed to a discussion of similar responses 
in the work of modern critics. 
That the marginalisation of female sexuality is integral to The Book of Margery Kempe has 
been established in previous chapters, and several reasons for this have been discussed. The 
production of the Book itself shows that Kempe was able to prove to a degree that she had 
escaped the aUeged contaminations of her sex: "To the extent that she establishes her chastity 
within the text, to the extent that she reaffirms through the text, as well as in the text, her 
subordination to all fathers, she is allowed the voice of authority, II as Sidonie Smith puts it 
(Smith 1987, 55). Kempe's Book exemplifies the way in which phallocentric discourse 
appropriates the feminine as fundamentally lacking in order to preserve its presence to itself 
and its own power: her life-text is contained within a clerically-endorsed format without which 
no record of her story could exist. Her book is a microcosm of the lrigarayan view of 
"western II culture as that which produces the otherwise excluded (i.e., the feminine) as an 
element of its own inner life. It is not surprising then that "the fathers" of religious discourse 
- the priests with whom Kempe had to interact continually - should betray concern with the 
aspects of her calling which exceed the base requirement of submission to clerical authority 
and make possible a subversion of her "chaste subordination." 
Soon after achieving separation from her husband and at the outset of her visionary "career," 
Kempe is commanded by God to dress only in white clothes (Kempe 1988, 67). Traditionally 
these represent purity and virginity, among other things, and the mystic uses them to signify 
that her life is now dedicated to the service of God (Kempe 1988, 273n). Kempe's white 
clothes, like her tears, are seen by her immediate critics, the priests and urban authorities from 
whom she encounters hostility, as disruptive in that they are a sign of strategic movement 
between sexual categories into which medieval patriarchal society classifies women (Kempe 
1988, 162). Normally only women in religious orders - that is, virgins - wore such garments. 
More specifically, Kempe's white clothes symbolise her rejection of her immediate family 
through the resumption of her public role, and her turning from the life of domesticity which 
she is expected to maintain with them. The clothes represent a challenge to the organisation 
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of her nascent capitalist culture in which women were becoming increasingly important as a 
domestic asset in the home, as discussed in Chapter Two (76-7; Howell 1986, 181; Aers 1988, 
87). As with her tears, Kempe persistently claims divine authority for her singular dress and 
the public speaking role it advertises. Her prophetic role grows out of her daily communings 
with Christ and other members of the Holy Family and extends to include counselling, 
chastising, and mediating between Christ and other lay people. 
In Chapter 48 of the Book, attention is drawn to Kempe's white clothes by the Mayor of 
Leicester, when he says: '''1 want to know why you go about in white clothes, for I believe 
you have come here to lure away our wives from us, and lead them off with you'" (Kempe 
1988, 153). While this response may demonstrate concern about the popular sect known as 
Flagellants, who also wore white clothes, it more directly dramatises the way in which Kempe 
refuses the fixed categories associated with these garments, for example enclosed religious 
orders such as the Carthusians. Kempe's clothes carry symbolic protest value at the 
circumscribed roles available to medieval women, and the fact that male authorities find her 
vocation threatening and fear her influence on other women may reflect the unhappy position 
of medieval wives, particularly those of Kempe's social group, the merchant class. In regard 
to women of Kempe's class David Aers notes that in the middle ages merchant wives may 
well have been in a IIfar more passivized and domestically powerless position than those of 
lower-class urban and rural families/' because in Kempe's class IIwives' work, and the relative 
increase in autonomy and domestic power this could bring, was not an economic necessity" 
(Aers 1988, 87). 
The material reality which is both central to but not mentioned explicitly within the record 
of the encounter between Kempe and the Mayor of Leicester is the conditions in which most 
medieval women lived as wives. As an officially unrepresented group in medieval Christianity 
- they could not become priests or, in the main, professional religious - many wives might 
well have desired more freedom than they were granted. Kempe is, in fact, assured of this by 
Christ, who says: II'Daughter, if you knew how many wives there are in this world who would 
love me and serve me well and duly, if they might be as free from their husbands as you are 
from yours .. .''' (Kempe 1988, 253), but in sections of the text where men of authority 
interrogate Kempe, female desire is hidden from view. Instead, the need to control female 
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sexuality and curtail female independence which is integral to the patriarchal social 
arrangements of Kempe's pre-capitalist society (Atkinson 1983, 109-11; Aers 1988, 100-2) 
is reflected in the Mayor's paranoid fear. 
This response echoes that of the old monk at Canterbury who says: "'1 wish you were 
enclosed in a house of stone, so that no one should speak with you'" (Kempe 1988, 63), and 
is again echoed by the men of Beverley when they tell her to engage herself in domestic tasks 
lias other women do" (Kempe 1988, 168), and thereby escape suffering. Both responses 
express the desire to negate Kempe's physical excessiveness - her travelling alone without the 
sovereignty of a specific man such as her husband - by relegating her to the circumscribed 
spaces of acceptable role-divisions for women in medieval society: the cloister or the nuclear 
family. Through their insistent focus on Kempe's escaping body, male civil and especially 
clerical authorities reveal the need to contain that female body in a male-controlled space. 
In Chapter 52 of the Book, the Archbishop of York also questions Kempe about her white 
clothes, interrogating her about her sexual status: 
At last the said Archbishop came into 'the chapel with his clerics, and he said to her 
abruptly, "Why do you go about in white clothes? Are you a virgin?" She, kneeling 
before him, said, "No, sir, I am no virgin; I am a married woman" (Kempe 1988, 
162). 
The Archbishop finds Kempe's independent action and speech in wearing white clothes while 
claiming to be a wife threatening and has her fettered, calling her a heretic. In the 
chapter-house at Beverley she is again brought before the Archbishop and many other 
powerful clerics and authorities by a priest who declares: 
II Sirs, I had this woman before me at Cawood, and there I with my clerics examined 
her in her faith and found no fault in her. Furthermore, sirs, I have since that time 
spoken with good men who hold her to be a perfect woman and a good woman. 
Notwithstanding all this, I gave one of my men five shillings to lead her out of this 
part of the country, in order to quieten the people down. And as they were going on 
their journey they were taken and arrested, my man put in prison because of her; 
also her gold and her silver was taken away from her, together with her beads and 
her ring, and she is brought before me again here. Is there any man here who can 
say anything against her?" (Kempe 1988, 170) 
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In the above account and in the discussion that follows, the central focus of the text is clearly 
upon men of influence as agents of exchange, and the effect is to represent Kempe as an 
object to be transported and judged. Her troublesome physical presence is the focus of the 
passage, as reflected in the description of her transportation and the implicit question "what 
is to be done with her?", and yet the fate of her body is seen to depend entirely upon the 
opinions and good will of powerful men. Despite "good men" having declared Kempe a "good 
woman, II the Archbishop has paid a man to take her from his diocese, a gesture which 
challenges her often evidenced mobility and independence. When the Archbishop fmds Kempe 
in his presence again, he objectifies her by enquiring if any of the men have new charges to 
bring against her. In response a friar claims that Kempe "disparaged all men of Holy Church II 
and two more men who had previously arrested Kempe accuse her of Lollardy with the phrase 
IICobham's daughter ll so that even the charge of heresy focuses on a man.4 
In the following interchange, Kempe continues to remain absent as a speaking subject while 
the claims of the men concerned are central: how Kempe is perceived as a threat to men by 
men forms the gist of the dialogue. Unable to convict her of heresy, the friar passes authority 
over her to another man, saying: lI'my lord of Bedford is angry with her, and he will have 
her'" (Kempe 1988, 171). The friar, however, refuses the Archbishop's command to escort 
Kempe to the Duke, stating that it is not a friar's job to escort a woman, and the Archbishop 
in turn declares that he will not have the Duke angry with him on her behalf. Kempe's 
singular mode of living represents a threat to a patriarchal society based on the exchange of 
women among men, and the response by these men of power is to attempt to recuperate her 
once more into that economy. In this scene she is all but absent as a human being and exists 
as a body to be taken charge of and a problem to be solved. The text displays a feverish and 
almost comical attempt on the part of male authorities to dispose of the excess which is 
Kempe's body, her problem-causing physical presence, by passing reponsibility over her from 
one to the other. The simultaneous absence and excessiveness of the mystic's physical being 
appears as the unrecuperable point of contention, the focus both present and absent among 
the arbiters of clerical rule. 
Kempe's physical being is likewise the central but disavowed term in several contemporary 
critics' articulations of anxiety over her rejection of sexual categories. John Hirsh, in a 
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relatively recent book which claims to place Kempe in her cultural context, produces a 
discourse which focuses on the mystic's excessiveness - of voice and physical presence - in 
such a way that she is more or less rendered invisible within the analysis. Hirsh effectively 
presents Kempe as an object, a mere reflection or phenomenon of medieval popular culture 
and its devotional traditions (Hirsh 1989, 87); her personality is effectively explained away 
so that Kempe is treated in a fashion similar to that of the clerics described in Chapter 54 of 
the Book, above. 
Hirsh describes Kempe's position without offering the kind of socioeconomic detail which, 
for example, Aers provides in his 1988 book with regard to Kempe, indicating previously 
neglected factors that help to reveal the kind of experience she may have had (Aers 1988, 73-
116). Consequently Hirsh's statements often depend on what appear to be blatant misreadings 
of the Book. His persistent use of the conditional tense reinforces the wishful quality of a 
historically unsupported reading. Discussing the burning of Oldcastle in 1417, the year in 
which Kempe was herself suspected of heresy and labelled "Cobham's daughter," he 
maintains: 
It seems to me easy to overstate the degree of peril which Margery faced .... Never 
recalcitrant in the face of ecclesiastical challenge, a brief conversation would have 
assured any competent authority of her essential orthodoxy, and certain of her 
mannerisms - her unconventional clothing, her tenor of address - would have had the 
effect of showing her without harm, or at least dispelled the idea that she was a 
subversive.... There is no shortage of conflict in The Book of Margery Kempe, 
but...very little real danger (Hirsh 1989, 6-7. Emphasis added). 
The critic can only make these claims by ignoring the occasions in the Book on which Kempe 
was physically threatened (Chapter Two, 98-100), at least according to her version of events, 
indeed by ignoring the centrality in her text of her body itself as a site of contestation. While 
Hirsh reserves the right to produce a modern version of Kempe's historical scene ("there 
is ... very little real danger [in The Book of Margery Kempe]"), he does so by denying Kempe's 
own account of events, insofar as that account is intricately bound up with her need to have 
the excessiveness of her body - and her speech - authenticated by clerical discourse. In the 
Book's versions of the mystic's wrangles with priests, her body is frequently the central focus 
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of an authoritative (disembodied) clerical speech, whether that body is emitting screams and 
wails or is simply present in its symbolically unsettling white clothes and singular status. 
Although all scholastic discourse tends to exclude "the feminine" along with physical matters 
to an extent; criticism of works in the mystical tradition (including texts like Kempe's, 
sometimes demoted out of the category "mystical") is particularly prone to do so. Hirsh 
describes Kempe's revelations as "like, but not the same as, mystical awareness" (Hirsh 1989, 
87), although "mystical awareness" is not specifically defined in his book on Kempe. Hirsh's 
intention, though, seems to be less to posit a mystical tradition in which female physicality 
has no place than to attempt to dislodge Kempe as a historical subject from the time and place 
represented in her Book, with its manifest clerical anxieties about the extent of ecclesiastical 
power in the face of increasing lay literacy and religious individualism (Beckwith 1993, 20; 
1992, 185-7). 
Within the narrative of Kempe's Book her body and voice, perceived as disruptive and 
unsettling by clerics, serve as outlaw figures for male-orchestrated Church doctrine' which 
depends - symbolically and literally - upon the submission of women. And the perception of 
her physical behaviour as excessive is played out in the specific historical context of Lollard-
ridden, fifteenth-century England, in which clerical control over lay people's speech was 
manifestly eroding and so had to be continually (and symptomatically) reasserted (Beckwith 
1993, 91). Hirsh, however, refuses the social context of Kempe's vocational endeavour and, 
like other (more clerically-oriented) critics blames Kempe for the "stressful" life she led. He 
applies to her a definition of "psychosomatic disorder ll which holds that: 
stress itself is not the cause of the illness, for healthy life consists of surmounting, 
adjusting to, or avoiding difficulties in one's path. In psychosomatic disorder ... the 
patient's handicap .. .lies in the possession of a combination of personality traits 
usually found in obsessional and hysterical personality types (Pollitt 1973, 76-7, qtd. 
in Hirsh 1989, 85). . 
Hirsh then remarks of Kempe that "often she seems to have created her own stressful 
situation, either by reprimanding another, particularly a social superior, or by her dress, or by 
her outbursts - her loud cries and boistrous weeping" (Hirsh 1989, 85-6). The mystic's 
forthright manner and disturbing tears are their own explanation for her "difficulties. II Hirsh, 
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at least, is prepared to accept at face value the word of Kempe's superiors as to the excessive 
nature of her behaviour. 
In wishing away the elements in Kempe's text which signal the challenge to conventional 
female roles enacted by her independent status and public, prophetic speech, Hirsh reveals his 
desire to banish the woman from her text and to silence the emergent possibilities of the 
female voice, as the monk at Canterbury would do in having her enclosed in stone so that no 
one may hear her speak. In an earlier essay on Kempe's Book, Hirsh actualises this desire 
through a constant focus on Kempe's male scribes, along with a complete disregard fqr the 
politics of her situation and the way in which her life and Book depended upon gaining the 
favour of male authorities: 
She shows a tendency to attach herself to - perhaps even to batten on - her spiritual 
confessors, and though this dependency was doubtless edifying, her attachment to 
her confessor-priests played a marked role in her spiritual life, and the relationship 
should qualify the degree of independence with which, in spite of her travels, she 
is to be credited .... The saintly aspirations that Margery undoubtedly entertained did 
not prevent her from injecting her own extraordinary narrative into the pattern the 
scribe set down (Hirsh 1984, 112). 
Elsewhere he asserts, in a similar vein: 
The second scribe ... took a part in forming the basic structure of the Book if only by 
putting Margery's random thoughts into a larger context, and by giving them 
direction. Because of him, the reader is not overwhelmed by detail, and is shown the 
spiritual growth of a temperamentally static human being (Hirsh 1975, 149). 
In the first extract, Hirsh portrays Kempe's "attachment to her confessor-priests" as an unusual 
phenomenon in the life of a late medieval, lay woman mystic, and not as the means of 
physical survival it evidently was (Chapter Two, 97-100). And in both extracts he clearly 
regards Kempe's life as the mere material basis for the more important, creative and learned 
work of her scribes. This was also the view of the preaching friar, whose debate with Kempe 
was discussed in Chapter Two (81-3). The friar's chief concern was that Kempe's vociferous 
devotions should not rival his own authoritative speech; she was to be the passive recipient 
of his learning, the silent female body at the heart of traditional Christian doctrine. 
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In his early review of the Book Father Herbert Thurston paraphrases the old monk at 
Canterbury in an implicit comparison of Kempe with the anchoress Julian of Norwich, 
Kempe's contemporary, which occurs in later critical writings. He contends, as though 
assuming Kempe's thwarted desire to live an enclosed life: Hlf she had really been an ancress, 
living secluded in her cell, [her] peculiarities would not have mattered. But she insisted on 
going everywhere, following, as she believed, the special call of God" (Thurston 1936, 570, 
qtd. in Atkinson 1983, 201). Thurston displays a desire to annul Kempe's insistent physical 
presence in the narrative of her Book, which results in the pejorative comparison with Julian 
of Norwich, whose physical enclosure was more readily endorsed by the Church. For 
Thurston, a medieval woman's desire could evidently lead her to only one of two patriarchally 
constructed categories for its expression and containment. 
R. W. Chambers provides another example of this censorious attitude, implicitly blaming 
Kempe for the difficulties she encountered during her life, in observing that IIthings might 
have been better for Margery if she had been a recluse .... But that she should wander about, 
rehearsing tales of scripture, was felt to be irregularll (Chambers 1944, 7). David Knowles, 
in The English Mystical Tradition, also compares Kempe unfavourably with Julian of Norwich 
and reinforces fifteenth-century clerical attitudes to women who define themselves outside of 
traditional gender roles in applauding the renunciation of her contemplative vocation to return 
to her role as a wife: 
The readiness with which she abandoned for the time her life of retirement to nurse 
and serve her ageing husband, after he had been disabled by a serious fall and had 
been reduced in his last years to helplessness, must weigh heavily in her favour in 
the final reckoning (Knowles 1964, 149-50).5 
The appropriation of god-language in the final clause of this summary of Knowles' judgement 
of the Book effects the denial of Kempe's desire for a life dedicated primarily to God by 
calling in her own highest authority against her. Knowles (a cleric) speaks - literally and 
figuratively - in the place of the transcendent God, miming his ultimate godlike act, the 
judgement of the choices made by individual sinners at lithe final reckoning. It Knowles 
presents an obvious example of a clerical criticism which reinforces the attitudes of the 
medieval Church toward female physicality (as that which must be contained by male rule and 
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excluded from orthodox discourse) by approving Kempe, the wandering mystic, once she is 
back under the jurisdiction of her husband and in her family home. 
In the second chapter I described how the preaching friar whose sermon is disrupted by 
Kempe's tears renames her gift as sickness, and how in the diplomatic assays which her allies 
undertake on her behalf the mystic's voice remains strangely silent. A number of the Book's 
modern critics, likewise troubled by Kempe's bizarre bodily speech in the form of wild 
weeping, reclassify her gift of tears as the medieval authorities do. Like the friar, modern 
critics are quick to provide explanations for her "deviant" behaviour. In the 1930s Thurston 
used the phrase "terrible hysteria" of Kempe and said he found it "impossible to forget the 
hysterical temperament revealed in every page of the narrative portions" of the Book 
(Thurston 1936, 570, qtd. in Atkinson 1983, 201), a reaction telling in its focus on the 
mystic's physical "excess. 1I Edmund Colledge, in 1965, went further, classifying her as "a 
hysteric, if not an epileptic I! (Colledge 1965, 222). Even in 1980, Kempe's mysticism was 
described as the reflection of her unhealthy state of mind. She was seen to be "quite mad -
an incurable hysteric with a large paranoid trend!! (Howard 1980, 34-5). More recently, 
Hirsh's critical speculations about Kempe's !!psychosomatic disturbances!! have been similarly 
used to avoid further investigation of the process of her empowerment through her gift of 
tears (Hirsh 1989, 85). 6 
What all of these judgements have in common is a tendency to replicate the tenets of 
orthodox Christian discourse insofar as physical excess is seen to be a specific problem 
associated with women. Why, for instance, is Kempe described in such individualistic terms 
(and certainly post-medieval ones, without explanatory qualification), and why is the official 
discourse of the late medieval Church and its more mutable, popular manifestations, not 
analysed in tandem with her Book and its devotional extremes? Such an analysis proves that 
physicality, especially female physicality, was privileged in the wider devotional climate of 
Kempe's culture (Bynum 1987,262-3; 1989; Gibson 1989, 1-18; Harding 1993, 182). Hence 
her behavioural excesses, however extreme, have a specific historical context. 
Part of an answer as to why some of the Book's earlier critics have isolated Kempe and 
produced such emotive judgements as !!paranoia/! "hysteria,!! and "madness!! lies in the nature 
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of the scholarly discourse out of which most writing on mystical texts, at least earlier in the 
century, proceeded. Sarah Beckwith points out that, although mystical theology has a long 
history in "western" Christendom, the notion of "mysticism" as a recognisable experience and, 
indeed, the word itself, is a distinctively Protestant (i.e., post-reformation) idea (Beckwith 
1993, 11).7 "Conceptualized as radically individualistic," and at the same time as the 
"essence ... ofreligion" (Beckwith 1993, 12,8), "western" mysticism has been characterised by 
early to mid-twentieth-century scholars as a discourse of personal and institutional "truth." 
Kempe's physical devotions, which frequently attend or are bound up with her visions, can 
be read variously, as the positive and negative reactions to them documented in her Book 
indicate. The textual instability produced by the Book's account of her behaviours is a 
challenge to the notion of mysticism as unmediated truth, while the behaviours themselves 
have sometimes apparently aroused an older belief that women speak falsely because they 
cannot escape a certain suspect "bodily speech." 
Knowles, for example, refuses to trust Kempe's word on anything, and focuses his analysis 
of her text on the credentials of others - implicitly and explicitly men - in a manner which 
echoes the preaching friar's sermon episode in the Book, where Kempe is defended by a 
number of authoritative men to another. Knowles lists views of Kempe held by "writers of 
repute" and then notes that "in her favour it must be noted that editors and most readers agree 
that her story gives an impression of basic sincerity," that she "never abuses her opponents 
and even suppresses their names" (in other words she is kind to men), and that "she had 
among her advisers and supporters many whom we know from other sources to have been 
theologians and preachers of repute." He even states that: "when she can be checked, she is 
found accurate and truthful[!]" (Knowles 1964, 143) as though such an outcome would 
normally be in doubt. 
In discussing Kempe's tears Knowles further observes that l1a majority, which included some 
of the most influential friars, were only too ready to accept her at her own valuation." He 
continues: "Even the various prelates into whose presence she came treated her with 
considerable respect, particularly two who are not usually represented as spiritual men: Philip 
Repingdon of Lincoln and William Courtenay of Canterbury" (Knowles 1964, 148). While 
this may be read as a backhanded half-compliment to Kempe for attracting the attention of 
211 
some worthy men, the focus, like that of Hirsh, is clearly male-centred, in such a way that 
Kempe is rendered absent in the analysis. Lastly Knowles, like others described above, uses 
the charge of "hysteria" to foreclose Kempe's text and diminish its importance for the student 
of mystical writing. In this way "hysteria" operates as an unexamined, emotively deployed 
term in his summary, the unconscious heart of his dismissal: 
There existed quite clearly from the beginning of her adult life, a large hysterical 
elemet in Margery's personality .... In general, we may perhaps say that there is 
nothing in the words themselves that suggests any other o.rigin than the vivid 
imagination and retentive memory of a sincere and devout, but very hysterical 
woman (Knowles 1964, 146-7. See also Underhill 1936, 642). 
As I have shown in earlier chapters, the term IIhysteria lt is telling when applied to Kempe, 
given that (female) hysteria can be seen - from a feminist perspective - as a means of 
symbolic protest at women's relegation to passivity. The regular use of the term by the Book's 
early (and even some more recent) critics attests to the impossibility of banishing the outlawed 
female body in the masculinist discourse of orthodox scholarship on mysticism. The use of 
the term in this context is in fact a hysterical response to the Book on the part of male critics: 
its recurrence betrays insistent and deeply held anxieties about female speech and sexuality 
which are evident but remain unaddressed in the work of the critics in question (Evans 1991, 
178). 
In other words, their fears remain unconscious and surface in critical moves to outlaw the 
bodies and words of women in mystical discourse. Knowles' charge: "there is nothing in 
[Kempe's] words themselves that suggest any other origin than ... vivid imagination and 
retentive memory" may indeed apply to hysteria, but it also places Kempe in the positive 
tradition of affective mysticism, in which memory and imagination play an active part. 
Knowles' denigration of these aspects of Kempe's mysticism reveals his unacknowledged bias 
towards the tenets of the negative mystical way, and his own "hysterical" (symptomatic) fear 
of female speech. Positive mysticism makes the physicality of the mystic an integral 
component of the visionary experience, and Kempe's (clerical) critics' dismissal of this form 
of devotion is in fact a response to her mysticism as privileging her own non-virginal flesh. 
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4. 1. 2 Outlawing the body: Traditional approaches to mystical writing 
According to Irigaray's deconstructive readings of the central Christian myths, it is the 
appropriation and denial of the female body which allows Christian discourses to be figured 
as immutable, beyond time and change. Her argument that this understanding of the Christian 
God replicates the male morphology of the body that underlies "western" intellectual 
traditions, helps explain why the female body must be repeatedly banished from mystical 
thought-systems. Beckwith also makes this point convincingly in an article on Kempe's 
"material mysticism II and its cultural contexts: 
1t is clear ... that the exclusion of women saints of positive piety is instrumental in the 
very construction of a "pure spirituality." The one is excluded so that the other can 
come into being. But it is also clear that even in the very attempt at this shutting off, 
this closing down, the forbidden body returns in the latent image of mysticism as a 
body open to contamination (Beckwith 1986, 55-6n). 
As I argued in the first chapter, the encounter between the divine and the mystic in the 
Christian tradition may be seen as taking place according to a model of "the feminine II by 
which divine communication fills a lack in the subject (39; de Certeau 1986, 88). 
Traditionally, the mystical subject is figured as "feminine" insofar as slhe consents to remain 
receptive and "open" and passively await the gifts of divine grace. In St Bernard the soul 
seeking God is like the bride in the Song of Songs who opens herself up to her lover (Bernard 
. of Clairvaux 1987, 238, 253; Leclercq 1987, 47-52). Given that mystical discourse is 
necessarily situated on the borders of Church orthodoxy, as explained in Chapter One, its 
representation as feminine is inevitable. This is because Christianity, in proclaiming a 
masculine God, has historically figured that which defiles its borders as female, whether 
through Eve's deceitful speech which precipitated the "Fall" into mortality, images of 
witchcraft or the heterogeneous flesh, to name some examples. However, as Chapter Two 
explained, that which threatens the borders of Christianity is also relentlessly present at its 
heart. The feminised, postlapsarian concept of the "flesh" in the middle ages is an intrinsic 
part of the human person and yet is constantly figured as an influx of dangerous (and 
womanly) passions (Chapter Two, 76-7, 115-8). 
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The Church has consistently sought to control female bodies in their symbolic position at the 
boundaries of orthodoxy, and in general scholarship on mysticism reflects this trend. 
Traditional, male-dominated commentary on mysticism manifests a desire to "outlaw" the 
female body from its field of expertise by downplaying (female) mystical excesses. It aims 
to return mystical discourse to the realm of the pure, beyond the influence of the physical and 
the senses: However I argue in this section that because mysticism is a "feminised" encounter 
and because its discourses centre around a relationship of excess (or in excess of the physical, 
in negative mystical terms), attempts to banish (female) bodiliness from versions of mystical 
orthodoxy are ultimately doomed to fail. In conventional scholarship on mysticism this 
attempt takes the form of privileging the negative way as the standard of mystical encounter, 
but as Beckwith has shown, "the forbidden body" in this context insistently returns. The 
question, then, becomes how best to rethink the binary which has shaped readings of many 
"positive mystical" texts by women. The following pages present a move towards this 
rethinking through a deeper examination of the attitudes governing critical assumption of 
"negative mystical" values. 
As Beckwith notes, it is negative mysticism which has been constructed by scholars and 
commentators in the field as "the superior mystical mode" (Beckwith 1986, 39), while positive 
mysticism, which connotes a less learned, more immediate and materially-focused attitude to 
the quest for God, has been regarded as inferior. Positive mysticism's association with 
medieval women is largely due to the fact that they had less access to clerical education and 
were in general more influenced by popular piety than male mystics. Lay women were in the 
main uneducated in Latin, the language of scholastic learning, and the media of popular 
devotion prescribed for them by the Church fostered affective devotion. Negative mysticism, 
transmitted to the middle ages through the work of the Greek writer known as Pseudo-
Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius 1987; Bischoff 1976; Louth 1981, 159-78),8 is, by contrast, in 
the Neoplatonic tradition. The "negative way" (via negativa) refers to the negation of images 
which occurs as the mystic proceeds through "divine darkness" in pursuit of God (Cousins 
1983, 165). According to Pseudo-Dionysius, the only experience of God available to human 
beings is that which "is known ineffably ... [and] which can be linguistically expressed only 
in ... metaphors of paradox or pure negation" (Bischoff 1976, 20). While the positive way (via 
affirmativa) "systematically asserts and relates the meaningfulness of symbols," the negative 
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method "destroys, step-by-step, all symbols - first the corporeal ones, next the emotional ones, 
then the conceptual ones, and finally the intuitive ones" (Bischoff 1976, 30). 
The positive tradition has its roots in the profound influence of St Francis and the Franciscans 
on medieval religious devotion.9 As Marina Warner notes, "humilitas, lowliness in the image 
of the bare ground's lowliness, was the core of the Franciscan revolution"lO (Warner 1985, 
180), which led to increasing emphasis on Christ's physicality (and concomitantly that of 
Mary) in late medieval Europe. Medieval women, more lowly than men and more closely 
linked with material things, responded readily to this trend in devotion. Ewert Cousins notes 
that in Francis "what is most innovative is the content of his visionary material," that is, "the 
figure of Christ crucified" which inaugurated the devotion to Christ's suffering and death in 
the later middle ages (Cousins 1983, 165): 
Francis represents a watershed in the history of Western Christianity. After him 
Western religious experience flows in two currents: speculative Neoplatonic 
mysticism gains vigour, reaching a culmination in the Rhineland mystics. But the 
devotional current flowing from Francis - with its focus on the humanity and passion 
of Christ - spreads throughout the people at large and becomes the characteristic 
form of Western religious sensibility for centuries to come (Cousins 1983, 165). 
Critical discourse on mysticism in this century has usually been ill-disposed towards the 
emphasis on the physical in late medieval Christianity. As Gail McMurray Gibson has shown, 
this tendency has been exhibited by scholarly attitudes to the fifteenth century in general 
(Gibson 1989,2-4). The trend has now begun to be displaced with the advent of feminist and 
poststructuralist theories into medieval scholarship, since at its heart existed a discomfort with 
what may be seen as the IIfeminisation" - and the fragmentation - of religion in the late middle 
ages (Jardine 1985, 93-5; Ash 1990, 85-92). The figuring of the dying Christ as female and 
the increasing popularity of affective, physically-focused devotion among believers were 
aspects of this process. As Gibson points out, negative attitudes to the period have centred on 
perceptions of it as a time of conflicts and "corruption ll frequently associated with women and 
evidenced by the importance of physicality in its discourses (Gibson 1989, 2-3). 
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Scholars in the field of Christian mysticism have for most of this century tended to regard as 
orthodox or "truefl mystics those in the negative tradition, while manifesting the general 
distaste for affective or popular spirituality that Gibson observes. Traditional scholarship has 
been theologically conservative and, following the tenets of the negative path, has constructed 
mystical discourse as numinous and so timeless and beyond change.l1 As Beckwith puts it, 
fl[negativeJ mysticism has been taken at its Word and the dominant assumption about the 
discourse of mysticism seems to be imbued with the transcendental trajectory that is 
mysticism's goal" (Beckwith 1986, 40-1. See also Partner 1991). 
In de-emphasising the specificities of mystical experience (and of mystical subjects), the 
language of this scholarship inevitably mystifies its objects. As Hans Penner observes of the 
work of such early to mid-twentieth-century commentators as Evelyn Underhill, W. Stace, R. 
C. Zaehner, and Rudolf Otto,12 "the emphasis is on mystical experience as expressed by 
mystical language. The experience is described as an ultimate experience, an experience of 
the absolute, numinous in quality, transcending self and world" (Penner 1983, 90). And 
Beckwith elaborates on this contention: 
The point. . .is that in the representation of mysticism the polarisation of negative and 
positive mysticism and their accompanying sexual polarisation is a mystification. 
Negative mysticism, by insisting on the unrepresentability of the Other (God) refuses 
the return to the social sphere. Indeed, this is the source of its transcendence: a God 
outside time and language and history is inviolable to change, the perfect 
legitimation of the system of which He is the transcendental centre and support 
(Beckwith 1986, 39-40). 
In most critical commentaries God's inaccessibility is rendered in terms which mystify his 
relation to the dominant order, and the emphasis on "true" and "false" mystics serves to reify 
this conservative view of the divine. Thus, like the universal, allegedly neutral subject of 
"western" thinking in Irigaray's analysis, God is neutralised by the mystifying timbre of 
mystical scholarship. In this context it is not surprising that Margery Kempe should have been 
frequently judged as not making the grade as a "true" mystic (Underhill 1936, 642; Knowles 
1964, 146-7; Medcalf 1981, 112; Hussey 1989, 117-8; Lawton 1992, 94) because her attitude 
to the divine is too physical, too firmly situated in her social sphere. 
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Knowles provides a striking example of the outlawing of the body enacted in mystical 
commentary prior to the 1980s, in his 1955 discussion of medieval mystical traditions in 
England. He cites Walter Hilton and the fourteenth-century author of The Cloud of Unknowing 
(who also translated thelvlystical Theology ofPseudo-Dionysius (Louth 1981,159)) as "the 
two greatest" writers of the period from 1350 to 1500, because they exhibit "an intellectual 
and emotional austerity, and a sense of the transcendence of supernatural reality ... derived from 
some of the purest sources of theological and ascetical tradition" (Knowles 1955, 222). He 
claims however that this stream of pure spirituality was, from the beginning of the flfteenth 
century, 
contaminated by another current, that of a more emotional and idiosyncratic 
devotion, manifesting itself in visions, revelations and unusual behaviour, 
deriving ... partly from the influence of some of the women saints of the fourteenth 
century, such as Angela of Foligno, Dorothea of Prussia, and Bridget of Sweden. 
The most familiar example of this type in England is Margery Kempe ... (Knowles 
1955, 223). 
The "austerity" and "transcendence" which comprises this "pure spirituality" is plainly 
constructed through the exclusion of emotions, idiosyncrasies and deviations from rigid norms. 
Late medieval spirituality, centred in the co'ncrete and the everyday, was open to the 
contaminations of women whose involvement as lay mystics in its media of devotion 
transformed the discourses of mysticism accordingly. Operating in Knowles' statements is a 
clear demarcation between "true" and "false" mystics, notions of purity and impurity, 
intellectual austerity and emotions, and the viewpoint which informs these attitudes is clearly 
the product of that other polarisation, between the negative and positive mystical paths. 
The "contaminating" physicality of Kempe's relation to Christ, condemned by Knowles, is 
most clearly manifested in her Book by her mystical marriage to the Godhead in Rome 
(Chapter 35) and its outcome, her received command to take Christ into her bed as lover and 
bridegroom (Kempe 1988, 126-7). As Lawton observes, the passage recording this injunction, 
and, I would add, others like it, have" determined many responses to the Book" (Lawton 1992, 
94). Critics like Knowles, working with the assumptions of the negative way, are shocked by 
such fleshing out of the notion of mystical or divine union, which, in the negative tradition, 
is expressed in the most ineffable and absolutist terms. Wolfgang Riehle, for example, 
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inveighs against Kempe for drawing "a much too forceful analogy between her mystical love 
and her earlier married sexuality" (Riehle 1981, 38). After conceding that such "drastic 
bluntness .. .is by no means unique in mysticism," and citing Mechthild of Magdeburg (1207-
82) as a continental example, Riehle pronounces Kempe's "crude realism" "embarrassing, fI and 
refers specifically to the physical details included in Christ's description of the relationship 
between himself and Kempe in her Book: 
"I must be intimate with you, and lie in your bed with you .... You may boldly, when 
you are in bed, take me to you as your wedded husband, as your dear darling, and 
as your sweet son, for I want to be loved as a son should be loved by the mother, 
and I want you to love me, daughter, as a good wife ought to love her husband. 
Therefore you can boldly take me in the arms of your soul and kiss my mouth, my 
head, and my feet as sweetly as you want ll (Kempe 1988, 126-7). 
These words from Christ endorse Kempe in the female roles she has known and practised 
before her conversion and which have caused her much remorse: those of wife and mother. 
But the transformation of her former familial roles into spiritual ones is the mark of her 
passing from a position of subservience to God to a kind of equality through her intimate 
devotion to Christ (see also Kempe 1988, 67, 122, 196, 215, 254-5). 
It is both aspects of this relationship which cause anxiety In Kempe's theologicalJy 
conservative critics, since Christ and Kempe appear as II equals II in the above scenario through 
the emphasis on the physical characteristics and responses of each. As Beckwith points out, 
this attitude 
sees Kempe as failing the test of the mystic, for she doesn't so much show forth the 
glory of God as compete with him for divinity. For this strand of criticism her 
personality is a barrier to her function as transparent and empty vessel of God 
(Beckwith 1992, 178). 
In Riehle's case, it is also Kempe's former life as a wife and mother which is at fault, since 
she has proved herself incapable of "transcendingH these sullying (to him, "embarrassing") 
experiences. That the negative mystical way was most commonly practised by women and 
men in anchorholds, monasteries or convents who were usually virgins, and positive 
mysticism by those in the world - often not virgins - isn't stated in Riehle's discussion. But 
this fact forms the basis of his judgement of Kempe' s "forceful analogy" between married life 
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and her love for Christ, since Mechthild, with whom he unfavourably compares her, was a 
virgin and met with traditional requirements to be a bride of Christ. Without her forceful 
analogy Kempe would have no means of reconciling her sexually active past with her later 
redemption and public role. 
Ute Stargadt expresses similar regrets about Kempe's mothering of the infant Christ, in 
language which insists on a clear distinction between "spiritual" and "physical" that is foreign 
to Kempe: 
In contrast to devout men for whom imitation of the Virgin Mary always remained 
the spiritual exercise it was meant to be, the women mystics, perhaps because of 
their sex, frequently lost sight of the spiritual nature of their imitatio, translating 
spiritual concepts into purely physical sensations and experiences. Their visions of 
Christ's infancy are generally accompanied by their own efforts to provide motherly 
care to the Christ child (Stargadt 1985, 292-3. Emphasis added). 
Stargadt is forced by her allegiance to a code of "spiritual" versus physical concerns to see 
Kempe's active devotion to the Christ child (which included helping Mary with the business 
of mothering and dressing the infant Christ (Kempe 1988, 53-4)) as "purely physical" and not 
as the spiritual exercise for women it was scripted as in works such as the Meditationes Vitae 
.Christi (Love 1992, 190; Gibson 1989, 15, 49-53). While such a clear distinction has little 
bearing on the devotions fostered in Kempe's culture, it has played an integral part in the 
construction of a critical discourse of mysticism in this century in which disembodiment is 
a sign of spiritual truth. This dualist position is, however, as Beckwith has said, "itself a 
mystification" and ultimately unsustainable in relation to mystical speech. 
While the intactness of the body is already undermined in the Christian view of the subject 
- since no one is immune from the breaching of physical boundaries by the "fissured flesh" 
- in the mystical encounter the flesh becomes the site of divine communication perceived by 
the mystic through its effects in the body and the senses. The means of mystical 
communication tend towards physical excesses: mystics experience sensations of burning or 
freezing, strange sights, sounds and smells. Lochrie observes that in mystical texts, the mark 
of transgression of the body's integrity is "the breakdown of a construct which otherwise rests 
securely on [its] external/internal demarcation .... the distinction between literal and figurative 
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language" (Lochrie 1991a, 70). She describes the works of Richard Rolle, a contemporary of 
Margery Kempe whose writings are, like hers, "emotional and enthusiastic ll (Atkinson 1983, 
145), in which an account of mystical love as "'fire,' 'sweetness,' and 'song,' eludes the 
distinctions between spiritual and physical, and hence, figurative and literal semantic fields" 
(Lochrie 1991a, 70)Y 
While critics such as Stargadt and Riehle persist in claiming for these images the status of 
metaphor, the experience thus described seems to resist such a neat separation. Mystical 
speech aims to transmit that which exceeds common (theological) knowledge; situating itself 
at the boundaries of what can be comprehended by the human, it is "always located in (or 
straying into) abjection ll (Lochrie 1991a, 71), in(to) the subject's sense of the borders of its 
corporeality. As a result, conventional representations of the body are frequently destabilised 
and brought into question in mystical texts. But this is especially likely to occur in the 
writings of a mystic like Kempe, who is situated in the tradition of devotion which clearly 
privileges the physical. The embarrassed responses of critics in the negative tradition to 
positive mystical texts like Kempe's reflects the precarious situation of the body in mysticism 
and the futility of attempts to get beyond the social sphere in its portrayal. 
The Neoplatonic assumptions of the negative way are directly opposed to the feminine and 
maternal aspects of experience on which Kempe's mysticism insists, as was suggested in 
Chapter Three in my discussion of Irigaray's rereading of Plato: 
For Plato, the highest truth - Being, the Good, the Idea - is that which has never 
been born (Irigaray 1985b, 319), never been mortal, never been subjected to the 
vagaries of time and change, never been incarnate, never been indebted to an act of 
intercourse (Irigaray 1985b, 312) or to a period of dependence on the maternal body 
(Whitford 1991a, 112).14 
Likewise, in the negative tradition the "divinization of intelligence" (the ascent to God) is a 
process of consecutive negation of each of these essential components of existence. (Roques 
1987, 5-7). The first to be renounced is the corporeality of the subject and its maternal origin 
(Bischoff 1976, 30). If, from the negative viewpoint, spiritual. truth depends upon the 
outlawing of the body, then the clarity of distinction between literal and figurative language 
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in mystical texts becomes a sign of the truth or falsity of the experience there described. Thus 
Stargadt claims that Kempe's 
consistent inability to differentiate between metaphor and actual experience appears 
with most embarrassing clarity in her descriptions of her soul's marriage to the 
Godhead. [Kempe J perceives the unio mystica as the human sex act; accordingly, 
Jesus behaves like a fleshly husband eager to enjoy his conjugal rights (Stargadt 
1985, 300). 
And Riehle, again comparing Kempe with Mechthild of Magdeburg, states that Kempe "comes 
off very badly" in descriptions of her touching God. While Mechthild' s imagery is "powerful, II 
Kempe's "shows the unpleasant side of medieval female mysticism" (Riehle 1981, 114). 
Riehle cites a passage from Kempe's Book in which Christ thanks the mystic for having often 
bathed him in her soul, and another where Kempe takes Christ's toes in her hand when he 
appears to her in a vision (Kempe 1988,255; 249). According to Riehle, "this is certainly an 
expression of the theme of man (sic) touching God, but the 'detour' via the incarnation of 
God becomes almost an end in itself for [Kempe]" (Riehle 1981, 114). As described in 
previous chapters, the emphasis on Christ's Incarnation in Kempe's culture was profound, and 
the physical acting out of Christie devotion was encouraged in spiritual literature for lay 
people. But until quite recently mystical scholars have regarded this popular aspect of 
medieval piety - which influenced medieval mysticism through the activities of women - as 
the degeneration of mysticism proper. 
Kempe's blurring of the boundaries between herself and Christ, and her figuring mystical 
union with him as a physical affair not only brings Christ down to her level but raises her up 
to his. The mystic recognises in the image of her suffering Saviour her own vulnerable 
physicality. The breakdown between literal and figurative language in the expression of this 
recognition is deplored by some of her more conservatively minded critics, but it is the sign 
- as Lochrie holds - of the transgression of bodily boundaries which has always already 
occurred through the mystical subject's situation in the realm of the fissured flesh (Lochrie 
1991a, 70). 
Kempe's identification with Christ in a pseudo-sexual relationship of physical touching means 
that he is represented in her Book as different from and yet similar to herself. Both figures 
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partake of a pervious physicality in which they are alike, and yet, in the bedroom vision, their 
bodies act out the (hetero )sexual script belonging to husband and wife. Kempe's insistence 
on a relationship of sexual difference between herself and Christ speaks of the necessity of 
exchanges with others in the defining of a singular self, and the relationship shows, in the 
(mis)recognitions of its physical encounters, that the individual subject as a self-sufficient 
entity is a fantasy dependent on the responses of other, equally dispersed and fragile selves. 
Thus Beckwith states: 
I would like to argue that the hybridity which is everywhere locatable in The Book 
of Margery Kempe is less a function of Kempe's personality, less her own 
idiosyncratic attribute, than the condition of subjectivity itself. The Book of Margery 
, Kempe foregrounds the very conditions of SUbjectivity by articulating the possibilities 
of its dialogic function. Kempe's account of herself is inevitably partial, because any 
self is hollowed out by its relation to others. But Kempe's text doesn't cover over 
the traces of that relation (Beckwith 1992, 179). 
Because she is not a prime candidate for the category of female saintliness - because she is 
not a virgin - Kempe's self-presentation is interactive and dialogical, as Beckwith claims, 
everywhere throughout her Book, as she seeks .to prove herself a holy woman in relation to 
other sinners and saints. Christ is the most important "otherll through whom the mystic shapes 
her version of herself, although other people's responses to Kempe and hers to them are also 
important, as was seen in previous chapters. But it is the Book's portrayal of Kempe's 
relationship with Christ that has constituted the strongest challenge to a scholarly discourse 
which holds that both the Christian God and the human subject are self-created and self-
sufficient: are, in fact, male-model subjects constituted by a disavowal of the body, of women 
and of sexual difference. 
If, to quote Beckwith again, "by returning to and insisting on grating domestic hierarchies 
against the transcendent, Margery Kempe's positive mysticism embarrasses the myth of God's 
neutral transcendence" (Beckwith 1986, 54), then her mysticism disturbs myths of scholarly 
neutrality as well. Kempe's II embarrassing foregrounding of the insistently physical emphasises 
the contradictions rather than the miraculous resolution of flesh and spirit in the Passion" 
(Beckwith 1986, 54), but it also - in that very physical insistence - plays on the contradictions 
of the exchanges by which human subjects understand themselves as such. Across the very 
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considerable gap of five centuries, I will now tum to a dialogic exploration of some such 
exchanges with Irigaray as one of the speakers in each case. 
In the text of my analysis, Irigaray can no more speak for hers elf than Kempe can, but her 
visionary philosophical texts, like Kempe's book of visions, are works which consistently seek 
after the response of an other (Irigaray 1991i, 149). And in both Irigaray's and Kempe's texts 
differences - primarily but, I want to argue, not necessarily uniquely sexual differences - come 
into play. Irigaray's writings speak of the profound difficulty of recognising that the 
constitution of a particular self is always dependent upon its interactions with others. The self 
which constructs itself by appropriating the voice and body of another (as male subjects do 
to female in Irigaray' s analysis) is an essentially vulnerable creation, and the ethics of its self-
constitutive process cannot be rethought apart from a recognition of the fragility of its state. 
Thus it won't be sufficient to have Irigaray answer her questioners, even in my artificial 
setting up of an interlocutive scene, with arguments for a new kind of subjectivity which 
privileges the female (Irigaray 1985a, 78); rather it is the dialogic, exchange-oriented, ethical 
aspect of her discourse which I next want to address. This chapter's title, "Divine Imaginings," 
refers to the licence to construct a self Margery Kempe takes with the divine who is held up 
to her as a model, a process which is bound up with her envisioning encounters like, but also 
unlike, those she has known. The title also refers, of course, to Irigaray, for whom the divine 
is an agent of imagining relationships and exchanges between different kinds of selves. 
Kempe and her Christ are physically vulnerable figures, and each suffers out of a kind of love 
and desire for the other. The divine in Irigaray seems to serve too as the visionary middle 
ground between human subjects, providing space for a range of affects and issues for which, 
in conventional subject-formation, there is no space. While Kempe pictures an afterlife in 
which her exchanges with Christ will transform her totally, including or especially her 
physical being, Irigaray's philosophical utopianism must be fleshed out in the present, between 
selves, in order to test the value of her visions. The following dialogues are an attempt to 
themselves envision, at times question the validity of, and explore how this complex and 
difficult process might take place. 
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4. 2 Beyond Dualities: Seductive Dialogues and Carnal Exchange(s) 
4. 2. 1 Dialogue #1: Irigaray and Lacan 
What gives some likelihood to what I am arguing, that is, that the woman knows 
nothing of this jouissance, is that ever since we've been begging them on our knees 
to try to tell us about it, well, not a word! We have never managed to get anything 
out of them (Lacan 1987b, 146). 
The question whether, in his logic, they can articulate anything at all, whether they 
can be heard, is not even raised. For raising it would mean granting that there may 
be some other logic, and one that upsets his own. That is, a logic that challenges 
mastery (Irigaray 1985a, 90). 
Elizabeth Berg has stated that, in her view, "all of lrigaray's work is in some sense to be 
understood as a dialogue with Lacan, although his name is spectacularly missing from her 
books ll (Berg 1982, 16). This is certainly true insofar as Lacan has been a structural influence 
on lrigaray's involvement with psychoanalysis (Whitford 1991 b, 6),15 and her involvement 
with psychoanalysis colours her entire oeuvre. But the spectacular absence (or lack) of the 
name of her father-mentor in Irigaray's work is her own kind of response to and reversal of 
what she describes as Lacan's inability to hear the speech of women (Irigaray 1985a, 112-3, 
cited in Grosz 1990a, 175-6). In her writings Irigaray engages with Lacan as a rebellious 
daughter: he is the father whose law she rej ects although she has suffered a rej ection in 
return. 16 And yet, as Berg points out, her readings are not only attacks on lithe father of 
psychoanalysis" but also "demands for love" (Berg 1982, 16). 
lrigaray challenges the terms on which Lacan claims that there can be no relation between the 
sexes by her insistent demand to be recognised as an "other woman," as a woman who speaks 
from a position other than the place of fantasy in excess of the phallic term (Ragland-Sullivan 
1991,60; Mitchell and Rose, introductory remarks to Lacan 1987b, 137). This is the situation 
ascribed to women in Lacan's account of the differentiation between the sexes which occurs 
in the symbolic order of language. For Lacan IIwomanllfunctions as the symptom of the lack 
inherent in the passage to SUbjectivity of all speaking beings, which achievement takes place 
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with reference to fundamental loss or castration (Rose 1987, 31, 40; Ragland-Sullivan 1991, 
56). Jacqueline Rose articulates the Lacanian view: 
Symbolisation starts ... when the child gets its first sense that something could be 
missing; words stand for objects, because they only have to be spoken at the moment 
when the first object is lost. For Lacan, the subject can only operate within language 
by constantly repeating that moment of fundamental and irreducible division. The 
subject is therefore constituted in language as this division or splitting (Rose 1987, 
31 ).17 
Because of the different positions that women and men are required to take up in the symbolic 
order - with regard to the fantasy of beinglhaving the phallus - "woman" becomes the site of 
the fantasy of a possibility of relation between the sexes. That is, both language and sexuality 
are played out in the social domain where each subject believes that there is another who will 
satisfy its lack or desire. According to Lacan this belief is a fantasy and the site of its 
projection is the Other which is assumed by the speaking subject (Lacan 1977c, 172; Rose 
1987, 32-3). The fantasy of wholeness which the Other of the speaking subject would 
complete is a phallic fantasy, in that the phallus symbolically stands in for the loss all subjects 
experience at their entry into the symbolic order. "Woman," existing on the side of this Other, 
functions then as the symptom of lack in the fantasy (Lacan 1987b, 151; Rose 1987, 50; 
Brennan 1994, 66). Thus Lacan's claim that there can be no relation between the sexes 
depends upon the premise that women and men must take their places as speaking subjects 
on one side or another of the phallic term. 
Irigaray takes issue with Lacan's articulation of "woman" as existing in a position in excess 
of - and of excess within - the symbolic order, as a "category within language" and "the 
fantasy of her definition" (Rose 1987, 47) insofar as this view makes it impossible to posit 
women as desiring subjects. In the essay "Cosi fan tutti," published in This Sex Which Is Not 
One, Irigaray undertakes a reading of Lacan that challenges the terms on which his view of 
"woman" "beyond the phallus" rests, as part of her wider project of beginning to articulate the 
conditions under which women might speak as women, so as to be able to be heard and 
understood as such. The essay was written in direct response to Lacan's Le Seminaire xx, 
225 
Encore (Rose 1987, 54n), in which he presents the figure of the female mystic as an exemplar 
of the female position in discourse. 
In the essay "God and the Jouissance of The Woman" (Chapter Six of Le Seminaire .xx; 
Encore), Lacan explores "woman"'s relation to jouissance, his name for that which exceeds 
the phallic term by which sexual identity is marked. He describes the mystic - man or woman 
- as the figure who seeks access to this excess or jouissance (Lacan 1987b, 147), and cites 
Bernini's statue of the ecstatic-agonised St Theresa in Rome as a model of a woman 
experiencing such an excess of desire: 
There is ajouissance proper to her [woman], to this "her" which does not exist and 
which signifies nothing. There is ajollissance proper to her and of which she herself 
may know nothing, except that she experiences it - that much she does know .... You 
only have to go and look at Bernini's statue in Rome to understand immediately that 
she's coming, there is no doubt about it. And what is her jouissance, her coming 
from? It is clear that the essential testimony of the mystics is that they ar 
experiencing it but know nothing about it (Lacan 1987b, 145, 147). 
Thus Lacan "essentially" mystifies female sexuality as the site of an unsignifiable excess, and 
the speech of the (female) mystic is the nearest woman II comes II to speaking her desire. 
Jacqueline Rose suggests that: 
Lacan's reference to woman as Other needs ... to be seen as an attempt to hold apart 
two moments which are in constant danger of collapsing into each other - that which 
assigns woman to the negative place of its own (phallic) system, and that which asks 
the question as to whether women might, as a very effect of that assignation, break 
against and beyond that system .itself (Rose 1987, 51-2). 
However because, "for Lacan, that break is always within language" (Rose 1987, 52) as it is 
constructed with reference to the phallus, the question of women's breaking or speaking 
against the system is, in Irigaray's view, always recuperated again within it. She scathingly 
points to Lacan's citation of St Theresa as a specific example of this appropriative process. 
In "Cosi fan tutti" she states her view that "psychoanalytic discourse about female sexuality 
is the discourse of truth II and the logic of that truth is "that the feminine occurs only within 
models and laws devised by male subjects" (Irigaray 1985a, 86). Irigaray claims that lithe 
question" of what women can say of their own sexuality/desire (or of what women want, to 
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put it in Freudian terms) cannot be articulated within the system of Lacan's psychoanalytic 
logic: 
And to make sure this [question] does not come up, the right to experience pleasure 
is awarded to a statue. IIJust go and look at Bernini's statue in Rome, you'll see right 
away that St Theresa is coming, there's no doubt about it." 
In Rome? So far away? To look? At a statue? Of a saint? Sculpted by a man? What 
pleasure are we talking about? Whose pleasure? For where the pleasure of the 
Theresa in question is concerned, her own writings are perhaps more telling (Irigaray 
1985a, 90-1). 
Irigarayi s own relentless questions articulate what Lacan's discourse is forced to leave out, 
what he claims women cannot say for themselves, as she reads his reading of St Theresa as 
a symptom of his own desire to speak on behalf of women and appropriate their pleasure to 
his seductive speech. Lacan's reference to a statue in Rome of a woman "coming," sculpted 
by a man, indicates for Irigaray his investment in female sexuality as it is enclosed and 
defined within masculine parameters. She asks how we can know whose pleasure is being 
expressed through a man's artistic representation of a woman in ecstasy, insofar as the 
traditions and requirements surrounding such a representation dictate what is able to be 
expressed. The citing by Lacan of a statue of a woman created by a man not only fixes the 
saint's desire in the frame of masculine referentiality, but sets her up as an object in a 
specular logic of phallic desire: lIyou only have to go and look at Bernini's statue in Rome 
to understand immediately that she's coming" (Lacan 1987b, 147. Emphasis added). Thus in 
Lacan's terms the articulation of feminine pleasure can only be read from the perspective of 
the visible, that is, the phallic, as evidenced by his citing a statue made of stone as an 
example, with the obvious phallic connotations that such an image conveys. 
In fact, as Grosz points out, Lacan's specularisation of St Theresa, his glorifying of her 
jouissance as unsignifiable or "beyond the phallus," affirms the phallus as: 
the fixed reference point, the only given signifier for symbolic and sexual 
representation. Irigaray instead makes clear that if this jOllissance is IIbeyond the 
phallus" it is not, for that matter, unsignifiable. This is not ajouissance that woman 
cannot know or say; rather, it is ajollissance that Lacan cannot hear for he does not 
know how, or even where, to listen. The valorization of certain modes of 
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representation .... woman as the incoherent or silent counterpart of man - and the 
disavowal of his own position as listener makes the male interlocutor unable to hear 
other than what he wishes to hear (Grosz 1990a, 175. See also Evans 1991, 242). 
Like the critics of the traditional schools of Christian mystical scholarship, Lacan takes the 
part of the speaker on the side of negative mysticism, that is, a discourse in which what is 
said (often by women) remains essentially inexpressible and resists the return to the earthly 
sphere. David Tracy holds the view that an analogy to Lacan can be found in "the Western 
monotheistic traditions" where "a peculiar kind of apophatic mysticism l1 emerges. He 
maintains that "all-literally all- that interests Lacan in Teresa (sic) of Avila is herjouissance 
and the excess and radical negations it disc10ses tl (Tracy 1988,269. Emphasis added).ls Lacan 
identifies the mystification of Itwoman" in IIwestern" culture with the idea of God, as Irigaray 
also does, but he maintains that this connection depends upon IIwoman"'s essential lack of 
knowledge concerning her desire: "It is in so far as her jouissance is radically Other that the 
woman has a relation to God greater than all that has been stated in ancient speculation .. ,II 
(Lacan 1987b, 153. See also 147; Rose 1987, 50; Brennan 1994, 74-5). lrigaray, on the other 
hand, seeks to exploit the association formed in phallocentrism between "woman" and God 
by insistently and strategically concretising the divine in the female body. 
As we saw in section 4. 1, an adherence to the tenets of negative mysticism hides, by means 
of that system's Platonic aspect, the appropriation of the physical - normally signified by 
"woman" - which it in turn disavows. Just as scholars of mysticism who defend the negative 
way outlaw the female body and female sexuality from their texts, so Lacan presents St 
Theresa as a figure experiencing a physical excess she knows nothing of and cannot activate, 
an excess in effect beyond or outlawed from within his discourse. 19 The discourse of negative 
mysticism, too, in its Platonist tendencies, privileges the visual, which is constructed so as to 
deny the physical location of the mystical seeker/speaker (Irigaray 1985b, 243-364; Chapter 
Three, 181-3). 
An example from Knowles highlights the similarities of this position with the Lacanian view 
of the mystic/female subject. Describing what he sees as the achievement of the fourteenth-
century anchoress Julian of Norwich at the conclusion of his study of "the English mystical 
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tradition," Knowles states that (and the differences from his previously quoted comments on 
Margery Kempe are striking): 
Her strength lies in the impression she gives of having pondered the mysteries of the 
faith with spiritual eyes illuminated by contemplative grace; her effect upon us is to 
bear us away with her into a world that is wholly spiritual. She tells of what she has 
seen, and though she may give counsel and direction, she is not addressing a 
particular individual or class, but is putting into words, for all who have ears to hear, 
the inexpressible truth she has experienced .... The substance of her message comes 
from within, and from what she has seen in her soul (Knowles 1964, 190. Emphasis 
added). 
While lithe substance of [Julian's] message comes from within," its outward expression is 
subject to' a rigid code of articulation. The mystic's strength - for Knowles - lies in the 
impression she conveys of a world that is untainted by the physical and the female, in contrast 
to Kempe, for instance, whose excesses "contaminate" the discourse of mysticism (Knowles 
1955, 222). Julian's physical/mystical responses to the divine are not evident or foremost in 
her text and this commends her to Knowles, just as St Theresa's excesses are only endorsed 
in Lacan through the work of Bernini, encased in stone. In fact, in this form their specificity 
is annulled, they are not really" excessive ll at all. 
In relation to Lacan's "apophatic mysticism" Irigaray may be seen to take the part of the 
woman visionary in the positive tradition. Whereas Lacan's version of Theresa privileges 
sight, Irigaray,s writings privilege touch as the means by which women articulate their 
sexuality in the absence of visual representation( s) of their own. Irigaray's famous 
representation of female sexuality in the image of the female genital lips is a primary example 
of this tendency in her work. The lips are figured as "neither one nor two" (Irigaray 1985a, 
26), that is, as situated somewhere beyond, because unrepresentable within, the phallic 
economy of singular forms. She presents their contiguous relationship of ceaseless touching 
(or exchange) as a possible female model of bodily and social experience.2o This figuration 
of touching and of female physicality is an attempt to challenge psychoanalytic theory's 
designation of IIwoman" as (the symptom of) lack. Reinterpreting female sexuality through 
an image of excess in this way is Irigaray's means of positing .or envisioning alternative terms 
of understanding female bodies and pointing up the arbitrariness of the rule of the phallic 
signifier, at the same time as highlighting the disavowed material aspects of phallocentric law. 
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Touching is also a figure in Irigaray's work which suggests the desirability of genuine sexual 
exchange or a relation between the sexes (Irigaray 1986c; 1991d, 178, 181-3; 1993b, 110-11, 
167)?1 The two lips may be read as expressing this possibility through their figuring a model 
of potentially active subjectivity for women (Irigaray 1985a, 25-6, 205-18). If there were 
different modes of autonomous selfuood (Le., of sexual representation) for male and female 
subjects, according to Irigaray, then productive sexual and cultural exchange could occur. 
However male-female exchange on a symbolic level is also necessary in order for women to 
accede to subjectivity. In other words, unless men accept that the conditions of their 
subjectivity involve the non-representation of women as specific subjects, neither recognised 
sexual difference nor legitimate female subjectivity seem likely. In Irigaray's view, Lacan's 
claim that there can be no sexual relation in the symbolic order is based on a fundamental 
unwillingness to shift his ground and examine the construction of his own position as 
listener/speaker, his own place in the phallic system of bodily representation. His speaking on 
behalf of a representation of St Theresa in the form of a statue is a symptom for Irigaray of 
the distance he takes from his own physical situation (the specific place from which he 
speaks), and the way in which the disavowal of his physical position is proj ected onto a 
woman/women. 
In the quotations which form the epigraphs to this section, Lacan and Irigaray speak across 
each other because the terms of their discourses are fundamentally opposed. lrigaray contends 
that Lacan's inability to hear women speak arises from his manifest desire to appropriate 
female speech into his argument as to the construction of language ("What gives some 
likelihood to what I am arguing .. .is that we have never managed to get anything out of 
them").22 The primary focus of Irigaray's challenge to Lacan in her essay is not, I would 
argue, as some Lacanian critics assume, the positing of a completely "other logic ll in which 
women might be heard (Rose 1987, 55; Ragland-Sullivan 1991, 54),23 but the raising of the 
question of Lacan's own position and the terms on which he speaks. For her both of these 
moves are in a sense necessary in order for (sexualllinguistic) exchange to occur, but the first 
cannot take place without the second. It is true that for Irigaray, this question is intimately 
connected with what she sees as the outlawing of female speech and bodiliness in 
conventional discourse, but her aim is to activate an exchange between female and male 
subjects which would transform the symbolic order and would reflect the appropriated-yet-
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excessive (present yet unsymbolised) nature of femininity within that order, rather than to set 
up an alternative to it. For her the new must be wrought from the transformations of the old, 
that is from the shifting of the terms of binaries currently operative in phallocentric culture, 
and from nowhere else. 
Positive mysticism, too, argues for the importance of the here and now and of a physically 
representable relation between the mystic and the divine. Its texts clearly display the bodily 
involvement of its practitioners, usually women, with and in the version of the divine they 
portray. It is also a discourse of movement rather than stasis, fluidity rather than firmness: 
positive mystical texts abound in imagery of blood, tears, wounds, bodies without boundaries, 
wailings and ecstatic convulsions. Female mystics in the positive tradition demonstrate their 
love for God "hysterically," re-presenting the physical sufferings and convulsions of their 
Saviour through their own bodies' seizures and uncontrolled excess. They refuse the disavowal 
of their physical being on which negative mystical discourse is based, and their bodies are 
present in their mystical texts as the site of their seductive and excessive encounters with the 
divine. 
Both Lacan's and Irigaray's texts are "seductive," both claim to undercut the "mastery" of 
their own discourse by the deliberate vagaries and slippage of their speech. And both 
simultaneously succeed and fail in this task, as their efforts to destabilise their own speaking 
positions necessarily form part of their ultimately comprehensible if complex texts (Rose 
1987, SOn; Holmlund 1991, 303). However their seductive "dialogue" leads to no exchange, 
and the figure of St Theresa in Bernini's incarnation of her may be seen to stand between 
them representing, in the medium of stone, their impassable differences from each other. Both 
Irigaray and Lacan read the mystic's excesses and their representation differently and in doing 
so, each takes the place of the mystic her/himself in their desire to speak of the social order 
from a strategically marginal place. 
lrigaray, in what may be termed her alignment with positive mysticism, aims, like Kempe, 
to bring the (female) body back into phallocentric discourse and thereby to II embarrass II its 
claims to neutrality, transcendence and the masculine ability to speak on behalf of women. 
It is her intention to demystify the basis of Lacan' s claim that women exist as symptoms of 
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the "lack in being" (Rose 1987, 40) of the human condition. Thus, in IICosi fan tutti," she 
insistently returns to the question of the representation of female physicality in the 
phallocentric order, and the connection between this lack and the construction of the symbolic 
order (and the non-relation between the sexes) as Lacan describes it. In appropriating female 
bodiliness to itself, in failing to address the matricide at its origin, phallocentric discourse and 
psychoanalytic theory cause "woman ll to occupy the place of God as invisible and silent 
support to the male speaking subject (Irigaray 1985a, 97). 
While Lacan claims that "womanl"s excessive pleasure (her jouissance) is the result of her 
position beyond the phallus, Irigaray asserts that female sexuality is produced and rendered 
inarticulable within such a system of representation: 
Sexual pleasure is engulfed then in the body of the Other. It is IIproducedll because 
the Other, in part, escapes the grasp of discourse. 
Phallicism compensates for this discursive crisis, sustaining itself upon the Other, 
nourishing itself with the Other, desiring itself through the Other, even without ever 
relating to it as such. A barrier, a break, a fantasmatic cutting-out, a signifying 
economy, an order, a law, govern the enjoyment of the body of the Other. 
Henceforth subject to enumeration: one by one (Irigaray 1985a, 97-8). 
The figure of St Theresa, arrested in motion, is, then, for Irigaray, a symbol of the invisibility 
of female desire in masculinist culture. In her reading, the statue signifies the construction and 
appropriation of female bodiliness as excess on which the symbolic order is founded, whereas 
for Lacan, the saint's excess remains - on his terms - visible (llyou only have to go and 
look. .. to understand that she's coming ll)' 
Irigaray advances an articulation of the female "excess ll outlawed in phallocentric discourse 
in the next IIseductive ll work I will examine, a section of Marine Lover, her overtly amorous 
dialogue with Friedrich Nietzsche. In this dialogic text Irigaray sets out to seduce the 
philosopher by playing the part of the "marine lover" or outlawed woman she discovers in his 
texts. While in several ways her project is fundamentally opposed to that of Nietzsche, she 
nonetheless seeks to articulate the terms of an exchange - specifically in the section of the 
work I will examine by means of a revisioning of the figures of Christ and his Mother. In 
this dialogue, exploring the conditions of a possible representation of female bodiliness in the 
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symbolic is an important focus. Irigaray's verSiOn of Christ challenges both traditional 
Christianity and the Nietzschean interpretation, and envisions a culture not based on the 
phallocentric repetition of the same. In thise sense it moves toward - more so than the 
dialogue with Lacan - a representation of carnal exchange. 
4. 2. 2 Dialogue #2: Irigaray and Nietzsche 
But when Zarathustra was alone, he spoke thus to his heart: "Could it be possible! 
This old saint has not yet heard in his forest that God is dead!" (Nietzsche 1968, 41) 
, Does the "death of God" not mean, therefore, the end of the security lodged with, 
of the credit accorded to, those who thus suspend meaning in the letter? Those who 
immobilize life in something that is merely the trace of life? The preachers of death 
who paralyze the becoming of peoples? Those who indefinitely repeat the identical, 
because they are unable to discover difference? (Irigaray 1991d, 169) 
Irigaray's 1980 book on Nietzsche marks a new departure in her work, which Carolyn Burke 
describes as an attempt "to initiate a sideways dialogue with the masters of philosophy whom 
she tried to approach head-on in her earlier writing" (Burke 1989,227). The methods of this 
oblique conversation were, however, present - if less dominant - in her earlier texts. In This 
Sex Which Is Not One, originally published in 1977, she describes her intention in engaging 
with the works of Plato, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Lacan, Levi-Strauss, and Marx in Speculum 
and This Sex as part of a project of "destroying [masculinist philosophical artifice] with 
nuptial tools," and "hav[ing] a fling with the philosophers" (Irigaray 1985a, 150; Holmlund 
1991, 292). In the seminar in which these comments occur Irigaray describes conventional 
philosophical and theoretical discourse as having played a role - in regard to women - which 
is normally ascribed to women themselves, that of seduction. She states that philosophy's 
claims to universality have led women astray from a path toward achieving cultural specificity 
(Irigaray 1985a, 150). With reference to the production-as-appropriation of female concerns 
within philosophical thought-systems, Irigaray claims to be deliberately engaged upon a 
strategic mimicry of the role of "woman" as seductress. This mimetic process has the dual 
effect of mocking that misogynistic trope at the same time as it aims to reappropriate 
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phallocentric discourse, to find a way to speak (as a woman?) from within it without being 
captured there.24 
But although this seductive method is employed in Speculum and This Sex, Marine Lover 
marks the beginning of Irigaray' s focus upon the figure of the heterosexual female lover, as 
Christine Holmlund points out (Holmlund 1991, 293), and her taking on this role more 
emphatically in her dialogues with male philosophers. While this new emphasis in Irigaray's 
work is evident throughout Marine Lover and cannot be ignored, I will address the issue 
specifically in the following section, where I put questions of my own to Irigaray in relation 
to her - for me, problematic - turn toward focusing almost solely on the refiguration of 
heterosexual relations. In this section, I am primarily concerned with a necessarily selective 
aspect of Irigaray' s interrogation of Nietzsche, and will focus upon the final part of Marine 
Lover, entitled "The Crucified One" (Irigaray 1991d, 164-90) and subtitled "Epistle to the last 
Christians," which occurs in the book's third section, "When the Gods are Born." 
The whole of Marine Lover is, as Irigaray has said, intended as an amorous dialogue with 
Nietzsche: "Amante marine .. .is not a book on Nietzsche but with Nietzsche who for me is a 
partner in a love relationship" (Irigaray 1981a, 44, qtd. in Holmlund 1991, 295). Thus 
Irigaray's dialogue with Nietzsche is more artful, playful and overtly seductive than her 
dialogue with Lacan, in the sense that in Marine Lover she attempts to act out what she sees 
as the cultural conditions for the transformation of a same-sex economy into a productive or 
carnal (in her terms heterosexual) exchange. As Frances Oppel notes: Marine Lover is 
"responsive to the rhetorical polyvalence" of Nietzsche's writing, and its narrative voices "take 
up positions not so much of opposition and antagonism towards Nietzsche's texts as of 
contiguity and comradeship-at-arms" (Oppel 1993, 88). At the outset of the book Irigaray says 
to Nietzsche: 
How I should love you, if to speak to you were possible. 
And yet I still love you too well in my silences to remember the movement of my 
own becoming. Perpetually am I troubled, stirred, frozen, or smothered by the noise 
of your death (Irigaray 1991d, 3). 
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She then proceeds to dismantle the philosopher's arguments - seductively - by insinuating her 
own voice into his texts, questioning the ways in which he appropriates the figure of "woman" 
and introducing the terms on which she believes women's desire may be able to be heard.25 
The book is one of a projected tetralogy (three of which have been published to date26) 
consisting of amorous dialogues with male philosophers. In these texts Irigaray evokes the 
pre-Socratic scheme of the four elements (air, earth, fire, and water?7 as a means of insisting 
upon that which she claims is excluded from masculinist philosophical texts: female bodies, 
constructed as passive materiality and as the Ilnatural" substrata of (masculine) cultural 
achievements (Grosz 1989, 168), as well as an adequate formulation of the passions and the 
experience of the senses. It seems that in these works Irigaray is attempting to suggest an 
alternative understanding of "the natural" and women's association with it as a means of 
rearticulating the terms of the nature/culture binary and its role in the construction of 
discourse. In Marine Lover she personifies the element of water in order to challenge 
Nietzsche's appropriation of "woman"; she figures a female "marine" lover to evoke the 
amniotic fluids of maternal origin and female sexual pleasure or jouissance (Irigaray 1981 a, 
48-9). Irigaray considers that Nietzsche appropriates these aspects of women's experience in 
the development of his ideas. Hence her dialogue with him is an attempt to deconstruct the 
philosopher's works while playing a teasing game which enacts the return of the repressed 
feminine element within them.28 
Nietzsche has been described as initiating a strain in the history of "western" philosophy 
which destabilises the primacy of consciousness by focusing on the body as the site of social 
inscription (Grosz 1993; 1994, 115; Diprose 1993, 3; Vasseleu 1993, 71). Irigaray shares this 
view and, as Frances Oppel claims, Marine Lover's method of a "corps-a.-corps" or 
performative writing is based on her perception of Nietzsche's use of language as 
"embodyingll its own concerns: 
The book does not argue a hypothesis, as theory does, but more in the manner of 
fiction or poetry it demonstrates or enacts its effects through the use of a battery of 
rhetorical strategies: repetition, polyvocality, allusion, ambiguity and contradiction; 
a sensuous diction, mimicry, parody and irony; open-ended ness; a linguistic duplicity 
much like Nietzsche's (Oppel 1993, 92). 
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In this sense Marine Lover articulates a language like that of positive mysticism, and yet, 
despite its obvious debt to Nietzsche, the text challenges the male philosopher on terms which 
align him with the same self-distancing qualities portrayed in the negative mystical tradition. 
Marine Lover's subject-matter and organisation reflect a focus on the Nietzschean concept of 
eternal return, just as the earlier Speculum "fixed the eternal return as a metaphor for the 
phallogocentric economy of the Same, in which women are trapped as men's mrrrors, 
prolonging the work of death" (Oppel 1993, 93). 
In Nietzsche the" eternal return" signifies the impossibility of escape from the work of human 
self-creation, an escape which is frequently sought, he argues, through the concept of the 
Christian God, according to which the self professes obedience to an other (Nietzsche 1968, 
109-11)?9 The notion of the eternal return is elaborated in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, but its 
import can be seen to pervade the body of Nietzsche's work, since essentially it articulates 
the belief that there is no ultimate purpose or (divine) end to the events of the universe, and 
as a result the passionate, self-willed actions of individuals are all-important; they constitute 
the substance and meaning of human life. Marine Lover however is an attempt to produce the 
"eternal return II differently, to recast Nietzsche's notion of IIbecoming" in terms of the 
Irigarayan divine (the sensible transcendental), which recognises and celebrates its debt to the 
female and maternal (Oppel 1993, 94) and seeks to elaborate the concept of a "horizon ll for 
the development of female subjectivity.30 In the process, the text portrays Nietzsche's 
conception of IIcreative self-fabrication II (Diprose 1993, .9) - his view of a self-generated 
humanity unbound by moral rules - as a masculine projection which relies on the disavowed 
substance of "woman. II 
The second section of the book, IIVeiled Lips, II points out that women do indeed - as the 
philosopher says - function as mere appearance or falsehood in IIwestern ll metaphysics and 
modern culture (Nietzsche 1973, 13, cited in Vasseleu 1993, 80; Diprose 1993, 16). But 
Irigaray claims that they are reduced to this role by their representation within an economy 
of truth that simultaneously incorporates and excludes their physical being (Whitford 1991 a, 
114)/1 to which Nietzsche's discourse is not immune. In this economy, IIwoman ll belongs to 
,lIthe world of appearances which is supposed to be transcended in the final vision of truth" 
(Whitford 1991a, 114), a description of the workings of malestream philosophising which also 
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describes the negative mystical approach to the divine. In Irigaray's manifest desire "to 
reconsider the material bases that underlie the demand for coherence and system in Western 
metaphysics" (Burke 1989, 231), she plays the part of the positive mystic, however her 
challenge to Nietzsche in Marine Lover is enacted on the philosopher's own terms. Irigaray 
mimes "woman'" s changeability according to Nietzsche's views, but in order to highlight what 
she sees as the inescapably masculine terms of his idea of self-creation (Vasseleu 1993, 80-1). 
In "The Crucified One" Irigaray takes on Nietzsche's frequently expressed and often 
contradictory views on Christ and Christianity as it has developed in the history of the 
"western" world. Like the rest of the book, this section is as concerned with formulating the 
terms of cultural transformation, of moving beyond dualities in a visionary, even prophetic 
manner, as it is with challenging the assumptions of maculinist philosophical texts. For both 
Nietzsche and Irigaray, Christ is a figure separable from the Christian traditions which grew 
up after his death and have informed the organisation of "western" culture. For Nietzsche, he 
was the "only ... Christian" (Nietzsche 1981b, 612) and the religion which followed in his wake 
was nothing but the degeneration of a noble ideal (Stem 1978, 99). Irigaray also sees Christ 
as representing a potential cultural transformation of a kind which did not occur in the 
centuries following his death, through what she depicts as his validation and celebration of 
the body and the sexual (Irigaray 1989a, 65; 1991d, 181-4). Irigaray's playful answer to 
Nietztsche on Christ, like Marine Lover as a whole, both celebrates and challenges the 
philosopher's views. What she mostly seems to be about is a picking up and teasing out of 
ideas which, in Nietzsche, are provocative but not for her put to sufficiently radical use; that 
is, while Irigaray's view of the divine as an "incentive for...becoming" (Irigaray 1993a, 68) 
is in some ways similar to Nietzsche's rejection of Christianity, she is critical of his tendency 
to recuperate the feminine. 
The idea expressed by Nietzsche, for instance, that "the death of God" signals a necessary and 
productive rethinking of what constitutes meaning in human life is echoed and expanded in 
Marine Lover. As Georg Stauth and Bryan Turner point out: "The death of God for Nietzsche 
was an intellectual and moral challenge which, in bringing to an end the false authority of a 
previous set of institutions, liberated moral agents for a new and dangerous adventure" (Stauth 
and Turner 1988, 138). This view is repeated by Irigaray in the epigraph at the head of this 
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section, but she takes it further, recasting the notion of eternal return by asserting that "those 
who suspend meaning in the letter II - those who have been responsible for male-led, 
institutionalised Christianity - are condemned to II indefinitel y repeat the identical, because they 
are unable to discover difference II (Irigaray 1991d, 169).32 For Irigaray, the real death is the 
annulment of the notion of sexual difference in conventional Christianity through its 
appropriation of the maternal element and its concomitant production of "woman" as mere 
matter. She calls for the "death of God" which Nietzsche proclaimed as heralding the 
"modern" era (Stauth and Turner 1988, 33) to be radicalised so that what she calls the death 
of fertility in Mary (Irigaray 1991 d, 167) may be uncovered and a complete rethinking of the 
place of the female in the Christian tradition and "western" culture can begin. 
Because in Irigaray's view the cultural representation of the Christian God is bound up with 
the construction-as-appropriation of the female and maternal (the Christian God serving as a 
model for masculine subjects of "neutrality" achieved via the transcendence of the body and 
the female) she begins and ends her "Epistle to the Last Christians II in Marine Lover with 
reference to the person of Christ's mother Mary. She argues that the repudiation of Mary's 
birth-giving flesh in the Christian tradition enables Christ to mimic the prior but unsymbolised 
position of the female, signified on his body at the Crucifixion in the form of the side wound 
which resembles the female genitals: 
The threshold that in her crosses the boundaries of the body and gives access to the 
infmite becomes in him a violent, yet already bloodless, penetration, marking the 
passage into Eternity ... She, a dumb virgin with lips closed, occasionally receives the 
favor of a word, which she must bring into the world in the shape of a child of God. 
Mediatrix between Word and flesh, she is the means by which the (male) One passes 
into the other (Irigaray 1991d, 166). 
Irigaray figures Mary as the arch-maternal figure buried beneath "western" phallocentric 
discourse(s), whose silent body and blood fuels its/their speculations: "This is her cross in life, 
this double closure of her lips, upon which is implanted the visible erection of his passion" 
(Irigaray 1991 d, 166). Mary's sexual pleasure and her speech, figured in the image of her 
closed genital and speaking lips, are outlawed in the traditional myths surrounding her Son's 
life. 
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For Nietzsche, Christianity (and particularly the Protestant Christianity in which he was 
raised), in its legalism and ascetic tendencies was regressive and binding of a life fuelled by 
(the) passion(s). In Thus Spake Zarathustra he railed against "the despisers of the body" 
(Nietzsche 1968, 61-3) and in Twilight of the Idols he claimed that the Church has mounted 
"an attack on the roots of passion [which] means an attack on the roots of life." Thus: "the 
practice of the church is hostile to life" (Nietzsche 1981c, 487). In Marine Lover Irigaray 
echoes this attitude but her diagnosis again focuses specifically on the female figure of Mary. 
She concurs with Nietzsche that Christianity is indeed a religion of negativity in relation to 
the body and the passions, but points out that it is such because it has negated the affirmative 
response of Mary at the Annunciation which, if accepted or answered to, if symbolised, would 
have transformed its rigid monotheism. Irigaray's representation of Mary is itself a challenge 
to Nietzsche's conception of "the great yes" (Staten 1990, 23), his endorsement of an approach 
to experience which affirms the willed response of the individual to life in the moment.33 
Irigaray figures the Annunciation as symbolic of a possible encounter with the female, one 
which was not taken up in Christian doctrine and is moreover not addressed by Nietzsche. She 
says of the Virgin at this point in time that: 
as soon as she says, "yes," and without the slightest prophecy or herald, she also is 
"crucified." Before her "son" endures that destiny, and also afterward .... Her "yes" 
subtends Christian culture, which would not exist without her. And if the nature of 
this fiat were questioned, perhaps the basis of centuries of Christianity would need 
to be reevaluated. Because, according to the traditional interpretation, her "yes" is 
equally a "no": a no to her own life. To her conception, her birth, her generation, 
her flowering. No to everything, except the Word of the Father (Irigaray 1991d, 166-
7). 
The Church's refusal to countenance Mary's "yes" as the willed response of an actual person 
leads to the antifeminist, anti-flesh theology it in the main espouses: "No man accompanies 
her: she knows no men. Physical embrace will be banned from this religion of love. Its only 
unions are celebrated between mouth to ear, sometimes with the gaze, always through 
symbolic mediations. Spiritual unions" (Irigaray 1991d, 168). Irigaray finds an alternative 
explanation to that given by Nietzsche for Christianity's limitations regarding a life lived in 
productive alignment with human passions. Nietzsche claims that Christ was a "symbolist par 
excellence [who stood] outside all religion" (Nietzsche 1981 b, 605), and he argues that 
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Christianity as a religion has refused Christ's meaning, the display of a "deep instinct for how 
one must live" according to the depths of feeling (Nietzsche 1981b, 607). But he does not 
consider the essential contribution of Mary to Christ's earthly existence, which his "integrity" 
of "instinct and passion" celebrates (Nietzsche 1981b, 609). 
For Irigaray, the appropriation and sacrifice of the maternal sets the terms for a religion and 
a morality in which genuine exchange between the sexes - on equal terms - is outlawed. 
Irigaray argues that for such exchange to occur it would be necessary to rethink the birth-
giving process and the symbolic colonisation by man of his first "home II (the womb), which 
is reflected in Christ's rebirth after death from the walls of his tomb in Gethsemane.34 Thus 
the Christian myth of Christ's Resurrection is a version of the process which takes place as 
subjects are birthed into the patriarchal symbolic order in which the maternal is subsumed 
within the masculine. In this part of Marine Lover Irigaray asserts her view that religious 
symbolisations are deeply complicit with dominant sociocultural formations and 
understandings of the body. 
However it is equally true that for her the divine is an agent of subversive possibility which 
can be rethought and refigured in excess of its hegemonic representations. She concurs with 
Nietzsche's view of Christianity as stultifying the creative possibilities or "becoming" of the 
human; however like the mystic in the positive tradition who alters the terms of the man-God 
exchange by her participation with God-in-the-flesh (her own as well as his), Irigaray seeks 
to rewrite Christianity in terms of a response to the substance of female flesh: 
According to Christianity, God is found only in Distance .... And what if, for Mary, 
the divine occurred only near at hand? So near that it thereby becomes unnameable. 
Which is not to say that it is nothing. But rather the coming of a reality that is alien 
to any already-existing identity. Relationship within a more mysterical place than 
any proximity that can be localized. An effusion that goes beyond and stops short 
of any skin that has been closed back on itself. The deepest depths of the flesh, 
touched, birthed, and without a wound (Irigaray 1991 d, 171). 
Here Irigaray can be seen as critiquing the Nietzschean notion of the distancing of the self 
which is bound up with the concept of the eternal return. In Nietzsche's view of self-creation 
the eternal return frees the self from attempts to escape the past through a positive recognition 
that no one lived moment is the same as another. But lrigaray argues that the self the 
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philosopher imagines is a male-model self; as Rosalyn Diprose observes: "Nietzsche often 
speaks as if the distance within the self effected by making the moment one's own is 
generated by the self alone," whereas in fact it is always mediated through relationships with 
others (Diprose 1993, 9). Irigaray reads Mary in the final section of Marine Lover as the 
quintessential - but unrecognised - other or mediator of the social relations endorsed by 
Christianity, a figure whose profound embodiment of the divine (transcendence) would 
provoke, if recognised, a challenge to Nietzsche's view of Christianity as well as the 
Nietzschean notion of (self-)creativity as an isolated, individual act. 
In a broad sense Irigaray's desire for a view of the divine which would help validate and 
extend tne representational possibilities of human bodies is in accord with Nietzsche's call for 
a celebration of life and "an ante dote to nihilism" (Stauth and Turner 1988, 137).35 Ultimately, 
however, she depicts Nietzsche as a proponent of the death-dealing philosophising which is 
based on an unrecognised disavowal of the feminine. In this respect she can be seen to 
repudiate Nietzsche as bound to the same distancing procedures which are endorsed in the 
negative mystical way. She states that he has perhaps: 
experienced and shown what is the result of infinite distance reabsorbed into the 
(male) same, shown the difference that remains without a face or countenance .... 
There is no other that might allow him to continue to make himself flesh. No other 
to set the limits of his corporeal identity with and for him, putting his latest thought 
into the background so a new one can be born (Irigaray 1991d, 187). 
For Irigaray, the philosopher fails to open himself to exchange with a female other (with 
herself perhaps, the "marine lover" who is speaking) and so, "by wishing to overcome 
everything, he plunges into the shadows ... with no perspective II (Irigaray 1991d, 187). Despite 
the scope of Nietzsche's philosophy and the grand assertions expressed within it, he is unable 
to produce ideas which are genuinely fruitful and transformative of culture because he insists 
on speaking "universal," not specifically situated anywhere. Admitting no lllimits [to] his 
corporeal identity" is the result of denying female bodiliness in his speech, of setting himself 
up as the one who speaks for all. Thus in Irigaray's reading his thoughts are doomed to be 
sterile: "The sacrifice he makes to the Idea is inscribed in this - that he preferred the Idea to 
an ever provisional openness to a female other" (Irigaray 1991d, 187).36 
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Like the critics influenced by negative mysticism, Nietzsche - in Irigaray's VIew -
paradoxically speaks from the position of the masculine God because he insists on universal 
speech, thus repeating the matricidal act which she holds responsible for the sterility of the 
Christian tradition. Hence Nietzsche is unable to produce a philosophy of "becoming" 
sufficient to counter Christianity's paralysing dogma. In Irigaray the concept of "becoming i' 
is connected with her reworking of the divine as a genre-category for women; it appears to 
refer to a process of cultural transformation whieh would follow from a genuine recognition 
of female contributions to cultural life (Irigaray 1991a; 1993a, 68-9). It also refers, in tum, 
to the conditions of emergent female SUbjectivity (Irigaray 1991d, 190), that is, a culture of 
genuine sexual difference and intersexual symbolic exchange. 
In contrast to her view of Nietzsche, Irigaray plays the positive mystic to Christ, reenvisioning 
him as a figure open to human contact and symbolically enabling the expression of sexual 
difference.31 In this way she answers Nietzsche's objections to Christianity by introducing the 
question of sexual difference into its origins, suggesting that its neglect of the feminine is an 
explanation for its denial of bodily passion as celebration of the divine and its lack of cultural 
productivity. She asks: "Must the Christie redemption mean that the advent of the divine has 
never taken place in the incarnation of a loving relation with the other?" and "why could 
[Christ's] presence in the flesh not be perceived as divine?" (Irigaray 1991d, 177). Like 
Kempe, Irigaray (re)introduces touch as the primary trope in her reading of Christ, positing 
it as a symbol of engagement and exchange between different selves which reduces neither. 
Again she asks: 
Was he really untouchable? His miracles are usually based on touch. Even his words 
aim to touch rather than to prove or convince. His teaching is almost always 
contradictory, and converts or heals by touching. A touch that is .... respectful of 
bodily space, of sensual space, of openings in the skin. Each remains [herself or] 
himself, these and those get close, meet, touch one another. Sometimes by a miracle 
in the moment, sometimes by a parable. So that history may be understood without 
understanding - may sprout where no one hears. Achieved from the depths of a flesh 
that sometimes needs time. Does not bear rape. But remains impassive to the letter 
enveloping or masking the message. The letter does not touch .... It remains outside 
the body. Is not, is no longer, made flesh (Irigaray 1991d, 181). 
242 
Finally, Irigaray returns in her own "letter" to the question of Mary's "yes." She contends that 
male subjects, like Nietzsche and like the Christian God, need to learn to say "yes" to female 
subjects; to play the part of responsive others to women who may then be subjects and not 
just objects of desire. She argues for a philosophy of afftrmation which "goes beyond" the 
male-centred one suggested by Nietzsche (Irigaray 1991d, 190), and ends her dialogue with 
him with a series of questions. These concern the reinterpreting of Christ and his legacy in 
"western" culture as a means of rethinking the relationships between "word and nature .... logos 
and cosmos," conventional understandings of the workings of the ("natural" and in tum the 
cultural) world. She suggests that lithe spirit, II instead of being "the product of the love 
between Father and son" - an endorsement of the hommosexual economy38 - might signify 
lithe universe already made flesh or capable of becoming flesh, and remaining in excess to the 
existing world" (Irigaray 1991d, 190). That is, the possibilities for cultural production and 
renewal which arise from a recognition of the female - as flesh, as life-giving, as excessive 
to or other than the male. 
"Grace that speaks silently through and beyond the word?" These are the ftnal words of 
Marine Lover. In the next dialogue I will take up this equivocation, this readiness to engage 
in dialogue which Irigaray's texts purport to express, by articulating some - no more nor less 
equivocal - questions of my own. The section will also explore the dialogue Irigaray has in 
several of her works with the Jewish philosopher and Talmudic scholar, Emmanuel Levinas/9 
a dialogue speciftcally focused on the possibilities of non-appropriative exchange between 
uniquely different selves. In this dialogue I challenge Irigaray on some of the more overt 
exclusions from her work as well as introducing questions which reflect my own particular 
concerns. As well as being a dialogic exploration, the section will serve as a "bridge passage" 
to the fourth dialogue, where I give myself over to a personal response to Irigaray, 
speciftcally the dramatic and performative qualities of her reconftgurations of the female body 
through her idiosyncratic notion of the divine. 
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4. 2. 3 Dialogue #3: Irigaray and Levinas 
"The true life is absent." But we are in the world (Levinas 1979, 33). 
The most intimate perception of the flesh escapes every sacrificial substitution, every 
resumption in a discourse, every surrender to God. Flair or premonition between 
myself and the other, this memory of the flesh as the place of approach is ethical 
fidelity to incarnation. To destroy it risks suppressing alterity, both God's and the 
other's. Thus dissolving all possibility of access to transcendence (Irigaray 1986c, 
256). 
The dialogue Irigaray has with Levinas in her work is in my view especially pervasive, 
particularly of the texts published since 1980 (beginning with Marine Lover), in which she 
begins to explore a more overtly dialogic style of writing. Although she has written two 
essays directly in response to the Jewish philosopher's work (Irigaray 1986c; 1991j), I will 
not be focusing entirely on these texts in this section. What I am interested in taking up here 
are some of the connections between Levinas' and Irigaray's ideas so as to explore how I read 
Irigaray's visionary reformulation of notions of the divine - God and the infinite - for strategic 
purposes. At the same time, I ask Irigaray some questions not unlike those she specifically 
asks Levinas, but this is related to my aim of producing a reading of my own of lrigaray's 
reworkings of the philosopher's ideas. 
Irigaray's dialogic engagements with Levinas are not in the consciously seductive mode of 
Marine Lover and the other "elemental" texts of that group, and this, it seems to me, signals 
a more "serious" and less playfully mimetic attitude on her part to his ideas. The theme of 
love as an encounter between a self and an other in which neither is subsumed into the other's 
desire is a central concept in Irigaray's work in the 1980s,40 and in the articulation of this idea 
she aligns herself with Levinas, even when not addressing him directly. But this engagement 
is not one in which she "teases" the philosopher so much as confronts him with a serious 
face. 41 Her textual relationship with Levinas is an ongoing one, reflecting, I think, a greater 
conscious commitment to his basic ethical ideas on her part than to those of Nietzsche and 
Lacan. The emphasis is on talking about love rather than engaging in flirtation in Irigaray's 
dialogues with Levinas. Levinas' formulation of ethical responsibility and self-other relations 
is clearly important to Irigaray, and while she is critical of his work at times (specifically in 
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"The Fecundity of the Caress" (1986c) and "Questions to Emmanuel Levinasl! (1991j», I think 
it can be argued that she has taken his concerns seriously enough to incorporate them into her 
own work quite consistently since 1980. 
Among the ideas in Levinas which have become important to Irigaray is the foundational one 
of his positing of human subjectivity as that which is always already destabillsed by the 
irreducible alterity of an other. "Language is born in responsibility," he claims (Levinas 
1989a, 82), and "the 1.. .. is a hostage for the other, obeying a command before having heard 
it" (Levinas 1989b, 178). As Cathryn Vasseleu explains: "The starting point of his ethics is 
a prioritization of the other who is acknowledged as being Other, that is, autonomous, 
independent and irreducibly different from the self' (Vasseleu 1991, 143), and Grosz observes 
that in Levinas: lithe other necessarily implicates the subject from the outside. In being chosen 
by the other, the subject is positioned as an identity, located as a being in space and time. The 
otherness of the other is, for Levinas, the precondition of the sameness of the self' (Grosz 
1989, 142). 
In terms of lrigaray's interest in pursuing the conditions of sexual difference, of autonomous 
female subjectivity, Levinas' work is useful in that he approaches the issue of social relations 
from an unusual angle. His avowed refusal to theorise about cultural and social totalities 
(Chanter 1988,34) by locating the individual subject's humanity in relation to a specific - and 
specifically different - other (here, ethics precedes or is the basis of metaphysics) is taken up 
by Irigaray's interventions into the domain of philosophy as a totalising reflection of the 
masculine self-as-same. Her challenges to the self-containedness of the masculine subject are 
in a sense enabled by Levinas' disruption of the notion of a singular self through positing the 
prior debt of that self to an other. In Irigaray's tactical rereadings of malestream philosophical 
works, this other is the female as heterosexual lover andlor the sacrificed maternal presence. 
In Levinas, the other is "encountered neither as a phenomenon nor as a being (something to 
be mastered or possessed), the other is encountered as a face. It is in the encounter with the 
face of the other [Ie visage d'AutruiJ that the other's infinite alterity is revealed" (Robbins 
1991, 136). Levinas writes: lithe Other becomes my neighbour precisely through the way the 
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face summons me, calls for me, begs for me, and in so doing recalls my responsibility, and 
calls me into question" (Levinas 1989a, 83). Thus, as Tina Chanter observes: 
To follow Levinas' account of the otherness of the Other, an entirely different 
conception of society is called for - starting not with equality, but with the 
asymmetry of the face-to-face relation. In order to think about the relation of self 
to Other, within the face-to-face relation we are required to re-think traditional ideas 
of subject, freedom and consciousness (Chanter 1988, 34). 
For Levinas, the face of the other transforms the gaze of the self, so that looking, understood 
as a violent form of interaction with an other, is converted into a concrete, physical response, 
signifying generosity and openness (Grosz 1987, 34).42 This response is enjoined on the 
subject; for Levinas the other's need is the basis of linguistic exchange: "To face someone is 
both to perceive him (sic) and to answer to him" (Lingis 1987, qtd. in Robbins 1991, 138). 
There is a strong sense in which the face of the other is also the face of God, an idea which, 
in its ethical requirement, is extended in Irigaray's notion of the divine as that which would 
mediate between irreducible selves and allow them each an autonomous subject position. 
Levinas claims that: 
The sense of the human is not to be measured by presence, not even by self-
presence. The meaning of proximity exceeds the limits of ontology, of the human 
essence, and of the world. It signifies by way of transcendence and the relationship-
to-God-in-me [/ 'a-Dieu-en-moi] which is the putting of myself into question. The 
face signifies in the fact of summoning, of summoning me43 -' in its nudity or its 
destitution, in everything that is precarious in questioning, in all the hazards of 
mortality - to the unresolved alternative between Being and Nothingness, a 
questioning which, ipso jacto, summons me. 
The Infinite in its absolute difference withholds itself from presence in me .... It is 
in calling me to other men (sic) that transcendence concerns me. In this unique 
intrigue of transcendence, the non-absence of the Infinite is neither presence, nor re-
presentation. Instead, the idea of the Infinite is to be found in my responsibility for 
the Other (Levinas 1983, 112-3, qtd. in Hand 1989, 5). 
Irigaray has taken up this notion of the divine as mediator in her writings on sexual 
difference. She argues that a concept of the divine or a divine function is required by women 
in order for them to mediate exchanges among themselves, and between themselves and men, 
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since in a phallocentric economy they function as objects and not subjects of exchange 
(Irigaray 1993a, 62). The divine for her is a reversal of this sacrifice of female bodies (and 
a reversal of the same sacrifice which occurs in the representation of the Christian God) in 
that it both enables and compels women and men to face each other as distinctive subjects. 
It signals a mode of interaction between subjects which it is at present almost impossible to 
practise, one in which female and male subjects operate in a recognition of being equally in 
the other's debt. Thus lrigaray's divine, operating both within and in excess of the self, is a 
way of reimagining current modes of intersexual relations, transfiguring the boundaries 
between the insides and outsides of male and female bodies.44 
The bod'y is integral in Levinas' account of consciousness; however, his assumption of "a 
constitutionally identical sensibility between one body and another" (Vasseleu 1991, 150), his 
effacement of the feminine in the relation of other to self, is a point of contention in lrigaray. 
The centrality of the body as active agent in Levinas' thought is evident in his claim that, lito 
take [the body] as an event is to say that it is not an instrument, symbol or symptom of 
position, but is position itself, that in it is effected the very transformation of an event into 
being" (Levinas 1978, 73, qtd. in Vasseleu 1991, 146), Likewise bodily contact with another 
in erotic intimacy is "not an attempt to assimilate an irreducible other, but an obsessive delight 
in contacting the alien, and losing it and one's own perspective simultaneously II (Vasseleu 
1991, 147). But Levinas characterises the other's evasive presence in love as feminine -
thereby assuming that men only may be subjects of desire (Irigaray 1991j, 185) - and, 
moreover, as that which IImodestlyll shuns or slips away from the light (Levinas 1987, 79, qtd. 
in lrigaray 1991j, 178),45 Thus the disruption of the solipsism of the self by the encounter 
with an other depends upon the effacement or "non-signifyingness," as Vasseleu terms it 
(Vasseleu 1991, 148), of the feminine. 46 Hence Irigaray claims that in Levinas: 
the feminine appears as the underside or reverse side of man's aspiration towards the 
light, as its negative. The feminine is apprehended not in relation to itself, but from 
the point of view of man, and through a purely erotic strategy, a strategy moreover 
which is dictated by masculine pleasure [jouissance] (Irigaray 1991j, 178). 
She contends that in Levinas "the monopoly of divine power" is still held by men and that 
the divine, by default, remains male (Irigaray 1991j, 178, 184-5). For her this leads to "female 
sexuality, in so far as it is visible at all, being kept from the light and left without 
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representation in terms of the divine" (Irigaray 1991j, 178), and thus without possibility of 
change. 
Irigaray's challenge, which asserts that the feminine is subsumed in the orientation of male 
subjects to the light (as metaphor for enlightenment, knowledge, and truth), would seem to 
place Levinas on the side of Platonic, negative theology, which outlaws female physicality in 
the soul's "dark night" in order that knowledge in the form of enlightenment might be 
reached.47 On the other hand, as I have argued, Irigaray herself can be seen to side with 
mystics in the positive tradition in her persistent concern with the representation of the female 
body and her privileging of physical agency in the (re)figuration of the divine. However, 
Levinas himself is critical of the Platonic tradition of thought,48 and light is described in his 
work as that which implicates the subject in the act of perception (of an object): "Light [is] 
a mode of seeing that, like touching, puts one in contact with the other" and "subverts the 
subject's identity and self-containment" by mediating between subject and other (Grosz 1987, 
36-7). His phenomenological approach to knowledge does not assume the existence of a 
substance apart from a subject's intention. 49 Thus he states that: "due to the light an object, 
while coming from without, is already ours on the horizon which precedes it; it comes into 
being as though it came from us, as though commanded by our freedom" (Levinas 1978, 48, 
qtd. jn Vasseleu 1991, 146). 
In a sense then, Levinas' philosophy proceeds "beyond dualities" in its description of the 
relation between self and other which is commanded by the divine. Touching, as a metaphor 
of the self s irresistible engagement with the other, signifies a contact which is ever more 
elusive: "the other recedes in the moment of touch" (Vasseleu 1991, 147).50 The irreducible 
presence of the body which operates in positive mysticism, and the inexpressibility of the 
encounter with the infinite which is central to negative mysticism, both occur in Levinas' 
account of self-other relations: 51 "The other's materiality is an exorbitant presence which is 
unrecuperable, unidentifiable; a materiality which exhibits its inexpressibility .... The caress is 
a hunger which suffers from an inability to tell it" (Vasseleu 1991, 147). 
But if Levinas' thought moves beyond dualities in one sense, Irigaray argues that it doesn't 
proceed far enough, and the seduction of the encounter between selves, because it occurs only 
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with the female as passive beloved, leads to no real exchange (Irigaray 1986c, 23-40). She 
argues that the feminine is in fact recuperated into the projection forward into eternity 
performed by the masculine philosophical subject, with its teleological mindset: "To caress, 
for Levinas, consists ... not in approaching the other in its most vital dimension, the touch, but 
in the reduction of that vital dimension of the other's body to the elaboration of a future for 
himself' (Irigaray 1991j, 179). Levinas returns to human flesh as the site of infinity in relation 
to the subject; in this sense he may be seen endorsing a relation to the divine like that of the 
positive mystic in the Christian tradition. 52 But the caress produces an "intentionality of 
pleasure directed purely and simply toward the future itself' (Levinas 1987, 89, qtd. in 
Irigaray 1991j, 179), and thus resists the return to flesh wherein the female body is undeniably 
present. For Irigaray, 
the only function of the feminine other is to satisfy the hungers of the philosopher 
[Levinas), to renourish the intentionality of his pleasure in the direction of a "future 
event," a future where no day is named for the encounter with the other in an 
embodied love (Irigaray1991j, 179). 
Thus as in negative mysticism, Levinas' denial of female flesh nourishes the inexpressibility 
- the impossibility in phallic discourse - of the self-other relation. 
In contrast to what she sees as Levinas' annulment of the feminine in his articulation of 
intersubjective ethics and in line with her project to introduce sexual difference into the 
symbolic order, lrigaray has been increasingly concerned since the early 1980s with rethinking 
the heterosexual couple as the basic unit of IIwestern" culture. Her focus on what she calls the 
"amorous economy" (Irigaray 1992a, 3) of this patriarchal society has led her to argue that 
women need a means of representing themselves as creators of culture (not just as aligned 
with "nature" through childbearing), as men have through the legacy of Christianity and its 
creator God. It is her view that the amorous economy which underlies "western" capitalism 
is a sterile one which is still based on the exchange of daughters between men. As a result, 
she contends, heterosexual couples find it hard to proceed beyond "mother-son relationships," 
in which women's availability, nurturing skills and fertility are taken for granted by men and 
go unrewarded, unrepresented in the wider culture (Irigaray 1992a, 2). The work of men in 
the cultural (as opposed to the domestic) sphere appropriates and is dependent upon this 
contribution, yet women remain without recognisable identities apart from men, and if they 
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enter the sphere of culture it is on maleterms. For Irigaray this is the result of the fact that 
. , 
"woman" has no history (herstory) of her own, no gods which would enable her to articulate 
a specific identity as a woman; any traces of such a tradition have all been erased(Irigaray 
1986a; 1993g; 1993h). Women lack a "divine identity which could be perfected in love," a 
means of ameliorating the entrapment of heterosexual relationships, and this lack of identity 
"turns love into a duty, a pathology, an alienation for [them]" (Irigaray 1992a, 2). 
lrigaray is not alone in this analysis of the contemporary social relations which dominate in 
the "western" world; a number of feminists have described the predicament of heterosexual 
women (as most if not all women are expected to be in patriarchal culture) in somewhat 
similar'terms (Dinnerstein 1977; Chodorow 1978; Gilligan 1982; Keller 1986). However 
Irigaray's focus on the divine as enabling symbolic identity is unusual, as is her persistent 
focus of late on the heterosexual couple as the primary example of the cultural sterility she 
identifies in "westernll culture as a whole. 53 This sterility, for her, is a result of the lack of the 
means of a specific female identity in the social networks of II western II capitalism. 
Irigaray's more recent writings on the heterosexual couple are extremely complex, as they 
articulate a history of heterosexual relations in contemporary culture in very dense 
philosophical terms. As in much of her previous work, she confronts and, in a subtle, mimetic 
fashion, re-presents the work of male philosophers whose ideas have shaped dominant forms 
of sexual and social relations in the "western II cultural past. Fascinating as it would be to 
address some of this work in detail, I have no space to do that here. I have given this very 
brief gloss on lrigaray's work on the woman/man couple in order to shortly raise some 
questions which trouble me about her (re)figuration of the divine as a form of exchange 
between women and men in love relationships together. 
While the heterosexual couple has been a consistent focus in her recent work, Irigaray's 
earlier writings - and the first to be translated into English - emphasised the necessity to think 
through the conditions of relationships of exchange, including sexual exchange, among 
women. In Speculum oj the Other Woman and This Sex Which Is Not One, Irigaray depicts 
the lesbian as the figure who shows up the "blind spot(s)" of Freud's dream of symmetry54 
or same-sex, masculine (hommosexual) economy by her disruption of the phallocentric system 
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consisting of the exchange of women among men (Trigaray 1985a, 65, 192-7; 1985b, 99-104). 
Christine Holmlund also argues that in Speculum Irigaray portrays the lesbian as mimicking 
and thereby exposing the feminine and masculine roles articulated in psychoanalytic discourse 
as ideologically motivated constructions (Irigaray 1974, 103, 112, cited in Holmlund 1991, 
288. See also Grosz 1988, 38-9). 
In her early work Irigaray describes the current cultural conditions under which it is more or 
less impossible for women to have relationships with each other that are representable in the 
public sphere (Irigaray 1985a, 170-97). Her writings on the difficulties women experience in 
relation to their mothers, and as mothers in relation to daughters, are part of this analysis of 
the need for women to achieve the conditions of active subjectivity (Irigaray 1981 b; 1985a, 
205-18). While as Holmlund points out, for Irigaray at this stage of her work, "lesbian 
relationships ... figure not only the possibility but also the actual existence of another kind of 
exchange, another kind of desire" (Holmlund 1991, 288), her attention in the 1980s shifts to 
heterosexual relationships in the formulation of an other desire, beyond the relations 
conventionally enjoined on women and men. That is, she focuses on reimagining the 
heterosexual relations which dominate in "western" patriarchal cultures, and part of her 
method in this endeavour is her (re)figuring of the divine. 
I don't have the space here to describe the specifics of this move in Irigaray, which consists 
of several layers of philosophical and psychoanalytic deconstruction and reworking. However 
broadly speaking, her use of the divine in this context - articulated at times as the sensible 
transcendental which partakes of both matter and transcendence (or the attributes of active 
subjectivity) functions as a third term enabling conventional sexual roles to be rethought, as 
described in previous chapters. The sensible transcendental as formulation of the divine as 
mediator between human subjects re-presents the conventionally appointed characteristics of 
both women and men. Irigaray makes the traditional, Christian divine serve as a means of 
symbolic redistribution of qualities which are traditionally understood only through a binary, 
a binary by means of which women are situated on the side of the immanent (sheer physical) 
and unrepresentable. 
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For example, in "Questions to Emmanuel Levinas" Irigaray describes a sexual relationship 
which does not occur according to the model of one sex and its opposite, by emphasising that 
which is traditionally unsymbolised in phallocentric representations, the mucous membranes 
or fluids of the body. Normally it is the body's shape or form which signifies according to 
a phallic model, as in the male=active/female=passive (sex as penetration and not engulfment) 
representation of conventional heterosexual encounter. She writes that: 
For Levinas, the distance is always maintained with the other in the experience of 
love. The other is "close" to him in "duality." This autistic, egological, solitary love 
does not correspond to the shared outpouring, to the loss of boundaries which takes 
place for both lovers when they cross the boundary of the skin into the mucuous 
, membranes of the body, leaving the circle which encloses my solitude to meet in a 
shared space, a shared breath, abandoning the relatively dry and precise outlines of 
each body's solid exterior to enter a fluid universe where the perception of being 
two persons [de fa dualite] becomes indistinct, and above all, acceding to another 
energy, neither that of the one nor that of the other, but an energy produced together 
and as a result of the irreducible difference of sex. Pleasure between the same sex 
does not result in that im-mediate ecstasy between the other and myself. It may be 
more or less intense, quantitatively and qualitatively different, it does not produce 
in us that ecstasy which is our child, prior to any child [enfant avant tout enfan·t]. 
In this relation, we are at least three, each of which is irreducible to any of the 
others: you, me and our work [oeuvre], that ecstasy of ourself in us [de nous en 
nOlls], that transcendence of the flesh of one to that of the other become ourself in 
us [de venue nous en naIlS], at any rate Ilin me" as a woman, prior to any child 
(Irigaray 1991j, 180). 
The divine here is the third term which partakes of the physical being of both partners and 
redefines the boundaries between them. As a result, what is typically seen as women's 
"fluidity" (metaphorically as well as literally (Keller 1986, 11-15)) becomes part of the 
reformulation of both figures through their encounter across a fluid threshold which is 
symbolised for each as "transcendence," something other than themselves which alters that 
perception of self. Just as in Levinas, the divine confronts the subject in the other's irresistible 
presence, so here, Ileach is a 'subject' in love; each is transcendent to the other (each is divine 
for the other); each can confront the other with admiration" (Irigaray 1984, 75-84, cited in 
Whitford 1991a, 167; Irigaray 1993b, 72_82).55 
As Whitford observes, Irigaray on the "amorous exchange,,56 (her revisioning of the sterility 
of the currently operative "amorous economy") is "at her most visionary and her most 
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utopian" (Whitford 1991a, 165). Furthermore, "the amorous exchange represents in the most 
corporeal and· the most intimate terms Irigaray's vision of the new world, deploying the 
erotico-transcendental vocabulary of mysticism and the language of the imaginary body" 
(Whitford 1991a, 168), While the above passage from "Questions" represents Irigaray at her 
most visionary and "mystical," I fmd myself relucant at this point to interpret the piece in 
positive mystical terms. I have deliberately not described the piece as re-presenting a 
heterosexual encounter, because in one sense I am aware that Irigaray is describing changes 
in the cultural understanding of feminine and masculine roles which she sees as necessarily 
occurring on a broad-based symbolic level, before individual experience can be symbolised 
differently. 
However despite this and like the positive mystic, Irigaray's use of "corporeal" and "intimate" 
terms insists on the return to the flesh of heterosexual engagement, however altered. Irigaray' s 
refiguration of a heterosexual connection to argue for broader cultural changes and symbolic 
redistributions leaves me unable to claim in this case that the "return to flesh" is particularly 
subversive, since to me it implies that heterosexual coupling is the paradigm for reworking 
conventional subject positions and so for social change. 57 If this is Irigaray at her most 
visionary and utopian, then I want to alter the terms of my understanding of her "mysticism." 
Although Irigaray describes the heterosexual encounter in the passage in mystical terms 
through which conventional understandings offemale sexuality are transformed (thus far I can 
align her with a mystic like Margery Kempe or Angela of Foligno, in their seductive 
encounters with Christ and their merging with his boundaryless, wounded body), this very 
transformation would presumably make lesbian relationships more visible and more readily 
seen as "productive." However, Irigaray does not state this, and her focus on the heterosexual 
couple (which occurs not only in this singular instance, but in entire volumes of work) seems 
to me to be limiting for efforts to think beyond current modes of heterosexual relations and 
the heterosexist culture that gives rise to them. 
I am aware that my response to the imagery of the heterosexual encounter in lrigaray may be 
likened to the negative responses of some of her critics (mostly in the Anglo-American 
academic scene, as described in Chapter One) to her provocative attempts to refigure female 
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sexuality through the metaphor of the two (genital) lips, women's fluid sexual economy, and 
so on. To recap, several feminists have stated their belief that these reworkings of images of 
female sexuality are an attempt on Irigaray's part to posit a "true" femininity, a reading which 
is obviously limiting in its view of the linguistic and symbolic understanding of the body as 
signifying its unalterable "truth" (Chapter One, 36). And perhaps Irigaray's latest tum towards 
symbolising heterosexual relations is a sign of her perverse and persistent desire to work over 
representations of female sexuality that are contentious for feminists and overdetermined in 
culture, in strategic fashion, so as to move beyond them. "Woman" as excessive in a 
phallocentric sexual economy (and so figured via the lips which are "neither one nor two" 
(Irigaray 1985a, 26)) and heterosexual relations as a site where women repeatedly "lose 
themselves" as definable subjects are obvious examples of such overdetermined 
representations. 
But whether my response is too "literal" or not, I want to state that, as a lover of women and 
men, I find Irigaray's repeated use of the heterosexual couple as an example in her arguments 
for cultural change disconcerting. This is especially so when, in line with her earlier work, 
such change would presumably lead to all sexual relationships being radically altered, perhaps 
beyond recognition. In Speculum and This Sex Which Is Not One Irigaray describes lesbian 
sexual relations, for instance, as "impossible" to represent as yet in the phallocentric economy 
(Irigaray 1985a, 205-18; 1985b, 98-104). In her work since Elemental Passions ((1982) 1992) 
she focuses on heterosexual relationships but again, argues for changes which would make 
new kinds of heterosexual relations possible and would completely transfigure current realities 
(i.e., women and men could encounter each other on equal terms). Thus the recent emphasis 
on heterosexual relationships would appear to suggest that these must change first in order that 
lesbian relationships might become visible; otherwise, why move towards a consistent focus 
on heterosexual relationships specifically? I don't think this in particular is a strategically bold 
but rather a conservative move from a feminist perspective, and it conflicts with the way(s) 
in which I generally find it most helpful to read Irigaray, that is, as a visionary strategist who 
continually engages with female "realities" that are without cultural representation, in order 
to alter the terms of discourse and force it to recognise the specific experience(s) of women. 
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lrigaray questions Levinas about allowing only one kind of "otherness" (i.e., the other of 
ethical subjects presumed to be masculine) and excluding sexual difference. But I question 
Irigaray's persistent focus on sexual difference between women and men as the ultimate 
cultural marker of ethical relationships, as others have also done. Holmlund writes that, 
although Irigaray 
argues against "making woman the subject or the object of a theory" and against 
IIsubsuming the feminine under some generic term such as 'woman,'" and although 
she urges that women's liberation movements should be recognized as many and not 
one, saying "there are multiple groups and tendencies in women's struggles today" 
(Irigaray 1977b, 156, 164), only rarely does lrigaray herself refer to or enter into 
dialogue with other women. Her collusion in the silencing of women's voices is a 
conscious choice, resulting from her desire to clear a space for "Ie feminin, II a 
female symbolic, a new form of knowledge, by tackling and engaging with 
patriarchal discourses (Holmlund 1991, 300).58 
As a result of Irigaray's preference for engaging in dialogue with white male thinkers, and 
the broad cast of her concerns in terms of issues of sex/gender, she does not address issues 
of race and class specifically in her analysis of women's oppression. Consequently, as 
Holmlund charges, IIfor all her emphasis on the need for a genealogy and a history of women, 
she may be in danger of 'ignoring who the other woman is'" (Spivak 1987, 150, cited in 
Holmlund 1991, 300_1).59 I would like to see the concept of the sensible transcendental put 
to wider use in the quest for new articulations of cultural diffference, of which the sexual is 
but one.60 On one level I see my desire to engage with Irigaray's reworking of the divine as 
the sensible transcendental in this study as a preliminary personal move towards such future 
work. 
On the subject of sexual difference as envisioned through refigured heterosexual encounter, 
I want to read Irigaray as combining positive and negative mystical tendencies, like Levinas, 
but differently. That is, I read her phantas(ma)tic61 descriptions of heterosexual coupling as 
returning to flesh in a tactical move in order to posit cultural changes, even as .t.1argery 
Kempe's much less conscious return to flesh in her relationship with Christ makes her body 
signify excessively and differently from the status quo. But in order to do this I must read the 
centrality of the heterosexual couple (and its "real," physical referent) in this move as 
provisional, as "matter" which is all too present in its conventional cultural incarnation and 
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which, if Irigaray' s visions were to be enacted, would be transfigured into a different kind of 
exchange. This is not to argue for the avoidance of heterosexual relationships, but to try and 
fmd a way around their persistent return as paradigm, as a norm which goes unquestioned in 
"western" patriarchal culture as a whole, and a way around this problem as I encounter it in 
Irigaray's recent writing. 
If the divine could be rethought so as to symbolise previously unsymbolised aspects of 
women's sexuality, as lrigaray would have it, then sexual relationships between women would 
also accede to cultural representation on a broader scale. Bearing that in mind, I want to read 
lrigaray's visions of the woman-man couple as only provisionally situated in the flesh as "we" 
know it: as oriented towards a future in which the exchanges that might occur remain as yet 
inexpressible,62 In this sense then, I read Irigaray as a negative mystic in order to read her as 
moving beyond dualities. I want to situate my own visions for feminist theory in the flesh but 
in order to have this flesh transformed, and this is what I tend to read Irigaray as doing, 
However, this reading is of course bound up with my desire to see lrigaray as articulating 
ideas of value, however mystifying, and/or to argue for the possibility of value in 
mystifying/mystical texts.63 
In Levinas, tithe only function of the feminine other is to satisfy the hungers of the 
philosopher, to renourish the intentionality of his pleasure in the direction of a 'future event,'" 
says lrigaray (Irigaray 1991j, 179). But I read in Irigaray's re-presentation of the heterosexual 
couple another deferral towards a future not yet tangible, and I find in this reading material 
for both Ilpositive ll and II negative" interpretation: frustration at what I see as the recuperation 
of alternatives to heterosexual relations and, despite this, a kind of inspiration from lrigaray's 
daring recasting of heterosexual coupling as transformed ethical event. 
In the first epigraph to this section Levinas, in the opening to Totality and Infinity, posits the 
inescapable tension of metaphysics, that of the subject who looks elsewhere or "beyond, II 
seeking explanation of the world in which s/he finds her/himself. For Levinas this move 
occurs only in relation to an other. The second epigraph, the final lines of Irigaray' s reading 
of Levinas (Totality and Infinity section IV, B) state the radical nonsubstitutability of that 
other: each subject approaches each other subject in love as though for the first time, 
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relearning the possibility of transcendence (in lrigaray itself a metaphor for (infinite) 
possibility (Irigaray 1992b, 28~9» through attention to touch. At the close of her article on 
Irigaray quoted previously, Christine Holmlund suggests that for feminists "who want to adapt 
Irigaray's provocative 'detour[s] into strategy, tactics and practice' to [their] own present 
political and theoretical needs, the best solution is to engage in dialogue with her.. .. It is, after 
all," she states, "unfair to expect Irigaray, or anyone, to have all the answers II (Holmlund 
1991, 303).64 I would like to take up the provisional, explorative tone of this injunction, as 
Irigaray's version of "ethical fidelity to incarnation" is also of necessity provisional, in this 
chapter's final dialogue. This is one I am having with Irigaray as I respond to her tactics in 
and through the moment-to-moment, physically attentive and, for me, always provisional 
practice nf dance. 
4. 2. 4 Dialogue #4: Reading Irigaray, dancing 
But is the body always the same? Can we fix it in one self-same form? Does it not 
wither when it has to keep to one appearance? Is not mobility its life? (Irigaray 
1992b, 33). 
Dance requires its own close watching .... Literacy in dance, from which a political 
reading proceeds, must begin with attention to the body and to the gravity, levity, 
spatiality and rhythms of its movement. When the object speaks, when the body 
dances, perhaps it is not a watching but a listening which is required. Or if it is 
watching, it is watching with an eye that glides under the surface of skin and rests 
there, listening without expectation (Dempster 1988, 52). 
Moving through the world, across the universe, or dancing, I construct more of a 
dwelling for myself than through vision (Irigaray 1993b, 175). 
Dancing, as Jane Desmond observes, is "the most ephemeral of all the arts" (Desmond 1991, 
29). This is ironic, since the fleeting presence of the dancer in performance depends upon a 
process of training more physically arduous and ineradicable in its effects than any other. The 
dancer's quotidian body is the mute, largely effaced ground of the dancing arts, for while 
irreducibly present in performance, it has traditionally not been granted agency as such 
(Dempster 1988, 38-9). "The dancer's body is her instrument," it is commonly said, and if this 
is so then the dancer "herself' must be in some sense without body, lacking, or at least 
distanced from the instrumental body which performs. In this sense dance is feminised, 
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signifying both body and lack, and indeed it has been and continues to be primarily associated 
with women in the capitalist "west." As Elizabeth Dempster writes: 
[Dance] has traditionally been defined in relationship to the male-identified art forms 
of music and drama, and its communicative potential, force and action is commonly 
misrepresented as being dependent upon those relationships. In this (false) 
representation, the body is dispossessed of its capacity for mindful action. The 
"male" arts of music and drama commandeer the space of mind and spirit; the 
female-identified art of dance is relegated to the nether regions of an unthought and 
unthinking body. Dance may be the mother of all manner of things but she cannot 
know or speak of herself (Dempster 1988, 38-9). 
Dancing is the mobile place in which I ground a number of my engagements with Irigaray 
and her 'writings about the representation of "the female body." It is also the chief means by 
which I experiment bodily with her provocative ideas. In this section, I want to bring 
"speaking as a woman" and "dancing (signifying bodily) as a woman" into dialogue together, 
since each has traditionally been an impossible achievement in phallocentric culture and since 
each is inseparable from the other for me. 
One is not born a dancer any more than one is born a woman, to ring a change on de 
Beauvoir's famous assertion, and the process of "becoming" a dancer is never finished, as 
every young ballet student learns. Irigaray's unusual formulation of the divine as the sensible 
transcendental which serves as agent of or horizon for women's future "becoming" implicates 
the female body profoundly in the search to discover the means of its specific representation. 
The sensible transcendental is situated in the present moment, in female physicality as it is 
experienced and conventionally understood. But it is above all a visionary notion and thus is 
connected with movement, with change which takes place as self meets other across a 
threshold re-envisioned as enabling the impossible (contact between unrecuperable selves), as, 
in fact, divine. Irigaray's writings move across and around and inside bodies; they are playful, 
flighty, they "perform." Her divine enables new connections to be thought between bodies, 
but how, one might well ask, might these be embodied; must one search for a partner who, 
as well as possessing compelling physical attributes, has also read Irigaray? Reading Irigaray 
I aim to make new connections between the dancer I was yesterday and the dancer I might 
be tomorrow, and to rethink the threshold, itself site of transcendence and the accession of 
women to active subjectivity, as the moveable site of this continued practice. 
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As my exchange with Irigaray, this section records an attempt to "think through the body" 
women's (this particular woman's) alienation from transcendence in the sense in which 
Irigaray means it: the inability to speak/dance as a woman, to signify specifically as female. 
"Dance may be the mother of all manner of things but she cannot know or speak of herself' 
(Dempster 1988, 39). For me, this disembodied "dance" must be repeatedly but differently 
read in my own movements, repeatedly but differently "embodied," in order to discover what 
can be known, what can be said; in order to grant "dance" - myself as female dancer - the 
agency and "becoming" previously unknown. 
In my experience the self and other (woman/man) of Irigarayan exchange can also be 
understood as the two selves that the classically trained dancer learns to hold in tension: the 
self she sees from a distance in the studio mirror - body as instrument, as object of her 
labours - and the self she is while dancing, from which the impulse to dance itself arises. The 
perception of the self in the mirror as separate, distant from the working, dancing self, is an 
idealised self, a creature of the mind ("that looks terrible, I know how the movement ought 
to look") as well as a reflection of the working body. The relationship between the two is 
tyrannous, but, like man and woman, each exists only by repressing elements of the other. 
They are of course not really separate at aU, but these two selves must shift in their relation 
to each other if I (a classically trained dancer) am to achieve a sense of dancing integrity. 
The (classical) dancing self is usually experienced as irrecoverably split between the present 
experience of movement and an imagined (impossible) ideal. If "dance" cannot speak of 
herself it is because dancers effectively learn to operate in its discourses as nonsignifying, 
absent selves. If what I see in the mirror now is "not good enough" but tomorrow it may be 
(I must have believed this yesterday to be trying again today), where, in the present moment, 
am "I" as dancer to be found? Where can I situate myself? Reading Irigaray, I try to re-
experience the self and other in this exchange (one self and yet two) differently: myself as the 
("selfless") dancer I have been (and was trained to be); myself as the dancer I am moving 
towards being, working with body as irreducible self, realising that I am more than a docile 
body. 
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Classical ballet training, like negative mysticism, "denies the female dancer her own agency" 
(Dempster 1988, 39). Dempster describes the female ballet dancer as "an icon of femininity," 
and Ann Daly states that ballet is "one of our culture's most powerful models of patriarchal 
ceremony,,65 (Daly 1987, qtd. in Dempster 1988, 39). This terminology, of icons and 
ceremonies, is, to me, inescapably religious. The famous American choreographer George 
Balanchine's description of ballet as quintessentially "woman, a garden of beautiful flowers," 
aligns ballet with "woman" with nature, the "mere matter" of male cultivation (qtd. in 
Copeland 1982, 48, qtd. in Dempster 1988,38).66 
This image fits well with Irigaray's analysis of Christianity as erected on the outlawed 
substance of "woman," which it thereby also helps to produce as such. As Dempster points 
out, "if dance is the space of 'the feminine' and 'the maternal,' it follows within the logic of 
a patriarchal social order that its power and the power of the body must be controlled, 
constrained, disguised or denied" (Dempster 1988, 38). Ballet training may in fact be likened 
to mysticism in its elitism and its role as a discourse which produces icons of the female role 
in patriarchy. It is a discourse which both elevates and debases or seeks to control its initiates. 
Like mystics, young ballet dancers learn to see themselves as "special" (even "chosen"; 
unusual talent is often described as a gift of God) while being taught simultaneously to deny 
themselves the pleasures of the flesh. These may be in the form of food (it almost always is 
in any case, since dancers are generally encouraged to be hyper-thin), friends, social activity, 
sexual relationships and other interests outside ballet (Adair 1992, 15-19, 115). 
But ballet training is specifically akin to negative mysticism in the particular kind of physical 
alienation it produces, the result of a phallocentric visual aesthetic inscribed onto the body: 
"The classical dancer's body is defined by achievement of the greatest degree of frontal 
legibility as established in the 'turn-out,' by a commitment to the vertical, to lightness and 
speed" (Dempster 1988, 41). "In ballet the human passions are expressed by the gradual 
uncontorted curves and straight lines of the extended human body. There is no residuum, no 
veil. The human body is purged of atmosphere. All is shown" (Stokes 1983, 247, qtd. in 
Dempster 1988, 41). The dancer monitors progress towards the physical ideal of "frontal 
legibility" by working before a mirror and/or the corrective presence of the teacher. In such 
a process it is clear that "all" is not shown; rather, all that is not interpretable according to an 
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economy of singular, upright forms is banished from the scene. The result is that the dancer's 
perception of herself becomes governed by the impossibility of imposing on the mirror image 
of her body "pure" movements, "purged of atmosphere." There is always an excess, since the 
body which is the dancer's instrument is also the dancer's unruly Itself' (if the dancer were 
no more than object or instrument there could be, after all, no drive nor desire to dance, no 
discipline nor II artistry"). 67 
Dancer Shona Innes has described the training process that occurs in ballet as one which 
"prepares and conditions the young female dancer to fail" (Innes 1988, 41, cited in Dempster 
1988, 49), and Dempster claims that this "conditioning to failure" underlies what she terms 
II an economy of shame II (Dempster 1987, cited in Dempster 1988, 49). The dancer experiences 
a double alienation in learning to relate to her performing body as though from outside herself 
(monitoring its frontal legibility as in the mirror) and dealing with its excess, that which does 
not yet conform to the required rigorous, formal standards, but is nonetheless part of her 
dancing self (this excess of physical being which escapes the formal standard is almost always 
translated by the female dancer into excess weight as well as excess weakness, no matter how 
thin the dancer is. Incidence of anorexia among female ballet dancers is, not surprisingly, 
extremely high (Druss and Silverman 1979; Vincent 1979, 54, both cited in Adair 1992, 60)). 
And yet there is a further alienation still, for somewhere in amongst the tortured components 
of the dancer's self-image there is her sense of her own talent, purpose, presumably enjoyment 
of and in dance. I say "presumably" because in my experience, this quality can become all but 
lost amidst the physical and psychic suffering involved in a bodily training which "conditions" 
one lito faiL II "Talent" likewise becomes something the dancer, even the professional dancer, 
finds it difficult to realise herself as having, and purpose is often inseparable from the 
necessity of performing repetitive exercises in daily class in order to maintain technique, a 
situation which imposes its own ungainsayable rhythm. 
What I am trying to indicate in all of this is that for female ballet dancers, the experience of 
dancing "we1l" involves taking a path and undergoing a process which results in an absence 
of "self, II but also an absence of body, in the sense of the body as flesh with all its foibles, 
and as agent of the individual dancer's being, personality, desire: 
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In the classical dance the spectator is invited to gaze upon a distanced, ideal world 
where the female dancer is traced as sylph and cipher, a necessary absence. The 
perception of the body as a natural, physical entity is obstructed and suppressed by 
distance: the mundane body has no place here. The classical ballet thus creates 
conditions conducive to self-forgetfulness (Dempster 1988, 49). 
Christy Adair notes that in ballet, "the hard work, repetition and structure of the daily class 
frequently results in 'unthinking' dancers, trained to accept unquestioningly the professional 
requirements." She adds that "for women this structure mirrors women's expected role as 
passive rather than active in [patriarchal] society" (Adair 1992, 15). 
But if bp,llet excludes "the body" as agent, treating it as machine, inert matter, there are certain 
sorts of bodies it excludes altogether. As one of "our culture's most powerful models of 
patriarchal ceremony" ballet pays homage to and endorses the dominant cultural hierarchies 
of class and race. My own training as a ballet student was a training in normative patriarchal 
femininity: in the docility, modesty and meekness expected of women; at the same time I 
unconsciously learned that "women" were white women, those who looked like me.68 In ballet 
one learns the desire to be part of an elite group; if one fits the general terms of that group 
(usually this means if one is white and middle-class) one doesn't learn to critique or even 
acknowledge the conditions on which that elitism is posited, the exclusion of bodies that don't 
fit the dominant culture's image of itself. Hence black dance (a term the need for which 
signals all too clearly the covert racism of ballet, in which whiteness is the norm, the 
standard) has developed prolifically since the 1960s in traditions outside of ballet. 69 A large 
number of postmodern companies and (female and feminist) choreographers work with 
untrained dancers and dancers whose bodies don't fit the classical norm.70 
My own gradual recognition of ballet's multiple exclusions has helped me to recognise my 
dancing body as a specific cultural as well as physiological construct, part of a system of 
social regulation in which I am placed relative to other dancing bodies. This, in turn, has 
provoked my desire to explore what kind of dancer "I" might conceivably be, in relation to 
other dancers as well as to the system of training which has formed me. The world of ballet 
is extremely competitive, its phallocentric methodology encourages the young dancer to see 
other dancers as better or worse versions of herself, never just "different." For difference, as 
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Irigaray is so fond of pointing out, requires that there be at least two models of legitimate 
selfhood and identity, and when there are at least two, there may be more. 
My desire to continually defIne and redefIne a dancing "self" through my dancing practice 
means that I am forced to reconsider not only my strained perception of myself but also my 
perception of other dancers. I am thinking here also of Spivak's injunction in the context of 
"doing" feminist theory and of what she portrays as the latent monoculturalism of some 
French feminist theoretical work: "However unfeasible and ineffIcient it may sound, I see no 
way to avoid insisting that there has to be a simultaneous othe\!ocus: not merely who am 17 
but who is the other woman?" (Spivak 1987, 150). And Elspeth Probyn, writing about the 
problematic of "speaking the self' and building on Spivak's insight, states that: 
Because of the material conditions of our selves we can not indulge in the fantasy 
of dialogism wherein "you" can be "me," and "I" can be "you." "I" am not "she" but 
articulating a working image of the self may allow for a movement of empathy 
between us. Working within the tensions of a doubled question of "who is she? and 
who am I?" forces us to recognize distinction and requires that we work over 
relations of alterity (probyn 1993, 171).71 
Indeed, attempting to unlearn, in specifIc situations, my view of female dancers as ideally 
uniform creatures helps me recreate the space between the dancer in the mirror "failing" and 
the (successful) dancer I "am" but cannot always feel myself to be. I need to learn to move 
into this space in the realisation that, however normative a physical training is, specifIc female 
bodies have the potential to disrupt those norms with physical excesses uniquely their own, 
and that these excesses can become part of the redefInition of the dancing "self." 
This insight is extremely diffIcult for me to admit as a classically trained dancer, let alone to 
work with. I am helped in this endeavour by thinking through the example of the "positive" 
mystic, whose body is the site of a transformation in her perception of it through her contact 
with the divine - her mirror or mediator with whom she identifIes and who reflects herself 
back to herself, but differently - and yet her body as medium of devotion is also the site of 
a certain amount of fleshly denial, suffering, and pain. It is a body despised by her medieval 
culture as well as by herself. It becomes transfIgured only through her visions of an other in 
whom she sees herself mirrored, with a difference. Her divine other provides her with the 
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possibility of eventually (in etercity) becoming an "other" self. And this other self is 
prefigured in the present through her body's excessive transformations. 
In Irigaray's version of the divine (in her "mysticism") the other is likewise both other to the 
subject and a mediator, part of the space between them which is figured as divine, that which 
enables exchange. In the interaction she envisages taking place between self and other through 
the aid of the divine, the self s physicality is also part of the mediatory "space between." Both 
self and other contribute to the sensible/transcendent place of exchange which separates and 
unites them at the same time: 
<Not in me but in our difference lies the abyss. We can never be sure of bridging the 
gap between us. But that is our adventure. Without this peril there is no us. If you 
turn it into a guarantee, you separate us. 
And it is the same when you turn God into difference extrapolated to inficity 
(Irigaray 1992b, 28). 
But the divine in Irigaray, as well as articulating the interactive space between unique 
subjects, also enables female self-constitution, and both aspects are interconnected in her view. 
Irigaray refigures God as that which would ~nable women to mediate the disjunction they 
commonly experience between signifying as a phallic object (the other of men) and a 
specifically female embodiment which they might desire but cannot achieve in phallocentric 
culture. This in-between space in which female desire is articulated, suggesting the possibility 
of achieving a specifically female embodiment in the future, is like that which the positive 
female mystic inhabits when her interaction with the divine alters the representation of her 
suspect physicality and renders it a means of authorial empowerment and public speech. 
Irigaray's divinely enabled intersubjective exchange also refigures the mirroring structures of 
conventional subjectivity. Like the visions of the positive mystic, the divine enables a self-
reflexive "gazing" on oneself which signals and makes possible a new kind of embodiment: 
being a woman for oneself, a notion which has hitherto been meaningless in phallocentric 
culture. Irigaray's divine would abolish the conventional mirror of phallic subjectivity, in 
which women experience themselves as always mediated through a totalising gaze, but it 
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would do so by reenvisioning the mirror itself as threshold, as facilitative (transcendent) 
materiality, that which partakes of the feminine and returns it to itself: 
We look at ourselves in the mirror to please someone, rarely to interrogate the state 
of our body or our spirit, rarely for ourselves and in search of our own becoming. 
The mirror almost always serves to reduce us to a pure exteriority - of a very 
particular kind. It functions as a possible way to constitute screens between the other 
and myself.. .. The mirror signifies the constitution of a fabricated (female) other that 
I shall put forward as an instrument of seduction in my place. I seek to be seductive 
and to be content with images of which I theoretically remain the artisan, the artist. 
I have yet to unveil, unmask, or veil myself for me - to veil myself so as to achieve 
self-contemplation, for example, to let my gaze travel over myself so as to limit my 
exposure to the other and repossess my own gestures and garments, thus nestling 
back into my vision and contemplation of myself (Irigaray 1993a, 65). 
In this extract Irigaray mimes to excess the way in which women are doubly alienated by the 
phallic mirroring structures of "western" culture: they are not only split subjects of language 
as male subjects are but must put forward "a fabricated (female) other...as an instrument of 
seduction in [their] place." For women, being "the phallus" for men allows no possibility to 
represent oneself (for oneself) as specifically female. This is what Irigaray seeks to make 
possible through recasting female sexuality as a moveable space of exchange, as sensible 
transcendental or divine. She hysterically (re)figures the space of women's double alienation 
(their lack) within language as the excessive space of divine encounter and engagement. By 
means of the divine the (female) self may represent itself to itself, both independently and in 
relation to others. The space before the mirror in which women conventionally put forward 
an "other .. .in [their] place," becomes a space of representation of the specific experience of 
femaleness. By means of this process the mirror-image self - the formerly "(fabricated) female 
other" - and the female self who looks at herself in the mirror become one. 
To return to the analogy of negative mysticism, the practice of ballet simultaneously engages 
and suppresses, is in fact an agent of sublimation of, enormous passion on the part of the 
dancer. Dancing requires so much energy, self-motivation, drive and persistence that it would 
be impossible to pursue without such intensity of desire. Through the practice of ballet the 
dancer identifies with an ideal self ("without residuum," "purged of atmosphere") who exists 
somewhere beyond present suffering. Of course, this ideal is never attained, but the experience 
265 
of striving to achieve it is often cathartic and sometimes enough to produce the phantom 
possibility of connection between present and future (ideal) selves. The point of continuing, 
though, is not that this ideal self should ever be attained but that, in the effort to reach it, the 
female ballet dancer is transformed beyond mundane realms. In performance she grants to 
other, lesser mortals the chance to partake of her efforts, to view the results of her "absence 
of self."n 
According to the model of positive mysticism, however, the focus of the dancer's attention 
would shift. The ideal dancing image (the selfs other, the equivalent of God for the mystic) 
comes closer, it has to be recognisable to the dancer (mystic) as herself in some way(s); as 
well as transcendent, it has to be immediately sensible. This act of recognition is an act of 
(re)embodiment which alters the status of the mirror; self and other interact across a divine 
threshold in which both partake. For me this is a concrete experience enacted through 
gradually altering the way I gaze at and perceive my dancing mirror image in relation to the 
self which moves in space. Moreover, according to this model, the dancer freely expresses 
rather than represses emotions, her Passion, in the interchange between the image of herself 
and the self who is dancing. By this means the space between these two selves (representing 
relationship in Irigaray and made possible by the divine third term) becomes altered, alive 
with feeling, open to change. In effect, the dancer's ideal image is envisaged through her 
current experience and understanding of herself, which is of course constantly changing, and 
is in turn affected by the ideal. She does not thereby escape cultural definition and placement, 
of course, but her movement between the two selves enacts a challenge to the rigidity of 
standard definitions. If I read this ongoing personal process through the work of Irigaray I am 
enabled to see it as significant when the impulse of my training is to dismiss my altering self-
perception, since dancers if they are successful do not need to think. In this way reading 
Irigaray helps me to construct a threshold for present and future changes in my (bodily) 
experience; perhaps Irigaray herself is my mediator (perhaps this is inevitable in some way 
because she is the central topic of my thesis; in engaging with her work I produce my own). 
Dempster writes optimistically that, despite the hazards of conventional training, "dance can 
be thoughtful action, a movement of embodied mind. It offers the possibility of...a mode of 
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action embracing a concept of the body which is not shadowed by habits of thought based on 
Cartesian dualism" (Dempster 1988, 39): 
In moments of dancing the edges of things blur and terms such as mindlbody, 
flesh/spirit, carnal/divine, male/female become labile and unmoored, breaking loose 
from the fixity of their pairings. This vision of dance is not utopian but a felt 
experience, occurring fleetingly, elusively, in many styles and occasions of dance. 
It is a potential not so much unrealized as unrepresented (Dempster 1988, 52). 
And, I would add, untheorised. However, Carolyn Burke's description of Irigaray's 
simultaneously deconstructive and reconstructive interventions into philosophical discourse 
charts a similar process of transmutation. What Burke calls "the oxymoronic figure of 
'destroying with nuptial tools:" described by Irigaray in This Sex as her rationale of 
intellectual seduction, "suggests the meeting place of opposites (masculine/feminine, 
mind/body, subject/object, philosophy/poetry) in a general "entre-deux" [pas de deux?] of 
thought" (Burke 1989,236). Burke writes that "like Derrida, Irigaray refuses the demand for 
fixed philosophical positions in what can only be described as a highly performative kind of 
writing" (Burke 1989, 236). 
In encountering this performative writing, audience response matters: IIreaders may respond 
with fascination, bafflement, or anger, depending upon their willingness to be led astray" 
(Burke 1989, 236). Reading Irigaray's dancing prose, I find I am continually being led astray 
from patterns of thought I had learned to take for granted, and this is a mostly pleasurable 
process in which I willingly collaborate. But reading Irigaray also draws me back again and 
again to the subject of body (the body of this subject) and the themes of movement, 
transcendence, threshold, change. Thinking about, thinking through, these ideas, I find myself 
wanting to return to a more fleshly (but probably no less intellectual) medium in order to 
translate my mind's wanderings into workable, liveable projects. Trying to get beyond 
dualities (mindlbody) requires quite a lot of moving around between them. 
For me, dancing is the most fundamental fact of my "embodiment"; it is the place where I 
work out "answers" to questions provoked by reading lrigaray, which in tum provoke more 
questions, different kinds of "reading" my dancer's body, and so on. "Literacy in dance," as 
Dempster says in this section's second epigraph, begins with attention to the body and its 
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processes of movement. And the "political reading" which proceeds from learning to read 
one's own dancing body is a visionary operation; it involves re-memembering what has been 
(dealing step-by-step with the effects of one's training) and imagining what may come to be; 
but it must be situated in devoted attention to one's own flesh in which dancing movement, 
bodily change, begin. 
In the past, dancing for me has been made more painful and more difficult by efforts at 
analysing, trying to "read" my dancing body. This is not surprising, since (classical) dancers 
are taught not to think but to listen, and to listen not to themselves but to their teachers. And 
they are taught to separate the activity of thinking from the movement of the body in 
obedience to limited thought. Dempster, citing Trigaray, talks about another kind of listening 
that can be cultivated in relation to reading dance. Using Irigaray's analysis of women as 
objects in a phallocentric economy, Dempster suggests that when the body dances, as when 
women who, as objects, cannot speak "as wom[e]n," do speak, perhaps we need to learn to 
listen for a different body-speech than that we are accustomed to hear or not to hear. 
As with "reading" female hysteria, which operates as a symptom of desires the hysteric - as 
a necessarily passive subject in patriarchal discourse - cannot coherently express, learning to 
read oneself dancing in an empowering way requires being alert to changes in the threshold 
between the ideal image and the dancing self. As well as working to introduce passion into 
this encounter, there is also a sense in which I seek to "listen without expectation." As 
Irigaray says, making this time a point which is Buddhist in origin: "it is ... a question not ~f 
renouncing the sensible, of sacrificing it to the universal, but rather of cultivating it until it 
becomes spiritual energy" (Irigaray 1991k, 171). In other words, learning to r~ad the body in 
new ways, learning to hear/see/experience or create a willing space for its unique and 
individual speech. 
For Irigaray the spiritual is always becoming flesh, it is never static. The movement she 
describes by means of the sensible transcendental is visionary, mystical, and proceeds beyond 
dualities. Learning to listen to my dancing body "speak" can result in a subversion of the 
specular economy in which I learned to separate my two selves and disallow commerce 
between them. It can lead to a new kind of watching, in which I see my body dancing as a 
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subject (myself) not an object, in which the angle of my vision continually shifts, because it 
starts from where I (dancing) am. 
In many ways learning to dance involves the same processes all women undergo in patriarchal 
culture: learning to see oneself as an object through a masculinised gaze, experiencing a 
physical and psychical alienation from one's body as active agent, inseparable from a sense 
of "self." This experience is reenacted theatrically in the bodily convulsions and other 
eccentricities of hysteria, and ballet, dedicated to producing "icons of femininity" destined to 
perform, may be seen as producing hysterical women toO.73 As Martha Noel Evans puts it: 
,While hysterics have ... become a kind of bellwether for both the acknowledged and 
unacknowledged expectations that shape women's lives, they embody precisely what 
is pathological in the scripts written for them .... Their reliance on physical symptoms 
demonstrates the impossibility for them of speaking authoritatively .... Hysteria 
therefore calls into question many basic assumptions about our social organization 
and the power structures that support it (Evans 1991, 241). 
Female hysteria, like ballet dancing, is an extreme manifestation of women in patriarchy's 
doubly split selves. In the following chapter I.will take my re-envisioning attempts further to 
address three different representations of mothering andlor "madness" by women. In these 
portrayals of female experience, the women's bodily speech is seen to be symptomatic of that 
psychic splitting and its associated pain. But there is also a "divine" element in each text and 
the birth/pain each represents. I argue that because of the women's attempts to incorporate this 
excessive component, their movements can be read with eyes attentive to what conventional 
patriarchal scripts for women repress, what hysterical body-speech may "really" be saying, and 
what visions for the future lie behind their own reports. 
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1. Writing about the mutual fascination between psychoanalysis and feminism or the 
discourse of women, Elizabeth Grosz defines the term as including the meanings: 
'''to attract, irresistibly enchant, charm'; or 'to deprive victim of the powers of 
escape or resistance by look or by presence' (OED). To fascinate is to entice and 
trap, seduce and contain, a relation similar to that between the snake and the snake-
charmer, in which each charms, and traps, the other. Mutual fascination is always 
a risky business. Lacan suggests that it is the consequence of an imaginary 
identification in which the self strives to incorporate the other in an act as aggressive 
as it is loving. It is never clear who, snake or snake-charmer, is mesmerized by 
whom" (Grosz 1990a, 6-7). 
2. Of course, as was shown in Chapter Two (96), Kempe was never convicted of 
heresy, and so charges of her unorthodoxy could not be officially maintained. The 
number of times she underwent clerical interrogation and was threatened with death 
by townspeople, however, are evidence that she was perceived by society at large 
as dangerously anomalous. 
3. I am describing here what has been a noticeable trend in scholarship on Kempe's 
Book, which has been remarked by several other more recent writers as well. See 
Atkinson (1983, 100-5, 197); Beckwith (1986, 37); Aers (1988, 74-5); Lawton 
(1992, 94-5). Since about the mid- to late eighties critical work has been appearing 
which is more sympathetic to and illuminating of the subject of Kempe and her 
cultural milieu. See the authors already cited, as well as Dickman (1984); Holbrook 
(1985; 1987); Mueller (1986); Lochrie (1986a; 1986b; 1991a); Smith (1987); 
Fienberg (1989); Gibson (1989); Gray (1990); Harding (1992, 1993); Johnson 
(1992); and the essays in McEntire (1992). 
4. The charge is a reference to John Oldcastle, Lord Cobham, who was accused of 
heresy in 1413 and hanged and burnt in 1417 before the Duke of Bedford (Kempe 
1988, 320n). 
5. Another critic, T. W. Coleman, similarly applauds Kempe's decision to nurse her 
infantilised husband, calling it a "splendid act of self-sacrifice" (Coleman 1938, 158). 
6. In a discussion of the Book Stephen Medcalf includes Ita modern diagnosis" of 
Kempe's "psyche" by Dr Anthony Ryle who states that "I don't think that there is 
any evidence of a continuing psychotic process at work. ... The most satisfactory 
description would be of a hysterical personality organization lt (Medcalf 1981, 115). 
7. Beckwith notes that the word "mysticism" was first used in 1736 (OED, cited in 
Beckwith 1993, 11). 
8. Guntram Bischoff provides the following brief biographical summary: "Dionysius 
(Denis: fl. c. 500) is the name given an anonymous author long reputed to be 
Dionysius, an Athenian converted by StPaul. His works synthesized Christianity and 
Neo-Platonism, the religious philosophy which profoundly influenced Augustine. The 
works ofDionysius, written in Greek, became known in the West through the ninth-
century translation of John Scotus Eriugena, an orientophile scholar at the court of 
the Frankish king, Charles the Bald" (Bischoff 1976, 13). 
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9. Clarisssa Atkinson charts the beginnings of affective piety from the circle of St 
Anselm of Canterbury in the late eleventh century, and goes on to discuss Franciscan 
developments (Atkinson 1983, 131-44). See also Sargent (1992, ix-xiii). 
10. Gibson describes the effects of the "Franciscan revolution" thus: "What began for the 
Franciscan preachers as an incarnational aesthetic sustaining their spiritual vision of 
the world, had by the fifteenth century turned itself outward and transformed that 
world. It matters not that by the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries many friars had 
betrayed the apostolic fervor of those early years or that 'friar' had often become a 
word charged with hypocrisy and deception. The mental revolution which the 
Franciscans brought, however it was accomplished, most certainly was 
accomplished" (Gibson 1989, 8). 
11. David Aers observes this trend at work in traditional medieval scholarship more 
generally, exhibited in a tendency to hark back to the middle ages as a time of 
unified order under Christian doctrine. He notes that this attitude relies on 
information transmitted by the partial viewpoint of those engaged in enforcing 
Christian orthodoxy, on "the projections of particular dominant groups seeking to 
control reality and shape the views of people on whose labour-power, forced 
services, and tithes their own privileged status depended" (Aers 1988, 7). 
12. These writers are treated by Katz (1978) and Beckwith (1993, 8-9). 
13. Atkinson makes some specific textual comparisons between passages in Rolle and 
Kempe which describe spiritual warmth or fire, II sweetness and song ll (Atkinson 
1983, 145-6). 
14. As explained in the previous chapter, the entire third section of Irigara y' s Speculum 
is devoted to a deconstruction and symptomatic reading of Plato's myth of the 
cavern as set out in Book VII of The Republic. In Irigaray's reading the Platonic 
move to replace (female) physical origin with (masculine) divine, disembodied vision 
is representative of the workings of the phallocentric symbolic. The same move is 
evidenced by the desire of scholars of mysticism to banish the corporeal elements 
associated with feminine piety from the mystical field in favour of visionary 
experience which denies physical location. 
15. Whitford writes that, prior to Irigaray's break with Lacan, he Ilwas one of [her] 
mentors; she had attended his seminars at the Ecole Normale Superieure, she was 
a member of the Ecole freudienne de Paris, and he was effectively in charge of the 
Department of Psychoanalysis at Vincennes," where she taught until 1974 (Whitford 
1991 b, 5-6). 
16. Irigaray was expelled by Lacan in 1974 from her position in the Department of 
Psychoanalysis in the University of Vincennes following the publication of her book 
Speculum of the Other Woman, which contains a radical critique of psychoanalysis 
(\Vhitford 1991b, 5; 1992). Martha Noel Evans states that Irigaray proposed a 
seminar in the department based on her book, which resulted in Lacan's action 
(Evans 1991, 194, 219). 
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17. Ellie Ragland-Sullivan explains further: "In this view of Lacan, the catch-22 for men 
and women alike appears as an irresolution that inhabits language, marking it with 
desire as a deficit in being and knowing which is ever present, but not fully spoken. 
Thus man fails to 'colonize' the unconscious by controlling the feminine or women. 
He also fails to pin down his own masculinity as a fixed, permanent, natural fact. 
Instead Woman becomes his symptom" (Ragland-Sullivan 1991, 56). 
18. Tracy takes the analogy between Lacan and the mystic in the apophatic (negative) 
tradition further, stating that: "The orthodox psychoanalytic institutions may expel 
Lacan as firmly as the papal commission at Avignon condemned certain propositions 
of Eckhart. Yet both would continue to insist on their higher orthodoxy: for them, 
only the mystic understands what the prophet really meant for only the mystic knows 
both the basic structure of the whole and its radically de-structuring actuality. But 
even the mystic may eventually find it necessary to adopt a prophetic rhetoric and 
proclaim the word of the Other. Otherwise, the others in their secure institutions will 
trivialize and reify the words of the Other once again. If necessary, prophetic actions 
may follow: leave the official institution, open a new one, close it, and start again 
is an all too familiar prophetic activity. The careers of Eckhart and Lacan are often 
as uncannily parallel as theirapophatic rhetorics" (Tracy 1988, 271). Irigaray, of 
course, may also be read as a mystic in this sense of desiring to speak from a 
position on the margins of dominant discourses. Her career also includes movement 
between institutions, and, like Lacan, she functions as something of an "outlaw" 
(specifically in relation to Lacan himself and his school) and this resistant stance is 
a fundamental quality of her work. 
19. St Theresa is commonly thought of as-adhering to the negative way of mysticism as 
opposed to the more popular spirituality of a mystic like Kempe. 
20. This attempt at representing female sexuality is also connected to Irigaray's interest 
in reinterpreting what she sees as the disavowal of fluidity by a phallic economy 
privileging stable and singular forms, as briefly discussed in Chapter Two (83-4). 
She argues that women are displaced into the realm of the fluid which is 
unsymbolised in phallocentric culture. Thus her refigurations of female sexuality are 
attempts to address this aspect of female bodiliness and elaborate a "mechanics of 
fluids II (the title of a chapter from This Sex Which Is Not One on this topic) by 
which specific symbolisation offemale sexuality might ultimately be achieved. See 
Irigaray (1985a, 106-18; 1989b, 199-201); Gallop (1982, 39-41). 
21. In Marine Lover Irigaray describes touch as "that mediatory sense par excellence. 
That sense that, most darkly, overcomes the distances between, the enclosure within 
distinct forms, the borders dividing up territories and private estates" (Irigaray 
1991d, 178). 
22. Elizabeth Grosz observes that Lacan's researches relied lion the fascinating discourse 
of 'madwomen' - psychotics, paranoiacs, hysterics, mystics, II and quotes Catherine 
Clement on the subject: "'The whole cast of characters in his early work consists of 
women .... Not a single man is present. [He was a] man who never stopped talking 
about women'" (Clement 1983, 61, qtd. in Grosz 1990a, 6). Similarly, Martha Noel 
Evans points out that Lacan was called a hysteric (Scruton 1978, cited in Evans 
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1991, 177) and was Itcredited with 'hystericizing' psychoanalysis." In his use of 
counter-logical language and his tendency to disrupt the desire for clarity in 
conscious thought, deferring always to the reader' s/listener' s response, as well as his 
specific claim that hysterics embody the mystery that is femininity in the symbolic 
(Evans 1991, 177-9), Lacan may be seen as appropriating the language of female 
hysterics. 
23. Whitford discusses Rose's objections specifically (Whitford 1986, 7). 
24. As Burke states: "the purpose of [Irigaray's] newly amorous language is to begin 
'speaking (as) woman' - the project elaborated in her earlier books - and to do so 
not theoretically but seductively: to beguile her philosophical partners into a 
recognition of sexual difference" (Burke 1989, 229). 
25. As this project has articulated, it is Irigaray's view that women may not yet speak 
, as subjects of desire, and part of her aim is to set out the conditions necessary for 
this to become possible. As Holmlund writes: ItWithin phallocentric discourse, 
neither female self-love nor an active female desire of the other can be envisaged. 
The female lover is positioned as object, as the beloved, in French, '1' aimee.' The 
consequences of such a restriction, Irigaray charges, are disastrous for women: 'To 
define the couple in love as lover and beloved signifies, already, an assignation to 
a polarity which deprives the female lover of her love'" (Irigaray 1984, 189, qtd. in 
Holmlund 1991, 294). 
26. Marine Lover is the first book in the series. The others are Elemental Passions 
(1992b), which focuses on the element of earth "in what is simultaneously a 
prebiblical evocation of desire as the substratum of existence and a new Genesis" 
(Burke 1989,232); and L 'ollbli del 'air (1983), a dialogue with Heidegger exploring 
his appropriation of the element of air. The fourth book was never completed, but 
was to have been "a dialogue with Marx in terms offire" (Irigaray 1981a, 44; Burke 
1989, 239n). 
27. In "Divine Women" Irigaray states: "Writing Marine Lover, Passions eIementaires, 
and L 'oubli de l'air, I had thought of doing a study of our relations to the elements: 
water, earth, fire, air. I was anxious to go back to those natural matters that 
constitute the origin of our bodies, of our life, of our environment, the flesh of our 
passions .... We still pass our daily lives in a universe that is composed and is known 
to be composed of four elements: air, water, fire, and earth. We are made up of 
these elements and we live in them. They determine, more or less freely, our 
attractions, our affects, our passions, our limits, our aspirations" (Irigaray 1993a, 57). 
She has also explicitly said: "I wanted to do a kind of tetralogy which would have 
tackled the problem of the elements ... applied to philosophers nearer our own time, 
and also to put into question the philosophical tradition, particularly from the point 
of view of the feminine" (Irigaray 1981a, 43, qtd. in Whitford 1991a, 200n). 
Elizabeth Grosz remarks that "this elementary language has the dual advantage of 
providing a corporeal model of sexual difference, as well as using a terminology, 
repressed or latent within our history, to describe the powerful relations that 
constitute love, exchange and social organization" (Gross 1986, 10, qtd. in Burke 
1989,231). See also Irigaray (1989a, 199). 
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28. The element of water evokes the imagery of the "fluid economy" that Irigaray 
employs in her attempts to reinscribe female physicality in terms other than those 
of phallocentric discourse. It also has important connections in this context to her 
refiguring of the body's mucous membranes as a symbol for the "threshold" of 
exchange between subjects (Irigaray 1993b, 109-11; 1992b, 15-16). I discuss this 
move further in the third section of this chapter. 
29. Cathryn Vasseleu provides the following helpful gloss on the idea of the eternal 
return in Nietzsche: "The test of the eternal return is the ability to recognize that 
every moment of one's life is the same moment which returns, in an infinite circle 
of becoming, to the will which created it and is inseparable from it. The 
reinterpretation of self is meant in an historical and cultural sense. Acceptance of the 
doctrine of eternal return implies an affirmation of the inevitable "logic" of the will 
to power in all its creations. For Nietzsche, the operation of interpretation can be 
construed either as a loss of confidence in any values in the face of a ~ultitude of 
possibilities or, alternatively, the open-ended anticipation of another reinterpretation 
of self with every recurring moment" (Vasseleu 1993, 83-4). See also Hollingdale 
(1968, 23-4). 
30. The notion of a horizon is important in Nietzsche in that he understands the present 
moment as fundamental in its simultaneous resumption of the past and reworking of 
the future. The "death of God," for instance, opens up for Nietzsche the possibility 
for humans to imagine their own "divinity"; to live as though their every act is all 
that remains through which to (re)construct a system of meaning and a way of 
understanding the world, as in fact he believes it is. In The Gay Science he writes 
that: "We philosophers and 'free spirits' feels as if a new dawn were shining on us 
when we receive the tidings that 'the old god is dead'; our heart overflows with 
gratitude, amazement, anticipation, expectation. At last the horizon appears free 
again to us ... " (Nietzsche 1981a, 448). And in The Use and Abuse oj History, he 
claims that: "A living thing can only be healthy, strong, and productive within a 
certain horizon; if it is incapable of drawing one round itself, or too selfish to lose 
its own view in another's, it will come to an untimely end" (Nietzsche 1957, 7-8). 
This idea is echoed by Irigaray when she writes in "Divine Women" that women 
need "some shadowy perception of achievement; not a fixed objective, not a One 
postulated to be immutable but rather a cohesion and a horizon that assures us the 
passage between past and future" (Irigaray 1993a, 67. See also 1993b, 69). 
31. Whitford cites some passages from Nietzsche to which this claim on Irigaray's part 
is a response (Nietzsche 1966a, 232; 1974, 361, both cited in Whitford 1991a, 114). 
32. Irigaray also refers to Nietzsche's statement about "the death of God" in An Ethics 
of Sexual Difference, where she connects the idea with the possibility of an era in 
which sexual difference might be articulated: "The cries and words of the last 
philosophers, of Nietzsche and Heidegger, about the' death of God' are a summons 
for the divine to return as festival, grace, love, thought. Contrary to the usual 
interpretation made of them, these philosophers are not talking about the 
disappearance of the gods but about the approach or the annunciation of another 
parousia of the divine. Which involves the remolding of the world, of discourse: 
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another morning, a new era in history, in the universe. The end of times, and the 
access to a new time, to one space-time, that are different. Could this be a time 
when a meeting between the sexes becomes possible?H (Irigaray 1993b, 140). 
33. The philosophy of affirmation is evident throughout Nietzsche's writings. In Ecce 
Homo, for example, Nietzsche states that: HI was the first to see the real opposition: 
the degenerating instinct that turns against life with subterranean vengefulness 
(Christianity, the philosophy of Schopenhauer, in a certain sense already the 
philosophy of Plato, and all of idealism as typical forms) versus a formula for the 
highest affirmation, born of fullness, of overfullness, aYes-saying without 
reservation, even to suffering, even to guilt, even to everything that is questionable 
and strange in existence" (Nietzsche 1966b, 728, qtd. in Love 1986, 40). 
34. In the essay ltSexual Difference" lrigaray discusses symbolic "envelopes" by which 
women and men differently mediate their relationship to time and space. This is a 
'consequence of their different relation (for women it is a non-relation, symbolically 
speaking) to the maternal container (Irigaray 1991a. See also 1989c; 1993b, 83-94). 
35. As Allan Megill points out, Nietzsche's philosophy is intended to counter the kind 
of nihilism which "views the devaluation of all present values as oppressive and 
burdensome" (Megill 1985, 33). Instead, Nietzsche posits that "the conviction of 
crisis" and shifting values in the modern world should cause human beings to "dance 
upon the void" created by cultural change. Megill describes this view as 
recommending a "divine - that is, a creative - way of thinking" and responding to 
crisis (Megill 1985, 34). Similarities with Irigaray's claims and intentions are evident 
here. 
36. Henry Staten observes of Nietzsche's elaboration of "the economics of love" in The 
Gay Science for example, that "what has to be avoided because it violates the 
essence of maleness and femaleness is a reciprocal human love in which the male 
would flow so to speak horizontally (rather than upward), without reserve, toward 
the female, as she toward him, because this would be nothingness, there would be 
nothing left, no one to preserve being as each spllled toward the other, both would 
cease to exist: horror vacui, the nausea of spilling into a void" (Staten 1990, 166). 
This economy of the singular (male) subject as the condition of existence is precisely 
what Irigaray is attempting to rework through her introduction of the feminine as 
speaking voice in her dialogue with Nietzsche in Marine Lover. In An Ethics of 
Sexual Difference she desribes as a "horizontal perspective" a possible economy of 
female desire, different from the current system which privileges the visible 
(erection) and which "does not lead toward another threshold, another texture of 
gaze, of world, of meaning" sufficient to include the female as active participant and 
pole of enunciation (Irigaray 1993b, 70. See also 108-9). 
37. Throughout the last section of Marine Lover, Irigaray moves back and forth reading 
Christ in this way and in the "orthodox" way in order to challenge the assumptions 
behind the traditional view of his role and suggest an alternative understanding. With 
this method she touches on some of Nietzsche's objections to Christianity including 
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his view of Christ as an "anti-Christian" who displayed a self-willed mode of living 
which Christianity ignored. 
38. Irigaray describes "the reign of hom(m)o-sexuality" as the law of "the exclusive 
valorization of men's needs, desires, of exchanges among men" (Irigaray 1985a, 
171), according to which "man begets man as his own likeness" through the 
appropriation of the bodies of women (Irigaray 1985a, 172-3). Grosz observes that 
the term refers to the patriarchal culture of exchange among men and is 
distinguished from any kind of legitimate homosexuality which might take place 
"beyond patriarchy" (Grosz 1988, 40). 
39. Grosz also points out that, as a philosopher of ethics, Levinas "theorises interhuman, 
interpersonal dynamics in the wake of Nietzsche's proclamation of the death of 
metaphysics" (Grosz 1987, 37), thus reworking the debt to the Greek logocentric 
> tradition which Nietzsche, despite himself, displays. 
40. In a succinct description of the development of Irigaray's work, Frances Oppel 
claims that Irigaray's "pessimism about the possibilities for an enactment of the 
copula, a discourse of sexual difference, changes, during the 1980s, to cautious 
optimism," when her writings begin to "signal an intuition that a turning-point in 
western culture may have been reached on account of what appears to be - she is 
tentative - the beginnings of the unrepression of the feminine" (Oppel 1993, 91). 
41. The face (of the other) is, as I will explain, an important image in Levinas' account 
of intersubj ective ethics. 
42. As Levinas writes in Totality and Infinity: "For the presence before a face, my 
orientation toward the Other, can .lose the avidity of the gaze only by turning into 
generosity, incapable of approaching the other with empty hands. This relationship, 
established over the things hereafter possibly common, that is, susceptible of being 
said, is the relationship of conversation [discours]. The way in which the other 
presents himself (sic), exceeding the idea of the other in me, we here name face 
[nous l'appelons, en effet, visage]" (Levinas 1979, 50, qtd. with modifications in 
Robbins 1991, 136). And Grosz, quoting Levinas, writes that: "It is the act of facing 
the other that expresses for the subject its incarnation: 'To approach the face is to 
assume the most basic responsibility .... The face is the other who asks me not to let 
him die alone, as if that would make him become an accomplice in his own death. 
Thus, facing says to me: you shall not kill. In a relation to the face, I am exposed 
as usurper of the other's place'" (Levinas 1981, 23-4, qtd. with modifications in 
Grosz 1987, 36). 
43. In the Judaic tradition, of course, "God is not revealed. He does not manifest 
Himself directly or indirectly; He is not made present by an imagination or through 
a corporeal representative. Rather, He speaks, He commands, He calls on the 
subject. ... The Jew does not choose faith; he is chosen, called on ... " (Grosz 1989, 
156). Hence "summoning" has particularly strong overtones in the Jewish context; 
it signifies the heart of the faith, the unavoidable debt the believer owes to Yahweh 
as deliverer and creator of the Law. 
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44. Spivak describes Irigaray's project as set forth in "The Fecundity of the Caress" 
(1986c) as aiming "to provide ingredients for an ethical base to rewrite gendering 
in the social sphere" (Spivak 1992b, 76). 
45. Spivak writes scathingly of Levinas' portrayal of "the feminine": "I intend no 
disrespect to the grandeur of Levinas' s thought when I say that the empirical scene 
of sexual congress behind Levinas's 'Phenomenology of Eros' is almost comically 
patriarchal, so generally so that the bourgeois male colonial subject from various 
parts of the world can be fitted into the slot of 'the lover.' The 'forever inviolate 
virginity of the feminine,' 'frail and animal-like,' is completely excluded from the 
public sphere: 'It excludes the third party ... [and is] the supremely non-public' 
(Levinas 1979, 258, 263, 265) .... 'The face, all straightforwardness and frankness, 
in its feminine epiphany dissimulates allusions, innuendos. It laughs under the cloak 
of its own expression, without leading to any specific meaning, alluding to it in 
empty space [en faisant allusion dans Ie vide], signalling the less than nothing' 
'(Levinas 1979,264). Just as I find it difficult to believe that Hegel's virulent racism 
is written off (not by Derrida) when we worship at the shrine of the dialectic; so do 
I find it difficult to take this prurient heterosexist, male-identified ethics seriously. 
lrigaray is more generous" (Spivak 1992b, 76-7). 
46. There are evident similarities with Lacan on this point, however fundamentally 
opposed the two writers' respective accounts of coming to subjectivity may be. 
47. I am not suggesting here that Irigaray misreads Levinas as writing in the Greek 
logo centric tradition, in which this concept belongs. Rather, I am persisting with 
exploring the theme of the "duality" of negative and positive mysticism in terms of 
the wider context and aims of this chapter. 
48. As Grosz points out, Levinas' work "is one of the few mainstream twentieth-century 
textual philosophies to be located outside the logocentric tradition of Greek thought" 
(Grosz 1987, 32. See also 1989, 156-8). 
49. A useful definition of phenomenology (the study of things-in-themselves) may be 
found in Levinas' earliest book, a study of HusserI, an extract from which is 
reproduced as "The Phenomenology of Being" in The Levinas Reader. In this piece 
Levinas writes that lithe origin of the very idea of 'an object' is to be found in the 
concrete life of a subject. .. a subject is not a substance in need of a bridge, namely, 
knowledge, in order to reach an object, but...the secret of its subjectivity is in being 
present in front of objects. The modes of appearing of things are not, therefore, 
characters which are superimposed on existing things by the process of 
consciousness; they make up the very existence of things" (Levinas 1989c, 17). 
50. Thus Levinas writes: "In a caress, what is there is sought as though it were not there, 
as though the skin were a trace of its own withdrawal, a languor still seeking, like 
an absence which, however, could not be more there" (Levinas 1981, 90, qtd. in 
Grosz 1987, 35n). 
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51. In relation to the centrality of the body (which also occurs in positive mysticism) in 
Levinas' philosophy, Grosz observes that "for the Judaic system of thought...works 
of art do not picture the divine by their capacity for verisimilitude, but through their 
corporeal effects on the subject, in the form of alterity. Art, as the other, touches 
(upon) the subject, brings about an encounter with the subject and may even 
transform the subject" (Grosz 1987, 39). This description of the Judaic attitude to 
art is remarkably close to the definition of positive mysticism which interprets 
human likeness to the divine in terms of the corporeal response of the mystical 
subject. However, the view of the inexpressibility of divine encounter (which occurs 
in negative mysticism) is also exhibited in Levinas' work, paradoxically, through the 
notion of touch or the caress. As Cathryn Vasseleu puts it: "The caress signals both 
contact and withdrawaL ... In soliciting what ceaselessly escapes it, the caress is a 
sensibility that parts with sense .... Erotic intimacy is not an attempt to assimilate an 
irreducible other, but an obsessive delight in contacting the alien, and losing it and 
one's own perspective simultaneously" (Vasseleu 1991, 147). 
52. I am conscious, again, of the absurdity of placing Levinas, so clearly in the Judaic 
tradition which is opposed to Hellenic systems of thought, on either side of the 
divide which has persisted in Christian mystical s.cholarship. However I intend this 
description only as a rhetorical device in the exploration of Irigaray's visionary 
moves as regards the divine and female flesh. 
53. Irigaray describes "a dialectic of the couple" in "The Universal as Mediation," an 
essay on Hegel (Irigaray 1993e, 144) and has more recently elaborated the concept 
in the essays in J'aime it toi (Irigaray 1992c). 
54. "The Blind Spot of an Old Dream of Symmetry" is the title of the first section of 
Speculum, a deconstructive reading of Freud. 
55. In An Ethics of Sexual Difference Irigaray articulates the simultaneous representative 
and expansive function of her refigured divine as mediator between the sexes: 
"Within sexual difference, there would, it seems, be at once finiteness and limit, as 
a result of the meeting of two bodies, and two thoughts, and also infiniteness and 
unlimitedness if 'God' intervenes" (Irigaray 1993b, 85). 
56. Whitford describes the amorous exchange in Irigaray as "not the exchange of 
commodities but a mode of ethical being" (Whitford 1991a, 165), i.e., a type of 
exchange that would transform the current (patriarchal) order of exchange by 
actively recognising and symbolising the material cultural contributions of women. 
As Whitford states: "It is not just a question of inventing some new terms, but of a 
total symbolic redistribution" (Whitford 1991 a, 165) in the order of discourse. 
57. Whitford states that in her opinion the passage from Irigaray on Levinas quoted 
above "does not .. .imply that heterosexuality is superior to homosexuality as a 
practice, since the fertility Irigaray is describing is symbolic, 'of the spirit'; women 
or men together could merge in this creative way" (Whitford 1991 a, 167). While I 
can accept this interpretation up to a point, it seems to me that the terms used to 
describe this merging can only be interpreted as applying to homosexual encounter 
if one somehow displaces them from all fleshly connotation. In other words, are we 
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not then back to arguing that Irigaray's attention to the "morphology" of bodies has 
no relation to bodies as they currently exist? (Kirby 1991, 91). If this is so, I am left 
wondering how these radical changes will ever be begun. I think they must begin at 
the site of rethinking concrete social (and sexual) relations, but not in such a way 
that the experience of the relations themselves is exempted from analysis. 
58. In a similar vein, Judith Butler observes that "[Irigaray's] terms tend to mime the 
grandiosity of the philosophical errors that she underscores" (Butler 1993, 36). 
59. Holmlund continues this charge in a footnote, saying that "Irigaray on the whole 
fails to raise questions about differences among women even where Western women 
are concerned." She quotes Naomi Schor, who claims that: "Irigaray has, like other 
bourgeois white feminists, only managed to relocate universality, to institute a new 
hegemony" (Schor 1989, 56n, qtd. in Holmlund 1991, 308n). 
60. My own project is no doubt open to the same charge I make here against Irigaray, 
since the aim of speaking "as a woman" would appear to assume that for all women 
the conditions of achieving speech as female subjects would be the same. I hope that 
the following section will counter this tendency somewhat, although the problem 
needs to be consistently brought to bear on the normalising modes of psychoanalytic 
theory. 
61. Whitford writes that, in Irigaray, "the language of amorous exchange is the language 
of phantasy; it offers an imaginary account of a different unconscious 'scene.' It 
should no doubt be seen as an ideal, a touchstone or horizon" (Whitford 1991a, 166) 
for future possibilities of female "becoming" or specific embodiment. Irigaray's 
"phantastical" language of amorous exchange is an attempt to challenge the 
phantasmatic constructions of the masculine cultural imaginary. 
62. This is the line taken by Elizabeth Grosz, who states that, in her view: "if Irigaray' s 
most recent texts advocate the creative, mysterious interchange between women and 
men, this does not imply her work's irrelevance to gay, and especially lesbian, 
politics. These texts problematize our culture's understanding of both homosexuality 
and heterosexuality in their present forms. Sexual relations between women or 
between men are both implicated in the phallocentrism involved in all discourse, 
representation and desire" (Grosz 1988, 43). 
63. On the other hand, it could just be a desire not to "throw the baby out with the 
bathwater," so to speak, since I can remember a day only a few years ago when I 
gave a group discussion paper on French feminism to a novice reading group in 
feminist theory of which I was a member, claiming that Irigaray's ideas were of 
little use to feminists in Aoteoroa because they represented female bodies in a 
limiting (not an expansive or utopian) fashion. See also Whitford's comments, 
quoted in my Chapter One (57-8), about what she calls the necessary "time of 
understanding" involved in reading Irigaray, and the possibility of changing one's 
thinking as a result of engaging in the creative thought processes reading her work 
often entails (Whitford 1991 a, 5). 
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64. Holmlund cites Whitford on the interlocutive tone of Irigaray's work, as I do in the 
Introduction (3). Whitford claims that "Irigaray's work requires an interlocutor more 
than most, since 'speaking as a woman,' if we accept the definition of it given by 
her work, necessitates a dialogue: the meaning of what women are saying only 
becomes accessible in an active exchange between speaker and hearer" (Whitford 
1986, 3). 
65. Dempster continues.: IIIf...the ballet is a cultural institution which ceremoniously 
inscribes patriarchal ideology, then this training process is the female dancer's 
initiation into a patriarchal symbolic order, that is, into the language of the father" 
(Dempster 1988, 41). 
66. The full quotation is depressingly specific: "The ballet is a purely female thing; it 
is a woman, a garden of beautiful flowers, and the man is the gardener" (qtd. in 
Copeland 1982, 48, qtd. in Dempster 1988, 53n). Balanchine also said that IIwoman 
is naturally inferior in matters requiring action and imagination. Woman oblingingly 
accepts her lowly place. Woman is an object of beauty and desire. Woman is first 
in ballet by default, because she is more beautiful than the opposite gender" (qtd. in 
Daly 1986, 8, qtd. in Adair 1992, 116). 
67. The construction of balletic discourse in (negative) mystical terms is evident in the 
following quote from Lincoln Kirstein, a notorious defender of classical ballet 
against what he perceives as the dengeneration of modern dance: "The classic dance 
is not merely a department of theatrical-dancing as opposed to the 'romantic,' but 
rather a central line, or governing attitude which links the purest developments in 
traditional stage practice, whatever the· epoch .... In the vocabulary of step and gesture 
over the last five hundred years, there have been many' impure' influences, affecting 
the idiom from individual personalities, from exotic or national dances, from circus, 
music-hall and ballroom" (Kirstein 1983, 364). There are obvious similarities 
between this attitude and the description of mystical discourse produced by Knowles 
and quoted earlier in the chapter, in which positive mysticism is described as an 
impure development of mysticism proper. 
68. Another factor governing who gets to be a ballet dancer is, of course, one's social 
status, since normally only middle-class and higher income bracket families can 
afford to pay for ballet classes for their children, and to be successful ballet training 
must (in most cases, especially for girls) be embarked upon while very young. 
69. There have also been black ballet companies but these tend to (have) be(en) the 
exception rather than the rule. The Dance Theatre of Harlem, established in the early 
1970s, is the most well known example, although Adair discusses its predecessors 
from the 1930s onwards (Adair 1992, 168-9). She also provides a concise survey of 
the wide-ranging developments in black dance in Britain, Europe and America 
outside of ballet (Adair 1992, 160-81). In Aotearoa the work of the Dance Pacific 
(now defunct), Manawa Nui and Kahurangi Dance Theatre companies (have) 
provide( d) examples of work which explores indigenous and postcolonial themes. 
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70. There are many examples of such work in the "western" world and they are 
increasing all the time. Adair includes two relevant chapters in her book, one on 
"new" dance and early postmodern projects which arose in the 1970s (Adair 1992, 
182-98), and one entitled "The Subversives - Women's Dance Practice," which 
charts developments in dance in the 1980s (199-238). See also Dempster (1988, 46-
9); Foster (1986, 169-72,209). 
71. In the conclusion to Probyn's original and engaging study of the autobiographical 
tum in recent (feminist and) cultural theory, she writes of possibilities of speaking 
the self in terms which apply to dancing. Dancing frequently seems to serve as an 
image for visionary hopes such as those Probyn articulates, and this in tum helps me 
to feel hopeful about possibilities of transforming dancing practice into a site of 
personal (and eventually cultural?) transformation. Probyn states her view that, 
"against and in the midst of speaking a tired self, we need to use our imaginations, 
strike a pose for other positions and instil feminisms with attitude. We need to keep 
'moving and to keep speaking our selves in ways that will encourage other 
movements, that will recreate alternative positions. I hear another self, I hear myself, 
she speaks and in the movement of other images of selves, alternative speaking 
positions appear as possible. I am drawn to them and re-fmd them in the motions 
of selves. As Barthes writes of the (grain,' it is 'the body in the voice as it sings, the 
hand as it writes, the limb as it performs'" (Barthes 1977, 188, qtd. in Probyn 1993, 
172). Similarly, Drucilla Cornell writes that: "We cannot know for sure, 'Yes this 
is definitely different. Now we are affirming Woman as other than the signifier of 
their [masculine] desire.' But the possibility that we might be approaching a new 
choregraphy of sexual difference with every new step we take can also not be wiped 
out. ... This is what Irigaray seeks to protect: the possibility that feminine difference 
performs against phallogocentrism in the name of the Other. ... This performance is 
affirmed as performance, not as a mere description of what woman is. But as 
performance, its evocation is explicitly utopian" (Cornell 1991, 205). 
72. Paul Vah~ry's philosophical musing on dance includes the following description of 
the dancer's Itselflessness": "This detachment from the environment, this absence of 
aim, this negation of explicable movement, these full turns (which no circumstance 
of ordinary life demands of our body), even this impersonal smile - all these features 
are radically opposed to those that characterize our action in the practical world and 
our relations with it" (Vah~ry 1983, 61-2). 
73. I have argued eleswhere that anorexia, from which so many female dancers suffer, 
is a hysterical disease. See Bremner (1993); Celermajer (1987). 
CHAPTER FIVE 
MYSTERIAlHYSTERIA: MOTHERING AND MADNESS 
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The relationship with the mother is a mad desire, because it is the lfdark continent" 
par excellence. It remains in the shadows of our culture; it is its night and its"helL 
But men can no more, or rather no less, do without it than can women. And if there 
is now such a polarization over the questions of abortion and contraception, isn't that 
one more way of avoiding the question: what of the imaginary and symbolic 
relationship with the mother, with the womanwmother? What of that woman outside 
her social and material role as reproducer of children, as nurse, as reproducer of 
labour power? (Irigaray 1991e, 35) 
There is a revolutionary potential in hysteria. Even in her paralysis, the hysteric 
, exhibits a potential for gestures and desires .... A movement of revolt and refusal, a 
desire for/of the living mother who would be more than a reproductive body in the 
pay of the polis, a living, loving woman (Irigaray 1991f, 47w8). 
The disavowed role of the maternal in the social systems of "westernlt capitalist culture is, as 
we have seen, one of lrigaray's primary concerns, and it informs the shape of most of her 
arguments about the oppression of women. "In the present system," she writes: 
It is a fact that women maintains (sic) the productive forces of society. By producing 
children, by reproducing the labour force, they continue to mediate the exchange 
between men. In other words, women's bodies constitute the infrastructure of our 
society: they reproduce the forces of production without being recognized as a force 
of production (Irigaray 1977a, 73). 
The non-representation of women's contributions to culture in Irigaray's view is the result of 
a prohibition of maternal desire in the myths by which "western" culture has come to 
understand itself. Irigaray identifies the Oedipal myth which forms the cornerstone of 
psychoanalysis as an exemplar of this pattern. She argues that the relationship between 
Oedipus and his father is projected retroactively onto the body of the mother so that the whole 
question of the mother's situation and relationship with her child is "fantasized post-
OedipaUy" (Irigaray 1991e, 38). Psychoanalysis has not been concerned to explore the life of 
mother and child prior to the child's birth into the world because it has always been primarily 
child-focused, a fact which other feminist writers have observed (Rich 1977, 17; Suleiman 
1985; Hirsch 1989,12).1 
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Irigaray writes of the unsymbolised relation between mother and child before the child is 
born: 
Psychoanalysis takes a dim view of this first moment - and, besides, it is invisible. 
A foetal situation or foetal regression, they say, and there is not a lot to be said 
about that. A taboo is in the air. If the father did not sever this over-intimate bond 
with the primal womb, there might be the danger of fusion, of death, of the sleep 
of death. But the exclusivity of his law forecloses this first body, this first home, this 
first love. It sacrifices them so as to make them material for the rule of a language 
[langue] which privileges the masculine genre [Ie genre masculin] to such an extent 
as to confuse it with the human genre [Ie genre humain] (Irigaray 1991e, 39). 
Language itself is an attempt to annul the primal fear of engulfment by the mother, therefore 
language' operates on a model of the masculine. For Irigaray, as we have seen, the function 
of language (and culture, the realm of the symbolic) as mediating the unsymbolised maternal 
needs to be radically rethought to make way for a model of social and linguistic exchange in 
which women are participants on a level with men. 
In the published account of a speech at a meeting entitled "Women and Madness," part of a 
colloquium on mental health, Irigaray states that in the current cultural system women's desire 
is madness. While she claims that "all desire is connected to madness2 .... one desire [the 
masculine] has chosen to see itself as wisdom, moderation, truth, and has left the other [the 
feminine] to bear the burden of the madness it did not want to ... recognize initself f (Irigaray 
1991e, 35). The relation of desire to madness, she says, is most evident in the relationship 
with the mother, the first object of the human subject's desire. But while men can express this 
desire in language, albeit an expression which incompletely mediates their loss, women 
cannot. For lrigaray this is the source of normative patriarchal femininity as pathology: 
When analytic theory says that the little girl must give up her love of and for her 
mother, her desire of and for her mother so as to enter into the desire of If or the 
father, it subordinates woman to a normative hetero-sexuality, normal in our 
societies, but completely pathogenic and pathological. Neither little girl nor woman 
must give up love for their mother. Doing so uproots them from their identity, their 
subjectivity (Irigaray 1991e, 44). 
And in an earlier piece sh~ states that in phallocentric culture: 
everything happens as if there were a necessary break between the earliest 
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investments, the earliest desires, the first narcissism of a little girl and those of a 
"normal" adult woman. In the place of those who (sic) would be in a position of 
continuity with her "pre-history," she has, imposed on her, a language, fantasms, a 
desire which does not "belong" to her and which establishes a break with her auto-
eroticism. That kind of schizo which every woman experiences, in our socio-cultural 
system, only leaves her with nothing more than somatisations, corporal pams, 
mutism, or mimetism with which to express herself (Irigaray 1977a, 75). 
Irigaray's early research into schizophrenia and the language of madness (Irigaray 1965; 1966; 
1967a; 1967b; 1973) revealed that, although schizophrenia, for example, is considered a 
disturbance whose symptoms are universal or sexually neutral, this is not in fact the case. She 
claims that, according to her experiments, men suffering from this condition "have an ability 
for syntactic modification, for 'metalanguage' which women do not have" (Irigaray 1977a, 
74). For women, "madness" is most often articulated directly through the body without 
linguistic mediation: 
A woman in a state of madness does not have ... the means for elaborating a delirium. 
Instead of language being the means of expression of the delirium, the latter remains 
within the body itself. The dominant element in feminine schizophrenia is corporal 
pain, the feeling of deformation or transformation of organs, etc. Thus ... women do 
not manage to articulate their madness: they suffer it directly in their body, without 
being able to transpose it in some different mode (Irigaray 1977a, 74).3 
The non-representation of the mother in "western" culture and the fact that all women must 
sacrifice their first relationship, without symbolic mediation, mean that women are 
fundamentally alienated from language. As a result, Irigaray believes: 
Nearly all women are in some state of madness: shut up in their bodies, in their 
silence and their "home." This kind of imprisonment means that they live their 
madness without it being noticed. This is perhaps why feminine madness is less 
explicit [than masculine] and, above all, less socially disruptive (Irigaray 1977a, 74). 
At the outset of the text of the talk on "Women and Madness" Irigaray notes the fact that the 
audience consists almost entirely of women. She claims that this is an unfortunate sign of the 
.attitude among medical and mental health practitioners, most of whom are men, to women 
speaking about their madness: "What women say appears to be of little importance to them" 
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(Irigaray 1991e, 34). She states that the men's absence from the meeting is in itself, then, "an 
explanation for the madness of women: their words [leur parole] are not heard" (Irigaray 
1991e, 35). Given that women are alienated from the allegedly "neutral" structures and 
operations of language and their "madness" often articulates itself in different terms from 
men's, the origins of their disturbance could be assumed to be different as well. Hence what 
is needed is specific attention to women's attempts to speak. (about) their suffering which, 
according to lrigaray's argument, would be prepared to concede that the language of madness, 
like other kinds of language, is not sexually neutral. 
Of course the modern archetype of female "madness" expressed through the body is hysteria. 
As we have seen, (female) hysterics act out their imprisonment in a body culturally 
understood as passive and for which there exists no symbolic means of specific, empowering 
representation. Frequently this occurs through their miming current fashions of femininity to 
a disturbing extreme, as with the eating disorder anorexia nervosa. Hysterics have been seen 
by many feminists as rebels who reveal "the hidden fault lines in women's social and private 
roles" and "the malady of femininity" in patriarchal societies (Evans 1991, 242. See also 200-
22; Cixous and Clement 1986; Clement 1989, 176-9). 
Hysterical activity also attests to the disastrous effects for women of the necessary but 
unsymbolised sacrifice of their relationship with the maternal. As Danielle Celermajer notes: 
When the boy renounces the Oedipal, imaginary dyad, he gains access to culture as 
a speaking subject, and attains a type of subjectivity, and ego and a set of possible 
relations which permit substitute satisfaction and re-expression of his desires. Yet 
[the girl] is excluded from that relation for different reasons and with different 
consequences: the mother/daughter relation is made impossible or unlivable because 
both parties are dependent on the phallus. In renouncing that relation she is offered 
no substitute, either in the form of positive self-representation, or in relation to 
others (mother:-substitutes), for she must henceforth function as the mother for the 
lost Oedipus, estranged (unlike the boy), without compensation. It is this lack of 
compensation and adequate representation in the case of the girl which is the basis 
of hysteria (Celermajer 1987, 62-3). 
Hysterical behaviours in women reflect the loss - or non-signification in the symbolic order 
- of a body which was experienced as other than passive and lacking in the preoedipal or 
imaginary stage, prior to entry into the symbolic: liThe body inscribed as castrated stifles all 
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possible positive representations of [the girl's] pre-Oedipal body-ego. It is a deadened 
corporeality through which her experiences and maternal prehistory are muffled and which 
is unable to represent or reinvest pre-Oedipal impulses" (Celermajer 1987, 64). As lrigaray 
writes: 
For us, the daughters, if our relationship with our mothers is a relationship with 
need, with no possible identity, and if we enter into desire by becoming objects of 
the desire of If or the father, what do we know about our identity and our desires? 
Nothing. That manifests itself in somatic pain, in screams and demands ... (Irigaray 
1991f, 52). 
Hysteria, then, is a sterile response to the situation in which a woman (or a child about to 
become a woman) finds herself; it is a protest against the conditions under which she attains 
selfhood and understands her own body. But as a "negative or reactive strategy," it "works 
by demolishing the body as her 'prison; limitation or more generally, the corporeality 
inappropriate to the wide range of experiences which, she feels, require embodiment" 
(Celermajer 1987, 64). Hysteria enacts a protest against the specific (non-)symbolisation of 
the female body which operates against the body itself. And the female hysteric as rebel 
insistently returns to the dual question of the non-symbolisation of both the mother and of 
herself as active agent (Irigaray 1985a, 136-9; 1991f, 47-8).4 
According to Irigaray's claim that the notion of God in the "west" is a primary means by 
which current social relations have been mythologised and are perpetuated, the Christian 
myths playa large part in annulling the relationship between mothers and daughters. "Without 
divine power," she writes, "men would not have been able to supplant the relationship 
between mother and daughter, and its consequences in nature and society. But man becomes 
God by giving himself an invisible father, a father tongue" (Irigaray 1991b, 65). 
Correspondingly, the figure of the Virgin Mary symbolises the patriarchally defined role of 
women/mothers as mere matter without specific identity: 
God is father; he begets a son, and for this purpose he uses a woman who is reduced 
to maternity. This has been the most abiding structure in our religious and civic 
traditions for centuries: a relation between men, or in man ... through a woman. In 
such a culture the woman remains at home, and is the object of use and exchange 
between men. She is used for reproduction and for the material maintenance of life 
(Irigaray 1991 b, 64). 
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The Virgin, "reduced to maternity," symbolises the fact that, in "western" culture, mothers are 
reduced - through maternity - to a condition without identity: the Virgin Mary represents the 
buried mother at the heart of "western" civilisation. 
The three texts treated in the rest of this chapter all deal with the madness of mothering in 
Itwestern" culture to some extent. All three texts are by women in the sense that it is women's 
words and experiences which form their basis, although men have transcribed two of them. 
They all feature the Virgin Mary too, and it is the representations of the women's experiences 
in relation to the Virgin that I am most interested to explore. In the following three sections 
I produce a reading of the hysterical "labourings" in imitation of Christ performed by Margery 
Kempe and depicted in her Book (5. 1); of the representation of the hysterical or phantom 
pregnancy of Freud's patient Dora in Freud's "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria" 
(5. 2); and of Julia Kristeva's "Stabat Mater," her essay on the role of the Virgin Mary in 
"western" culture, which incorporates an autobiographical account of her own experience of 
motherhood (5. 3). 
While the texts are widely separated from each other in time, place, authorial mediation and 
intention, my reading brings them together to explore the ways in which they produce an 
emulation of and engagement with the Virgin that takes up but also challenges her status as 
the archetypal model for women in the Christian tradition. I read the three texts as "hysterical" 
in terms of their mimetic, yet excessive qualities. The figure ofthe Virgin, differently engaged 
in each text, provides a point of departure for my (re)reading female hysteria, mothering and 
madness through each. The fact that these diverse texts involve a figure who is traditionally 
portrayed as a model for all women, in all times and places, is intended to help me ascertain 
whether there are in fact common aspects to different women's reflections on the figure of 
Mary and if so, what these may be. 
This focus on my part is problematised by the fact that one of these texts is authored by a 
man - Freud's - one by a woman - Kristeva's - and the other - Kempe's - is a collaborative 
effort. However I think this mix of conditions of production is relevant to a consideration of 
the portrayal of the Virgin since she is a hybrid figure who has served a range of different 
symbolic functions for women and men in "western" history. As we saw in Chapters Two and 
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Three, Margery Kempe's identification with the Virgin in her Passion visions may be seen 
as a "hysterical" response to a figure who is herself hystericised. In a great many popular 
medieval portrayals of the Virgin she goes literally mad with grief at the death of her Son, 
and this madness articulates itself through bodily convulsions and self-mutiliations which, 
mimicking her Son's suffering, can be read as "hysterical" (Lochrie 1991a, 180-92). Kempe's 
dependence on her priestly scribe is qualified by her divine gifts, especially her excessive 
weeping, performed at its most intense when she imitates Mary. Kempe's tears function as 
signs of God's grace that impress those clerics who support her, particularly the scribe who 
collaborates with her on the production of her Book. 
Freud'~ "Dora" case has been the focus of much interest on the part of feminists working with 
psychoanalytic theory, and several writers have pointed out that it reveals as much about 
Freud himself as it does about his patient (Bernheimer 1985, 18; Hertz 1985; Kahane 1985, 
19; Marcus 1985; Moi 1985b; Evans 1989, 81-2). Thus it is particularly suited to an enquiry 
into the construction of the category of female hysteria by psychoanalysis, one of my 
intentions in section 5. 2. In fact, I do not think that a consideration of whether female 
hysteria can be empowering on any level (through a reading of three women's "hysterical" 
responses to the Virgin) can afford to neglect Freud. It was Freud's work which, like that of 
Margery Kempe's scribe, both appropriated and attempted to make public the "secret" 
language of these tormented women, a double bind that feminists writing about the Dora case 
have consistently had to confront. Most agree that Dora's resistance to Freud's interpretations 
of her illness shows up the defects in traditional psychoanalytic theory's attitudes to women, 
however the case is frustrating in the sense that it provides us with information about Dora 
only insofar as it escapes Freud's consciousness, forming an inconclusive trail of "clues" 
regarding the possibility of female empowerment in the text. 
Kristeva's essay "Stabat Mater" is, too, thoroughly informed by her involvement with 
psychoanalysis (Smith 1993); and although it is a woman-authored text it is fundamentally 
concerned with the necessity of articulating oneself in two modes when one is a woman and 
a mother: the "objective" language of the symbolic order which is necessarily paramount, and 
the more fragmentary, "poetic" underside of this discourse which arises from maternal 
experience. The second is destined to remain unexpressed as such in the symbolic order in 
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Kristeva's view, however its power to disrupt and displace (public) language remains constant 
and needs to be continually explored. The Virgin may be seen as the locus of this 
contradiction between "outlaw femininity" (maternal excess) and phallic recuperation of it in 
all three of the texts considered here. What happens when particular women, themselves 
"outlaws" or women who speak of their own desires, focus on this ambiguous figure who 
mediates maternity for men? Can they turn masculinist discourse (including the psychoanalytic 
theory which frames the female hysteric) "hysterically" on its head? Can they exploit the 
contradictions inherent in the figure of the Virgin and suggest a specifically female mode of 
speech? These are some of the questions to which I seek answers in the final chapter of my 
study. 
In all three of the texts I examine in my search for empowering articulations of the Virgin, 
then, there is a tension between the expression of an "outlaw femininity" ordinarily annulled 
by the symbolic - such as occurs in female hysteria - and the maintenance of patriarchal order 
which requires that female "madness" be understood as just that. In the Freudian text, of 
course, the latter mode is most explicit and to the fore. Consequently I want to use Freud's 
. text of Dora's case as a kind of touchstone or point of departure for the ideas I am exploring 
in the chapter as a whole. While I call Kempe's Book and Kristeva's essay "hysterical" with 
some reservations, I want to reserve judgement on Freud's version of female hysteria in the 
Dora case as well; to try and retain the notion that hysteria as Freud described it can be open 
to alternative interpretations, that the "symptomatic narrative" (Bernheimer 1985, 18) he 
constructs may be read so as to further destabilise the production of "the female hysteric" and 
the Virgin within its frame. I also use Freud's text on Dora as a point of departure for the 
work of Irigaray in the chapter since, while her ideas inform my treatment of all three texts, 
they are considered more closely against the FreudlDora and Kristeva pieces (5. 2 and 5. 3). 
Irigaray's work has produced challenges to Freud which also express an obvious debt to 
traditional psychoanalysis and its concern with "mad" or hysterical women. I will pursue this 
challenge further while exploring the specific contradictions surrounding the Virgin and 
female/male attitudes to her role. 
Hysteria, as we have seen, "unsettles the [dominant] system by throwing back to it what it 
cannot accept about its own operations" (Grosz 1989, 138), what it has repressed in order to 
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function as it does, and Irigaray, who has been described as a hysteric (Grosz 1989, 136-8), 
provides a clear example of this move in her work. I have suggested throughout this study 
that Irigaray's view of "western" culture as deeply informed by Christianity, and as having 
a great deal invested in the concept of a masculine God which outlaws the substance of the 
maternal, nonetheless implies that women can challenge this scenario and access for 
themselves the seeds of symbolic transformation. Whether these women are mystics in the 
traditional sense or feminist visionaries like lrigaray herself, in her view they may produce 
symbolic "excess" by hysterically mimicking the figures who serve as models for them - such 
as Christ and the Virgin Mary - to an extreme degree, thereby questioning the symbolic 
parameters these figures are erected to guard. Visionary women effectively highlight what lies 
beyond'the contested symbolic model, for example the outlawed mother whose threatening 
physicality the Virgin Mary masks. I suggest that where maternity and "madness" are 
connected in the work of female visionaries, hysterics and feminists, the potential for 
subversion of patriarchal expectations of women is greatest, since both conditions (and often 
they are effectively one and the same) are the repository of patriarchal culture's outlawed 
excesses, that which it abjures in instituting the rule of masculine Reason. 
In the following pages I take up the idea that, however debased and without symbolisation 
maternal experience is in "western" culture, the (hysterical) re-presentations of the Virgin in 
the texts of Kempe, FreudIDora and Kristeva produce and highlight an unassimilable 
(female/maternal) physical excess. This excess is the product of the women's engagements 
with the Virgin in which points of connection and disparity between their experience and 
those ascribed to her emerge, the result of her contradictory status as a model for women's 
lives. In the situations of FreudIDoraand Kempe, for example, the excess of female 
physicality associated with the female protagonists is the appropriated basis of the masculine 
construction of the text, yet it continually disrupts the writing's surface meaning with an other 
kind of language. It is this excessive female language, articulated in connection with the 
Virgin, that I want to try and develop a way to read. 
My analysis of the relationship between the three female figures (Kempe, Dora, Kristeva) and 
the Virgin will draw on the arguments put forward by Irigaray about the female mystic and 
hysteric, the Virgin, and the divine in "La Mysterique,u Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche, 
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and An Ethics of Sexual Difference respectively. In the third section of Marine Lover, as we 
have seen, Irigaray suggests a reformulation of divinity in the Christian tradition which would 
take account of the irreducible contribution of Mary to its basic doctrines (Irigaray 1991d, 
166-90). This work in general, while on one level a celebratory response to Nietzsche, also 
contributes to lrigaray's project of transforming and redeploying conventional religious 
categories so as to set up conditions of specific female embodiment and representation. 
Following lrigaray, I argue that the three depictions of mothering and/or "madness" considered 
here, by incorporating "the divine" through the figure of the Virgin, suggest ways of reading 
maternal and hysterical experience other than according to conventional models of femininity. 
While the chapter's title refers to the congruence between certain kinds of female mysticism 
and hysteria that Irigaray posits in Speculum of the Other Woman (and which she names 
"mysteria"), the section titles are echoes of Kristeva and allude to the three "privileged" 
moments of "rupture, renovation and revolution" that she figures through the discourses of 
"madness, holiness and poetry" (Kristeva 1976, 64; Grosz 1989,97) in "western" culture. For 
Kristeva these individual and cultural occasions represent the eruption of semiotic energies, 
associated with the maternal body, into the symbolic order. As Grosz outlines, commentating 
on Kristeva: "neuroses and psychoses signal [the] eruption [of the semiotic] in the subject's 
psychical economy; religious ecstacy [sic] and jouissance indicate its expression in religious 
discourses; and avant-garde experimentation in all of the arts point to its disruption of the 
rules of signifying practice" (Grosz 1989, 97-8). However the semiotic is, in Kristeva's 
writings, always present within and dependent upon the function of the symbolic (Kristeva 
1986b, 93-6). Rose remarks that the Kristevan semiotic "has to work through the order of 
language it defies" and that the relationship between semiotic and symbolic is "one of a 
'dynamic'" (Rose 1991a, 147) in which neither is expendable. This chapter investigates the 
shifting relationship between semiotic and symbolic in the texts it explores, as part of its 
attempt to isolate moments of hysterical subversion in the representation of the Virgin by 
women. 
Like Irigaray, Kristeva has shown a fundamental concern with motherhood, the Christian 
religion and connections between the two in her writings, and I have discussed some of her 
work on these issues in previous chapters. However, Kristeva's interest in the "darker side" 
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of maternal experience and psychic life seems more directly relevant to this chapter on 
mothering and madness than to earlier ones. In the chapter generally I have sought to bring· 
the two writers into a kind of dialogue together or at least to produce an undercurrent of 
creative tension between their ideas about Christianity and women. As Jacqueline Rose points 
out, Kristeva's work has continually focused on: 
the psychic pain and violence which ... characterises the early interaction between the 
mother and child. This is why [she] is able at one and the same time to layout the 
horrors of the fantasmatic structure which underpins the writings of an author like 
Celine, while at the same time praising that writing for exposing a psychic drama 
which - with massive social repercussions - is constantly denied, projected onto the 
other, and then played out by the culture at large (Kristeva 1982, cited in Rose 
, 1991a, 154-5). 
The general subject matter I am considering here, the difficulties of mother-daughter relations 
in patriarchal society and their connection with madness, presents perhaps the greatest 
challenge to Irigaray's utopian vision. The chapter engages with some key themes of her 
writings - hysteria, mothering, mysticism and divinity - at times alongside and at times in 
tension with Kristeva's rather different perspectives. The Kristevan/lrigarayan dialectic is the 
means by which I hope to establish what women's (maternal) self-figurations involving the 
Virgin might be attempting to symbolise; thus'the overall focus remains the investigation into 
the potential for women of reinscribing religious concepts for physical ends. 
5. 1 Embodying holiness: Margery Kempe's "gostly labowr" 
As Sidonie Smith observes, The Book of jl;[argery Kempe begins with a description of the 
mystic'S "descent into madness and her diabolic invective against all those forces supporting 
the patriarchal order" (Smith 1987, 83). It is also an account of the beginning of Kempe's 
married and mothering life. The Book's first chapter describes how, at around the age of 
twenty, Kempe was married to her husband John and shortly found herself pregnant. Because 
of the sickness she experienced during her pregnancy and the pain of her labour when giving 
birth, she despaired of her life and called for her confessor to make her final confession. As 
described in Chapter Three (156), the Book records how Kempe had a particular sin on her 
conscience, which she had never previously confessed to anyone, but doesn't specify what it 
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was. When she began to describe this sin, her confessor cut her off, which caused her to go 
"out of her mind and [be] amazingly disturbed and tormented with spirits for half a year, eight 
weeks and odd days" (Kempe 1988, 41). 
During this time Kempe was troubled by demonic visions and a great desire for "wickedness"; 
she slandered herself, friends, and family and physically mutilated her body, so that she had 
to be tied up to prevent this behaviour (Kempe 1988, 42). Smith suggests that Kempe's 
"witchlike collusion with the devil" at this point serves "both to support the patriarchal order 
and to disrupt it" (Smith 1987, 83). The disruption is evidenced in her wild railing against all 
the authorities of her life - Church, family, God, good works, the saints (Kempe 1988, 42) 
- but the support comes later, as Kempe is healed of her madness by a second birth in which 
she is not the birth-giver but the product of another's labour.s This is a spiritual (re)birth 
engineered by Christ and is the source of Kempe's embarking on her visionary path. The story 
of this new life, transcribed into her Book, effectively replaces and erases the other (thirteen) 
childbirth experiences she undergoes, which with one brief exception (Kempe 1988, 73), are 
not recorded in the text. The spiritual narrative of the Book transforms the maternal narrative 
of Kempe's life into the pre-text of a story about divine grace. 
The allegiance to the patriarchal order which Kempe enacts following her final conversion (a 
second, more lasting conversion experience occurs in middle age, following a relapse into 
pride after the first (Chapter 2) is in the form of her seeking and following the counsel of 
priests as she strives to continue in lithe way of everlasting life" on which she has begun 
(Kempe 1988, 45). But as we have seen, this allegiance is continually troubled, as Kempe's 
narrative records, by events which may be traced to her maternal experience insofar as her 
former wifely status makes her a less-than-perfect vehicle for divine inspiration. As Smith 
points out: 
In opening her Book with a description of the birth of her first child, Kempe 
announces her contaminated relationship to the spiritual life, for, with her child, she 
bearslbares the ineradicable mark of physical corruption: The moment of childbirth 
refers backward to an earlier moment when, her womb pierced and unsealed, she is 
irreversibly severed from the wholeness and integrity of the virgin's state (Smith 
1987, 64). 
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It is Kempe's status as a non-virgin (i.e., her lack of acceptable status in the eyes of the 
Church) which makes her efforts to proceed along the path of complete devotion to Christ so 
fraught with danger and so requiring of articulate defence. Her desperate confession gone 
awry at the Book's opening, the rest of Kempe's narrative - the story of her renewed, spiritual 
life - can be seen as the displaced attempt to seek absolution from past sexual sins. It is, as 
its beginning asserts, a mother's story, but after this description of the first childbirth and 
madness there is no more direct or detailed reference to mothering experience within it. In this 
respect it conforms to the works of other women visionaries of Kempe's time who had been 
mothers (e.g., St Bridget of Sweden and Blessed Dorothea of Montau. Chapter Two 110, 111-
2). Instead, there are accounts of Kempe's maternal devotions to Christ (Kempe 1988, 53-4, 
113,25'1); of God's and the Virgin's maternal devotions to her (Kempe 1988, 66-7,215); and 
Kempe's own interactions with the Virgin, in which Kempe aids and emulates and, on one 
occasion, explicitly takes her place at Christ's request (Kempe 1988, 229). 
Kempe's Book as a whole, then, may be read as an attempt to mediate the voicelessness and 
extreme passivity enjoined on her through childbearing. One interpretation of her thwarted 
confession is that mothers are not taken seriously by priests, a notion endorsed by the 
Church's belief that after giving birth a woman was especially unclean and unworthy of 
clerical attention; she was refused the sacrament until the Purification cermony had taken 
place (Erickson 1976, 196). Kempe's initial "hysterical" madness, in which she takes on and 
dramatises the negative qualities associated with her fallen foremother, Eve, does not lead to 
freedom from what is in her mind but only to her literal confinement. But when Christ 
mediates a second (spiritual) birth she is enabled to practise a more empowering kind of 
mimicry, no less expressive of suffering,but part of the working out of her salvation and so 
more acceptable to the patriarchal authorities of her world. 
Thus, somewhere between her fervid emulations of Eve and the Virgin Mary - the madonna 
and the whore, those twin poles that are an attempt to annul the threat of maternal power for 
men (Sprengnether 1990, 40) - is born Kempe's own story, that of a mother who is not a 
mother, who seeks to be remembered for acts of spiritual and not carnal birth-giving, divine 
and not demonic acts of madness. The description of Kempe's major imitations of the Virgin 
Mary (which are also, as Chapter Three showed, imitations of Christ's suffering) occur near 
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the end of her narrative (Chapters 79-82). They show how the spiritual and physical 
pilgrimages of her life have led to a kind of participatory redemption from her sinful past. But 
they also reflect the unresolved tensions and trauma which are the result of Kempe's desire 
to pursue an active life despite the passivity and public silence normally required of mothers. 
If we read The Book of Margery Kempe as a confession of Christ, a transcription into book 
form of the mystic's imitatio, the excessiveness of Kempe's response to her Passion visions 
may be seen to evoke the earlier clerical refusal and resultant demonic madness. Both 
orthodox and unorthodox forms of madness present a challenging response to Kempe's initial 
silencing by priestly discourse. 
Kempe'S postpartum madness which opens the narrative of her Book also exemplifies 
Irigaray's view that "an explanation for the madness of women" lies in men refusing to hear 
their words (Irigaray 1991e, 35), and her related observation that women's alienation from 
language leads to their expressing psychical suffering directly through their bodies (Irigaray 
1977a, 74), for example through disorders such as hysteria. As Grosz explains the situation 
of the hysteric, her original suffering stems from an invasive imposition of another's desire: 
The traumatic event lies dormant until it is re-evoked through a similar event, an 
event which provokes the onset of the hysterical symptom. The symptom is an act 
of (unconscious) defiance. It is provoked, not directly by the repetition of a 
precipitating event, although the symptoms only appear after a second event, but in 
an earlier "seduction" to which the child was passively subjected. This earliest 
seduction is not simply a chance event but is seen by the child as an anticipation of 
her position as a feminine subject in a patriarchal culture, an omen of what is to 
come. Her symptom is a strategy to ward off the violations with which she is 
expected to comply (Grosz 1989, 137). 
Kempe'S initial confessor may be likened to the (male) figure who first imposes his desire on 
the hysteric, so that this imposition is felt as a portent of the way things will henceforth be 
for the female subject in (phallocentric) culture. Kempe's confessor "seduces" her into silence 
with his official words of absolution, ending the confession ritual prematurely. In responding 
with reproof to the mystic before she could tell of a sin long on her conscience, effectively 
I ' 
stopping her speech, he may be seen to have contributed to a narrative in which maternal 
experience (and maternal guilt) is largely repressed yet erupts in physical behaviours that are 
figured through miming current devotional fashions. 
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The madness Kempe describes at the beginning of her Book follows directly on her first 
experience of childbearing, that condition in which women become, according to a feminist 
psychoanalytic reading, an unsymbolised liminal space between culturally comprehensible 
notions. Kempe's double alienation, her occupying the place of the unsymbolised maternal 
origin of language itself, coupled with her thwarted desire to be heard by the appropriate male 
authority, can be seen to lead to a "hysterical" response when normal speech fails. But as 
Smith observes, this "contaminated moment" and the madness that follows is cast "in an 
eschatological framework: Childbearing [Kempe] presents as a moment of total disorientation, 
vulnerability, and sinfulness, a time that brings her to the brink of physical and spiritual 
death" (Smith 1987, 64). And after this death, spiritual regeneration follows. 
Hope Weissman argues for a self-healing aspect to Kempe's mimetic tears, which assimilate 
her maternal suffering into "a sanctioned form of grief' (Weissman 1982, 207). Describing 
Kempe's pilgrimage to Jerusalem, where her first outbreaks of weeping occur, she suggests 
that: 
in technique as well as in aim, [Kempe's] journey is a recreative one; the narrative 
appropriates and reworks traditional paradigms in serving its heroine's concerns. 
Regarded in this light, the narrative technique itself can be recognized as an 
instrument of healing. It is used by [Kempe] to articulate a complex new relationship 
to authority, one which mediates between her desire for formal validation and her 
awareness that such validation might finally be withheld (Weissman 1982, 208).6 
The representation of Kempe's "hysterical" or disturbingly mimetic tears in her Book, then, 
works as a kind of "talking cure," as was argued in Chapter Three (156), part of her 
achievement of validation by formal, orthodox means which yet remains equivocal due to its 
excessive basis in a non-virginal female body. Both the clerically sanctioned and the clerically 
disturbing aspects of Kempe's behaviour are integral components of the text. While Kempe's 
tears can be seen as "hysterical" in their extreme expression of culturally endorsed behaviour, 
itself mimetic, beneath the Passion formula which makes her devotions acceptable to clerical 
authorities lies her own unresolved and unexpressed maternal pain. 
Kempe's "hysterical" madness in Jerusalem (Chapter 28) is echoed by the visions described 
near the end of Book I (Chapters 79-82), in which she twists and turns like a woman giving 
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birth (Kempe 1988, 106). Weissman writes of this part of Kempe's text that "its departure 
from the main-line tradition of compassion narratives is marked by the phrase 'wondyrfully 
turnyng & wrestyng. "I She observes that while the phrase, "indeed the entire iconographic 
complex, has obvious erotic overtones which it shares with many other late-medieval Passion 
meditations .... [it] also is highly suggestive of a woman laboring with child" (Weissman 1982, 
212). 
While I have described how Kempe's self-presentation as an ardent follower of Christ 
involves her following conventional models of behaviour in order to speak with recognised 
authority, specific connections between her "hysterical," holy "madness" and her re-
presentation of childbirth in mimicking Christ have only been touched upon so far. It is this 
aspect of Kempe's imitative behaviour which I believe has most to say to contemporary 
women, for whom motherhood is still a "vocation" or an activity culturally aligned with 
muteness, with sheer materiality and so with a particular kind of inarticulateness or madness. 
Of course, the archetype of this condition in "western" culture is the Virgin, whom Kempe 
emulates closely in several of her meditations on the Passion. For lrigaray, as I have 
explained, the muteness which is still enjoined on mothers in "western" culture in the late 
twentieth century is bound up with Christian traditions in which the only mother to be 
recognised is silent and whose physicality is all but erased. For Kristeva, too, the myth of the 
Virgin Mary is of significance for an understanding of the cultural meaning of motherhood 
in the twentieth-century "west." Kristeva describes the Virgin as a visible cultural site where 
the heterogeneous, crisis-ridden discourse of motherhood is papered over, recuperated within 
the workings of the symbolic order (Kristeva 1980a, 237; Oliver 1993,49; Weir 1993, 81-4). 
At this point I will outline in more detail Kristeva's views on the Virgin before returning to 
Kempe and relating them to her "hysterical" imitatia. 
According to Kristeva the Virgin represents an attempt to contain and neutralise the effect of 
the semiotic in language. Kristeva's notion of the semiotic chara has more than one meaning, 
but is related to the Lacanian symbolic as a kind of constant traversal of language, attesting 
to the subject's prior relationship with its mother (Kristeva 1986b, 93-4). It is "always a 
bodily presence disruptive to the sublimated symbolic order" (Gallop 1982, 124).7 For 
Kristeva, maternity is a discourse in which concepts of identity operative in the symbolic are 
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called into question. She claims that "the maternal body is the place of a splitting, 
which ... remains a constant factor of social reality" (Kristeva 1980a, 238), and that "the act of 
giving birth" consists of a "strange form of split symbolization" at the "threshold of language 
and instinctual drive, of the 'symbolic' and the 'semiotic'" (Kristeva 1980a, 240). Kristeva's 
interest in moments of psychical and cultural crisis makes maternity a central focus of her 
investigations (Grosz- 1989, 78). 
Kristeva sees religion as one of the few "western" discourses which represent maternity as 
such, but its orthodox symbolisations have the effect of denying the mother's jouissance and 
pain (Kristeva 1987,259-61; 1988a, 42). In her view, the cult of the Virgin contributes to "the 
madness of motherhood" for ordinary women by its representation of a woman, "alone of all 
her sex," who exhibits an extreme masochism through which the semiotic drives are violently 
but non-productively engaged (Kristeva 1987,258; Oliver 1993, 50-1). The crisis component 
of maternal experience, which Kristeva describes as "a strange fold" on the borderline between 
"nature" and "culture," "speaking" and "biology," makes "woman" effectively a "catastrophe 
of being that the dialectics of the trinity and its supplements would be unable to subsume" 
(Kristeva 1987, 259-60). Thus the experience of maternity enacts a continual challenge to 
Christian doctrine, which its myths and images attempt to annul. "The Mother and her 
attributes, evoking sorrowful humanity ... become representatives of a 'return of the repressed' 
in monotheism. They reestablish what is nonverbal and show up as the receptacle of a 
signifying disposition that is closer to so-called primary processes" (Kristeva 1987, 249-50). 
As Kelly Oliver elaborates: 
Although the myth ofthe Virgin can control the maternal semiotic, it cannot contain 
the semiotic. Kristeva argues that Christianity, with its Virgin birth, both unravels 
and protects the paternal function (Kristeva 1989, 40). Like sacrifice, the violence 
of the semiotic returns within the very ritual that attempts to repress it. The maternal 
semiotic is focused in the symbol of the Virgin and its threat to the Symbolic order 
is thereby controlled (Oliver 1993, 51). 
Because she is concerned with crises in identity and sites of "revolution" in language, 8 
Kristeva's writings on maternity and the Christian myths can shed light on Kempe's 
"hysterical" behaviour. As Oliver points out, during the course of her oeuvre Kristeva has also 
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"become increasingly interested in the dynamics of religious fantasies and symbols" (Kristeva 
1984b, 268; Oliver 1993, 125). Kristeva argues that Christianity cannot entirely regulate 
maternity within its discourses, precisely because maternity is the crucial juncture between 
nature and culture, biology and language, the (Irigaray would say reductive) binaries by which 
the subject's experience becomes intelligible in the symbolic. As Grosz observes, Kristeva's 
earlier works claim: 
that religious discourses are in a unique, privileged position to recognise the cost of 
symbolic organisation. It is the system by which the renounced jouissance of the 
drives is recuperated back into the symbolic order .... As the privileged site of the 
symbolic, the space where it can "elaborate a theory which represents its own 
. signifying practice to itself" (Kristeva 1976, 65), it is a highly condensed, rich object 
. of speculative investigation for her researches on the speaking subject's debt to 
repressed maternity (Grosz 1989, 82). 
Because the Christian religion presents sublimated figures of maternity in the Virgin and the 
feminised Christ, the unassimilable residue of maternal experience that escapes coherent 
symbolisation can sometimes appear in "discourses of the sacred ... religious ecstasy" and 
corporeal surrender (Grosz 1989, 84) in which these figures appear. The text of a late 
medieval, "positive" female mystic like Kempe might be seen as such a discourse. 
The portrayal of the "hysterical Virgin" in medieval culture - to which Kempe's Book attests 
- is also a discourse of crisis. As previously described, in this image of the Virgin, which 
derives from "eastern" traditions, she "is unmeasured in her sorrow" (Lochrie 1991a, 180). As 
with Kempe's madness at the opening of the Book, the Virgin expresses her suffering by 
. mutilating her own body, crying uncontrollably ~md experiencing physical convulsions 
(Lochrie 1991a, 180; Chapter Two, 121). While her movements mimic the pains of 
conventional childbirth, her suffering at Christ's death marks her first experience of such 
trauma, as she gave birth without pain, but suffers belatedly with Christ in his Passion. While 
Mary is "hysterical" in her extreme imitation of Christ, articulating personal pain for which 
there is no other means of expression, Kempe is "hysterical" in imitation of the Virgin, and 
by this means she presents herself as a virginal woman who is also a mother, or a mother 
whose purity is painfully regained. Mary is a fitting model for Kempe because Kempe can 
identify with her corporeal excesses and their maternal source while she also mimics her by 
adhering to a visionary way of life normally only available to virgins. As Weissman states of 
299 
Kempe's tears in Chapter 28, in which Kempe envisions Mary as well as Christ: 
At Jerusalem [Kempe] is reenacting her own harsh labor of childbirth, the labor unto 
madness, and almost unto death, with which her vita begins. By reexperiencing the 
pains of labor at the scene of Christ's Passion, [Kempe] cancels both the sin and the 
legacy of shame. For by reexperiencing her labor pains at the scene of the Virgin's 
Compassion, [Kempe] demonstrates her passage beyond Eve's biological maternity 
to achieve a maternity suprasexual and faultlessly pure (Weissman 1982, 215). 
Lochrie has noted how Christ's crucified body was understood in the late middle ages as a 
book in which Christian believers endowed with special grace might read edifying 
information.9 This theory also implied participation in Christ's suffering on the part of 
believers as the rupture in the text of Christ's body - signified by his wounds and eventual 
death - allowed a transference of his pain into the meditators' hearts (Lochrie 1991a, 167-8). 
Through Kempe's reading of Christ's crucified body she attempts to "'fill up in [her] flesh 
the sufferings which are wanting'" (Monk ofFarne 1961, 76, cited in Lochrie 1991a, 169) in 
the body of Christ - the Church - more generally. This imitation may be seen as similar to a 
hysterical displacement in which Kempe's formidable grief becomes central in her text and 
threatens to overwhelm that of Christ. This too is behaviour exemplified by the Virgin, whose 
grief as it was portrayed in Kempe's culture rivalled that of her Son (Lochrie 1991b, 181). 
The Virgin is the exemplar of Kempe's claim to a privileged relationship with Christ, one 
which gives her own sufferings special significance and enables their dramatic, even (in a 
spiritual sense) fltherapeutic" expression. 
Lochrie observes how in a range of medieval representations of the hysterical Virgin, in which 
she is frequently joined by the other female mourners at the Cross mentioned in the Gospels 
- Mary Magdalene and Mary Cleophas - the women refuse to take comfort from Christ's 
promise of his Resurrection: "Instead, they seek to decipher their own thoughts, words, and 
deeds in his body" (Lochrie 1991a, 191). In Kempe's Passion meditations she mimes the 
Virgin's behaviour at the point in the Passion narrative when Christ dies and Mary's grief 
overwhelms her completely, sending her mad (Kempe 1988, 234). 
Kristeva's work helps illuminate Kempe's response to the Passion and its maternal component 
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when, in an essay on a painting of the dead Christ in his tomb by Hans Holbein the Younger, 
she describes Christ's death in psychoanalytic terms as an image or cultural mediation of the 
"many separations that build up the psychic life of individuals" (Kristeva 1989, 132). These 
separations are those potentially traumatic events which threaten psychic balance but are a 
necessary aspect of human growth: "birth, weaning, separation, frustration, castration" 
(Kristeva 1989, 132). Kempe's mimicry of the Virgin who identifies with Christ most strongly 
at the moment of his death, when the sufferings which Mother and Son hitherto shared 
become wholly laid upon the Virgin's body, emphasises "rupture and loss over union and 
transformation," in Karma Lochrie's words (Lochrie 1991a, 135). Christ's death represents 
the ruptures in human subjectivity which make meaning possible, but Kempe's identification 
with the Virgin at this point highlights the maternal presence, whereas psychoanalytic 
discourse focuses on the necessity of leaving the mother behind. Kempe's devotional 
identification with the Virgin as extreme exemplar of subjective splitting means that she 
identifies with the maternal source of her own subjectivity (Lochrie 1991a, 135), her birth into 
the symbolic order and her own special involvement in this process through having given 
birth. While Kristeva describes the process of a woman's giving birth as a kind of reunion 
with the body of her own mother through which a woman exemplifies an "instinctual" form 
of memory that threatens her with madness (Kristeva 1980a, 239), Kempe's spiritual madness 
in identification with Mary, as a spiritualised reworking of her former maternal suffering, may 
be seen as an attempt to articulate the maternal experience which is unsymbolisable in her 
culture and so to ward off this destructive threat. 
Kempe's "gostly labowr" ("spiritual effort!!) (Kempe 1940, 169; 1988, 105) can be seen to 
represent what in Kristevan terms would be described as "a privileged symbolic representation 
of the semiotic" in religious discourse, "in which the symbolic is able to tolerate the 
expression of normally unspoken pre-oedipal pleasures" (Gross 1990b, 99). Kristeva argues 
that poetic discourses are the most privileged site of "revolution" in language, where semiotic 
energies breach the symbolic. Religious discourses, in her view, represent a more conservative 
expression of this tendency, the move towards presenting semiotic elements in symbolic 
(culturally acceptable) terms. For Kristeva, "the religious recodes what is becoming uncoded 
and destabilized in the poetic" (Gross 1990b, 99), it is a textual system of "renovation" 
(Kristeva 1976, 64). However Kristeva does acknowledge that religious discourses contain the 
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potential for symbolic transgression (Kristeva 1976, 64; 1987,249-50; 1988a, 40-1; 1989,24-
5, 132-5). The popular devotional discourses of late medieval Christianity and the affective 
mysticism associated with them reflect this potential, as they tend to allow the articulation of 
experiences not prescribed by official doctrine, in ways which exceed orthodox devotional 
norms. 
In Kristeva's analysis, human subjects are enabled to cover over the traces of the abjection 
of maternal origin by the resolution of the Oedipus complex and submission to the Law of 
the Father. Linguistic exchange is built upon and substitutes for the renounced pleasures of 
the mo~er's body (Kristeva 1988a, 40-1; 1989, 43; Gross 1990b, 101). From a Kristevan 
angle, Margery Kempe's wild tears and simulation of a woman in labour, in which incoherent 
cries and strange physical movements breach the boundaries of normal speech, display the 
debt language owes to maternity and the fragility of orthodox religious discourse's attempts 
to contain and subdue this power that belongs to women. In fact Kristeva suggests that 
Christ's Passion indeed figures the loss of the mother which subjects undergo before they can 
enter into the symbolic order of language. In In the Beginning Was Love she claims that 
"Christ's Passion brings into play even more primitive layers of the psyche" than the Oedipal 
scenario of the Father visiting punishment on his Son, namely: "a fundamental depression (a 
narcissistic wound ... ), that conditions access to human language" and is the sign of the 
renunciation of "the maternal paradise" (Kristeva 1988a j 40-1). 
In the Passion narrative of Kempe's Book, when Christ dies Mary asks to be buried with him, 
lamenting the fact that she saw so little of him when he was alive. When Mary is persuaded 
to yield up her Son's body, Kempe in turri expresses the same desire, to be buried with Christ 
(Kempe 1988, 235). Mary's sufferings, the delayed birth pains which presage the new birth 
for humanity gained by Christ's death, signify the fact that she exists only as a once-necessary 
appendage to the God-man. Upon his death, she has no more reason to live. Her desire to join 
Christ in the tomb figures the prior appropriation of her womb by God the Father, since the 
place where she longs to go with her Son is the place in the earth from which Christ is 
reborn, this time without the aid of a woman. Christ's rebirth from the tomb and Mary's 
desire to partake of his descent there would be seen, in an Irigarayan reading, as the finale 
of the Gospel narrative that is built upon her unsymbolised body. The extreme grief she 
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displays in popular medieval religion at Christ's death can also be read as an unconscious 
expression of sorrow for her own annihilation (Irigaray 1991d, 167). It is a return of the 
repressed maternal function in the popular discourse of Christian piety. 
However Kempe's desire, following the Virgin's, to enter the tomb with the dead Christ adds 
to Mary's expression of despairing "madness" a disruptive carnal and maternal aspect. 
Whereas the madness Kempe describes in the opening pages of her Book signals her 
perception of her state of spiritual death, here, near the end of the bulk of the narrative which 
constitutes Book I, the death and burial of Christ which presage the Resurrection are 
expressed through Kempe's hyperbolic miming of the pains of giving birth. The suffering 
which is the result of Kempe's necessary efforts to repress her sexual and maternal past (a 
task which is ultimately impossible) and which achieves expression here as her desire to 
become one with Christ, marks Christ's descent into the tomb as a return to its inescapable 
maternal source in the body of the Virgin. 
While the Virgin mediates between Kempe and Christ, offering Kempe a model of maternal 
compassion which it is the mystic's task to emulate and inscribe into her text, Kempe signifies 
with and on her body the signs of Christ's maternal debt that the Virgin - alone of all her sex 
- cannot signify. There is then an impulse of life about Kempe's death wish, in which the 
meanings of physical (maternal) and spiritual (masculine-appropriated) birth intermingle and 
(re)inform each other. As Lochrie observes: 
The burial of Christ's body produces a crisis in Kempe's reading [of the Christie 
text] and a rupture in her desire. Its absence becomes displaced in the Virgin's 
sorrow and her own marvelous body with its wresting, writhing, turning blue as lead, 
and loud roars. The body which the Marys seek at the tomb has already reappeared 
elsewhere - both in Kempe's body and in the mystic text that we are reading 
(Lochrie 1991a, 174-5). 
If, as in the Kristevan view, Christ's death is understood as a cultural symbol for the most 
basic symbolic processes of human life in "western" culture - "birth, weaning, separation," and 
so on (Kristeva 1989, 132), and if it is suggestive of the loss of the maternal body (Kristeva 
1988a, 40-1), then at the moment of her Saviour's death Kempe can be seen to face once 
again her maternal trauma, one of the unresolved processes of psychic life which led her first 
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to a crisis of madness and then to a holy vocation. According to Kristeva: "[the] nonexecution 
or repudiation [of the processes of birth, weaning ... castration] leads to psychotic confusion; 
their dramatization is, on the contrary, a source of exorbitant and destructive anguish" 
(Kristeva 1989, 132). 
Kempe dramatises such "exorbitant. .. anguish" in the Passion visions of her Book when she 
relates how after Christ died she 
thought that she continually ran to and fro, as if she were a woman without reason, 
greatly desiring to have had the precious body by herself alone, so that she might 
have wept enough in the presence of that precious body, for she thought she would 
have died with weeping and mourning for his death, for love that she had for him 
(Kempe 1988, 234). 
Kempe's desire to have Christ's body to herself, away from the ministrations of the other 
Marys, signals her desire to be one with Christ. Her madness and her weeping - the 
uncontrolled expressions of her love - are to her the equivalent of a longing for death, 
Kristeva's "destructive anguish." But they also signify - in Irigaray's terms - the relentless 
immediacy (madness) into which the mystic is plunged when the one who has offered her a 
resolution from her earlier maternal madness is seen, in her vision, to die. In the following 
description of female mystical experience from Irigaray' s "La Mysterique," "the unknowable," 
without "self-identity," is a description not only of mystical union but of the experience of 
femininity in "western" patriarchal culture as a state of indifferentation from the maternal, 
which itself remains unsymbolised. Kempe's first,Postpartum madness attests to this lack of 
symbolisation of maternal experience in patriarchy and her later "gostly labowr" may be seen 
as a more empowering evocation of her earlier sorrow. Irigaray writes that: 
Everything is relentlessly immediate in this marriage of the unknowable, which can 
never be evaded once it has been experienced.... Each becomes the other in 
consumption, the nothing of the other in consummation. Each will not in fact have 
known the identity of the other, has thus lost self-identity except for a hint of an 
imprint that each keeps in order the better to intertwine in a union already, finally, 
at hand (Irigaray 1985b, 196). 
Kempe's desire to be one with Christ can be seen as a desire to return to the womb that is 
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signified by his tomb, to a state of maternal plenitude. The female hysteric's symptoms have 
also been considered by feminists, and particularly by Irigaray, as an effort to articulate the 
relationship between mother and daughter which is denied expression in the symbolic, an 
attempt on the hysteric's part to "give birth" to herself symbolically by depicting a woman-to-
woman connection which is not based solely on female castration but privileges a kind of 
(maternal) excess (Irigaray 1985a, 136-8; Collins et al 1985, 249-50; David-Menard 1989, 
130-1). Kempe's returning carnality to the discourse of the Virgin could be read in this way 
since, like the double-bind depicted by hysterical expression in phallocentric culture, it is an 
expression of anguish which is ultimately unresolvable in mortal life. In terms of Kempe's 
culture, of course, her distraught mimesis represents a union which, however incomplete while 
she lives: is expected to be wholly achieved in eternity. 
The anguished articulation of Kempe's maternal experience described above is represented 
more positively elsewhere in her Book, and I have considered some of these occasions in other 
chapters. In Chapter 75, however, there is an episode that recalls most specifically Kempe's 
earlier suffering, and simultaneously marks her as a healer, a woman through whom God 
works wonders. In this scene a distressed husband tells Kempe that his wife has gone mad 
after giving birth, and has been physically bound to stop her harming herself and others 
(Kempe 1988, 218). When Kempe visits her, the woman is quieted, but in the presence of 
others she is plagued by demonic sights. Eventually the woman is healed by Kempe's prayers, 
and is taken to the church to undergo the Purification ceremony that follows childbirth. As 
described in Chapter Three (179), the period after giving birth and before Purification, during 
which a woman was denied the sacrament, added to tlthe physical trauma of childbirth ... the 
spiritual trauma of virtual exclusion froni the Christian community" (Erickson 1976, 196) in 
the middle ages. This woman's anguish, like Kempe's earlier suffering, displays the traumatic 
effects of this exclusion and its associated fear of dying unpurified and not in a state of grace 
(Erickson 1976, 196). 
This scene, as Sue Ellen Holbrook notes, clearly "reverses the opening one in the book," in 
which Kempe herself has "lost the power of words" (Holbrook 1985, 103). Here, Kempe's 
words, inspired by God, effect healing and serve as a sign of her own recovered judgement 
and her role as a woman whose words bear divine sanction. And yet, the Book suggests that 
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Kempe's ability to heal the mad woman is also dependent on her empathy, her own never-
quite-resolved experience of being earlier denied participation in the Church's healing rituals. 
While this woman's madness is used to signify Kempe's recovery from such illness, the whole 
of her Book bears the marks of her condition as a woman whose life experiences fall outside 
the Church's requirements for female visionaries. It is these experiences which, inevitably, 
return again and again to shape her Passion( ate) devotions and to move towards a kind of 
resolution in them. Although this resolution is never conclusively achieved, the movement 
constitued by Kempe's struggles to reinvent her wayward past insistently returns maternal 
excess to Christian narrative. 
Insofar as contemporary cultural understandings of maternity in the "western" world are 
informed by these same Judeo-Christiannarratives, as Irigaray claims that they are, Kempe's 
discourse may be of. interest and even instructive for twentieth-century women. Susan 
Suleiman contends that, still, "we know too little about what and how and why mothers 
write," most critical work on 'writers, even female writers, dealing with "the-mother-as-she-is-
written rather than the-mother-as-she-writes" (Suleiman 1985,358). Margery Kempe's writing 
strategies reflect the difficulties of "writing" as a mother and of achieving a public identity 
that are specific to her time and place, but they also shed light on the long history of the 
repression of maternity in the dominant discourses of the "west," which has continued to 
affect women up to the present time. In the next section I will explore another stage in this 
history and one specifically concerned with the development of the notion of hysteria, by 
investigating the function of the Virgin in the incomplete case study of Freud's most famous 
patient, "Dora." 
5. 2 Hysterical rapture and bodily madness: Dora and the Virgin Mary 
Freud's case history concerning eighteen-year-old Ida Bauer, whom he named "Dora," is one 
of his most famous and has been much written about by feminists (Ramas 1980; Gallop 1982, 
132-50; Moi 1985b; Sprengnether 1985; 1990,41-54; Cixous and Clement 1986, 48-9; Evans 
1989, 81). My reading of the case takes up this interest in Dora as a resistant figure but with 
particular attention to the absent figure of the mother in her case, and relates this blind spot 
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in Freud to Dora's adoration of the Virgin in Raphael's Sistine Madonna (c. 1512-1513) 
painting and her related (according to Freud) phantom pregnancy or hysterical imitation of 
the Virgin. While Margery Kempe's "hysteria" may only be figuratively named as such, the 
Dora case has become "the psychoanalytic model for the etiology of hysteria" (Kahane 1985, 
19) and provides several clues to specific Freudian dilemmas that have informed the history 
of this female "illness." Maria Ramas writes that '''Fragment of an Analysis' is considered a 
classic analysis of the structure and genesis of hysteria and has the first or last word in almost 
every psychoanalytic discussion" of the illness (Ramas 1980, 473). That the analysis was 
prematurely terminated by Dora herself was of great concern to Freud, but his fretting at the 
case's "failure" is symptomatic of both his attempt to cast Dora into a mould as part of a 
developing theory and the resistance she displays (which he names madness), itself a central 
feature of hysterical women. 
Charles Bernheimer writes of this text that Freud: 
while admitting that his own text is fragmentary, full of detours, gaps, and 
omissions ... nevertheless insists on its difference from Dora's hysterically disjunctive 
and incoherent narrative. Thus the patient-analyst in attempting to cure himself is 
also involved in a kind of narrative cure, one intended to establish the dominance 
of a (male) discourse of scientific mastery ( ... ) over a duplicitous (female) tale of 
guilty fantasies and repressed desires. The productive failure of this therapeutic effort 
is a symptomatic narrative that invites us to read Dora as an overdetermined figure 
in Freud's unconscious (Bernheimer 1985, 18). 
And Madelon Spreng nether claims that "ultimately, [Freud's] own narrative displays the 
symptoms he attributes to the hysteric [Dora], whose pathology, he claims, manifests itself 
in the inability to construct a coherept story" (Sprengnether 1990, 40). I want to explore just 
a few of the more glaring omissions from Freud's text - aspects of the Freudian unconscious, 
if you will - in order to firstly chart how Freud's indifference to questions of female and 
specifically maternal desire (what Irigaray calls "the blind spot of an old dream of symmetry" 
(Irigaray 1985a, 13-129)) leads to his construction of Dora's physical responses to her 
intolerable situation as a kind of bodily "madness." 
Secondly, I want to use the work of Irigaray and Kristeva on the Virgin Mary to explore 
something of the possible significance for Dora of her focus on and mimicry of the Madonna 
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in relation to her problematical connection with her mother. Finally, I will address Irigaray's 
work on divinity as a hysterical strategy by which she attempts to reimagine mother-daughter 
relations in the symbolic. This section, then, will not only critique the representation of 
hysterical rebellion as madness but attempt to understand what unrepresentable processes and 
events might have been being played out through Dora's specific hysterical behaviours, and 
in turn relate these to Irigaray's similar if more explicit visionary moves. 
In the Lacanian formulation of hysteria, the superficial seductiveness of female hysterics 
(Dora's Itleading Freud on," only to terminate the analysis prematurely) is seen as "the 
necessity of maintaining a puzzle - the relationship between the sexes as something impossible 
to know" (Evans 1991, 182). Hysterics wish to disrupt or remove themselves from the circuits 
of phallic desire (Grosz 1989, 134), to posit conventional heterosexual relationships and the 
roles associated with them as a perennially open question (Lacan 1987c). In the Lacanian 
view, the hysteric's "tendency to idealize nonsexual mothers" (Evans 1991, 183) reflects her 
desire for knowledge about her mvn sex from a female source (Lacan 1987c, 68). Evans' 
related claim that "the hysteric's idealization of wise, virginal mother figures thus 
retrospectively sheds light on a similar idealization of the hysteric expressed by many analysts 
and psychiatrists" (Evans 1991, 183) makes clear that Freud's discourse - indeed that of all 
psychoanalytic theory - is ever dependent upon the expression (in symptoms) of the non-
satisfaction of the hysteric's desire. In other words, it requires knowledge about women from 
a female source. Thus Ned Lukacher writes that "Freud cures Elisabeth [von R.] of her 
symptoms by allowing her to present to him the impossibility of satisfying her desire; this 
presentation becomes itself a kind of satisfaction that one calls the cure." And "for Freud 
himself the presentation of the impossibility of satisfying his desire to understand the mystery 
of Elisabeth's divided subjectivity becomes itself a kind of satisfaction that one calls theory" 
(Lukacher 1989, xi. See also Cixous and Clement 1986, 9). 
In exploring the process at work in the representation of Dora's psychic struggles through a 
relation to the Virgin Mary there is implicit, then, a critique of Freud's colonisation of the 
hysteric'S excess of desire. But since hysteria consists in the attempt to represent the 
unrepresentable - the female body as other than lacking in the way conventionally required 
by phallic discourse - no interpretation of hysterical activity can escape complicity with this 
308 
colonising effect. Monique David-Menard notes, however, that "it is important. .. to say at what 
price the universalism ofthe concept wins out over the hearing of a fantasy" in psychoanalytic 
theory, although "the one who undertakes that task is doubtless unable to say it, at least not 
while doing itll (David-Menard 1989, 195). This, of course, is the great contribution of 
Freud's discovery of the unconscious: 
Freudian thought ruins every philosophical or scientific idea of truth, not by 
dissolving the difference between interpretation and theory, but by making it possible 
to say at what price the universal is constructed - by making interpretation the 
aftermath of constructions of concepts that pretend to put an end to interpretation 
(David-Menard 1989, 195).10 
The following exploration is an attempt to identify and pay a different kind of attention to 
what was left aside by Freud in Dora's case, and to move towards answering the - perhaps 
ultimately unanswerable - question of the possible significance of the hysteric's "mad" 
struggle to re-present in non-phallic terms the separation from her mother. 
The description of Dora's remaining "rapt in silent admiration" for two hours before Raphael's 
Sistine Madonna (Freud 1953,96) in Dresden occurs as part of Freud's interpretation of what 
is named "The Second Dream" in the text of Dora's case. In the dream Dora found herself 
"wandering about alone in a strange town" (Freud 1953, 95) which Freud describes as 
"overdetermined," since the previous day she had had to show a visiting cousin around 
Vienna, which in turn reminded her of a prior visit to Dresden, when the scene before the 
Madonna took place. In order to critique the Freudian interpretation of both the dream and 
Dora's situation some background information will be necessary. "Dora" was brought 
reluctantly to Freud for treatment in 1900 by her father, whom Freud had previously treated 
for symptoms of confusion, "paralysis and slight mental disturbances" associated with an 
earlier contraction of syphilis (Freud 1953, 19). 
Sprengnether outlines the history of Dora's symptoms as including: tlshortness of breath, 
coughing, loss of voice, an apparent attack of appendicitis [according to Freud the hysterical 
pregnancy], catarrh, and a vaginal discharge of undetermined origin" (Sprengnether 1990,42; 
Freud 1953, 22). She also apparently suffered from mild anorexia, "a limp, and a phobia 
which prevented [her] from walking past 'any man whom she saw in eager or affectionate 
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conversation with a lady'" (Freud 1953,29, cited in Ramas 1980,475). Ramas notes that "in 
addition, she was chronically depressed and had threatened suicide. She had long been on bad 
terms with her mother, but recently she had become hostile towards her father as well" 
(Ramas 1980,472). Dora's father told Freud that his daughter's symptoms were doubtless due 
to an incident that had taken place two years previously, when the family were staying with 
some "intimate" friends, Frau and Herr K. and their children, in the Alps. At this time Dora 
had informed her mother that Herr K. had made a sexual proposal to her while the two were 
out walking, upon which she had slapped his face and run away. When confronted Herr K. 
denied all knowledge of the event, and Philip Bauer concluded that Dora had imagined the 
scene, since, according to K., she "took no interest in anything but sexual matters" 
(Freud 1953, 26). This information Herr K. had from his wife, who confided that Dora had 
read books on such subjects in their house. 
Both the Bauers and the K.'s were unhappy as couples, and Dora had become friendly with 
both the K.' s, but had formed an especially close friendship with Frau K. However Frau K. 
and Philip Bauer had been having a love affair for some years prior to and during the time 
in which Dora was seeing Freud, and during this time also Herr K.' s attempted seduction of 
Dora took placeY When Dora's father told Freud of this event, he described his relationship 
with Frau K., using the words, "you know ... that I get nothing out of my own wife" (Freud 
1953, 26). Freud observes that Dora was well aware that she had been "handed over to Herr 
K. as the price of his tolerating the relations between her father and his wife" (Freud 1953, 
34). As Ramas puts it, "to all intents and purposes, an exchange of women had taken place" 
(Ramas 1980, 476), and already in this scene Dora's mother is the absent party. 
While Freud saw that Dora's anger at her father was justified, his construction of her psychic 
situation was intolerable to her, leading eventually to her termination of the analysis. To quote 
Ramas again: 
At the most obvious and general level, Ida Bauer's hysteria signified refusaL .. Freud 
recognized this, but never deciphered the meaning of the refusal. While Freud's 
analysis is complex, his main proposition is a simple one. Freud claimed that Ida 
Bauer was aroused by Herr K.'s pursuit of her, but was unwilling to acknowledge 
her desire consciously .... Her hysterical symptoms were compromise formations that 
represented both her desire to yield to Herr K. and a composite force rebelling 
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against that desire (Ramas 1980, 477). 
In Freud's interpretation of Dora's case he takes the part of Herr K., describing him as an 
attractive man (Freud 1953,29) and regarding Dora's actions rather than his as misplaced. As 
Sprengnether points out, Freud sees both seduction attempts tlthrough the eyes of Herr K., 
going as far as to provide Herr K. with an erection at the scene of the kiss" (Sprengnether 
1990, 46). Freud thus produces a "virile construction of Herr K.'s advances," representing 
"'normal' - that is, aggressive - male heterosexuality. By representing Dora's refusal of Herr 
K.'s courtship as abnormal or 'hysterical,' Freud protects the Oedipal as opposed to the 
preoedipal fiction" (Sprengnether 1990, 47). 
Freud's emphasis on the heterosexual, postoedipal paradigm with its blindness to inter-female 
relationships necessitates the suppression of Dora's mother from his account of Dora' s life and 
the related failure, admitted in a footnote, to "discover in time and to inform the patient that 
her homosexual (gynaecophilic) love for Frau K. was the strongest unconscious current in her 
mental life" (Freud 1953, 120n).12 As Jane Gallop (citing Cixous) observes, "the Dora case 
is punctuated by women being declared 'nothing.' Both Herr K. and Dora's father say that 
of their wives" (Cixous and Clement 1975, 281; cited in Gallop 1982, 147). Describing Kathe 
Bauer's obsession with housecleaning, Freud states that "such women (and this applied to the 
patient's mother) are entirely without insight into their illness, so that one essential 
characteristic of an 'obsessional neurosis' is lacking" (Freud 1953, 20), a statement which 
reflects the extent of his interest in her: she knows nothing of importance; she is "nothing." 13 
Dora's adoration of the Madonna in Raphael's painting, recalled whilst recounting "the second 
dream" to Freud, is connected by Freud with his interpretation of an acute attack of 
"supposed" appendicitis suffered by Dora, prior to getting her period with violent pains, 
several months previously (this attack of appendicitis is also mentioned by Dora in the course 
of musing on her dream). Upon asking his patient when this attack had occurred in relation 
to the scene by the lake, and discovering that it had taken place nine months later, Freud 
decided that Dora had been "enabled ... with the modest means at her disposal (the pains and 
the menstrual flow) to realize a phantasy of childbirth" (Freud 1953, 103). Dora's remembered 
rapture before the figure of the Virgin is thus interpreted by Freud as a hysterical 
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identification with the Madonna, figuring - in Freud's view - both Dora's desire for a child 
by Herr K. and her wish to protect her virginity, to consciously refuse Herr K.' s attentions. 
Sprengnether notes "the coercive quality of Freud's interpretations and ... the uneasy tone of 
the narrative" in relation to Dora's dreams (Sprengnether 1990, 50) and concludes that, "on 
an interpretive level, [Freud] subjects her to a process of defloration, impregnation, and 
parturition in an aggressively Oedipal fashion at the same time that he invalidates her rejection 
by naming it hysteria" (Sprengnether 1990, 50). Freud's reading of Dora's fixation with the 
Madonna provides endorsement of his belief that Dora has repressed her conflicted desire for 
Herr K. The "hysterical pregnancy and childbirth.... confirms his view that Dora secretly 
wished for a different upshot" (Jacobus 1986, 174; Freud 1953, 104) to the scene that 
occurred by the lake. Freud's conclusions resolve this situation in a conventionally 
heterosexual manner and in the process Dora's own mother is excised once again from the 
scene. 
The fact that Dora ultimately colludes with Freud in this interpretation (after being told that 
her love for Herr K. has persisted Freud notes that she "disputed the fact no longer" (Freud 
1953, 104)) may be explained on one level'in terms of the female hysteric's inability to 
"reabsorb the mother's potency" (Chasseguet-Smirgel 1978, cited in Evans 1991, 167). For 
hysterical women, caught between the need to struggle against maternal power by gaining the 
protection of the paternal realm, and a fear of adult heterosexual relations (experienced as a 
"massive misreading" of their need for male protection) (Evans 1991, 167), bargaining with 
male power ensures a sense of psychic survival. This would explain Dora's continuing to 
receive the attentions of Herr K. (Freud 1953,28) following his attempt to seduce her, which 
she rebuffed. As David-Menard points out: 
In hysteria, the connection to seduction, to the man, is so strong only because it 
masks terror of the maternal, the impossibility of picturing incest with the mother. 
The hysteric demands from the man that he guarantee that she will not have to 
confront that which binds her to the mother (David-Menard 1988, 54). 
The hysteric's symptom stems from the absence of symbolic representation of her relationship 
with her mother but also from her excess of desire, which disables her from accepting herself . 
as lacking and so from becoming a subject of language: 
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[The hysteric] relates to her femininity, as incarnated in the mother, as something 
she must at once adopt and resist (Geahchan 1973; Schaeffer 1986), and to her 
sexuality, as incarnated in her father's desire, as simultaneously supremely 
frightening and as a temptingly convenient tool in her search for love and protection. 
Faced with choices all of which seem to represent an inconceivable loss (Fain and 
Begoin-Guignard 1984), the hysteric remains inwardly on the threshold of sexual 
difference while outwardly representing an exaggerated version of femininity. This 
false femininity, mistaken so often for willful trickery, performs the multiple 
function of protecting her from her inner confusion, expressing indirectly her anger 
at a society that provides her with an unpalatable either/or choice of gender roles, 
and attracting at least the attention, if not the affection, of those around her (Evans 
1991, 167-8). 
The question to be asked in Dora's case is what might her adoration and mimicry of the 
Virgin Mary suggest about her repressed and problematic relation to her mother. And given 
that Freud constructs his narrative on the basis of Dora's case, the only way to go about 
answering this question is to observe the symptoms in his narrative, the "uneasy tone" that 
pervades his "coercive" a,ssertions (Sprengnether 1990, 50). When Freud describes outlining 
what he considers to be the facts concerning Dora's "phantasy of childbirth" to Dora, he 
includes a substantial footnote on the Madonna, in which he states his view that: 
The "Madonna" was obviously Dora herself; in the first place because of the 
"adorer"14 who had sent her the pictures [po 96], in the second place because she had 
won Herr K.' s love chiefly by the motherliness she had shown towards his children 
[po 25J, and lastly because she had had a child though she was still a girl (this being 
a direct allusion to the phantasy of childbirth). Moreover, the notion of the 
"Madonna" is a favourite counter-idea in the mind of girls who feel themselves 
oppressed by imputations of sexual guilt, - which was the case with Dora .... If the 
analysis had been continued, Dora's maternal longing for a child would probably 
have been revealed as an obscure though powerful motive in her behaviour (Freud 
1953, 104n). 
Freud's interpretation of the Madonna with regard to Dora relies upon the orthodox depiction 
of her - which is also Raphael's - as a vessel for the desire of the Father and an object of 
masculine adoration. As Jacobus notes: 
The Christian dogma of the Immaculate Conception depends on the fantasy of the 
Madonna's unconsciousness; one might almost call it her hystericization. She must 
become a maternal body unawares in order to be sanctified as the mother of God. 
In this sense, the Christian Madonna is a sublimated version of the hysteric. Like 
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Dora's, her body swells of its own accord; she knows nothing about it (Jacobus 
1986, 140). 
Jacobus concludes that Dora's falling silent before the image of the Virgin hystericises "the 
Madonna's muting by Christian motherhood and the innocence of carnal knowledge which 
makes hers a Virgin Birth" (Jacobus 1986, 140). Freud's long footnote on the Madonna 
finishes with a reference to Frau K. in relation to Dora's precocious sexual knowledge: 
"Behind the almost limitless series of displacements which were thus brought to light, it was 
possible to divine the operation of a single simple factor - Dora's deep-rooted, homosexual 
love for Frau K" (Freud 1953, 105n). As Jacobus points out, Dora's love for Frau K., passed 
over by Freud, suggests an alternative, possibly preoedipal scenario to the Oedipal 
interpretation of events on which he aggressively insists: "he is blinkered when it comes to 
dealing with a triangle in which a man [Dora' s father] mediates the relationship between two 
women" (Jacobus 1986, 142),15 
Freud's relegation of the important but belated insight concerning Dora's love for Frau K. to 
the end of a footnote on the Madonna suggests that the Madonna serves her usual function 
as repository for unsymbolisable aspects of female sexuality - maternity in its specificity and 
love between women - in his narrative. To quote Jacobus again: 
As the other of the missing mother, the Sistine Madonna becomes a symptom of the 
repressed maternal discourse which surfaces in the sublimated discourse of 
Christianity. Where Freud falls silent, the other woman in the picture hints at the 
existence of a rival source of instruction, secular rather than religious, unsanctioned 
rather than sanctified, maternal rather than paternal, oral rather than written (Jacobus 
1986, 142). 
Dora's imitation of the Virgin's muteness, along with her other (oral) hysterical symptoms, 
invest the Madonna with an unfathomable power. Ramas likewise claims that: 
The image of the Madonna and child is a preoedipal phantasy that suggests oral 
sexuality. This image, as well as the location of Ida Bauer's hysterical symptoms -
chronic cough, gastric pains, mild anorexia - indicate that the conflict, which was 
framed in terms of genital sexuality, was transposed to and played out on the oral 
terrain (Ramas 1980, 499), 
This is certainly true. But if Dora's oral symptoms are the result of her inability or refusal to 
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accept her body as lacking, we might well ask what special function the Madonna serves for 
her in the articulation of this "rebellion." For Freud, the Madonna represents Dora's 
unacknowledged desire for a child, her repressed longing to tread the path of "normal" 
femininity and heterosexual union with Herr K. David-Menard points out what is at stake in 
an identification such as Dora's with the Virgin when she describes the relationship between 
the hysteric and her body as one of a particular kind of lack: 
The hysteric lacks a bodyI6 .... But...if the hysteric lacks an erotogenic body, it is 
because he or she passionately rejects the lack, dreams of a perfect erotic body that 
could display itself as a whole .... There is obliteration of the subject by a body that 
could be figured as a whole and adored as Dora adores the Madonna or Frau K., 
through her gaze (David-Menard 1989, 130). 
The hysteric suffers from the experience of an excess of body insofar as the body which must 
be represented as castrated in the phallic domain is "too much," there is nothing left with 
which to signify other (unsymbolised) desires. She has "an inability to conceive of any reality 
but that of her own body, with the result that she uses this ground to express her refusal of 
an unrepresentable incompleteness" (David-Menard 1989, 127). As Evans puts it, the hysteric 
"drowns the symbolic order of language in the immediacy of a bodily act, thereby 
challenging ... the primordial law of castration" (David-Menard 1989, cited in Evans 1991, 
188). 
The Madonna, with her "perfect erotic body ... figured as a whole," simultaneously stands in 
for the lack which Dora cannot or refuses to represent to herself through her own body, and 
the dream of impossible completeness to which her hysterical symptoms attest. The Virgin 
Mary is nothing but body and as such remains unrepresented in her agency in Christian myth, 
according to Irigaray (1991d, 167; 1993b, 68). She symbolises maternal "lack" in Christian 
tradition. But. she is also, in the Kristevan view, a figure of plenitude and ambiguous 
nostalgia: her milk and tears, "evoking sorrowful humanity," represent the disruptive impact 
of the semiotic in language (Kristeva 1987, 249-50): 
Starting with the high Christly sublimation for which it yearns and occasionally 
exceeds, and extending to the extralinguistic regions of the unnameable, the Virgin 
Mother occupied the tremendous territory on this and that side of the parenthesis of 
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language. She adds, to the Christian trinity and to the Word that delineates their 
coherence the heterogeneity they salvage (Kristeva 1987, 250). 
As Anna Smith states, "Kristeva suggests that maternal love [for whom Mary's 'privileged 
position allows her to stand, '] is founded, like all our loves, on loss, but that it retains 
something distinctive - the capacity to remind us of and compensate us for our ,fleshly 
identity" (Smith 1993, 69). The Virgin is suggestive of the loss experienced by all speaking 
subjects but her privileged language of milk and tears recalls a time of wholeness which 
existed prior to representation: "milk and tears: oral absorption, fusion, and the moment of its 
loss: symbols of a presymbolic, a nonlinguistic order of relationship" (Weir 1993, 82). 
When Dora hystericises the Madonna's muteness and, later, her "virgin birth," she represents 
the Virgin's contradictory status (the Virgin as icon of femininity who yet lacks female sexual 
experience) as a figure for her own impossible position. Dora's oral fixation stops her from 
experiencing genital erotogeneity. Her disgust with sexuality is, in David-Menard's reading, 
"one side of a process whose other side is the displacement of erotogeneity that mobilizes the 
body of jouissance" (Lukacher 1989, xv): 
So that no part of the body has to represent an absent portion of jouissance, a 
missing portion, this jouissance has to be present, dargestellt and not vorgestellt: 
hysterical conversion as precipitation of the subject's entire existence in attacks that 
privilege certain erotogenic zones in an attempt to totalize the body, to ensure that 
nothing has to be represented as lost (David-Menard 1989, 104). 
The hysterical symptom constitutes the hysterical subject as physically both present and 
absent: Dora absents herself from the world of adult sexuality by her behaviour, which yet 
dramatises her desire that nothing should be experienced as lost. The Virgin, too, is 
simultaneously present and absent to Dora. She is silent in Christian tradition but everything 
- the salvific events of the Gospels - depends upon her "yes" (Irigaray 1991d, 167). Dora's 
oral symptoms, like the Virgin's initial submission, have the effect of freezing her desire even 
as they are an attempt to express it. And a "pregnancy" achieved without heterosexual contact 
is the outcome of both Mary's and Dora's oral responses. The Virgin is untouched by any 
man, yet commands the adoration of all men. She is thus the perfect model for Dora, who 
flees sexual contact but is happy to receive tangible signs of the admiration of Herr K (Freud 
1953, 28; Grosz 1989 134). 
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I think it is possible to conclude, contrary to Freud's belief that the Virgin merely symbolises 
Dora's repressed maternal longings, that the Madonna is the site of a complex intersection of 
processes involving Dora's refusal to allow part of her body to signify lack (in the 
conventional manner) and her inability to represent separation from her mother in empowering 
terms.17 The collective writers of "Questioning the Unconscious: The Dora Archive," suggest 
something like this, noting that: 
In the second dream Dora attempts unsuccessfully to return to her mother; indeed 
she goes home, only to fmd her mother absent. 18 This places Dora's contemplation 
of the Sistine Madonna in another perspective. Her immobilization in front of this 
image recalls the fascination of the mirror-stage, in which the child is held in its 
mother's arms before its own reflection. It may be, therefore, that Dora's deepest 
'desire is not identification with the mother (in the sense of the assumption of the 
mother's role) but fusion with the mother, a return to that "desperate paradise" which 
is riven by entry into the Symbolic (Collins et aI, 1985, 249-50).19 
Dora's virginal "pregnancy" may reflect her inability to make her body signify the renounced 
pleasures of her preoedipal experience and so to represent the maternal separation in 
empowering terms. Her gazing on the Virgin, what David-Menard calls her "passion for 
form," impels an infantile regression and "prevents her body from taking on an erotic 
configuration" : 
Dora's orality and the specific way her passion for seeing comes into play perhaps 
allude to what binds a woman to her mother and is so difficult to symbolize .... It 
may be that [Dora's] passionate interest in the form of another woman's body, along 
with her voracious orality, manifests a woman's need to symbolize differently the 
experience of emptiness that her separation from her mother's body entails. And we 
know that, in the remainder of her story, that inclusion in her mother is indeed what 
Dora faces. She has identified with the only feature Freud picks up concerning her 
mother: the housewife psychosis (David-Menard 1989, 131-2). 
In the Kristevan view, motherhood effects "the reunion of a woman-mother with the body of 
her mother" (Kristeva 1980a, 239), the mother who had to be "killed" so that the child could 
become a subject (and a woman) but who can never be killed completely as that would mean 
death for the daughter herself (Kristeva 1988a, 28-9, cited in Oliver 1993, 63). Dora's 
phantom pregnancy, achieved without male contact, makes her - like the Virgin - a child and 
yet a mother, or, to put it another way, neither a child nor a mother. Through this hysterical 
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response to the ambiguous figure of the Virgin she refuses her own castration while 
preserving a sort of connection with her mother. She refuses to acknowledge that part of her 
body must signify lack, which means that she cannot effectively represent separation from and 
so remains locked in combat with her mother. And yet, if Dora accepts herself as neither a 
child nor a mother then she denies the necessity of obliterating her mother by consenting to 
take her place. Perhaps Dora's passion for the Madonna and her mimicry of the Virgin's 
maternal state may, then, be an attempt to reconfigure the impossible separation from her 
mother by way of a third term which isn't entirely subsumed within the phallic function. 
The Virgin herself, as arch-hysteric of the Christian tradition, may seem ambiguous and 
excessive enough for Dora to imagine her as representing a way out of her predicament. The 
Virgin's physicality, unsymbolised as such in Christian myth, achieves a disturbing return 
through milk and tears (according to Kristeva her compensatory signs (1987, 249-50» and the 
violent displays of grief such as those in medieval representations described earlier. The 
Virgin's sorrow is not her own; she is both hysterical (i.e., like a daughter who feels 
compelled to seek the attention of both parents through her extreme somatic behaviours20), and 
maternal, represented as a container and not in her own right. In an interview, David-Menard 
suggests that women's dependence on "the phallic problematic" can only be altered by an 
"analysis of what is terrifying in the relation to the mother and finding forms for symbolizing 
that." If women can somehow "face their difficulty in separating from the mother while 
identifying with the mother in a certain way, they will be able to symbolize that which 
constitutes them without going through the intermediary of seduction of men" (David-Menard 
1988, 54). Irigaray depicts female hysteria as such an attempt at mediation when she asks: 
Isn't hysteria a privileged place for preserving - but "in latency," "in sufferance" -
that which does not speak? And, in particular (even according to Freud ... ), that 
which is not expressed in woman's relation to her mother, to herself, to other 
women? Those aspects of women's earliest desires that find themselves reduced to 
silence in terms of a culture that does not allow them to be expressed (Irigaray 
1985a, l36). 
Since the Virgin is both a mother and a hysteric, could she perhaps symbolise "what is 
terrifying in relation to the mother" for Dora? 
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For Kristeva, of course, the Virgin represents the "symbolic-paternal" version of motherhood 
par excellence (Jacobus 1986, 149; Oliver 1993, 52), the lire sorption of femininity within the 
Maternal" that is brought to its peak in Christianity (Kristeva 1987, 236; 1981, 158). She 
writes that "the war between mother and daughter" is not addressed by the myth of the Virgin, 
and the Virgin's status as adjunct to the paternal Word would for Kristeva make Dora's 
identification with the Madonna a sterile one. Kristeva - unlike lrigaray - does not see the 
hysteric as a heroine. Instead, as Alice Jardine states: 
if Kristeva does have a primary text, it is Freud .... While recognizing hysteria as a 
historical form of contestation, she also relentlessly emphasizes its very real limits: 
the fantasy of the phallic, all-powerful mother through which women reconnect with 
the very Law they had set out to fight (Jardine 1985, 263). 
Irigaray, however, not only proposes new readings of female hysteria but of female 
participation in acts traditionally belonging to God, to the divine. In the third section of 
l\1arine Lover, as we have seen, she argues for a reinterpretation of Mary's role in the birth 
and death of Christ (Irigaray 1991d, 172-3), an essential part of her call for a revision of 
Christ's life and the cultural impact of the resultant Christian myths. Irigaray contends that 
Mary's place in Christian myth, because it is' fundamental but officially suppressed, has the 
power to transform our understanding of the Christian religion if rethought. In her 
deconstruction of the canonical stories, Irigaray posits Mary as a divine figure who has not 
been thought of as divine since "God is found only in Distance .... encountered only through 
death and resurrection," and not in the dark mysteries of birth which nonetheless must precede 
. incarnation (Irigaray 1991d, 171). For Irigaray, too, of course, the enquiry into what remains 
unsyrnbolised of Mary's contribution to Christianity is explicitly linked to her visionary 
project of (re)imagining what it might mean to be a specific female self in the symbolic 
instead of the other of the male same, and how such an achievement might become possible. 
Because Irigaray reads Mary's divinity - her contribution to the divine - as an irreducible 
aspect of the construction of Christian religion, and because her focus on interpreting this 
contribution is part of her broader desire to refigure and change women's experiences as 
mothers and daughters in the symbolic, an Irigarayan reading of Dora's mimicry of the Virgin 
would produce a different result from a Kristevan one. For Kristeva, every human being must 
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rid itself of its mother, but if a woman "enters ... combat" with her mother, struggling to 
separate while recognising the relationship, "this gives rise to fairly serious forms of 
psychosis" (Kristeva 1988b, 136-7). Kristeva writes that 111anguage starts with a negation 
(Verneinung) ofloss" which is the loss of the emergent subject's mother (Kristeva 1989,43). 
As Kelly Oliver explains, in Kristeva's view: 
the child must agree to lose the mother in order to be able to imagine her or name 
her. The negation that this process involves is not the negation of the mother. 
Rather, it is the negation of the loss of the mother that signals proper entry into 
language (Oliver 1993, 62). 
The child must consent to lose the mother so that it can find her again in signs and in 
language, and this IIfinding," this compensation, constitutes the negation of the initial loss 
(Kristeva 1989, 43). For lrigaray the fact that women especially cannot adequately represent 
the loss of their mothers means that the relationship and women's experiences are already in 
the realm of the inchoate and inexpressible, of madness: "The imaginary and the symbolic of 
intra-uterine life and of the first bodily encounter with the mother," she writes, "where are we 
to find them? In what darkness, what madness, have they been abandoned?!I (Irigaray 1991e, 
39). 
Consequent on these differing views ofmother/daughter relations in the symbolic, Irigaray and 
Kristeva, as we have seen, take different lines on the Virgin. For Kristeva, to imagine the 
mother as a subject rather than a '''filter': a passage, the threshold on which nature and culture 
confront one another .... is the kernel from which religious mystifications develop, the soil of 
their breeding ground is this phantasy of the phallic mother" (Kristeva 1981, 159). In other 
words, Christianity's "hypostatisation" of the heterogeneous maternal body through the figure 
of the Virgin is the negative outcome of attempting to assign the mother a subject position; 
the subversive power of maternal experience is thereby annulled and frozen (Kristeva 1981, 
159). 
lrigaray, however, engages in "religious mystifications!! of her own, as I have argued, weaving 
alternative readings in and out of her analyses of religious concerns such as the position of 
the Virgin. Rather than arguing that women must at all costs avoid the type of recuperation 
enacted on the figure of Mary, Irigaray reinterprets Mary in view of the problems 
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women/mothers face in the symbolic order. This is part of her broader contention that 
Christian mythology not only enforces the social order but is a potential site of reformulation 
of social norms because the absoluteness of its claims rely on the disavowal of the feminine. 
In Irigaray's view that which sets itself up as singular must always annihilate its other in the 
process, but can never do so completely. This is particularly so when maternal physicality is 
disavowed; therefore Christianity and indeed "western" culture must be made to recognise and 
rehabilitate its debt to the maternal. For Kristeva the feminine and particularly the maternal, 
as figured in Christianity, serve as "the ultimate affirmation of transcendence" (Kristeva 1981, 
158), but Irigaray's own "mystifications," her transfiguring of "the divine" in relation to 
women's position in the symbolic, refuse the notion of transcendence as such and force its 
return to'the physical, indeed the maternal, sphere. 
Dora's imitation of the Virgin might well, then, in an Irigarayan reading, appear as a strategy 
for attempting to represent the impossible separation from her mother, as an altered version 
of "the maternal function" that is repressed through the figure of Mary in traditional 
Christianity, but never completely. In Irigaray's view, Mary stands as an icon for everything 
concerning the maternal body that is barred expression in the symbolic (Irigaray 1991 d, 166-
8). Within the traditional myths about Mary is found the paradigm of male-appropriated 
motherhood but also its challenge to the dominant order of things, a challenge that consists 
in Christianity's inability to escape the fact of the body (Irigaray 1989a, 65; 1991a, 169; 
1991d, 172; 1993b, 60-1). 
In Marine Lover Irigaray rewrites Mary by suggesting her as a "divine source" (Irigaray 
1991d, 172). In Irigaray's terms, to act as "divine" means to serve as a threshold for a new 
incamational ethics in which no one type of subject bears the burden of "flesh." Instead each 
is symbolised specifically and physically through the divine, that which partakes of each and 
yet creates a space between them. Irigaray's figuration of Mary as "divinetl elaborates on 
Mary's quintessential mediating act, bearing the Christ, signalled by her affirmative response 
to the angelic Annunciation. For Irigaray, Mary's physicality is an ambiguous and 
unassimilable element in Christianity, and its mediating properties are where its subversive 
potential most strongly lies. 
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In An Ethics of Sexual Difference Irigaray writes in utopian mode of ordinary mothers and 
daughters as figures for a future "love for the feminine" among women, and she recasts this 
relationship too in terms of the threshold, the "divine": 
Women must love one another both as mothers, with a maternal love, and as 
daughters, with a filial love. Both of them. In a female whole that, furthermore, is 
not closed off. Constituting, perhaps, both of them in one female whole that is not 
closed up, the sign of infinity? Achieving, through their relations with each other, 
a path into infinity that is always open, in-finite (Irigaray 1993b, 105). 
Here, Irigaray refigures women's boundarylessness, their having "no place" of their own in 
the sym?olic order - while men appropriate the female/maternal body as their nourishing home 
- as a kind of "infinity" achieved via acts of love. She seeks to imagine an extendable limit 
(called "infinity") to women's attempts to be both mothers and daughters at the same time, 
to confound the law of the same by which "the two become at once accomplices and rivals 
in order to move into the single possible position in the desire of man" (Irigaray 1993b, 102). 
Irigaray reimagines a space of exchange or movement between the figures of mothers and 
daughters, who cannot yet become independent subjects but can only replace each other 
according to phallic law, and she constructs this space of mediation from and within the 
bodies of mothers and daughters themselves. Instead of characterising female bodies as 
lacking, she rereads the site of castration as a moveable, "divine" (or infinite) threshold. The 
divine/threshold is a space of plenitude and dynamic excess which resists recuperation by 
phallic law. The divine as a figure of extension for the (female) symbolic body thus bears 
similarities with (female) hysterical activity which overwhelms the symbolic body with an 
excess of desire manifested in physical symptoms. 
Irigaray's reading of these filial and maternal acts of love as mimetic acts depicts them as 
tactical, excessive performances of women's conventional roles; in this sense they are 
hysterical. In order to "make possible a love among us" - in order to be subjects of the 
symbolic order - "women need to double and play what we are twice over, lovingly" (Irigaray 
1993b, 105). Love is figured as the ethical impulse behind such transformation while 
"infinity" or the divine is its "safeguard," its moveable limit. The divine is the means of 
creating a space in the symbolic for otherwise impossible acts of filial-maternal love, but it 
is also that which cannot be denied in terms of the body, as made clear by Irigaray' s figuring 
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of it through the mucous membranes which mother and daughter share: 
A world for women. Something that at the same time has never existed and which 
is already present, although repressed, latent, potential. Eternal mediators for the 
incarnation of the body and of the world of man, women seem never to have 
produced the singularity of their own body and world. The originality of a sameness 
that would relate to incarnation .... This sameness, quite apart from everything that 
can be said about it from the outside, has a way of relating to its appearance which 
cannot be equated with that of the masculine world, as a result of the way it lives 
in mucous (Irigaray 1993b, 109). 
While for Dora, the Virgin may hold forth but cannot fulfil the promise of mediating her 
inescapable struggle, serving as a bridge between corporeal reality and impossible female 
desire that Dora cannot cross, Irigaray recasts the mucous membranes of the body, that which 
presently mediates without symbolisation, as divine: as a substance which exists both inside 
and outside - at the threshold of - the body/self and as a symbolic anchor for developing a 
notion of a female self or selves. In writing about "the mucous" as "possibly correspond[ingJ 
to something that needs to be thought through today" (Irigaray 1993b, 110), as an 
unsymbolised material substance particularly associated with women and repressed in 
psychoanalytic and philosophical discourse, Irigaray suggests that: 
because the mucous has a special touch and properties, it would stand in the way of 
the transcendence of a God that was alien to the flesh, a God of immutable, stable 
truth. On the contrary, the mucous would summon the god to return or to come in 
a new incarnation, a new parousia (Irigaray 1993b, 110). 
lrigaray refigures the traditional masculine, Christian God as feminine by positing the mucous 
as property of the female and as an irreducible challenge to the notion of (masculine, phallic) 
transcendence. 
The mucous, unlike the Madonna's body as traditionally understood, is that which can never 
be wholly appropriated by another. It is a symbol of profound embodiment and of the 
potential for "divinity" or creativity that is contained within the female body. It is: 
never merely something available, never merely a material ready for some hand or 
some tool to use to construct a piece of work. And equally something that cannot 
possibly be denied. That always leaves a trace behind: nostalgia for a return to the 
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womb .... Impossible to suppress or forget entirely, without trace, it is only in an act 
that the mucous perceives and loves itself. Without thesis, without position outside 
itself. The potency achieves "its" act which is never set in a finished piece of work. 
But which is always half-open. Never amounts simply to consumption (Irigaray 
1993b, 111). 
The mucous, as a figure for a feminine divine, the sensible transcendental which proceeds 
beyond binaries, marks "nostalgia for a return to the womb" but is present to itself only in'''an 
act" (of love), thereby escaping phallic recuperation. This act, too, is "never set in a finished 
piece of work." The mucous, read as an image of Irigaray' s reworking of Christian divinity, 
has several things in common with (Dora's) hysteria, especially in the David-Menard reading 
outlined earlier. And since Irigaray - unlike Kristeva - does see the hysteric as a heroine, and 
moreover acts the hysteric herself in her writing, this should perhaps come as no surprise. In 
fact, in an essay translated as "Women Amongst Themselves: Creating a Woman-to-Woman 
Sociality," Irigaray connects "women's so-called hysterical symptomatology" with their search 
for modes of expression for female jouissance, which she depicts as relating to "a dimension 
ranging from the most corporeal to the most spiritual," and as generating "a passage or bridge 
between what is most earthly and what is most celestial" (Irigaray 19911, 190). 
According to David-Menard, as stated previously, hysterical symptoms represent the visible 
aspect of a process whose invisible side is a "displacement of erotogeneity" (Lukacher 1989, 
xv) that results in the somatic symptom, as the body frantically attempts to symbolise itself 
as an undiminished whole (David-Menard 1989, 104). Dora's fixation with the Virgin 
represents, as others have suggested, her desire to return to the womb, or at least to express 
in her body (in the present) a continuity of experience in which preoedipal pleasures can 
accede to symbolisation. Her imitation of the Virgin suggests that she desires to be neither 
mother nor daughter in the symbolic order insofar as both these options require a repression 
of her jouissance, which is unacceptable to her, and an acknowledgement of specific lack in 
phallic terms. Or, perhaps, she desires to be both mother and daughter in the way in which 
Irigaray means it: to refuse the available options for a female in the symbolic by exceeding 
them, "doubl[ingJ and play[ingJ what we are twice over" in order to suggest, through 
symptoms, the possibilities of love among women. Indeed, Dora's love for Frau K., passed 
over by Freud, might seem to suggest this interpretation. 
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lrigaray's divine has in common with Dora's hysterical activity - her oral symptoms and her 
rapture before and mimicry of the Virgin - status only in the passage between opposites 
(between mothers and daughters or women and men as specific subjects, in lrigaray's case, 
and between the rejected symbolic body and the absent body of jouissance, in Dora's) which 
momentarily disrupts the circuits of phallic desire. As David-Menard notes, what Freud 
defined as hysterical conversion involves "a momentary extinction of discourse and a 
presentification of the impossible" (David-Menard 1989, 181), and "in hysteria, in the 
spectacular crisis with so much excess, there is the will to actualize something crazy, to 
represent it in order for it to exist" (David-Menard 1988, 58). What lrigaray calls divine, the 
strategic possibilities for women of a reworked notion of tlinfinity" that would partake of and 
so create'space between different subjects (principally women and men), bears similarities 
with and has specific bearing on Dora's doomed struggles to symbolise separation from her 
mother in non-phallic terms. And yet Irigaray's conscious use of hysterical strategy in her 
writings is also worlds apart from Dora's reactive symptoms which we may read only as 
portrayed in the Freudian text. 
lrigaray's avowedly hysterical response to the limitations imposed on women by the 
phallocentric order have more in common with the writer of my next textual object of 
investigation, Julia Kristeva. While recognising the obvious ways in which the views of these 
two writers differ (Gallop 1982, 114-6, 121; Grosz 1989, 100-4; Sellers 1991, 52; Oliver 
1993, 176-9), I will argue that some of Kristeva's writing tactics resemble, in their 
performative qualities, Irigaray's mimetic and disruptive philosophical style, ifnot her overtly 
mystical moves. 
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5. 3 The poetics of passion: Julia Kristeva's "Stabat Mater" 
Hers is a divine that does not need to erect any capital letter. Hers an omnipresence 
that pertains to no Person. Creeping through the mesh of any code of law, the nets 
of institutions, the organization of Churches. That uproot her from her most living 
source of inspiration. By assigning her a place in the religious scenario. As a 
receptive-passive female extra, not as a divine source. Flesh that has already become 
word beyond any locatable figure. The holy spirit? (Irigaray 1991d, 172) 
A woman's discourse, would that be it? Did not Christianity attempt, among other 
things, to freeze that see-saw? To stop it, tear women away from its rhythm, settle 
them permanently in the spirit? Too permanently ... (Kristeva 1987, 259). 
In IIWomen's Time," Julia Kristeva discusses feminist struggles in relation to women's place 
in the phallic domain, the symbolic tlorder of sacrifice and .. .language" (Kristeva 1986c, 199). 
She writes: 
No longer wishing to be excluded or no longer content with the function which has 
always been demanded of us (to maintain, arrange and perpetuate this socio-symbolic 
contract as mothers, wives, nurses, doctors, teachers ... ), how can we reveal our place, 
first as it is bequeathed to us by tradition, and then as we want to transform it? 
(Kristeva 1986c, 199). 
Kristeva's own answers to this question may be said, like Irigaray's, to be strategic and 
performative. Circling around the issue of the nature of women's place in the symbolic, 
Kristeva is reluctant to formulate general statements about the specific representation of 
women. Instead, she recommends a "self-analyticaP' attitude, 
which - without refusing or sidestepping this socio-symbolic order - consists in 
trying to explore the constitution and functioning of this contract, starting less from 
the knowledge accumulated about it (anthropology, psychoanalysis, linguistics) than 
from the very personal affect experienced when facing it as subject and as a woman 
(Kristeva 1986c, 200). 
Such affective formulations are Ithesitant but always dissident" and attempt to articulate "a 
specific discourse closer to the body and emotions, to the unnameable repressed by the social 
contract" (Kristeva 1986c, 200). Perhaps Kristeva's most obvious tentative articulation of such 
a discourse is her 1976 text "Stabat Mater," an analysis of the function of the Virgin Mary 
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in traditional Christianity and "western" culture as it bears on the cultural status and personal 
experience of motherhood. 
In "Stabat Mater," Kristeva constructs a kind of dialogue with the figure of the Virgin as she 
is traditionally understood. On the right-hand side of the page Kristeva writes, in "academic," 
scholarly mode, about the Virgin and her place in "western" civilisation, and this part of the 
text frequently takes over, covering the entire page of the work. On the left-hand side of the 
page, at intervals, appears a record of the Itpersonal affect[s]" felt by Kristeva during her own 
experience of motherhood, a lyrical account which has been read variously as the voice of the 
child in opposition to the mother (Suleiman 1985, 369); the semiotic body (Oliver 1993, 53); 
and the "flesh made Word" (Jacobus 1986, 186). 
As well as interrogating the terms of female sacrifice in the symbolic order through a tentative 
exploration of a language "closer to the body," "Stabat Mater'''s dual structure theatricalises 
Kristeva's own formulation of maternity as "a strange fold that changes culture into 
nature ... speaking into biology" (Kristeva 1987,259-60). The interaction of the text's two types 
oflanguage - one logical, philosophical, learned; the other poetic, strange, emotive - summons 
a space between in which the reader, through the act of reading and interpretation, must 
consider the maternal/physical origin of language addressed by the essay as a whole and the 
question of her own maternal source. This interpretation is suggested by Kelly Oliver's view 
of "Stabat Materll as signifying "the split columns of the mother's sex" through which the 
child is birthed (Oliver 1993, 54). While it is ultimately up to the reader to bridge the text's 
two types of discourse, this act of discerning meaning involves bridging the passage between 
Kristeva's view that in order to be speaking subjects "matricide is our vital necessity" 
(Kristeva 1989, 27), and her production of "a perverse witness to the excess of maternal 
alterity overflowing the symbolic system" (Ziarek 1993, 70_1).21 The reader must confront the 
question of her origin as a speaking/reading subject who replaces the absent mother through 
her negotiation of the Kristevan dialectic between sacrifice and excess. 
Alison Ainley observes that Kristeva 
posits motherhood as the site of potentially reconceptualized notions of production 
and reproduction, as different kinds of time, a different notion of identity. In this 
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sense it represents a possible irruption or interruption of the Symbolic, in the 
conjunction of stasis and dynamism, of cyclical and monumental time with the linear 
time of genealogy and grammar. In "Stabat Mater," the personal, left-hand, "other" 
side of the text irrupts into the historical mapping of the Virgin Mary as 
paradigmatic mother. Textually, this double writing corresponds to the mother as a 
body positioned and repositioned in language, but a body with intimations of its own 
splitting, separation and pleasure (Ainley 1990, 58). 
But what is the significance of these intimations? And how far can Kristeva herself be 
conscious of (master of) this experimental process without setting herself up - like the Virgin 
- as a phallic mother, thus binding the subversive impact of her "double writing" and its 
maternal (subject) matter? In the text Kristeva attempts to inhabit, if only briefly, the space 
between maternal madness (such as that which would result from "rejection of the paternal 
function ... generating psychoses" (Kristeva 1986c, 199)) and phallic recuperation of 
motherhood. In her refusal to posit or take up a female ltsubject position" (here named 
maternal), her persistence in maintaining an ambivalent relationship to the Virgin - neither 
complete identification not substitution, as indicated by the two columns of text, but a kind 
of subversive mimicry - "Stabat Mater" may be read as a hysterical piece like Kempe's Book 
or Freud's study of Dora. 
Kristeva can be seen to take a "hysterical" stance in "Stabat Mater" as a result of the two 
speaking positions she articulates, as mother and female academic, both of which she seeks 
to undermine in their conventional formations. "Stabat Mater" can be seen to exemplify her 
later statement about how women "might try to understand their sexual and symbolic 
difference in the framework of social, cultural and professional realization," so as to "go 
further and call into question the very apparatus itself' (Kristeva 1986c, 198). However, the 
text's self-critical workings and indeed Kristeva's own views on motherhood as a process 
without a subject (Kristeva 1980a, 237) require that Kristeva, even while writing "as a 
mother, tI feign innocence of sexuality (her experience of motherhood) within it, since writing 
as an intellectual (becoming a speaking subject) necessitates losing the mother: "Matricide is 
our vital necessity," she 'writes, "the sine-qua-non condition of our individuation" (Kristeva 
1989, 27-8). Thus Kristeva, in a hysterical move which Kempe and Dora also make, sets 
another woman - The Virgin - up as knower in her text. The Virgin as "knower" is the figure 
who takes the place of that which cannot be expressed in language: the impossible 
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combination of the subject's maternal loss speaking a discourse of maternal plenitude. 
In other words, if pregnancy is "experienced as the radical ordeal of the splitting of the 
subject" (Kristeva 1986c, 206) in which "no one is present" to signify the experience (Kristeva 
1980a, 237), the Virgin must stand in Kristeva's text as a figure for the impossibility of 
maternal speech, as "a sort of subject at the point where the subject and its speech split apart, 
fragment, and vanish" (Kristeva 1980a, 237). The Virgin is traditionally the means by which 
"western" culture, through the doctrines of the Church, domesticates the challenge of 
maternity to its sacrificial logic. Kristeva's incorporation of the Virgin into her 
autobiographical text allows her to avoid claiming a maternal "subject position!l22 - the Virgin 
herself stands as emblem of the dangers of such a move - while making space for a tentative 
exploration of alternatives. Mimetically, strategically, Kristeva skirts around the figure of the 
Virgin and, like the hysteric, articulates a physical excess which cannot be wholly interpreted 
in phallic terms. 
While Kristeva, unlike lrigaray, does not see the female hysteric as a figure of subversion, she 
does, as Jane Gallop puts it, repeatedly place herself "in the privileged position of marginality, 
in the position to represent heterogeneity, 'in that space both double and foreign, to signify 
it'" (Kristeva 1977b, 409, qtd. in Gallop 1982, 119). The theatricality of this move, Kristeva's 
"drawing attention to her self, her body, her individual history in the midst of [a] larger 
theoretical discussion" (Gallop 1982, 118) highlights the "reality" of female experience which 
it would be madness, in Kristevan terms, to name as such in theory.23 Thus, like the hysteric, 
she attempts to articulate what cannot be said in phallocentric discourse through the 
production of an excessive personal aspect which aims to displace the terms on which she 
speaks and depends finally upon the response of an audience of readers. 
Anna Smith notes that "where the hysteric denies the separation of body from words (the 
'somatic symptom'), 'Stabat Mater' similarly denies the purity of the signifier, but it does so 
through displacing the effects of the body into words" (Smith 1993, 66). In "Stabat Mater," 
Kristeva's text of maternal experience may be read as an attempt to engage in the subversions 
that belong to "poetic language": in Kristeva's terms, language which challenges the truth of 
the symbolic at the crisis point of its emergence in the thetic phase of linguistic enunciation 
329 
(Hekman 1990, 88_9).24 For Kristeva, "poetic language" stages the confrontation between 
"semiotic jouissance and the thetic" (Kristeva 1986b, 103; Hekman 1990, 89), celebrating the 
maternal remnants of language at the limits of sense (Lechte 1990, 129; Oliver 1993, 97). As 
Oliver describes it: 
Poetry is a type of borderline case that calls into question all that is central to 
representation .... Poetry unravels the symbolic and the unity that it requires. Poetry 
reveals the nature of all signifiance through its practice. Kristeva defines a practice 
as the acceptance of the symbolic Law together with the transgression of the Law 
for the purpose of renovating it (Kristeva 1986d, 29. See also 1974, 195-234, cited 
in Oliver 1993, 99-100). 
Poetic practice as a simultaneous acceptance and tactical transgression of the Law is akin to 
Kristeva's technique of double writing in "Stabat Mater." Although for Kristeva herself, 
"poetic writing" has been emblematised by the works of certain male writers (including 
Shakespeare, Mall arme , and de Sade, among others) in whose work she has discerned a 
politically revolutionary potential (Roudiez 1980, 5),25 "Stabat Mater"'s own poetic elements 
invite reading as transgressive text that engages the maternal body - irreducible in language 
- and thereby calls into question the absolute rule of the Law. Mary Jacobus writes that, 
although: 
for Kristeva, there is only one way to traverse the religion of the Word and its 
supporting pendant, the mother; that is, the way of the artist.. .. the "drama of the 
wordlbody separation whose flash-spasm the poet alone can hear" (Kristeva 1980b, 
196) is the same drama enacted by Kristeva's discourse of maternity (Jacobus 1986, 
170). 
Such a reading is encouraged by the fact that, for Kristeva, poetic language is the subversive 
flipside of orthodox discourses of the sacred. She describes poetic language as "an unsettling 
process - when not an outright destruction - of the identity of meaning and speaking subject 
(sic), and consequently, of transcendence or, by derivation, of 'religious sensibility'" (Kristeva 
1980a, 125), and claims that poetic language is "the only language that uses up transcendence 
and theology to sustain itself' and that it is "knowingly the enemy of religion" (Kristeva 
1980a, 125). Elizabeth Grosz argues that, for Kristeva: 
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where the poetic text signals a language to come, the sacred text attempts to stabilise 
a situation in decay or breakdown; where the poetic engenders a semiotic breach of 
the symbolic, the religious is a semiotic recoded in symbolic terms .... Religion is the 
recoding of what is becoming uncoded in the poetic or the revolutionary (Grosz 
1989, 84). 
Thus the staging of the conflict between the historical representation of Mary and Kristeva's 
own experience of motherhood presents maternity, as in all of Kristeva's writing on the 
subject, as the crisis point where the "personal" (individual experience) meets the social and 
"a dangerous threat [is posed] to the notion of subjectivity itself' (Jacobus 1990,22).26 As the 
poetic radicalises the religious, undoing its recuperative effect, and as Kristeva herself usurps 
the Virgin as the agent oftransgression in her text, she plays the hysteric to the arch-hysteric, 
, . 
Mary. Kristeva's own passion, her searing account of the psychic pain of motherhood, mimics 
and displaces Mary's orthodox Passion, itself a mimetic displacement of Christ's, enacting a 
challenge to Christian discourse and its appropriation of the maternal. 
"Stabat Mater" produces, via a discourse centred on the body, a series of displacements not 
unlike "the displacement of erotogeneity that mobilizes the body of jouissance" (Lukacher 
1989, xv) in hysteria. Where . hysterical symptoms are a doomed attempt to vacate the 
symbolic body and represent it (in fact, an other body) as an impossible whole, "Stabat Mater" 
attests to the general difficulty of effecting "political transformation when the terms of that 
transformation are given by .the very order which a revolutionary practice seeks to change" 
(Rose 1991 a, 148), the impossibility of inhabiting an "other body." The text's double writing 
both confounds and reflects the way in which writing about maternal experience is 
circumscribed by the symbolic. The text's subversive impact, like that of hysteria, perhaps 
ultimately lies in the response it calls forth from readers who must confront the maternal body 
at the point where it is effaced by language. The text's hysterical qualities, its multiple, 
strategic displacements, create in the end an uncomfortable space in which the reader is 
inserted, and this discomfort attests to both the inescapability and inexpressibility of the 
relation to the maternal, which the female hysteric's somatic symptoms also dramatise. 
Writing about responding to Kristeva, Anna Smith observes that: 
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"Stabat Mater" ... "nourishes" and exhorts, but its conceptual strangeness forbids any 
permanent identification. The discourse of maternity as I read it according to 
Kristeva swallows the necessity for a paranoid reader ("alone of all her sex") and 
sustains us instead through a vibrant play with the textures of language. Yet at the 
same time it does not forget its debt to the semiotic, the body. Thus it moves 
between drives and signs, bodily gratification and representation (Smith 1993, 68). 
What Smith describes as "Kristeva's ambivalent borderline position here between separation 
and fusion, body and text" (Smith 1993, 72), resembles the hysteric's inability or refusal to 
resolve her combat with her mother by taking up a position in the phallic domain. The female 
hysteric's bodily speech draws attention to the site of female experience which cannot be 
represented in language, just as Kristeva's confrontation - in language - of the maternal 
"heterogeneity that cannot be subsumed in the signifier" (but which "explodes violently with 
pregnancy" (Kristeva 1987,259)) creates a space in her text for interpretation which Kristeva 
herself vacates and which ultimately the reader must fill. 
Does the female reader in tum, then, have to read "Stabat Mater" hysterically? What radical 
reading possibilities are suggested by the hysterical movement of the text? If the Virgin is the 
starting point, and the stand-in, for Kristeva's explorations of the problems of maternal 
speech, can she serve a similar function fora woman responding to this difficult piece? I 
think it is possible to read Kristeva's text "hysterically," to productive effect, if one seeks to 
reread the Virgin, the phallic mother par excellence, as Irigaray does when she de constructs 
maternity as the umepresentable substance of masculine invention. To reread the Virgin in the 
highly poetic and visionary terms of Irigaray could be to displace her as Kristeva herself does 
and perhaps thus to mime, excessively, the already destabilising gestures of the text. But if 
such a reading is "hysterical," what exactly might it produce, and further (to return to the 
question I set out at the start of this chapter), what might it specifically reveal about the 
Virgin as a model for women's hysterical protests? In the remaining pages of the chapter I 
will attempt to shape some answers to these questions. 
Kristeva has said that, in "Stabat Mater," she wanted to create the impression of "a sort of 
wound, a scar" (Kristeva 1984c, 24, cited in Jacobus 1986, 167, and Oliver 1993, 53) as an 
image of the position of the psychoanalyst which she herself is. She describes psychoanalysis 
as "a knowing discourse, a discourse which pretends to some objectivity," and states that "at 
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the same time we elaborate this discourse through what is often painful involvement in the 
observation. We have to exlribit this contradiction, this pain" (Kristeva 1984c, cited in Jacobus 
1986, 167). In Kristeva's reading, the Virgin Mary mediates a fixation on the fantasy of the 
all-powerful mother which is not disabling to the subject, since the Virgin is recuperated into 
the service of phallic Law. In this sense the Virgin covers up the threat of castration 
symbolised by the mother, which the child must recognise on entry into the symbolic (Jacobus 
1990, 22). The poetic side of Kristeva's text, however, in displacing Mary as a coherent 
symbol, reopens the wound of maternal castration, confronting the reader with her own 
maternalloss.27 At the same time Kristeva inhabits this wound as analyst, seeking to displace 
the experience of motherhood in the symbolic by giving voice to its repressed pain (Oliver 
1993, 53). 
Irigaray's reading of the Virgin in Marine Lover involves, like Kristeva's, a poetic meditation 
on Mary's symbolic function, but in it she suggests castration as threshold, and conflates the 
experience of Mary with, rather than separates it from, that of ordinary women. Like Kristeva, 
Irigaray reads Mary as an ordinary mother made extraordinary (i.e., virginal) in Christianity 
so as to control the threat of maternal jouissance to the phallic order (Oliver 1993, 51), but 
her continual reversal of the terms of Christian discourse leads her to translate Mary's 
uniqueness back through the repressed maternal experience she undergoes. This interpretation 
is prompted by Irigaray's desire to produce an alternative version of motherhood to the 
conventional one, in which she hopes, eventually, a maternal subject might speak. In 
Irigaray's visionary terms, Mary as a "divine" figure serves as an active locus of exchange (or 
mediation) which instead of recuperating female physicality within the phallocentric symbolic 
attempts to bring it to signification. Irigaray's articulation of the divine as always-embodied 
agent of symbolic exchange, in terms of which she reads the Virgin in Marine Lover, allows 
her a more explicitly visionary, optimistic focus as regards the representation of motherhood 
than Kristeva would be willing to accept. 
In order to read Mary as a figure suggestive of the transformation of female (maternal) 
sexuality in the symbolic, however, Irigaray must also speak from the site of the scar which 
marks the repression of maternal jouissance or the semiotic (Oliver 1993,53). She also speaks 
as an analyst, and as one with a particular concern for mother-daughter relations as they bear 
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on the analytic environment (Irigaray 1991c). Irigaray, too, speaks of the necessity for the 
analyst to reflect upon the pain of her own transference (Idgaray 1991c, 114-5). She suggests 
that the mucous, which analytical language "does not speak" (Irigaray 1991c, 113) and which 
is excessive to current theory, can be used as a figure for the necessary relationship between 
female analyst and analysand, as an invisible "space-time that is a gift, moving from inside 
to outside, like a body already becoming flesh ... " (Irigaray 1991c, 116); as a threshold which 
inspires non-appropriative interaction. 
lrigaray's thoughts on Mary in Marine Lover, then, have points in common with Kristeva's 
in "Stabat Mater,lI although what in Kristeva amounts to a poetic invasion of the religious 
, 
becomes in lrigaray this and more. Where Kristeva claims that Christianity freezes "the 
strange feminine see-saw" (between an "unnamable community of women" and "the war of 
individual singularities") that constitutes female identity in the symbolic (Kristeva 1987, 258-
9), lrigaray (re)discovers this inside/outside effect within Christianity, by reading Mary, and 
Christ in relation to Mary, as figures of dynamic excess. 
Irigaray consistently aims to resituate what has traditionally been named the divine in 
Christianity in the realm of the human, the flesh. She argues that God's return "in the womb 
of a woman lt (Irigaray 1991d, 175) makes Mary the harbinger of "another world" for 
contemporary women, although this aspect of Mary as symbol has been denied (Irigaray 
1991d, 189). This interpretation depends upon a reading of Mary's maternal role in which 
Mary enacts Christianity's potentially revolutionary synthesis of the divine (a transcendental 
projection of the (traditionally male) sexed subject) and the flesh. Mary's mediating act -
consenting to bear the Christ - means that for her the divine "occur[s] only near at hand" 
(Irigaray 1991d, 171), whereas "evil, sin, suffering, redemption, arise when God is set up as 
an extraterrestrial ideal, as an otherworldly monopoli' (Irigaray 1991d, 173) which requires 
a forgetting of fleshly (maternal) origin. 
Irigaray writes of Mary that "her sexuate body never separates from the place where it has 
place" (Idgaray 1991d, 172). On one level this is another way of saying that she cannot 
become a maternal subject as such in the phallocentric order, because she must signify phallic 
lack, unable to "forget" her body and rise to an image of illusory wholeness. Thus far Kristeva 
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would agree. However in Irigaray this lack of separation is figured as an excess which is itself 
the very site of intersubjective exchange, although in order to signify and have an effect it 
must be "read" and responded to by an other (different) subject. Irigaray's rereading of Mary, 
then, is part of her rereading of Christianity as she would like to transform it; that is, into a 
system which would enact an ethics of (sexual) exchange and not of sterility and 
appropriation, which in her view it currently does. 
Irigaray reads Mary's communion with the divine as a contract with the Holy Spirit which 
is "an effusion that goes beyond and stops short of any skin that has been closed back on 
itself. The deepest depths of the flesh, touched, birthed, and without a wound" (Irigaray 
1991d, 171). But is this reading any different from Kristeva's, in which the Virgin masks 
maternal castration and the threat of maternal power? In Irigaray the wound of maternal 
castration becomes a divine threshold, divine here in Irigaray's revised sense as physical and 
symbolic mediation (the sensible transcendental), in this case between the Virgin and the Holy 
Spirit who plants the seed of Christ in her womb. Irigaray uses the conventional representation 
of motherhood, as, indeed, a "process without a subject" in phallocentrism (Kristeva 1980a, 
237-8)) ([Mary'sJ ... body never separates from the place where it has place" (Irigaray 1991d, 
172)), along with a re-presentation of Christ and the Virgin, to reread maternity as the site of 
an exchange between separate subjects. 
In this revision of Christian orthodoxy Christ and Mary are the "subjects," but they are 
inseparable, just as, in Irigaray's view, ordinary female and male "subjects" of the symbolic 
are in fact inseparable, although they accede to representation according to a singular 
masculine model. Consequently the conventional, phallocentric figuration of the two sexes 
relies upon the repression of one of them, the female, in the absence of any means of inter-
sexual ethics or exchange.28 The divine element of which both Mary and Christ partake -
traditionally the Holy Spirit who is the source of conception in Mary's womb and the sign 
of the union of mother and child - is transformed in Irigaray's reading into a "third term" 
capable of symbolising each, but only in the sense that it is bound up with and represents the 
maternal (here the Virgin's castration as refigured threshold) and doesn't, as in the orthodox 
manner, repress it. 
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In Irigaray, as we have seen, the divine is that which acts as a mediating substance or site of 
exchange within and between human bodies but does not yet accede to symbolisation. As that 
which can be seen as enabling hitherto unsymbolised aspects of female experience to signify, 
the divine, however, also retains the properties of Mary's "yes," her affirmative response to 
the angelic Annunciation. That is, it is visionary: it refers to a persistence of hope in relation 
to human sexual and social interactions that the psychic pain of maternal experience, for 
example, can achieve articulation as other than a void in discourse and gain new meaning. But 
this hope depends upon attempts by subjects-who-would-be-separate (such as mothers and 
daughters) to find new ways of enacting and representing the hidden processes that pass 
between them. 
I don't think lrigaray's reading of Mary as a kind of model for ordinary women suggests that 
contemporary women should imitate Mary's submission and willing maternal sacrifice. 
lrigaray rereads Mary's "yes" as exemplifying her formulation of a new code of sexual ethics. 
This new ethics both enables and is constitutionally open to exchange; it depends upon the 
response of an other which precipitates movement into an uncharted and productive space 
between the other and the self (Irigaray 1991a, 167-8, 171-6; 1991d, 175-8; 1992b; 1993b, 
82, 149-50). Irigaray also points out the ways in which the traditional depiction of Mary has 
glossed over that which is, in her, a normal experience of motherhood. She thus questions and 
reverses the way in which Mary has served as a figure to contain and curtail a possible 
women's discourse of maternity. 
Like Kristeva, Irigaray states that this "virgin .. .lives forever because she dies to her generation 
in order to become merely the vehicle for the Other" (Irigaray 1991d, 166. See also Kristeva 
1987, 257-8), and that "all that is left of her loves and desires is the patience, gentleness, 
tenderness or compassion that, on occasion, she breathes into the ear of her 'son'" (Irigaray 
1991d, 167. See also Kristeva 1987, 248, 257). Irigaray even comes close to Kristeva's view 
of artistic practice as the only site of expression of a (semiotic) excess which recalls the 
maternal body. "What does it mean that the word is made flesh?" she asks: 
Why does its proph,ecy have such a wide influence? And, despite all the well-known 
horrors and repressions, how do we account for all the works of art which that 
prophecy gave rise to? What energy let them root and flourish, through the centuries, 
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as places where the divine lives and breathes? ... And can that creative strength be 
reduced to the power of the love between son and father, that matrix for idealism, 
with the virgin-mother as its sensory substrate? Are the desire and the sharing of the 
flesh not at work here? Don't they paint? Sculpt? Speak? In a language that of 
course goes beyond and stops short of any grammar of reason. Cryptic, or mystic, 
in its language .... Something always, and at each opportunity, heretical in the eyes 
of orthodoxy (Irigaray 1991d, 179. See also Kristeva 1987, 253). 
To read Mary excessively in this way, as a figure suggestive of the possibilities of symbolic 
exchange between those who are as yet non-subjects in the symbolic order - mothers and 
daughters for example - is to read her hysterically. Hysteria is, in Irigaray, an attempt to 
articulate a process for which there are no symbolic channels, the lack of which the hysteric 
refuses to, accept (Grosz 1989, 138-9). In this sense Irigaray's own reading of Mary as a 
model for a sexual ethics of exchange (which would enable communication between mothers 
and daughters, as well as between women and men) is an intentionally hysterical move. 
If I read "Stabat Mater" through the lens of Irigaray's hysterical vision, I can see the Virgin 
as effectively enabling Kristeva to "speak" as a mother in the semiotic spaces of symbolic 
discourse. In other words, I read the Virgin as an essential part of Kristeva's attempt to 
analyse "what is terrifying in relation to the mother and finding forms for symbolising that" 
,; 
(in David-Menard's description of the focus of female hysteria (David-Menard 1988, 54» as 
regards her own experience. "What is terrifying" in Kristeva's work concerns the fantasies by 
which phallocentric culture strives to accommodate the maternal, of which the Virgin is a 
prime example, but this same Virgin is also the means by which Kristeva can unravel the 
religious via the poetic in "Stabat Mater" and create a space to reflect upon her own maternal 
experience. 
Reading Kristeva (and Kempe and Dora) back through Irigaray, I am struck by the number 
of ways in which it is possible to read the Virgin, and by the variety of readings in which she 
serves as an interface for women's attempts to express what she has traditionally been set up 
to hide: fear of the maternal; the madness that threatens when a woman seeks not to repress 
the maternal relationship; maternal experience as an exercise in self-reflection which 
challenges the current symbolic system. I conclude that the Virgin's simultaneous erasure and 
elevation in orthodox Christian discourse makes of her an excessive but also a continually 
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shifting, mediating symbolic presence. Some women, in substituting her for the female self 
they cannot yet speak (this is her hysterical function) and the maternal presence that has been 
repressed, seem able to attempt articulation, however tentatively, of a connection to the 
maternal which might bypass psychic breakdown or madness. 
Reading the Virgin in "Stabat Mater" as enabling Kristeva's tentative expression of a kind of 
maternal speech itself hints at the possibility of maternal-filial communication. Indeed, to read 
"Stabat Mater" hysterically would, in Irigaray's terms, mean to read with the hope of 
eventually signifying just that. But of course work towards that kind of exchange, if it is ever 
to be actively signified, must be continued off the page as well as on it. The lesson of female 
hysteria, in many feminist readings, is that the analyst can recuperate or respond to the 
symptom depending on herlhis willingness to take into account the unsymbolised aspects of 
female sexuality and the hysteric's gesture toward the as yet unseen. 
This visionary kind of attitude and continual readiness to be surprised, the timbre of Irigaray' s 
"ethics of sexual difference," needs of course to be put to work between mothers and 
daughters, between specific maternal and filial subjects, so that this relationship which seems 
threatening to female self-constitution (the traditional mother-daughter bind with which the 
hysteric struggles) can move, can be imaged and understood by its participants in new ways, 
altering the dependence on "the phallic problematic" (David-Menard 1988, 54) by mobilising 
the excess within. What I am attempting to describe is, evidently and necessarily, a process 
which, although it can be written about suggestively, cannot be charted ahead of time by 
virtue of its constant attention to the initiatives and responses of the body. Writing about this 
move toward specific female self-expression as "the generation of a sensible transcendental," 
Irigaray states that "it would be of the order of the constant and gradual creation of a 
dimension ranging from the most corporeal to the most spiritual, a dimension which is never 
complete and never reversible" (Irigaray 1991c, 190). The texts I have examined in this 
chapter reflect aspects of a process of rereading female bodies through the agency of the 
excessive figure of the Virgin, but if such a process is to have contemporary and culture-
specific relevance, other rereadings must be undertaken in specific ways by specific female 
subjects, so that female subjects themselves can reinscribe their bodies as active, living matter. 
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1. E. Ann Kaplan writes that "many theorists of motherhood ... end up looking from the 
child position. That slippage from talking about the mother to talking from the 
child's perspective seems endemic to research in this area, and in itself revealing of 
the instability of the mother construct." Kaplan claims that, according to Kristeva, 
"things are further complicated by the fact that when we try to think motherhood, 
what we end up thinking is rather the idealized relationship between her and us" 
(Kristeva 1986a, 99, cited in Kaplan 1993, 40). 
2. See MacCannell (1992, 65-7). 
3. Elsewhere a woman interviewing Irigaray remarks that "we [women] often feel so 
guilty about not being resigned [to passive femininity], or so powerless, that the only 
path that remains open to us is madness," and Irigaray responds: "It is not certain 
that we even have the right to madness. Or in any case to a certain type of madness 
to which one accedes only through language [langage]. How can we define the 
madness in which women are placed? You often need something of language [du 
Zangage], some delusion [delire], to signal that you are living in madness. Women 
do not in fact suffer much from delusions. If they could, it would protect them. They 
suffer in their bodies. An absolutely immense bodily suffering" (Irigaray 1991f, 48). 
4. In This Sex Which Is Not One Irigaray asks whether female hysteria isn't "a 
privileged place for preserving .... that which is not expressed in woman's relation 
to her mother, to herself, to other women? Those aspects of women's earliest desires 
that find themselves reduced to silence in terms of a culture that does not allow them 
to be expressed. A powerlessness to 'say,' upon which the Oedipus complex then 
superimposes the requirement of silence" (Irigaray 1985a, 136). 
5. Kempe's Book reports that, "when she had long been troubled" by the 
aforementioned difficulties, Christ appeared to her one night in a vision and told her 
of his love for her (Kempe 1988, 42). This experience made her "calm in her wits 
and reason" and, although she had yet to undergo the more thorough conversion 
which would lead her to take up her special vocation, she was able to "perform all 
her responsibilities wisely and soberly" (Kempe 1988, 43) as a result of this divine 
intervention. 
6. This is a reference to the unsatisfactory response of Kempe's confessor to her initial 
confession, described in the Book's first chapter. 
7. Allison Weir notes that in Kristeva "the Virgin represents the semiotic order - the 
order of bodily drives and their rhythms, which is associated with the mother - and 
reconciles this with the symbolic order under God the Father" (Weir 1993, 81). 
8. As Oliver explains, "the semiotic disposition in language ... calls signifying practice 
to its crisis" or limits. In this sense, for Kristeva "the semiotic in language is 
revolutionary .... Like a political revolution, the semiotic in language causes an 
upheaval of the Symbolic and the subject" (Oliver 1993, 96). Kristeva argues that 
revolution which occurs in the signifying system of language through particular 
aesthetic practices, for instance, is akin to and indeed sparks revolution in the realm 
of the socio-political (Kristeva 1984a, 104, cited in Oliver 1993, 96). For her the 
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two spheres are not neatly separable. 
9. The most explicit representation of Christ's body as a Written text was the "Charter 
of Christ, It which figured the body of Christ as a legal document whose inscription 
- symbolising the wounds which marked Christ's body - promised fulfilment of the 
debt of sin owed to God by fallen humankind. See Rubin (1992b, 306-8); Evans 
(1994, 123-4). 
10. Jacqueline Rose has elaborated this point in relation to feminism in "Femininity and 
its Discontents" (Rose 1991b). 
11. The attempt recounted above was in fact the second Herr K. had made to Dora. The 
first had occurred a few years earlier, when Herr K. invited Dora to his place of 
work where he had contrived to be alone. There he clasped the young woman to him 
and kissed her. Freud's persistence in interpreting Dora's hysterical symptoms as a 
sign of her repressed desire for Herr K. is heralded here where he states that "this 
was surely just the situation to call up a distinct feeling of sexual excitement in a 
girl of fourteen who had never before been approached" (Freud 1953, 28), a reading 
that has been greeted with understandable dismay by feminists. 
12. Freud continues: "I ought to have guessed that the main source of her knowledge of 
sexual matters could have been no one but Frau K. - the very person who later on 
charged her 'with being interested in those same subjects" (Freud 1953, 120n). 
13. In a footnote on the same page on which this statement occurs, Freud refers to Philip 
Bauer's having contracted syphilis before his marriage. However he fails to connect 
this fact - relating clearly to the "contamination" of Kathe Bauer and the Bauer's 
sexual relationship - with Kathe Bauer's housecleaning obsession, her attempt to 
purify her domestic space as a response to the contamination of venereal disease. 
14. This is a reference to a young man who had sent Dora an album of pictures from 
a German health-resort, showing views of the town, which she had been looking for 
on the day prior to the dream (Freud 1953, 95). Freud writes of this young man that 
"it was easy to guess that he intended to come forward as a suitor one day, when his 
position had improved. But that would take time, and it meant waiting" (Freud 1953, 
96), just as Dora waited before the image of the Madonna. 
15. Jacobus points out that the Madonna proves to be the "mediating or third term" 
between the two stories Freud tells: the heterosexual narrative concerning Dora and 
Herr K., which appears in the body of the text, and the homosexual one, involving 
Dora and Frau K., which is mentioned only in footnotes and a textual postscript 
(Jacobus 1986, 171). Freud's observation that Dora used to praise Frau K.'s 
,I< adorable white body' in accents more appropriate to a lover than to a defeated 
rival" (Freud 1953, 61) suggests Dora's visual fixation with the Madonna and the 
Madonna's function as a symbol for Dora's subjective impasse, her inability to 
accept herself as the object of masculine desire (Lacan 1987c, 68, cited in Jacobus 
1986, 70). 
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16. Another quotation from David-Menard helps to clarify this point. Earlier, she writes 
that "we need to specify that the somatic compliance through which hysteria is 
defined depends upon the hysteric's absence to her own body. The hysteric has no 
body: Breuer's earliest research was directed along these very lines. Among Anna 
O. 's symptoms were her absences. These may be described equally well as a way 
of ceasing to answer to her own identity or as a way of ceasing to recognize people, 
in particular the doctors in attendance. The symbolic mainspring of these negative 
hallucinations was particularly clear in her case, since the presence of her visitors 
was abolished for Anna solely by the loss of meaning of the words they spoke. Anna 
no longer spoke nor understood the language of her own people" (David-Menard 
1989, 101). Thus the hysterical symptom simultaneously presents the hysterical 
subject as absent from the circuits of normal communication and present in protest 
at the requirements of her conventional role. 
17. These processes are, of course, intimately connected in the passage to subjectivity 
'of girls, who must replace their mothers, without compensation, in order to become 
subjects in the symbolic (Celermajer 1987, 62-3). In Lacanian terms, the hysteric 
refuses everyone's castration - her mother's and her own - because she cannot admit 
to such symbolic privation nor tolerate heterosexual relations as they are figured in 
phallocentric culture (Lacan 1987c, cited in Evans 1991, 181). 
18. In her account of the second dream Dora describes arriving at the house where she 
lived and finding a letter from her mother informing her of the death of her father. 
When she arrives at her family's house she finds that her mother has left for the 
funeral (Freud 1953, 94). 
19. This point, cited earlier by Jacobus and Ramas, is also made by Wiseman (1993, 
134). 
20. In Mary's case the "parents" whose attention she seeks would be Christ as mother 
and God the Father since Christ (according to Irigaray) becomes Mary's mother in 
a symbolic reversal of their roles, by appropriating her maternity for his humanity. 
The Virgin as hysteric could be read as articulating the dearth of maternal 
representation with which this process leaves her, as was suggested in the previous 
section in regard to the excessive depictions of her grieving common in medieval 
religion. 
21. At this point in her essay on Kristeva and Levinas from which this quote is taken, 
Ewa Ziarek is actually considering Kristeva's writing position in her book Black Sun 
as a dialogue between "the conservative analyst" and "the patient philosopher," in 
which she reverses the conventional hierarchy of patient and therapist and 
"rearticulates it as a more complex exchange between the philosopher and the 
analyst" (Ziarek 1993, 71). 
22. According to Kristeva, there can be no such thing as a maternal subject position 
since, in her words, "if we suppose that a mother is the subject of gestation, in other 
words the master of a process that. . .is prior to the social-symbolic-linguistic contract 
of the group, then we acknowledge the risk of losing identity at the same time as we 
ward it off' (Kristeva 1980a, 238). See also Rose (1991a, 156-7); Ziarek (1993). 
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23. As Rose points out, in Kristeva's writings, (sexual) identity, while "necessary ... [is] 
only ever partial and therefore carries with it a dual risk - the wreck of all identity, 
a self-blinding allegiance to psychic norms" (Rose 1991a, 150). Rose writes that 
Kristeva desires "to hold onto both sides of this dynamic" and that in her view 
"sexuality - the crucial ways it determines and structures our lives - cannot be 
understood without acknowledging the importance of fantasy, and fantasy in turn 
reveals aspects of subjectivity which crush the splendor of our (conscious) dreams" 
(Rose 1991a, 150, 163). Phallocentric culture's fantasies of the female and the 
maternal and their functions are a persistent concern in Kristeva's work and she 
follows Lacan in maintaining that the identity and therefore "reality" of sexed 
individuals, because always influenced by fantasy, is a constantly shifting thing 
(Rose 1991a, 156). 
24. Kristeva describes the thetic phase as "the precondition for signification" and as 
marking "a threshold between [the] two heterogeneous realms" of the semiotic and 
symbolic (Kristeva 1986b, 102). It thus represents the point at which the subject 
enters the symbolic order and takes up a speaking position that results in the 
recognition of subjective splitting characterised by the Lacanian mirror stage 
(Kristeva 1986b, 98-102; 1974,49, cited in Oliver 1993, 40). See also Rose (1991a, 
144); Lechte (1990, 135). 
25. Leon Roudiez writes that in Kristeva '''poetic language' is distinct from language as 
used for ordinary communication - but not because it may involve a so-called 
departure from a norm; it is almost an otherness of language. It is the language of 
materiality as opposed to transparency (where the word is forgotten for the sake of 
the object or concept designated), a language in which the writer's effort is less to 
deal with those objects or concepts words seem to encase than to work, consciously 
or not, with the sounds and rhythms of words in transrational fashion ( ... ) ... 
effecting .. .'semantic displacements'" (Roudiez 1980, 5). 
26. Mary Ann Doane observes that Kristeva's delineation of the maternal body as 
containing an "unmasterable ... other" (Kristeva 1980a, 237) results in "a confusion 
of identities [which] threatens to collapse a signifying system based on the paternal 
law of differentiation." She argues that "it would seem that the concept of 
motherhood automatically throws into question ideas concerning the self, boundaries 
between self and other, and hence identity" in Kristeva's work (Doane 1990, 170). 
27. Gallop claims that Kristeva "dephallicizes" the Virgin and the phallic position by 
theatricalising her and speaking from what in Kristeva is the "necessarily vacant 
position of the Mother" herself (Gallop 1982, 121, 118; Oliver 1993, 54). 
28. Irigaray writes that "the double event of the annunciation and the crucifixion would, 
in fact, always be tied together. This virgin, indeed, is always to be found at the side 
of the man they call the son of God, like his female other of whom he would be the 
manifest reproduction" (Irigaray 1991 d, 167). 
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CONCLUSIONfHORIZON: DIVINE WOMEN 
The woman is not protected by the mechanism of the fort-da, by the way in which it 
is constituted by divisions of time, space, the other, the self, by its phonetic divisions. 
She is more often than not unable to express herself unless to start with, her lips touch 
each other again and she moves her whole body. A woman is more at a loss when she 
is immobile than when she is moving, for she is fixed in one position, exposed in her 
own territory (lrigaray 1989c, 136). 
Is not locating myself in my in-finite the only way of doing without the criminal 
intervention of the Other? Renouncing the infinitely large so that at any moment I can 
experience, move, relate, exchange myself as incomplete. Having within me an 
infinitely small space which prevents me from closing myself up as a whole. Never 
whole in any place. Rather the melodious rhythm of half-opening which makes my 
measure limitless. Or limits a lack of measure. Concerned to hit the right note without 
claiming to speak the truth. 
Right, for what can be sung now, and not what might be true for all time (Irigaray 
1992b, 85). 
I began this thesis with a comment by Irigaray about the (im)possibility of "speaking as a 
woman" in maculinist culture. This speaking is understood by Irigaray as always excessive 
because to speak as a human subject means to' speak as a man, and the alleged "neutralityt' 
of masculine speech marks the feminine as mute and outlawed body. Consequently it is of 
paramount importance, in her view, that women find ways to understand and represent the 
experience of their bodies, since female bodies are the site of the masculine transcendent, the 
claim to neutral language. 
Irigaray makes a clear connection between the construction of language as neutral and the 
socio-symbolic function of a monotheistic, masculine God. Both language and God are 
rendered invisible by the operations of "western" culture. In this sense they are both 
considered external or transcendent to the subject. As Irigaray writes: "the human race tends 
to be of the view that the rules of syntax are eternal and unchangeable. This is part of a fear 
of social change. As Nietzsche says, we will always believe in God while we believe in 
grammar" (Irigaray 1991b, 64). 
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In this study I have explored some of Irigaray's thoughts on the Christian God as symbolic 
representative of man, a function which she claims is intimately connected to general belief 
in the neutrality of symbolic structures, including language (Irigaray 1993b, 112-3), and the 
resistance to large-scale change in these structures, such as would be required for "the entry 
of women [as women] into the public sphere" (Irigaray 1991b, 64). To speak as a woman in 
public, to refuse the modes of speech ("neutral"; unemotional; "objective") that men have used 
for centuries, requires work on the structures of language which refuses to deny the body its 
own speech. Irigaray claims that the disavowal of the body and the projection of this 
disavowal onto women by men has traditionally enabled public, "objective" (masculinised) 
speech at the expense of women's bodies and the possibility of female language (Irigaray 
19931). 
Therefore, to "speak as a woman" requires transformations in the signification of women's 
bodies. In Irigaray such transformation is figured primarily in terms of an ethics or language 
of exchange in which male subjects recognise their (bodily) debt to female (including 
maternal) subjects in the constitution of their identity, and in which female subjects are 
enabled to articulate a (bodily) language of their own. The divine or sensible transcendental 
is a primary figure for this new sexual ethics in Irigaray. It both challenges the masculinsation 
of language and culture in the "west" and enables the symbolic transformation or articulation 
of female speech and embodiment. The idea of the Christian God as a kind of meta-category 
for the male proto-subject is questioned and reworked by Irigaray so that that which is left 
out of the traditional man=God equation might attain representation. 
Hence Irigaray's divine is always uniquely embodied; as a means of providing cultural 
expression for the as yet unsymbolised and immanent, it is always intimately related to the 
physical reality and physical moves of the subject. Irigaray reverses the conventional 
understanding of God in the "west" as setting up the conditions of man's metaphysical 
(teleological) journey through life: her divine, proceeding from the physical placement of each 
individual sexed subject, is in the service of that subject's articulation of its experience 
(Irigaray 1985d, 32). In the case of women, the divine enables them to mediate or represent 
their bodies for themselves when traditionally they function as mute matter from which they 
cannot distance themselves in order to speak. 
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In the foreword to the English translation of Elemental Passions, Irigaray's reconsideration 
of the element of earth in the elaboration of It an ethics of sexual difference, II she describes the 
book as: 
some fragments from a woman's voyage as she goes in search of her identity in love. 
It is no longer a man in quest of his God, his path, his identity through the vicissitudes 
of his life's journey, it is a woman. Between nature and culture, between night and 
day, between sun and stars, between vegetable and mineral, amongst men, amongst 
women, amongst gods, she seeks her humanity and her transcendency (Irigaray 1992a, 
4). 
Instead of "a man in search of his God,'t the traditional orientation of the human subject which 
appropriates female substance and renders women invisible and groundless, with no specific 
place from which to speak, Irigaray suggests another kind of journey, figured in the book, 
which proceeds by means of the articulation of a space between (polar) opposites: "nature and 
culture ... night and day ... sun and stars." The type of journey described here is not linear nor 
primarily circular, but it is physical; it works over Itspaces between" in an attempt to insert 
the female body into language; thus the woman seeks "her humanity and her transcendency," 
she recognises her bodily experience through attempting to give it a future which will 
continually enable its specific recognition. The' always embodied space between present and 
future is represented by the divine. As lrigaray states in "Divine Womentl : 
Love of God .... shows the way. It is the incentive for a more perfect becoming. It 
marks the horizon between the more past and the more future, the more passive and 
the more active - permanent and always in tension. God forces us to do nothing except 
become: The only task, the only obligation laid upon us is: to become divine men and 
women, to become perfectly, to refuse to allow parts of ourselves to shrivel and die 
that have the potential for growth and fulfillment (Irigaray 1993a, 68-9). 
The "horizon" in the context of this essay represents the possibility of a future for women. 
However the idea of a horizon as an always embodied and continually moving way-marker 
for self-constitution is a refiguration of the Christian concept of space and time as goal-
oriented and masculinised, the understanding of reality as that which exists outside the self: 
"Their love is teleological. It aims for a target outside them. It moves toward the outside and 
to the constitution, on the outside, within that which is outside themselves, of a home. Outside 
the self, the tension, the intention, aims for a dwelling, a thing, a production" (Irigaray 1993b, 
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101). What lrigaray is describing here, in An Ethics of Sexual Difference, is the tendency of 
man to forget "the fact that his body is the threshold, the portal for the construction of his 
universe" (Trigaray 1993b, 100), and instead to attempt continually to reconstruct, "outside 
himself, It a home to possess, which corresponds with the possession, the appropriation through 
forgetting, of the female as subject. 
Irigaray's divine, then, is a means of symbolising the threshold of not only the female but also 
the male body, of returning each sex to itself in specific representation: "What protects me 
from the other and enables me to move toward him or her is ... often the settling of a space, 
an enclave of air rather than the interposition of mirrors and glasses whose cutting edge all 
too often threatens to tum against me" (Irigaray 1993a, 66). Vision is traditionally understood 
(in its metaphysical and physical senses) as a projection forward by the eye from a static, 
unimplicated situation: "shutting [the body] up within a gaze that originates in it but detaches 
itself to constitute the identity of a subj ect that is always metaphysical" (Irigaray 1992b, 88. 
See also 1978, 50). But vision is refigured by Irigaray as a passage through space between 
subjects where that space is understood as material, "an enclave of air"; there is no possibility 
of distancing oneself from the body since there is no space that cannot be or is not already 
materialised, understood in terms of its elemental properties, figured as a mediating substance 
between "me" and "the other." 
lrigaray's reimagining of phallocentric vision as a continual awareness of the situatedness (in 
space and time) of the sexed body-subject constitutes her feminist visionary endeavour, itself 
a reworking of the conventional notion of the visionary as "seer." Traditionally the visionary 
is far-sighted, capable of observing at a distance developments that ordinary people cannot 
see. But the visionary qualities ofIrigaray's work, while indeed forward-looking and oriented 
towards a specifically female future, align her with a positive mystic who restively embodies 
her visions of God, or a dancer who learns to articulate moves through space: "to construct 
and inhabit our airy space is essential. It is the space of bodily autonomy, of free breath, free 
speech and song ... " (Irigaray 1993a, 66. Emphasis added). She writes that: 
Language [langage] seems to have paralysed our gestures, including our verbal 
gestures. As adults, we no longer have any mobility. Once childhood is over, our 
moving trajectories are limited to poetry, art, prayer. Does not the still silent 
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understanding of the feminine signify movements to be liberated? This is not a matter 
of women outbidding technology, even if they can, but of their discovering forgotten, 
misrecognized gestures, and also verbal gestures other than those of mothering, 
shedding a different light on corporeal generation in the strict sense (Irigaray 1991i, 
152). 
In the same piece Irigaray observes that God, who has "for centuries been the focus of a 
monopoly on truth(s)," is invisible, and his invisibility is echoed in the cultural invisibility of 
female sexuality. So she asks: "What birth takes place, is yet to come, between these two 
poles of invisibility?" (Irigaray 1991i, 152). How might we rework the function of "God" for 
the benefit of women? 
In this thesis I have explored some specific aspects of Irigarary's interest in the divine and 
female bodies. I have examined The Book of Margery Kempe for its similar and different 
negotiations of the repression of the feminine in masculine language and for its articulation 
of vision and journey (which appears as pilgrimage in Kempe, both literally and as a passage 
through life to eternity) through the medium of a female body understood in terms of its 
culture as excessive. I have treated aspects of female bodily behaviour which occur on the 
interface between the production of femininity as physical excess in "western" patriarchal 
culture and the excessive representation of the divine, proposing that when the two appear 
together, there is potential for change in the representation of female bodies. In Kempe's case, 
as in the case of Dora, the archetypal female hysteric of Freudian psychoanalysis, this 
potential is umecognised as such; Kempe naturally sees her spiritual endeavours as the means 
of salvation in her culture's terms. In Irigaray, however, the presentation of female excess as 
empowerment, "speaking [always excessively] as a woman," is consciously activated by the 
divine, and re-envisions the Christian notion of salvation through fleshly denial. 
Irigaray claims that "the love of God has often been a haven for women. They are the 
guardians of the religious tradition." She adds that "certain women mystics have been among 
those rare women to achieve real social influence, notably in politics" (Irigaray 1993a, 63). 
Margery Kempe is probably not one of the women Irigaray has in mind here; more politically 
influential figures (such as St Bridget of Sweden and St Catherine of Siena) spring to mind. 
But the love of God was certainly a haven for Kempe, and one which had the effect of 
enabling a material transformation of her life - from inhabiting the home as possession of her 
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nusband, to becoming a visionary pilgrim, a voyager for Christ - which was an embodiment 
of the spiritual transformation that she understood as her salvation. Kempe's spirituality led 
her to enact a particular kind of "becoming" through her Christic imitatio, the sign of her 
( future) sanctified self, in which the boundaries, or threshold, of her body were refigured in 
their excessiveness through mimetic alignment with Christ, as I have explained in the chapter 
and sections on Kempe. This kind of mimetic behaviour is self-consciously elaborated by 
Irigaray, in the manner of a hysteric who strives to make her excess of desire present itself 
in the symbolic through her body. 
lrigaray is strategically hysterical in her postulation of discursive terms which refuse to outlaw 
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the female body. The hysteric has "an inability to conceive of any reality but that of her own 
body" (David-Menard 1989, 127), as we saw in the case of Dora. The process of hysterical 
conversion may be read, with a feminist agenda, as an attempt to reconstitute the female 
body/self through an excessive presentification of female desire, articulated through the body, 
which overwhelms language (David-Menard 1989, 104). And yet hysteria is ultimately a 
paralysed mode of bodily speech, a protest at the limits posed by the symbolic system to 
femininity, which cannot alter the system as such. Irigaray suggests that to read female 
hysteria with attention to its particular logic of desire, its "gestural and lingual...latency," 
might be to move towards the possibility of a future for women, "another mode of 
'production' ... Perhaps as a cultural reserve yet to come?" (Irigaray 1985a, 137): 
The problem of Hspeaking as (a) woman" is precisely that of finding a possible 
continuity between that [hysterical] gestural expression or that speech of desire - which 
at present can only be identified in the form of symptoms and pathology - and a 
language, including a verbal language. There again, one may raise the question 
whether psychoanalysis has not superimposed on the hysterical symptom a code, a 
system of interpretation(s) which fails to correspond to the desire fixed in 
somatizations and in silence .... There is always, in hysteria, both a reserved power and 
a paralyzed power. A power that is always already repressed, by virtue of the 
subordination of feminine desire to phallocratism; a power constrained to silence and 
mimicry, owing to the submission of the "perceptible," of "matter," to the intelligible 
and its discourse (Irigaray 198 Sa, 13 7 -8). 
Yet while Irigaray mImes the body language of hysterics and mystics as part of her 
excessively seductive reworking of femininity, she regards their suffering as signs of a 
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physical alienation which must be overcome. In "Divine Women" she states that "this vocation 
for collaborating in the redemption of the world through suffering and chastity (which is 
viewed as privation) ought not to remain our only destiny, our only horizon, should not 
constitute the only means or path to our fulfillment as women" (Irigaray 1993a, 66. Emphasis 
added). Instead, attention to the body must be combined with a recognition of the need for 
symbolic forms which respect and mediate the female body's reality. In lrigaray, "God" is one 
of the names for this process, which also insistently recalls the transcendent, including 
masculine subjectivity, to flesh: "Keep [the body] in its becoming. Be attentive, not tense. 
Remember, without accumulating or making a profit. A memory open to what is happening. 
Eyes which gaze without a fixed field of vision lt (Irigaray 1992b, 69): 
In order to become, we need some shadowy perception of achievement; not a fixed 
objective, not a One postulated to be immutable but rather a cohesion and a horizon 
that assures us the passage between past and future, the bridge of a present that 
remembers, that is not sheer oblivion and loss, not a crumbling away of existence, a 
failure, simply, to take note (Irigaray 1993a, 67). 
I have called this concluding section ltConclusionIHorizon" because, although this is an 
academic project and must stand on its own merits, I want to claim for it something of the 
contingency and open-endedness that Irigaray articulates through the concept of a divinely 
enabled horizon for the future of female subjectivity. The epigraphs to this summary describe 
a kind of female embodiment which attempts to express a working representation of the self 
through the movement of the body. A woman's (genital) lips "touch each other again" when 
"she moves her whole body"; this is the means of her understanding her experience in a form 
which exceeds the phallic, of attempting to symbolise it specifically, a means which is always 
capable of reformulation since it is constantly mobile: Ita woman is more at a loss when she 
is immobile than when she is moving It (Irigaray 1989c, 136). In the second epigraph, Irigaray 
describes the refiguration of the infinite, which may be understood as (the Christian) God, 
man's transcendental representative. ItLocating myself in my in-finite" is both to extend the 
possibilities for female selfhood and to continually re-embody "God," transforming the notion 
of an extra-subjective, (masculine) transcendent space into a mediation of current, as-yet 
unsymbolised, female bodily experience: "Renouncing the infinitely large" - renouncing God 
instead of the female body as Kempe had to be seen to do - "so that at any moment I can 
349 
experience, move, relate, exchange myself as incomplete .... Never whole in any place. Rather 
the melodious rhythm that makes my measure limitless" (Irigaray 1992b, 85). To refuse the 
desire to be "whole in any place" is to refuse the phallic position, to refuse to become dead 
to the rhythms and vicissitudes of the body in the name of public, singularly authoritative 
speech. This refusal is in fact an embracing of possibility and an openness to intersubjective 
exchange: "The outline engendered between my lips is never once and for all. Reserve, excess, 
source of movement - my lips could never be reduced to subject or object, instrument of use 
or function. Our exchanges? An engendering through rare and always infinite fortune" 
(Irigaray 1992b, 29). 
This is the kind of note I want to strike at the end of my study of Irigaray's visionary 
articulation of connections between female bodiliness and the divine. As I said at the 
beginning, Irigaray is a "visionary" not only in the sense of her utopianism but also in her 
desire to be read and understood by a community of (feminist) women. This desire for a 
(female) response permeates and shapes her work and contributes to its necessary instability, 
its refusal, by and large, to make definitive statements about female experience. Feminist 
politics, depending on a tactically unstable coalition of women of various cultural positionings, 
which aims to make those differences expressible, is the always-contingent (embodied) context 
for Irigaray's bodily visions. It is also, I hope, the wider context for my own work. Thus, 
while this project in its academic orientation must end with a satisfying conclusion, a 
symptom of the linearity of masculinist discourse which Irigaray continually deconstructs, I 
am also, like Irigaray, "concerned to hit the right note without claiming [univocally] to speak 
the truth" (Irigaray 1992b, 85). 
There are many approaches to understanding and refiguring the contradictions of female 
embodiment in a patriarchal world, just as there are a great many ways to read Irigaray. In 
forming my own, "mystically-oriented" response to her work I hope I have produced ideas 
which can be responded to and rearticulated in the context of feminist debate. This is an 
academic thesis, but as feminist, teacher, dancer - as a woman - my desire is to articulate as 
compellingly as possible some consciously open-ended methods of reading "the female body" 
with "the divine" as a means of empowerment, to express the extent of what might be able 
350 
to be individually and specifically "sung now, and not what might be true for all time" 
(Idgaray 1992b, 85). 
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